Director of Public Prosecutions v Hoppner
[2015] VCC 1389
•25 September 2015
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Case No. CR-14-01451
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| LEANNE HOPPNER |
---
JUDGE: | HER HONOUR JUDGE PULLEN | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 23 September 2015 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 25 September 2015 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Hoppner | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2015] VCC 1389 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
---
Subject:
Catchwords:
Legislation Cited:
Cases Cited:
Sentence:
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Prosecution | Mr M Fisher | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Ms K Churchill | Greg Thomas Lawyers |
HER HONOUR:
1 Leanne Hoppner, you have been found guilty by jury verdict of one charge of criminal damage (Charge 2), one charge of threat to kill (Charge 3) and one charge of aggravated burglary (Charge 5).
2 On Charges 1 and 4, the jury returned verdicts of not guilty.
3 The maximum penalty applicable to the offence of criminal damage is ten years’ imprisonment, threat to kill, ten years' imprisonment, and aggravated burglary 25 years’ imprisonment.
4
These crimes arise out of events which took place in the early hours of
15 November 2013.
5 It is not necessary for me to recount in great detail the facts of this matter, as they were canvassed in detail by both counsel during the course of your trial. It is sufficient for present purposes to simply say the facts in this case, in my opinion, are most serious and disturbing. Your behaviour was obviously quite unacceptable.
6 In this regard, I discussed with your counsel the opportunity you had during the day prior to your offending to desist from continued attendance at the unit where Ms Tartaggia and Ms Hippi were staying. You were not deterred by their repeated protestations that Skye Croucher was not at home.
7 Ms Croucher was a person with whom you had a history of "run ins" over a significant period of time. She quite simply was not at the house when you committed this offending. Your offending also likely, I stress likely, occurred against a background of alcohol consumption by you during the day, evidence of this from Ms Tartaggia at your trial. The jury also heard a 000 call made by you shortly before this offending (Exhibit K). I note as an aside only, that in the report recently received by Corrections officer, Mr Doidge, you reported at the time of this offending, considerable daily consumption of alcohol.
8 The evidence before the jury was you became more and more angry and aggressive towards the occupants of the front unit by the time of your offending.
9 You assumed an assault upon your husband that day was connected in some way to Ms Croucher, although the context of that assault is far from clear to me. There was, however, no suggestion Ms Tartaggia and/or Ms Hippi, the occupants of the front unit, were involved in that incident.
10 Briefly, by way of summary of the charges of which you were found guilty, in relation to the charge of criminal damage, the jury were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt you caused the damage to the security door and also smashed the frosted windows next to the front door of 37A Mitchell Crescent, Meadow Heights.
11 Turning to the charge of threat to kill, the jury accepted you said the words, “You are fucked. I'm going to kill you”, relevant to the victim Bianca Tartaggia, just as or just before you entered the property at 37A Mitchell Crescent.
12 Turning to the charge of aggravated burglary, the jury was satisfied the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt you were the person who entered 37A Mitchell Crescent with the intent to assault a person therein.
13 Regarding the charge of criminal damage, there is no dispute the damage had occurred to the property alleged, the issue before the jury was whether you were the person who caused that damage.
14 Turning to threat to kill, your defence was that if those words were said, they were not said by you to either Ms Hippi or Ms Tartaggia. The jury were satisfied you made a threat to kill Bianca Tartaggia. As I have previously stated, the jury found you not guilty of threatening to kill Ms Hippi.
15 Your defence in relation to Charge 5 was that no one entered the house, but if someone had entered it was not you.
16 By their verdicts, the jury was satisfied the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the three charges that are before me.
17 You pleaded not guilty to these charges which, of course was your right. In the circumstances, I am unable to find you are remorseful for your offending.
