Director of Public Prosecutions v Hibberd
[2020] VCC 1597
•2 October 2020
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CRIMINAL DIVISION | Revised (Not) Restricted Suitable for Publication |
Case No. 20-00676
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| JACKSON HIBBERD |
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JUDGE: | HER HONOUR JUDGE HAMPEL | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 21 September 2020 (Sentence Indication & Arraignment); 2 October 2020 (Plea) | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 2 October 2020 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Hibberd | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VCC 1597 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Mr A. Grant | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr J. Taaffe | Doogue & George |
HER HONOUR:
1 At about 2:30 in the morning of 19 April 2019, Alex Roszak fell off the back of a utility which was being driven by you, Jackson Hibberd, on a suburban street in Frankston. He struck his head on the road and died shortly after as a result of the head injury he sustained.
2 Alexander Mischa Roszak was only 19 and his future was ahead of him. He was a much loved son and brother. His family are, and remain, grief stricken. In his victim impact statement his father, Sascha Roszak, said:
We are without Alex but it is he who lost the most. He no longer has all of those around him who loved him, who wanted to be with him so much. His life with us is nothing more than memories we all shared with him. He has been taken away with no opportunity, choice or decision; without any say of his own. A life taken and a life never to be returned. For the rest of my life I will mourn the loss of my son Alex.
3 I will refer later to more that Sascha Roszak said and also to things that his mother, Sarah, and his sister, Georgia, said.
4 The night before, Alex had met up with two young women he knew. They spent some time at a hotel and then arranged to go back to your place to relax and watch movies. One of the young women called you and you agreed to pick them up and bring them back to your house. All three of them travelled in the cabin of your ute with you. On the way, the two young women spoke of having previously ridden on the tray of your ute. You stopped by Mr Roszak’s home for him to collect some belongings. Your home was only 550 metres away.
5 You remained inside the ute but the two young women stood outside it while Mr Roszak was inside his house. On his return, the three of them climbed onto the tray of the utility. The tray had no side panels. They crouched down on the tray and held onto the frame at the rear of the cabin. Mr Roszak was closest to the passenger side.
6 You drove off and the three people on the tray half stood, still holding onto the frame. You successfully negotiated a left turn and a speed hump at a narrowed section of the road. You moved closer to the centre of the road to pass a car parked on your left as you approached a second speed hump. This manoeuvre caused the three passengers on the tray of the ute to move left, then right and it was then that Mr Roszak lost his grip and fell onto the road.
7 You heard a bang on the tray and immediately stopped. It was then that you realised that he had fallen off. You immediately tried to render aid and you stayed with him as the police and an ambulance were called.
8 You have now pleaded guilty to one charge of dangerous driving causing the death of Mr Roszak and two charges of reckless conduct placing persons, namely the two young women who were also on the tray as you drove, in danger of serious injury.
9 The penalty for Charge 1, dangerous driving causing death, is a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment, and for Charges 2 and 3, reckless conduct endangering serious injury, is a maximum of five years' imprisonment.
10 Dangerous driving causing death is a Category 2 offence. That means, pursuant to s 5(2H)(e) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), a term of imprisonment without a community correction order made in addition must be imposed unless the offender satisfies the court that there are substantial and compelling reasons that are exceptional and rare that justify not doing so.
11 In the case of Farmer[1] the Court of Appeal confirmed that this is a very high standard and the burden of establishing substantial and compelling reasons that are exceptional and rare is heavy. It is a burden that is not capable of being lightly discharged. It can only be applied in a case that is atypical. The reasons must be forceful. This provision, s 5(2H)(e), is what the Court described as 'a residual category of limited scope'.
[1]Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140.
12 It was been submitted on your behalf that the circumstances of this case justify departure from the imposition of a term of imprisonment not imposed as part of a combination sentence otherwise mandated by s 5(2H)(e).
13 It was common ground between the parties that the assessment of the gravity of an offence of dangerous driving causing death is heavily influenced by an assessment of the moral culpability of the offender and the objective dangerousness of the driving. That requires an analysis of the extent to which the offender should have foreseen the consequences of their driving behaviour. Moral culpability is higher where an offender knowingly takes a risk. Objective dangerousness requires an identification of the extent of the risk that the driving creates and that, in turn, is measured by the likelihood that something will go wrong and the extent to which harm will result if something does.
14 In Neethling[2] the Court of Appeal set out a list of factors which may be relevant to an assessment of the level of risk created by dangerous driving. They are:
[2]DPP v Neethling (2009) 22 VR 466.
