Director of Public Prosecutions v Ho and anor (Ruling No.20)

Case [2009] VSC 450


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1485 of 2006

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (COMMONWEALTH)
v
KAM TIN HO & ANOR

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JUDGE:

CUMMINS J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

24 June 2009

DATE OF RULING:

24 June 2009

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Ho & anor (Ruling No.20)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2009] VSC 450

Revised 19 October 2009

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Criminal law and procedure – slavery – Criminal Code (Commonwealth) s 270.3(1)(a) and (c) – jury trial – elements of offences.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Director Mr D Gurvich with Mr R Davis Director of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Kam Tin Ho Mr J Dickinson SC Theo Magazis & Associates
For the Accused Ho Kam Ho Mr J Montgomery SC Slades & Parsons
For the Accused Hoo Mr J Bisas Michael J Gleeson & Associates
Pty Ltd
For the Accused Rahardjo Ms S Beech Robert Stary & Associates

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Ruling No 20

HIS HONOUR:

  1. I consider that the present analysis stated on the face of Law Sheet 2 is consonant with the elements as stated in Tang, and I do not propose to alter it.

  1. I do, however, propose to alter Law Sheet 3, Point 4, to change "is" to "can be," because not all "use" is a power attaching to the right of ownership.

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Details
AGLC
Director of Public Prosecutions v Ho and anor (Ruling No.20) [2009] VSC 450
Case
[2009] VSC 450
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The defendants, Ho and another, were charged under section 270.3(1)(a) and (c) of the Criminal Code (Commonwealth) with slavery offences. The Director of Public Prosecutions brought the charges, which were heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute centred on whether the acts alleged constituted slavery and whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on these charges. The legal issues before the court were the interpretation of the slavery offences in section 270.3 of the Criminal Code and the entitlement of the defendant to a jury trial for these offences.

The court first examined the definition of slavery under the Criminal Code, focusing on the elements of sections 270.3(1)(a) and (c). It considered whether the acts alleged by the prosecution met the criteria for slavery, including the exercise of ownership or control over a person for the purposes of exploitation. The court also addressed the issue of the defendant's right to a jury trial, determining whether slavery offences were indictable offences that required such a trial. In interpreting the relevant provisions, the court referred to the plain language of the statute and the legislative intent.

In its reasoning, the court concluded that the acts alleged by the prosecution did indeed constitute slavery as defined by the Criminal Code. The court found that the defendants had exercised a degree of ownership and control over individuals for the purposes of exploitation, satisfying the elements of the offence. Regarding the jury trial, the court held that slavery offences under section 270.3(1)(a) and (c) were indictable offences and therefore required a jury trial. The court's interpretation was based on the statutory language and the broader legislative context.

The final orders of the court affirmed the charges against the defendants and confirmed their entitlement to a jury trial. The court's decision clarified the scope of slavery offences and reinforced the procedural rights of defendants charged with such offences.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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