Director of Public Prosecutions v HR
[2024] VSC 467
•12 August 2024
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2024 0126
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Prosecution |
| v | |
| HR | Accused |
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JUDGE: | Elliott J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 30 July 2024 |
DATE OF RULING: | 12 August 2024 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Director of Public Prosecutions v HR |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2024] VSC 467 |
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OPEN COURTS – Application for proceeding suppression order – Application made in relation to a child – Whether the child a “complainant” – Whether the child a “witness” – Whether order necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment – Suppression order made – Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic), ss 1, 3, 4, 17, 18.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the prosecution | J Warren | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the accused | N Goodenough | Victoria Legal Aid |
HIS HONOUR:
A. Introduction
The Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Director”) has applied for a proceeding suppression order pursuant to sections 17 and 18(1)(d) and (e) of the Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic) to prevent disclosure in a report of, or information derived from, this proceeding or an earlier Magistrates’ Court proceeding that contains particulars that would be likely to lead to the identification a child.[1] An interim order is presently in place.[2]
[1]The accused was committed for trial in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Melbourne on 5 June 2024, and a proceeding in this court was commenced upon the filing of the notification of committal for trial. An indictment is yet to be filed.
[2]On 28 June 2024, an interim order was made pursuant to s 20 of the Open Courts Act. That order continues to have effect until the hearing and determination of this application or further order. Prior to that, a proceeding suppression order was made by the Magistrates’ Court in May 2023, which order expired upon the commencement of any proceeding in this court.
For the reasons that follow, the Director’s application for a proceeding suppression order will be granted. Accordingly, only scant details of the underlying facts will be given to preserve anonymity.
The accused[3] was charged in early 2023 with the attempted murder of her daughter, who suffers from severe autism spectrum disorder. It is alleged that the accused poisoned both herself and her daughter. The accused told police that she had intended to end her suffering and that of her daughter, amongst others, by taking the drastic steps that she allegedly took.
[3]The accused will not be named. For citation purposes, the pseudonym “HR” has been used.
The defence of mental impairment has been raised in this proceeding. The Director intends to seek a second expert opinion as to the availability of the defence.[4]
[4]It was correctly acknowledged that an application for an order to prevent publication of details that may lead to the identification of the accused’s daughter could not be made under s 75 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) as it is not expected that she will appear or give evidence in the proceeding: see s 75(1)(c) and par 25 below. Also compare Director of Public Prosecutions v EN [2023] VSC 724, [18], [42]-[43].
In substance, the suppression order sought is confined to prohibiting publication of any report of, or information derived from, this proceeding or the earlier Magistrates’ Court proceeding that contains particulars likely to lead to the identification of the accused’s daughter. Counsel for the accused indicated the application for a suppression order was not opposed.[5]
[5]The relevant news media organisations were given notification of the application pursuant to s 11(1) of the Open Courts Act. No organisation appeared to oppose the application.
The central issues were whether the daughter was captured by the relevant provisions of the Open Courts Act, and, if so, whether an order was necessary to avoid causing her undue distress or embarrassment.
A proceeding suppression order will be made substantially in the terms sought, subject to further order. The order will expire 5 years from the date on which it is made,[6] or 12 months after the conclusion of any trial in this court (whether by jury verdict or determination by judge alone) of any and all charges on any indictment filed, whichever occurs first.
[6]Open Courts Act, s 12(3).
B. Background
The accused’s husband, who is the father of the daughter, has provided a statement to police attesting to their daughter’s personal circumstances (who is not their only child).
The daughter attends a specialist school. The numerous and severe symptoms of her condition were expanded upon by the accused’s husband in his statement. He also gave details about the very distressing circumstances in which his family has found itself (including by reason of court proceedings).
He expressed the view that publication of any personal details of his daughter (amongst others) or any details of the incident the subject of the attempted murder charge would destroy her life and exacerbate the many difficulties she already experiences. He also considered that if the relevant circumstances became generally known as a result of exposure in the media, this would cause his family to be isolated from the community.[7]
C. Relevant legislative provisions and principles of statutory interpretation
[7]In order to avoid the risk of identification, the specific details of the family circumstances which underlie this conclusory statement are not included.