· the extent and nature of the injuries inflicted;
· the number of people put at risk;
· the degree of speed;
· the degree of intoxication or substance abuse;
· erratic or aggressive driving;
· competitive driving or showing off;
· the length of the journey during which others were exposed to risk;
· any ignoring of warnings;
· any escape of police pursuit;
· any degree of sleep deprivation; and
· failing to stop.
15 When considering the first two of these Neethling factors it must be borne in mind, first, that it is an element of Charge 1, the most serious charge you face, that the driving caused a death. We are here dealing with a life lost. Assessing the severity, or relative severity of injury, therefore does not, for the purposes of Charge 1, arise. Next, nobody other than the three people on the tray of your ute were placed at risk by your driving. Third, it is the same episode of driving and exactly the same conduct that gives rise to all three charges you face and to which you have pleaded guilty. Although the risk posed to the two young women on the tray did not result in either of them sustaining serious injury, the gravamen of those charges relate to the exposing of those two young women to the risk of sustaining serious injury and that requires the imposition of separate sentences for the risks posed to them.
16 The total distance that you intended to cover was very short; only 550 metres from Mr Roszak's home to yours. You were in a residential area and a 50 km/h zone. It was in the early hours of the morning and there was little, if any, other traffic likely to be in the vicinity, as was in fact the case. Your speed, as determined by the reconstruction experts, was 21 km/h; a little under the estimate you gave the police when interviewed and well below, less than half, the permitted speed. There is no suggestion that you were showing off, driving erratically, or that you were doing any unnecessary or exaggerated swerving or braking. There was no suggestion of aggressive or competitive driving or what might commonly or colloquially be called 'hooning'. You were not impaired by sleepiness, sleep deprivation, drugs or alcohol.
17 You stopped immediately and went to Mr Roszak's aid and rendered what assistance you could. After others arrived at the scene and attended to him you remained at the scene. You identified yourself readily as the driver and, when asked, explained what had happened. You submitted to drug and alcohol testing and gave full and frank answers to questions when interviewed.
18 This is not a case where there was any driving to avoid or escape police pursuit. You did not run away or try to hide. You did not fail to render assistance or do anything to avoid responsibility and accountability for what you had done.
19 It would appear, from the prosecution summary, that the passengers decided to travel on the tray of the ute over that short distance from Mr Roszak's home to yours. Having no side panels, there was no barrier of any sort to prevent anyone or anything from sliding off the edge if a person lost their grip or their balance.
20 There is no evidence that you instigated or were a party to the decision of the others to ride on the back of the ute. Your moral culpability lies in your acquiescing to their decision by driving off. They could not have travelled on the tray of a moving ute if you had refused to drive off with them on that tray. You made, and are responsible, for that decision; the conscious choice to drive off with three people on the tray of a ute without side barriers or anything to stop them sliding off if they lost their grip or their balance.
21 You grew up on a farm. I was told it was commonplace for adults to transport people on the back of the ute, across paddocks, for farm work on that farm. In assessing your moral culpability in acquiescing to the decision of Mr Roszak and the two young women to ride on the tray, I take into account that you did so against that background of childhood exposure to people you regarded as responsible adults driving utes on farms with people on the back tray. I accept Mr Taaffe's submission that, consistently with your childhood exposure to farm utility driving practices of that sort, although you appreciated there was a risk associated with driving with people on the tray of the ute, you had not appreciated the possibility of a fall with the catastrophic consequences that occurred here.
22 This is an important consideration, as the authorities make clear that not only is it necessary to analyse the extent to which the offender should have foreseen the consequences of their driving behaviour, but also to consider whether the offender knew of the risks associated with their driving behaviour.
23 It follows then, from the application of the circumstances of this case to the Neethling factors that I have just done, that there is an absence of the aggravating features which are often present in cases of this type. The objective gravity of the offending is properly to be characterised as at the lowest end of the scale and so too is your moral culpability.
24 Having reached those conclusions in respect of Charge 1 (dangerous driving causing death) it follows that the same conclusions apply to the two offences of reckless conduct endangering serious injury. The circumstances of your driving are the same. The consequences of the driving is not death or the sustaining of injury, but exposure to risk, which, fortunately for the other two people on the back of the ute, did not materialise into serious injury.
25 When determining, for the purposes of s 5(2H)(e), whether there are substantial and compelling reasons that are exceptional and rare which would justify departure from the otherwise mandated imprisonment, s 5(2HC) requires the court to regard general deterrence and denunciation as having greater importance than the other sentencing purposes in s 5(1) of the Sentencing Act and to give less weight to the personal circumstances of the offender than to other matters, such as the nature and gravity of the offence.