18 The victim of your offending has suffered considerably and I shall return to pass some remarks on that later.
19 You have an extensive and relevant criminal history commencing in 1992, appearing on a relatively frequent basis until your most recent prior court appearance in 2012. Your prior criminal history includes, of some relevance, on 7 August 2000 an appearance at Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on a charge of unlawful assault. You were convicted and fined $500. On 22 May 2001 you again appeared at Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on a charge of unlawful assault and received an aggregate sentence, along with other offences, of four months’ imprisonment wholly suspended for 12 months. That suspended sentence was breached.
20 You later appeared at Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court in 2002 on two charges of unlawful assault and were, with conviction, fined an aggregate of $200.
21 On 29 February 2008 at Melbourne Magistrates’ Court, you were sentenced on a charge of unlawful assault and theft from a shop, and received an aggregate sentence of two months' imprisonment suspended for six months.
22 You were then before the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on 21 October 2008, on charges of criminal damage and burglary, amongst other charges, and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of two months' imprisonment wholly suspended for 12 months.
23 Your most recent prior court appearance was at Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court on 27 January 2012 on a charge of unlawful assault, where you were convicted and fined $500.
24 You have a significant number of other prior court appearances and charges effectively relating to dishonesty. Over the years you have received a range of sentencing dispositions, including community-based orders that have been breached and suspended sentences also breached. I note however, this is your first time in custody undergoing sentence.
25 Your counsel both at your plea and trial, Ms Churchill, prepared a number of written submissions for your plea and sentence (Exhibit 1) and addressed those during the course of her oral submissions.
26
Ms Churchill referred to your personal history and circumstances. You are
49 years of age at time of sentence.
27 Ms Churchill referred to your dysfunctional background and childhood trauma, including you having been a victim of incestuous sexual abuse. I note decisions that have referred to family dysfunction when sentencing including Marrah v The Queen[1] and DPP v Terricks & Ors[2].
[1] [2014] VSCA 119
[2] [2009] VSCA 220
28 Whilst such is a relevant sentencing consideration in your case, I must also take into account the entirety of the circumstances of your offending. In my opinion, your background also includes extensive prior convictions which I cannot ignore.
29 Whilst your history of family dysfunction does not result in a significant reduction in the need for general or specific deterrence, in your case some reduction is relevant. Your rehabilitation prospects also cause me concern, independent of your disadvantaged background.
30 You met your husband when you were 12 years of age and commenced dating at 15, and married in 1984. There are four children of the marriage, two sons and two daughters. Your husband suffers with a mental illness and your relationship involved a history of domestic violence. Approximately 13 years ago, your husband was imprisoned for 18 months for an assault upon you, which resulted in you receiving a broken nose, fractured jaw and extensive bruising.
31 Ms Churchill submitted you have fragile mental health and relied upon the report of Ms Gina Cidoni, to which I shall shortly refer.
32 You have been in custody to date for 55 days since the jury verdict on 30 July 2015, up to and including 22 September. This figure needs to be revised, subject to discussion with counsel in a moment. In custody, you have been working and have completed a number of courses. To date you had not obtained a place in a drug and alcohol course, although I understand this was through no fault of yours.
33 Ms Churchill submitted as you are now not consuming alcohol or smoking, you general health had improved in custody, although you suffered pain associated with an ovarian condition. Prior to incarceration you had been prescribed appropriate medication for that, which had unfortunately been reduced by the authorities to Panadol whilst in custody. As a result your pain persisted. I discussed that with your counsel during the course of your plea hearing.
34 Turning to your offending before me, Ms Churchill submitted regarding the charge of aggravated burglary, that it was of short duration, no weapon was involved by you and there was no associated violence. Ms Churchill also submitted there was no further offending by you once inside the premises. She urged that your offending fell towards the lower end of gravity for this type of offending.
35 I discussed with Ms Churchill that whilst your actual offending was of short duration, your involvement with Ms Tartaggia and Ms Hippi had continued for some time over the day and become more aggressive. You would not accept their denials of contact with or the presence of Ms Croucher. In my opinion, your offending does not fall at the lower end of scale of gravity for the offence of aggravated burglary.