C.1 The legislation
Section 1 of the Open Courts Act relevantly provides:
The main purposes of this Act are to—
(aa) recognise and promote the principle that open justice is a fundamental aspect of the Victorian legal system which—
(i) maintains the integrity and impartiality of courts and tribunals; and
(ii) strengthens public confidence in the system of justice;
(a) reform and consolidate provisions for suppression orders relating to information derived from proceedings applicable to the Supreme Court, the County Court, the Magistrates’ Court, the Coroners Court, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and other prescribed courts and tribunals;
…
(c) make general provisions applicable to all suppression orders made pursuant to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and by courts or tribunals under this Act;
…
Section 3 contains a number of definitions, including:
In this Act—
…
“child” means a person under 18 years of age;
…
“family violence offence” means—[8]
[8]Pursuant to s 5(1)(a) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), “family violence” includes behaviour by a person towards a family member of that person if that behaviour is, amongst other things, physically abusive.
(a) an offence where—
(i)the accused is a person who, at the time of the alleged offence, is subject to a family violence intervention order, a family violence safety notice or a non-local [domestic violence order]; and
(ii)the complainant or alleged victim is a person who is protected by the order or notice referred to in subparagraph (i); and
(iii)the conduct comprising the alleged offence, if established, includes conduct by the accused which is a contravention of the order or notice referred to in subparagraph (i); or
(b)an offence where the conduct comprising the alleged offence, if established, constitutes family violence within the meaning of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 by the accused against the complainant or alleged victim and the conduct could reasonably have justified the making of a family violence intervention order or a family violence safety notice applying to the accused and protecting the complainant or alleged victim;
…
“party” to a proceeding includes—
(a)in the case of a criminal proceeding, the complainant or victim or alleged victim;
(b) any person named in evidence given in a proceeding;
(c)in relation to a proceeding that has concluded, a person who was a party to the proceeding before the proceeding concluded;
“proceeding” means a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding;
“proceeding suppression order” means an order made under section 17;
“publish” means disseminate or provide access to the public or a section of the public by any means, including by—
(a)publication in a book, newspaper, magazine or other written publication; or
(b) broadcast by radio or television; or
(c) public exhibition; or
(d) broadcast or electronic communication—
and “publication” must be construed accordingly;
…
“suppression order” means—
(a) a proceeding suppression order;
(b) an interim order;
…
Section 4 provides:
(1) A court or tribunal is to have regard to the primacy of the principle of open justice and the free communication and disclosure of information in determining whether to make a suppression order.
(2) A court or tribunal is only to make a suppression order if satisfied that the specific circumstances of a case make it necessary to override or displace the principle of open justice and the free communication and disclosure of information.
Sections 17 and 18(1) relevantly provide:
17 Court or tribunal may make proceeding suppression order
A court or tribunal on one or more of the grounds specified in section 18 may make a proceeding suppression order to prohibit or restrict the disclosure by publication or otherwise of—
(a) a report of the whole or any part of a proceeding;
(b) any information derived from a proceeding.
18 Grounds for proceeding suppression order
(1) A court or tribunal … may make a proceeding suppression order if satisfied as to one or more of the following grounds—
…
(d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a complainant or witness in any criminal proceeding involving a sexual offence or a family violence offence;
(e) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a child who is a witness in any criminal proceeding;
…
C.2 Relevant principles
In construing a statutory provision, the text is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning, unless a contrary legislative intent is plain.[9] The wording must be considered in context, including by having regard to the legislation as a whole, its purpose and object, and any relevant extrinsic material.[10] A construction of the legislation which promotes its underlying purpose or objective is to be preferred over a construction that does not.[11]
[9]Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554, 572 [26](Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
[10]Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 384 [78]; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408.4 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ).
[11]Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35(a).