26 That general deterrence and denunciation assume greater importance than the other sentencing purposes does not mean that the only way that they can properly be weighted or given effect in any particular case is to impose a term of imprisonment. The carrying of the burden of guilt of taking a life, the stain of conviction and the serving of a sentence in the community, with restrictions and controls over a person’s activity during the time of that sentence, all, in my view, can, in the appropriate case, meet the needs of general deterrence and denunciation, even when, as here, they must be given greater weight than the other sentencing considerations, which must also be taken into account.
27 Young people tempted to drive as you did that night should be given pause for thought by seeing what devastating consequences flow from driving as you did - even where the objective gravity of the offending is low and the moral culpability is low. This case should serve as a powerful reminder to young drivers that they are responsible for the safety of their passengers. They must have the foresight to appreciate the risks that their driving might pose to their passengers, even if the passengers themselves are taking risks. They cannot absolve themselves from responsibility by saying that it is the passengers’ decision. They must have the courage to refuse to drive if they consider their passengers may be at risk.
28 I had already prepared this last passage in my reasons for sentence before reading the victim impact statements of Alex’s mother, Sarah, and his sister, Georgia, and each of them makes, in a very direct and personal way, exactly the same point.
29 Georgia Roszak said:
Not a day goes by when I’m not reminded about Alex
My heart breaks for what Alex has missed out on, but he won’t get to experience… I was meant to go through my life with my brother right beside me but that has been cut short now.
Despite this, despite my grief, I feel sorry for Mr Hibberd. He is having to deal with something no young man should ever have to go through. In the end Alex’s passing, although immensely devastating, is the result of a tragic accident, nothing more, nothing malicious.
30 Sarah Roszak said:
In the early hours of Friday 19 April 2019, I got a knock on my door that no parent ever should have. There stood two police officers…From that moment my life as I knew it changed forever.
That night, and the days that followed, will be etched in my mind always; and shock and sadness will always be with me.
I will never be the same person I was before Good Friday 2019 and I know that I will be affected for the rest of my life.
Even through the pain and grief of the last 17 months, I have always thought of Jackson and how this has affected his life, and what he has gone through. I hope that if anything good can come out of this awful situation, it is that it can teach people that what seemed like harmless fun\, can end in tragic circumstances that can change so many lives in so many ways
31 Alex's father, Sasha, in his victim impact statement, also said:
For me, I can only hope that any sentence passed by the court will be fair and take into account the unmeasurable loss felt for Alexander. He is dearly missed by all. In reality, no penalty will ever change anything for me, as my son is no longer with me.
32 I hope that their grief, their loss and their compassion can serve as a stark reminder, so that the next Jackson Hibberd will say, ‘No, I will not drive away, because I do not want to take the risk of cutting your life short and seeing the grief of those left behind, and carrying the burden of guilt that this Jackson does, and will, for the rest of his life.’
33 You were 21 at the time and are now 22. Young drivers are far too often responsible for acts of dangerous driving which cause death or serious injury, or risk doing so, and this reinforces the need, quite apart from the statutory imperative in s 5(2H), to give weight to denunciation and general deterrence. On the other hand, courts have long recognised that when sentencing a young offender, allowance needs to be made for the underdeveloped insight, judgment and self-control of young people, compared to that of mature adults. In this case, not only was your assessment of the dangerousness of driving with people on the tray affected by your own childhood experiences, youth can also explain why you did not turn your mind to challenging your friends’ decision to ride on the tray or to refuse to drive until they got back into the cabin of the vehicle with you.
34 You do not have a history of rash or uncontrolled behaviour. You grew up in the country and you remained with your mother and siblings after your parents separated. You completed school. You moved to Melbourne after finishing VCAL and you have lived with your father ever since. You are three years into a carpentry apprenticeship. You won Apprentice of the Year in your first year. Although you were recently retrenched as a result of a COVID-19 downturn in work with your employer, you have secured another job; one which will enable you to complete your apprenticeship. That speaks of your competence and your skill and the regard in which you must have been held as an employee apprentice. You have no criminal history and, significantly and relevantly, that includes an unblemished driving record.