36 I discussed with Ms Churchill decisions that have recently considered the offence of aggravated burglary, including Hogarth v The Queen[3] and DPP v Meyers[4]. Whilst there is no doubt there would be other instances of aggravated burglary which fall at the more serious end of the scale of gravity than your offending, I regard your offending as very serious indeed, with both a threat to kill Ms Tartaggia and damage to the door glass panel and door, immediately prior to or at the time of entry. Such was no doubt very frightening to the occupants of the unit, as was apparent in particular in the 000 call made by Ms Tartaggia.
[3] [2012] VSCA 302
[4] [2014] VSCA 314
37 A report from Ms Gina Cidoni, Psychologist, dated 20 August 2015, was tendered. She interviewed you at Dame Phyllis Frost Centre.
38 Ms Cidoni made reference to your prior court appearances, which you described as linked to your heroin and other prescribed medication abuse. Your drug use, you said, had also made your compliance with community and court orders difficult to maintain. Ms Cidoni noted your last court appearance in 2012 for unlawful assault was linked to Skye Croucher.
39 Ms Cidoni set out your background and history. You were born in Melbourne. Your parents separated when you were 5 years of age. You have two brothers. The eldest lives in Queensland and you have irregular telephone contact with him. You have a younger brother with whom you have not had contact for five years. Your sister passed away five years ago at age 46.
40 You described your life as a child as an unhappy one and described having also been sexually abused from ages 4 to 11, as was your sister. You reported that offending when you were 22 years of age, however no further action was taken. Your mother passed away ten years ago from ill health and your father died approximately five years ago.
41 Reference was made in Ms Cidoni’s report to your marriage and relationship with Walter Hoppner. Your husband suffers with schizophrenia, emphysema and liver cirrhosis. He is employed as a car detailer and at the Melbourne Show. In the past, he had psychological admissions due to his psychotic episodes and he relied on medication. You described a history of severe domestic violence towards you when you were 30 years of age, which caused you to separate from him on a number of occasions. Your husband was currently being monitored by family members.
42 You said you had been living at the Meadows Heights unit for about seven years and described your ongoing difficulties with Ms Croucher over the past four years (p3 of Ms Cidoni's report).
43 Turning to your current health issues, you reported ovarian cysts with a forthcoming appointment at the Royal Women’s Hospital. Medical reports relevant to that were before me (Exhibits 3 and 6). In the past, on two occasions you had been admitted to the Royal Melbourne Hospital, as a result of assaults upon you by your husband.
44
In the past, you have experienced depression from a young age and had symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder, following your experience of childhood sexual abuse. You had not had any counselling for that abuse nor any psychiatric care. In the past you had been prescribed
anti-depressant medication.
45 You commenced drug use at age 16 with amphetamines and you used intravenously with your husband. You also used cannabis regularly. You began heroin use in your mid-20s and used for over 13 to 14 years. You also abused prescription medication. You have abused alcohol over the years.
46 In the past, you have been prescribed Suboxone and buprenorphine. You had also completed a drug and alcohol program when previously living in Flemington. You last used heroin approximately two weeks prior to being remanded for these offences, which would place your use of that drug shortly prior to your trial commencing.
47 You attended school to Year 8 at Coburg High School and described yourself as an average achieving student.
48 When you left school, you worked as a machinist for three years. When your children were born, you stayed at home attending to home duties.
49 In the past six years you had worked as a casual for Chance Amusements at carnivals around Victoria.
50 Ms Cidoni undertook psychological testing, which indicated you had a full scale IQ score of 78. The results of Symptom Checklist–90–R was indicative of significant distress, with elevated scores in a number of scales, as outlined at p5 of her report.
51 In the opinion of Ms Cidoni, you presented as operating at a borderline level of intelligence and symptoms of chronic anxiety, PTSD and substance abuse problems.