Further, if a particular word or phrase is used more than once, then it ought to be given a consistent construction unless a contrary intention is made clear.[12]
[12]Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2023) 299 FCR 604, 637 [130] (O’Bryan J, with whom Moshinsky and Jackman JJ relevantly agreed); Registrar of Titles (WA) v Franzon (1975) 132 CLR 611, 618.6 (Mason J, with whom Barwick CJ and Jacobs J agreed).
D. Issues for determination
Before turning to the issues for determination, it is noted that no application was made under section 18(1)(c) of the Open Courts Act on the grounds that a proceeding suppression order was necessary to protect the daughter’s safety. This was explained on the basis that the Director did not have any expert evidence concerning any psychological harm the daughter might suffer if publication of her personal details or details of the alleged offending were to occur. For various reasons, the Director stated that such evidence was not readily available.
Further, there was no application made for a suppression order or a pseudonym order relying upon the inherent jurisdiction of the court.[13]
[13]See Open Courts Act, ss 5(1) and 29(1).
Instead, the Director’s application was made solely in reliance on the grounds under section 18(1)(d) and (e). For a suppression order to be made on either of those grounds, it was necessary for the Director to establish firstly that the daughter was a “complainant” or a “witness” in a criminal proceeding, and secondly that the order was necessary to avoid causing her undue distress or embarrassment.
D.1 Issue 1: Is the daughter a “complainant”?
D.1.1 Submissions
The Director submitted that the daughter was a “complainant” for the purposes of section 18(1)(d). This was put on the basis that a broad construction of the word should be given, so that it included any alleged victim (whether or not that person had actually made a complaint).
In supporting this position, the accused submitted that the fact that her daughter was severely disabled and therefore incapable of making a formal complaint should not preclude her from benefitting from this statutory protection. However, the accused properly acknowledged that “complainant” ordinarily means a person who has made or lodged a complaint.[14]
[14]See Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (online at 12 August 2024), “complainant” (def 1).
D.1.2 Analysis
In my view, there is no basis for construing “complainant” as including someone who has not made a complaint.
Leaving aside the ordinary meaning of the word,[15] a construction of “complainant” which includes an alleged victim even where that victim had not made a formal complaint would be inconsistent with the way in which those terms are used elsewhere in the Open Courts Act. For example,[16] the definition of “party” includes “in the case of a criminal proceeding, the complainant or victim or alleged victim”.[17] Plainly, these terms have distinct meanings (albeit that, naturally, it is common for a person to be both a complainant and a victim or alleged victim). If the meaning of complainant invariably included the victim or alleged victim of the relevant offending, then it would be unnecessary to refer to these latter terms separately in defining “party” for the purposes of the Open Courts Act.
[15]In a different statutory context, “complainant” has been held to be a person who makes a complaint in a criminal proceeding and not necessarily the person injured by the conduct the subject of the complaint: Potts v Brooks; Ex parte Potts [1983] 2 Qd R 48, 51E (Andrews SPJ, with whom Macrossan and Shepherdson JJ agreed).
[16]See also Open Courts Act, s 3 (definition of “family violence offence”, pars (a)(ii) and (b)).
[17]Ibid, s 3 (definition of “party”, par (a)).
Further, there is nothing about the characteristics of a criminal proceeding to suggest that a victim or alleged victim ought to be considered a complainant even where that person has not made a formal complaint. In criminal proceedings, there may or may not be a complainant. Many proceedings may be commenced and prosecuted without a complaint ever having been made by any person injured or otherwise adversely affected by the conduct constituting the offence.[18]
[18]The obvious example being murder proceedings. Other examples include family violence proceedings which, from time to time, are commenced despite the absence of any formal complaint from the alleged victim.
D.2 Issue 2: Is the daughter a “witness”?
Self-evidently, the prosecution alleges that the daughter bore witness to the alleged offending, namely her mother’s actions in allegedly poisoning her. However, there has been no visual and audio recording of the daughter’s evidence,[19] and she has not given any other form of statement to police. Further, it is not expected she will appear in any trial in this proceeding and the prosecution does not expect to call her as a witness. Consequently, the prosecution acknowledged that there was an issue as to whether the daughter was properly considered a “witness” for the purposes of section 18(1)(d) or (e).