35 Your conduct since this tragedy speaks of genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility. You wrote a letter of apology to Alex’s family, acknowledging responsibility. You did so before you were charged. Lawyers either told you, or would have told you had you asked, that this was an admission of responsibility that could have been used against you in court proceedings if you had wanted to challenge the charges. You had the courage and the sense of personal moral responsibility to write and apologise and to accept responsibility for what you had done. The passages that I have read from the victim impact statements indicate to me an acceptance by Alex’s family of the genuineness of your remorse and an understanding of the burden that you carry and will continue to carry as a result of this.
36 Not only do you come before the court as somebody who has not committed any offences before this, in the 17 months or so since the commission of the offences, there is no suggestion you have been involved in any criminal activity. You formed a new relationship after the events and have been frank with your partner and her parents about what you had done and were responsible for.
37 There is, as I have noted, no suggestion that drugs or alcohol played any role in your driving or your decision to drive on the night and there is no suggestion that you have, or have had, any problems with substance abuse.
38 These matters are relevant to your personal circumstances, although I am conscious of the fact that for the purposes of s 5(2H) I cannot rely on them as evidence of good character or as relevant to an assessment of your prospects for rehabilitation. I am also aware that consideration of your personal circumstances carries less weight than general deterrence and denunciation.
39 In addition, s 5(2I) requires the court, in determining whether there are substantial and compelling reasons under s 5(2H)(e), to have regard to Parliament’s intention that a term of imprisonment should ordinarily be imposed and the court must have regard to whether the cumulative impact of the circumstances of the case would justify a departure from such a sentence.
40 In the case of Farmer, to which I have already referred, the Court of Appeal held that, in determining whether there are substantial and compelling reasons that are exceptional and rare, it can be the accumulation of matters, none of them in themselves uncommon, which can compel the conclusion that the otherwise mandatory imprisonment provisions should not apply in a particular case.
41 Bearing in mind Parliament’s intention that imprisonment should ordinarily be imposed for the offence of dangerous driving causing death, I am satisfied that in this case you have established that there are substantial and compelling reasons that are exceptional and rare, which justify imposing a sentence other than a term of imprisonment. In coming to that conclusion, I take into account the combined effect of your low moral culpability, my finding that the objective gravity of the offending is properly to be characterised as at the lowest end of the scale, those personal circumstances which I am permitted to take into account which I have already detailed and my conclusion as to how the predominant needs of general deterrence and denunciation can be served in this case.
42 Having come to that conclusion, I can now turn to consideration of the appropriate sentence for all three charges and, for that purpose, once the hurdle of s 5(2H) is overcome, I can take into account evidence of your good character and your prospects for rehabilitation.
43 As to your good character, impressive testimonials have been provided from your partner, her parents, two mature adult men who have known you since childhood and seen you grow into the young man you are now, and one other mature adult man who has had contact with you in more recent years. Your partner and her parents speak of you in glowing terms. Your partner's parents have set a very high standard for you to continue to live up to.
44 Two of the men who wrote testimonials have had contact with you through your association with the local cricket club. One is the captain, a man with a long and impressive sporting career who has been a lifelong friend of your father’s. He speaks with great insight and balance about the development of young men through sport generally, your development and the way in which you have dealt with your guilt and responsibility for the death of Mr Roszak. He speaks of his knowledge of your father and his assessment of you by reference to your father and his qualities, with an insight and understanding that is compelling. One of the other men who wrote a testimonial is a man who has known you since you were eight and, with his son, plays in a ‘father and son’ team at the club, as do you, and that man spoke of your impressive interaction with his son and the younger boys and the older men in the team. His observations are consistent with those of the other two.
45 The evidence of your personal circumstances, which I have recounted, namely your youth, the absence of previous convictions, your stable upbringing despite parental separation when you were a child, the support of your parents and siblings and your successful completion of school, the success in your apprenticeship to date including managing, in these difficult times, to find alternative employment which will enable you to complete your apprenticeship, the absence of any drug or alcohol abuse, the powerful affirmative evidence of good character in addition to the absence of previous convictions, or subsequent convictions or charges, together with the evidence of your remorse and acceptance of responsibility, all point to your prospects for rehabilitation being very good. All are relevant, therefore, to the importance of ensuring consistency with the statutory mandate – but consistently, for a younger person generally, encouraging rehabilitation as an important sentencing factor.
46
All of these matters are confirmed in the psychological report of
Mr Jeffrey Cummins. Importantly, he finds that there is no mental illness or psychological condition which affected you on the night or which would impede or interfere with that finding of good or very good prospects for rehabilitation. Mr Cummins does recommend that you engage in counselling or psychological treatment to assist you to confront and address the grief and guilt that you feel as a result of your driving on the night. You have tried some counselling but told Mr Cummins you found it too difficult to deal with.