52 You described various dependencies over the years upon amphetamines, pills, alcohol and heroin.
53 Your assessment findings indicated maladjustment, with symptoms of chronic PTSD and a diagnosis of substance use disorder, with ongoing, albeit less frequent, heroin use and alcoholism.
54
Ms Cidoni concluded, "Evidently, (an interesting term I note) your coping resources and judgment was poor in response to your neighbour's behaviour that resulted in the offending." I find that conclusion somewhat strange, as it is far from clear on the evidence before the jury, what behaviour of your neighbour's, in particular Ms Tartaggia and Ms Hippi, resulted in your offending. The information available to Ms Cidoni that, "The offences, (those before me), involved victims who lived adjacent to you for the past four years, is inconsistent with the evidence in this trial regarding Ms Tartaggia and
Ms Hippi's residence at that house."
55
The possible misunderstanding of the facts in this case was further reflected in Ms Cidoni’s reference to, "Her last appearance was in 2012, for unlawful assault, (linked to the same neighbour victims)." The offending dealt with in 2012, as I said earlier, related to Skye Croucher and not Ms Tartaggia or
Ms Hippi.
56 Your offending, in my opinion, showed you acted purposefully, were angry and aggressive when you committed the offending.
57 In Ms Cidoni’s opinion, you would benefit from psychological treatment and relapse prevention. You also needed to address managing your anger.
58
Ms Churchill submitted the principles in Verdins[5] applied when sentencing you, especially Principles 1 to 6 of the re-statement of the Tsiaris principles.
I discussed this at some length with her.
[5] (2007) 16 VR 269
59 In my opinion, your offending and mental health does not enliven Principles 1 to 4 in Verdins. In my opinion, the necessary "connection" between your offending against Ms Tartaggia and your diagnoses is absent.
60 In my opinion, the material before me in the report of Ms Cidoni falls short of establishing that the effect of your particular conditions justify a reduction in your moral culpability, or a reduction in general and specific deterrence, based on Verdins principles. The material before me does not show a "real connection" between any of your mental conditions and your offending, which would lessen the attribution of moral responsibility for this offending (see Meyers).
61 I also note the evidence of your possible alcohol consumption that day prior to this offending (see Johnston v The Queen[6]). Whilst this is not conclusive, there was as I said, some evidence of you being described as having consumed alcohol (see T.100). The jury, as I have said, also heard a 000 call made by you shortly before your offending occurred, and also I note your acknowledgment of alcohol daily in the recent report.
[6] [2013] VSCA 362
62 In R v Zander[7] Court of Appeal Dodds-Streeton J noted:
“The principles of Verdins do not dictate the automatic mitigation of sentence in an offender, simply because he or she has suffered, or is suffering from a mental illness, however severe. Rather, Verdins requires scrutiny and assessment based on cogent evidence of the relationship between the mental disorder and the offending, and other relevant matters. See paragraph 29.
"In the present case, Her Honour did not adopt a narrow approach to the evidence in the appellant's favour. To the contrary, her approach was liberal and favoured the appellant. The evidence of any causal relationship between the appellant's illness and his offending, moral culpability and other matters, was tentative and slight. Despite its deficiencies, Her Honour accepted that the appellant's condition probably did contribute to the offending and she moderated the sentence on that basis.” See paragraph 30.
[7] [2009] VSCA 10
63
As in Zander, whilst I have not found Principles 1 to 4 of Verdins to be enlivened on the material before me, your mental health, as described by
Ms Cidoni, does enable some moderation of your sentence, as part of the general sentencing principles, albeit not Verdins.
64 Ms Cidoni was of the opinion that due to your emotion/psychological problems, imprisonment would impose a greater burden on you and adversely affect your mental health. In that regard Principles 5 and 6 of Verdins, in my opinion, are enlivened.
65 Also before me was a report from the Royal Women’s Hospital, dated 23 June 2015, from Dr Cebola. It was noted you may require treatment, although such had not, at that time, been positively determined.