[19]Commonly referred to as a “VARE”.
D.2.1 Submissions
Reference was made to a number of dictionary definitions. These included the Macquarie Dictionary, which lists 5 different definitions for when the word is used as a noun.[20] It was submitted that the ordinary meaning of the word encompassed someone who would not be giving evidence at trial.
[20]Macquarie Dictionary (online at 12 August 2024), “witness” (defs 7-11).
The prosecution further submitted that, although it did not necessarily support the desired outcome, it should be pointed out that the definition of “witness” in the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) includes a reference to a party giving evidence.[21] Although this definition is stated to be inclusive, it was submitted that viewed in combination with sections 12 and 13 of the Evidence Act, there may be a more limited meaning of “witness” for the purpose of proceedings conducted in accordance with that Act.[22] In particular, the use of “witness” in section 13(7) was contrasted with the use of “person” in section 12 and the preceding subsections of section 13. It was submitted that this legislation seemed to indicate that someone who was either competent or otherwise to give evidence on a topic was considered “a person”, and only when evidence “has been given by”[23] someone was that individual “a witness” for the purposes of the Evidence Act.
[21]Evidence Act, sch 2, pt 2, cl 7.
[22]An extensive list of provisions in other Acts in which the word “witness” appears was also provided, however it is unnecessary to descend into the detail.
[23]See Evidence Act, s 13(7).
D.2.2 Analysis
The word “witness” has a number of meanings. In the context of court proceedings, it may be limited to a person who is expected to give evidence or actually gives evidence in a trial.[24]
[24]The meaning of “witness” may be even more confined. By way of illustration, see the limited meaning of “witness” in s 389A(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) for the purposes of Div 1 of Part 8.2A of that Act and contrast it with the broader meaning of “witness” elsewhere in the Criminal Procedure Act: see, for example, ss 43(1)(e), 45(3) and 48(4)(a).
The meaning of witness must be construed as it appears in the phrase “witness in any criminal proceeding” within paragraphs (d) and (e) and in the overall context of the Open Courts Act. Adopting this approach, it appears the words “in any criminal proceeding” were included with the intention of distinguishing criminal proceedings from civil proceedings rather than to seek to narrow the natural and ordinary meaning of witness.[25] The inclusion of these words makes plain that the operation of these paragraphs is confined to criminal proceedings of a particular kind (paragraph (d)) or criminal proceedings more generally: paragraph (e). Such a conclusion is consistent with the explanation given for the inclusion of these paragraphs at the time the Open Courts Bill 2013 (Vic) was introduced to parliament.[26]
[25]There are other examples of a distinction being drawn between civil and criminal proceedings in the Open Courts Act: see ss 3 (definitions of “party” and “proceeding”), 15(1)(b)(ii) and 15(1A)(b)(iii).
[26]The explanatory memorandum records that the grounds that became those set out in s 18(1)(a) to (c) substantially reflected the grounds for making suppression and non-publication orders outlined in the suppression order provisions which existed under individual courts and tribunal Acts. The additional grounds under paragraphs (d) and (e) were provided “to make an order where necessary to avoid undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving family violence, or to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a child who is a witness in a criminal proceeding” (emphasis added): Explanatory Memorandum, Open Courts Bill, 6.7, cl 16.
The natural and ordinary meaning of “witness” when used as a noun is a person who is present or sufficiently proximate and sees, hears, feels or otherwise perceives an act, occurrence or thing.[27] There is nothing in the provisions in question or in the Open Courts Act more generally (including the expressly stated main purposes) that would indicate that “witness” should be given a narrower or different meaning to its natural and ordinary meaning. Further, to give “witness” a narrower or different meaning would have the result that each paragraph could operate capriciously, and contrary to the apparent purpose of each paragraph to provide a level of privacy and discretion in certain types of cases.
[27]In a different statutory context, it has been held that the normal meaning of “witness” is a person who is a spectator of an incident or who is present at an incident: In the Estate of Charles Gibson (decd) [1949] P 434, 436.7 (Pearce J), in determining whether a blind person was a witness to a will.
