Director of Public Prosecutions v James (Ruling)

[2023] VCC 2452

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT LATROBE VALLEY

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

Case No. CR-22-00398

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROESCUTIONS

v

WARREN JAMES

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JUDGE:	JUDGE CHAMBERS
WHERE HELD:	Latrobe Valley
DATE OF HEARING:	23 October 2023
DATE OF RULING:	24 October 2023
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v James (Ruling)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2023] VCC 2452

RULING
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Subject:

Catchwords:              

Legislation Cited:      

Cases Cited:

Ruling:  

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the DPP	Mr R Hammill	Office of Public Prosecutions
Victoria
For the Accused	Self-represented

HER HONOUR:

1The accused is charged with assaulting an emergency worker on duty and resisting emergency workers on duty. He intends to plead not guilty to the charges.

2At issue in the trial is the lawfulness of the conduct of police in removing false registration plates from the accused’s Nissan Utility, when it was parked at Longwarry Primary School on 25 June 2020.

3The prosecution relies on s 16 of the Road Safety Act 1986, which is headed ‘Seizure of Number Plates’ and relevantly provides as follows:

(1)… a police officer may take possession of any number plate which the … police officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting –

(a)is being used other than in accordance with this Act and the regulations; or

(b)       was not issued in accordance with this Act and the regulations-

and may retain it until the Secretary is satisfied that it was not being so used and that it was issued in accordance with this Act and the regulations.

4The accused argues that the Road Safety Act is invalid, arguing:

·        that the Road Safety Act was assented to on 23 December 1986  by a fictional character, being the ‘Queen of Australia’;

·        that the Road Safety Act has no application to a ‘free man or woman’;

·        that the ‘statute of monopolies’ precludes VicRoads from acting as a monopoly over matters such as registration and licencing;

·        that without a contract indicating consent, there can be no burden placed on free men and women; and

·        that the Road Safety Act applies to ‘persons’ and that the accused is not a ‘person’ but rather, is created in the image of God, and is entitled to the freedoms given by God.

5In short, the accused argues that he is only subject to ‘common law’ and that State legislation, such as the Road Safety Act and the regulations made under that Act, have no application to him and are invalid.

6This contention has no foundation in law and must be rejected.

7Arguments such as those advanced by the accused have been comprehensively rejected by the Supreme Court of Victoria.

8Relevantly, Justice J Dixon rejected similar arguments regarding the validity of the Road Safety Act 1986 in the case of Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501.

9As to the argument that the accused was able to distinguish himself from a ‘legal person’ who was charged with the offences, Dixon J characterised the argument as ‘misconceived’, stating that the ‘natural and ordinary meaning of ‘person’ where it appears in the Act is ‘a reference to an individual human being’, further stating:

‘It is plainly wrong to assert that a natural person is not subject to statute law, only to common law and the principles of equity. All persons are subject to all law, whether its source be the Constitution, statute or judge made law.’

10As to the argument that the accused is a free man, created by God and not by the State, and that the Commonwealth Constitution does not grant legislative power to Parliament to affect the rights of a free man, a similar argument was also considered and rejected by Dixon J in Stefan v McLachlan, stating ‘such irrelevant matters cannot impugn’ the validity of the Road Safety Act or the jurisdiction of a Court to deal with matters under that Act.

11The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that there is any requirement for a contract or consent to bind a free person, with Dixon J stating:

‘Regulatory schemes legislated by Parliament do not require the consent of every individual for the law to apply to that individual…the ‘consent of Victorian’s to statute law…follows from the election of parliamentarians to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the State and their subsequent exercise of that legislative power’.

12Prior to advancing these arguments, I provided the accused with a copy of the decision in Stefan v McLachlan and the other authorities to which I refer.

13Finally, as to the question of whether the Road Safety Act is invalid by reason of it being assented to in the name of the sovereign, this argument has also been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in Smart v City of Greater Geelong  and in Sill v City of Wodonga, both of which were also provided to the accused.

14These cases stand for the proposition that the Constitution Act 1975 was properly assented to, and hence, s 16 of that Act gives the Parliament of Victoria ‘the power to make laws in and for Victoria in all cases whatsoever’. The Road Safety Act is such a law.

15The Road Safety Act was assented to on 23 December 1986 under the hand of the then Governor of Victoria, J. Davis McCaughey as recorded in Government Gazette 108. It is clear that that the Act was properly assented to. There is no foundation to the accused’s argument. As stated by Byrne J in Smart v City of Wodonga, s 143(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 was enacted to prevent arguments like these being made.

16It is difficult to understand the basis of the accused’s argument that the ‘statute of monopolies’ invalidates the legislation. There is no basis to argue the provisions of the Road Safety Act, are invalid in law or are otherwise contrary to overriding “competition laws”.

17The arguments advanced by the accused are without merit and must be rejected.