66 There was a report from Dr Steven Rome, dated 22 May 2015, who provided details of an ultrasound on that date. Two small cysts were observed and a follow-up ultrasound and/or consultant gynaecologist opinion was recommended.
67 There was a reference from Darrel Brown, dated 18 September 2015, the owner of Brown’s Amusements. He referred to you having been a casual employee of his for the past five years. You were trustworthy and honest and he would continue to employ you.
68 Also before me were three certificates from Kangan Institute of courses, Vocational Pathways, a Certificate III in Cleaning Operations, and a Certificate II in Kitchen Operations, which you have completed recently.
69 Turning to your prospects of rehabilitation, Ms Churchill submitted they were "favourable" and that you would be able to appropriately address your issues in the community. There was also employment available to you.
70 I have, at best, guarded optimism regarding your rehabilitation prospects, noting your extensive prior criminal history, including breaching of court orders. When sentencing you, however, I must seek to maximise your chances of rehabilitation as they may be.
71 I was advised there were no police matters pending and nothing subsequent, which I note.
72 Ms Churchill correctly conceded the offences before me required the need for general deterrence and just punishment.
73 Ms Churchill also conceded she was unable to rely upon your remorse as this matter proceeded to trial, and of course I state, to do so was of course your right. Further, she acknowledged you did have prior convictions for similar offending. I discussed, however, my concern regarding your prior violence-related type offending.
74
The victim of your offending has suffered considerably as a result of it.
Ms Tartaggia referred to your offending impacting on her, already existing PTSD and anxiety. She was very nervous when people walked past her home and she constantly checked doors were locked. She had trouble sleeping, was waking at all noises, big or small.
75 She often thought of your offending and she could have been seriously injured or killed, or lose her baby.
76 She was concerned whilst pregnant that her stress and anxiety as a result of your offending would impact adversely upon her baby.
77 The effects upon a victim are a relevant sentencing consideration (see s5 Sentencing Act 1991). I am conscious, however, I must not allow the effects upon a victim to swamp the sentencing process.
78 Turning to her submission on sentence, Ms Churchill urged that the appropriate disposition would be a term of imprisonment, specifically time served by way pre-sentence detention (at the time of the plea that was 55 days) in combination with a community corrections order. Her secondary submission without abandoning her primary submission, was that a longer term of imprisonment be imposed, together with a community corrections order.
79 In that regard, Ms Churchill relied upon the decision of Boulton & Ors v R[8] and in support of that submission. I discussed with Ms Churchill Boulton and other cases in which it has recently been considered, including DPP v Maxfield[9], Alam v The Queen[10], and Hutchinson v The Queen[11], to name a few.
[8] [2014] VSCA 342
[9] [2015] VSCA 95
[10] [2015] VSCA 48
[11] [2015] VSCA 115
80 I did not understand, however, the decision in Boulton to remove the need to take into account s5 Sentencing Act 1991, nor did I understand Boulton to mean that the principles stated by the superior courts relevant to the seriousness of this type of offending, in particular aggravated burglary, now amount to nought, nor did I understand Boulton to remove the instinctive synthesis when sentencing.
81 It has always been that the court must consider dispositions, other than immediate terms of imprisonment, before concluding that that was the only appropriate disposition in any given case.
82 Mr Fisher, who appeared on behalf of the prosecution, addressed the written and oral submissions of Ms Churchill.
83 Mr Fisher conceded your offending was of short duration, however, referred to your ongoing conduct with your victim throughout the day of your offending. That you were well aware Ms Croucher was not at the house, and that there was no link between the assault upon your husband and either Ms Tartaggia and/or Ms Hippi.
84 Mr Fisher submitted the impact of your offending upon Ms Tartaggia had been profound, referring to her victim impact statement and the 000 call made by her.