To elaborate, although open justice is espoused and, to a large extent, enshrined in the Open Courts Act, the introduction of these further bases upon which to make a proceeding suppression order demonstrates that parliament intended to expand upon exceptions to the open justice principle.[28] These further exceptions to the common law align with other statutory provisions that have been introduced in more recent times to enable the preservation of anonymity in proceedings concerning children and charges of sexual assault or family violence,[29] in clear recognition of the added sensitivity and discretion that may be required in such proceedings. This protective purpose would not be properly served if the power to make a proceeding suppression order for the purposes of avoiding causing undue distress or embarrassment were to be limited only to persons who had given evidence, or were to be called to give evidence, in a criminal proceeding.
[28]See John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465, 476G-477B (McHugh JA, with whom Glass JA agreed).
[29]See, for example, Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 534(1); Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), s 166.
A narrower construction of this kind would have the undesirable result that a person who is particularly vulnerable because of their youth or their exposure to sexual assault or family violence may be precluded from obtaining a proceeding suppression order to prevent them experiencing undue distress or embarrassment simply because a decision has been made to conduct a criminal proceeding without that person being called as a witness at trial. Sometimes a person may not be called to give evidence even though her or his testimony is central to the case; for example, where an accused has made a concession which renders it unnecessary to call an otherwise crucial eye-witness, or where an alleged victim or witness suffers from a severe disability which renders them incapable of giving evidence. It would be capricious to interpret section 18(1)(d) and (e) in a way that meant that the power otherwise available to make a proceeding suppression order in respect of such a person would dissipate simply because it was clear at the time of an application that someone who witnessed and suffered from the relevant events was not to be called as a witness at trial.
Accordingly, I consider that the accused’s daughter is properly considered a “witness” within the meaning of paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 18(1) of the Open Courts Act, notwithstanding that it is not intended that she give any evidence in the proceeding.
This conclusion is not displaced by the meaning accorded to “witness” in various provisions of the Evidence Act. It suffices to say that the definition in that Act is non-exhaustive and, as a matter of statutory construction, the enactment of that earlier Act does not impose some restriction on the construction of the meaning of “witness” in the Open Courts Act.
D.3 Issue 3: Is an order necessary to avoid causing the daughter undue distress or embarrassment?
D.3.1 Construction of relevant terms
Both paragraph (d) and (e) of section 18(1) include the phrase “necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment”.
These paragraphs of section 18(1) are not directly concerned with the proper administration of justice or the safety of any person.[30] Nevertheless, by the use of the word “necessary” together with the word “undue”, in the context where a main purpose of the Open Courts Act is to promote the principle of open justice,[31] parliament has made it clear that a strict approach must be taken in determining whether the relevant ground has been made out and that a proceeding suppression order should be made. As has often been observed, necessity in this context is a high bar that is not met simply because an order would be convenient, reasonable or sensible.[32]
[30]See Open Courts Act, s 18(1)(a) and (c).
[31]See ibid, s 1(aa). See also s 4.
[32]Re WD (No 2) [2023] VSC 790, [58]-[61] and the cases there cited.
That said, necessity in this context does not mean it must be established with certainty that the undesired consequence will definitely occur if an order is not made. The exercise involves consideration of a hypothetical scenario and requires consideration of the expected consequences if a future publication were to occur. Although a high level of satisfaction must be present before an order can be properly made, in most cases there will be at least some degree of speculation about if and, if so, the extent to which undue distress or embarrassment would be caused by the foreshadowed disclosure by publication of information derived from a proceeding.
Many cases the subject of court proceedings cause hurt, shame or reputational harm, including because of distress or embarrassment to the parties or to others involved, including witnesses. Although each case must turn on its own facts, the mere existence of distress or embarrassment would not ordinarily be sufficient to attract the operation of section 18(1)(d) or (e) as, in most cases, the distress or embarrassment will not properly be considered “undue”. Accordingly, in addition to the high bar already imposed by the requirement of necessity, any expected distress or embarrassment must be excessive or in some way exceptional.[33] Naturally, this threshold is more readily met if the person for whom the benefit of the order is sought is a child.[34]
[33]See Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v County Court of Victoria [2005] VSC 70, [14] (Byrne J), a case concerned with antecedent legislation, namely, County Court Act 1958 (Vic), ss 80 and 80AA.
[34]Noting the proscription that exists on the identification of a child in any report of a proceeding in the Children’s Court or of a proceeding in any other court arising out of a proceeding in the Children’s Court: see Children, Youth and Families Act, s 534(1). See also Re WD (No 4) [2024] VSC 144, esp at [59].
D.3.2 Analysis
Although there was no relevant medical evidence before the court, the underlying facts the subject of the lay evidence are such that the court has sufficient credible information to be satisfied that the requirement of “undue distress or embarrassment” outlined under section 18(1)(d) and (e) has been established.[35]
[35]In determining an application for a suppression order, the court is not confined to consideration of the evidence adduced and formally admitted, but may also be satisfied based on sufficient credible information (Open Courts Act, s 14), and may rely on inferences which might be drawn from such information, as well as judicial knowledge and experience: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Brady (2015) 252 A Crim R 50, 60 [59]-[60] (Hollingworth J).
The accused’s daughter is a child who suffers from severe autism spectrum disorder. There could be no real controversy that it is highly probable that any report of this proceeding (or the anterior proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court)[36] that included publication of the tragic circumstances of the alleged offending and particulars likely to lead to her identification would cause her undue distress or embarrassment. Further, it appears that such a publication would be highly likely to lead to isolation of the accused’s family from the community. Self-evidently, this would be something that would be most unhelpful, if not harmful, to the daughter’s ongoing treatment and care. Accordingly, it is also highly probable this further consequence would cause her significant distress or embarrassment.
[36]See fn 2 above.
Thus, an order preventing the disclosure by publication of any report of, or information derived from, this proceeding or the earlier Magistrates’ Court proceeding that contains particulars likely to lead to identification of the accused’s daughter is necessary to avoid causing her undue distress or embarrassment. In short, if an order were not made, this risk of such distress or embarrassment eventuating would be materially advanced.[37]
[37]Compare AB v CD (2019) 364 ALR 202, 205-206 [15] (Nettle J).
E. Conclusion
It follows from what is set out above that the accused’s daughter is a “witness” for the purposes of both paragraph (d)[38] and (e) of section 18(1) of the Open Courts Act, and that an order of the type sought is necessary to avoid her experiencing undue distress and embarrassment as a result of the publication of any report of the whole or any part of, or of information derived from, this proceeding or the earlier Magistrates’ Court proceeding that contains particulars that would be likely to lead to her identification.
[38]Self-evidently the alleged offending was a “family violence offence” within par (b) of that definition: see par 12 above.
Accordingly, the application will be granted and a proceeding suppression order will be made substantially in the following terms:
1.Pursuant to section 17 of the Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic), any disclosure by publication or otherwise of any report of the whole or any part of, or of any information derived from, this proceeding or Magistrates’ Court proceeding [details] that contains particulars likely to lead to the identification of [name of child], including, but not limited to:
(1)The address (including street name and suburb), whether current or past, of [name of child];
(2)The name of [name of the accused];
(3)The address (including street name and suburb), whether current or past, of [name of the accused];
(4)The names of any other family members of [name of child], [names of other family members];
(5)The addresses (including street name and suburb), whether current or past, of the family members of [name of child] referred to in paragraph 1(4) above;
(6)The date of birth of [name of child]; and
(7)The date of birth of [name of the accused];
is prohibited.
2.Paragraph 1 of these orders applies to any publication within Australia.
3.Subject to further order, paragraph 1 of these orders has effect until the conclusion of a period of either 5 years from the date of these orders, or 12 months after the conclusion of any trial in this court (whether by jury verdict or determination by judge alone) of any and all charges on any indictment filed, whichever occurs first.
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