85 Mr Fisher submitted that whilst there was no associated violence in your offending, specifically addressing paragraph 3a(iii) of Exhibit 1, your offending nevertheless involved a dramatic entry into the house, with a threat to kill and smashing of glass next to the door as you entered. Your offending, he submitted, fell "to the middle of the scale of gravity." In my opinion, your offending falls just below the middle level of gravity.
86 Addressing paragraph 4(b) Exhibit 1, Mr Fisher submitted the long history of animosity between you and Ms Croucher had nothing to do with your offending, as there was no interchange at all between you and Ms Croucher on this day.
87 Mr Fisher submitted your prospects of rehabilitation were not "favourable", given your prior criminal history and opportunities given to you in the past to address your various issues, which included breaching of court orders. This, as I have said previously, also concerns me.
88 Mr Fisher sought to distinguish the case of DPP v Stanbury[12] from the facts in your case. Ms Churchill sought to rely upon that authority, in particular in relation to paragraph 24.
[12] [2010] VSCA 49
89 It is very difficult comparing cases factually, as circumstances of offending vary case to case, as do matters in mitigation of sentence. I am assisted, however, by the principles stated by the Court of Appeal relevant to particular types of offences and matters relevant when considering specific offences, of course also taking into account all matters personal to you and in mitigation of sentence.
90
Turning to Ms Churchill’s submissions regarding the Verdins principles,
Mr Fisher conceded Principles 5 and 6 applied when sentencing you, however, submitted Principles 1 to 4 of the re-statement of the Tsiaris principles, were not enlivened. I agree, as I have previously state in these reasons.
91 Mr Fisher submitted the seriousness of your offending included that your offending occurred at night, that neither occupant had done anything to you except chat to you that day. Both Ms Tartaggia and Ms Hippi, he submitted, were entitled to be in the unit and to feel safe. I agree.
92 Your offending, he submitted, required both general and specific deterrence, and it does.
93 Mr Fisher submitted Ms Churchill’s primary submission was not within the range of appropriate dispositions.
94 The prosecution submitted a further term of imprisonment, together with a community corrections order would be within the range of appropriate dispositions.
95 However, as well as matters personal to you, to which I have referred, including your prospects of rehabilitation as I find them to be, and I must say they are guarded at best, I must also consider a number of other relevant sentencing considerations.
96 There is the need for general deterrence when sentencing you. General deterrence is an important sentencing consideration in cases such as this, as has been stated in cases including Hogarth and Meyers.
97 There is also a need for specific deterrence when sentencing you, given your extensive, lengthy and relevant prior criminal history. I note, however, not for the same type of offence, that is aggravated burglary.
98 There is also the need to protect the community from you. In this regard I remain concerned.
99 When sentencing you, I take into account principles of totality.
100 I am also called upon by the Sentencing Act 1991 to manifest the community’s denunciation of your conduct, as I have said, and to impose a just punishment.
101 Turning to parity. You and your husband were charged with offences relevant to this property on 15 November 2013. Walter Hoppner pleaded guilty to one charge of criminal damage and was dealt with at Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court on 25 September 2014. That criminal damage related to the lounge room windows that were broken at the home of Ms Croucher. He was convicted and placed on a community correction order for 12 months, with conditions attached. He also had an extensive history.
102 It is clear from the authorities that the parties to the commission of the same offence should receive the same sentence. However, matters such as age, prior criminal history, character and role placed in the offence, are taken into account (see R v Taudevin[13] and Postiglione v The Queen[14]).
[13] [1996] 2 VR 402
[14] (1997) 189 CLR 295
103 In my opinion, the principle of parity does not apply when sentencing you, given the different charges for which you fall to be sentenced from that pleaded to by Mr Hoppner.
104 Mr Hoppner was also sentenced in the Magistrates’ Court, you fall to be sentenced in this court.
105 Following your plea hearing, I called this matter back on for mention. You had, however, at that stage, been returned to Dame Phyllis Frost Centre. In the presence of your counsel, Ms Churchill, and Mr Fisher, I indicated that whilst I had not determined a community correction order would be an appropriate disposition, I was prepared to have you assessed for your suitability or otherwise for such a disposition.
106 I made it clear to Ms Churchill at that mention, that having you assessed would not necessarily mean such a disposition would be imposed, but would rather enable me to have all possible material before me for my consideration. Ms Churchill assured me you would be advised of that mention, because you had gone back to Dame Phyllis Frost when it occurred at about 1.00pm.
107 I have now received that report prepared by Anthony Doidge, which indicates you are suitable, should I determine such is appropriate.
108 I have considered that report, being mindful as I am of Boulton and the changes to sentencing reflected within that and subsequent decisions relating to Boulton. I have, however, determined that to impose a community correction order is not appropriate, and to impose such even with a longer sentence of imprisonment, would be manifestly inadequate.
109 I note in that regard the limitation upon the length of imprisonment I could impose if I proceeded to such an order.
110 When sentencing you, I have taken into account the principle of totality.
111 I sentence you as follows.
112 On Charge 2, you are convicted and sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment.
113 On Charge 3, you are convicted and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.
114 On Charge 5, you are convicted and sentenced to 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
115 Charge 5 is the base sentence and I direct that 3 months of Charge 2, and 5 months of Charge 3 be served cumulatively upon Charge 5.
116 That results in a total effective sentence of 3 years and 2 months’ imprisonment, and I direct you serve a period of 20 months in custody before you are eligible for parole.
117 For completeness only, I do not make a s6AAA declaration, as this matter, of course, proceeded to trial.
118 Pursuant to s18(4) Sentencing Act 1991, I declare you have spent 57 days in custody, up to and including yesterday, 24 September 2015, by way of pre-sentence detention, and I direct that that be entered into the records of the court. I will come back to that extra one day in a moment.
119 Have a seat for the moment please.
120
The prosecution also made application pursuant to s464ZF for a forensic sample. This was not opposed by counsel on your behalf, and I make the order in the terms sought. It will be for a saliva sample, and I make the order on the basis of the seriousness of your offending and your prior convictions.
I must advise you, the authorities may use reasonable force in order to obtain that sample.
121 The prosecution also made an application for a disposal order. This was also not opposed by counsel on your behalf, and I make the order in the terms sought. And I do not think there are any other orders sought.
122 Now, just in relation to this matter, was there a day somewhere, or not?
123 MS HARRIS: No, Your Honour, Ms Hoppner was arrested in the early hours of 15 November and she was bailed the same day.
124 HER HONOUR: Was she? All right.
125 MS HARRIS: Yes.
126 HER HONOUR: No, I just want to make sure. The note here, this police summary, does seem to indicate she was charged, bailed and released after being transported to the station. So the same day.
127 MS HARRIS: Yes, Your Honour, that - - -
128 HIS HONOUR: So it appears there is not that extra day. I just want to be sure. Every day matters, you know?
129 MS HARRIS: Yes, Your Honour.
130 HER HONOUR: If it is there, I would give it to her, but it is not, so. That seems right. Do you agree with that?
131 MS HARRIS: Yes, that seems right, Your Honour, she was bailed that same day.
132 HER HONOUR: All right, so then does that make it a total of 55 days, up to and including yesterday, the - - -
133 MS HARRIS: Fifty-seven.
134 HER HONOUR: Fifty-seven, my apologies.
135 MS HARRIS: Yes, Your Honour.
136 HER HONOUR: Fifty-seven days, up to and including yesterday, which was 24 September 2015. There were no other orders sought. Does anyone want any help with the maths or anything like that? No?
137 COUNSEL: No, Your Honour.
138 HER HONOUR: All right, thank you. All right, thank you. Can you remove Ms Hoppner. Thanks, Ms Hoppner. Can I thank you both.
139 COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honour.
- - - - - -
0
5
0