Mr Cummins’ warning that you need to deal with it is one that you should carefully consider.
47
All of these matters strongly support the sentencing submissions made by
Mr Taaffe. That is, that you be sentenced to a community correction order. You have been assessed and found to be suitable. The assessment report recommends supervision, mental health assessment and treatment and participation in programs to address the offending behaviour and I accept all of those recommendations.
48 Although, as I discussed before proceeding to deal with my reasons for sentence, COVID-19 restrictions mean that unpaid community work is at present unavailable as part of a community corrections order, I am including a component of unpaid community work. I was impressed by the evidence of your volunteering at the cricket club. That shows that you have the capacity, commitment and a proven track record of volunteering your time for the benefit of others. Unpaid community work is, in my view, not only an important aspect of a community correction order if it is able to be delivered and performed; it is also punitive and rehabilitative. It enables a person to put back into the community.
49 In the event that circumstances change before the expiry of this order, you will be able to undertake that part of the order. It may well be that the cricket club can make an application for your volunteer work with the cricket club to count, in future, as unpaid community work. If COVID-19 restrictions continue to impact on performance of unpaid community work under a community correction order for the duration of your order, you and Corrections, of course, can apply to have that condition removed.
50 I have directed that any hours that you commit to participation in other programs mandated by the community correction order can be offset against your unpaid community work commitment and the number of hours that I have fixed for unpaid community work is less than the number of hours I would have imposed had it not been for the pandemic. Had unpaid community work been available as it had before the pandemic, I would have imposed a considerable amount of hours that would have required you, probably for the duration of the order, to volunteer some of your time for the benefit of others. But that cannot happen and it does not mean you should not be appropriately sentenced it just means the sentence is to be tailored to note these changing times.
51 That then brings me to the formal sentencing orders.
52 Jackson Hibberd, on the three charges to which you pleaded guilty you are convicted.
53 You are sentenced to a community correction order for a period of three years on Charge 1.
54 On each of Charges 2 and 3, a community correction order which will run concurrently with the order on Charge 1, and that community correction order for Charges 2 and 3 is to run for a period of 12 months.
55 On the three-year community correction order for the dangerous driving causing death charge - and on the other order, running for one year - there are core conditions that apply to all orders. I have also included special conditions in addition to the mandatory core conditions on the three year community corrections order, but, other than supervision, they are not part of the 12 month order. So I will take you through those conditions in a moment.
56 You will know that when you had your assessment you were asked by Corrections about your preparedness to be subject to a community correction order and you indicated that you understood the core conditions of the order and the possible additional conditions that could be imposed and you indicated you were prepared to abide by such conditions.
57 I want to, though, take you through those conditions, and you must advise me whether you are prepared to abide by those conditions before I can impose the order. Do you understand that?
58 OFFENDER: I do, yes.
59 HER HONOUR: Thank you. Right. On the charge of dangerous driving causing death you are sentenced to be placed on a community correction order for a period of three years. That order commences today, 2 October 2020, and ends on 1 October 2023.
60 For the charges of reckless conduct endangering serious injury you are placed on a community correction order for a period of 12 months. That commences today, 2 October 2020, and ends on 1 October 2021.
61 It is a condition of both community correction orders that you must attend at the Frankston Community Correctional Services within two clear working days after the commencement of this order – that means by Tuesday next week. Given COVID-19 restrictions that means not personal attendance but rather a telephone attendance via the number 9784 1444. That will be on the order that you will be provided with.
62 The mandatory terms that apply to both community correction orders are these:
· you must not commit another offence for which you could be imprisoned during the time the orders are in force - and that means just about anything, Mr Hibberd, including major driving offences;
· you must comply with any obligation or requirement prescribed by Regulation 17 of the Sentencing Regulations 2011 that means you must not be unimpaired by substances when you attend on Corrections for anything to do with participation in your order, or attending to programs directed by the order, and you must submit to drug or alcohol testing if directed to do so;
· you must report to and receive visits from the Secretary or delegate;
· you must let the Community Corrections Officer know within two clear working days if you change your address or your job;
· you must not leave Victoria without first getting permission to do so from the Secretary or delegate; and
· you must obey all lawful instructions from and directions of the Secretary or delegate.
63 Once the border is open you can't cross the border, go anywhere in Australia, and you can't fly out of Australia - when people are allowed to do that again - for the duration of the order without getting the permission, in advance, from the Secretary or delegate, and any time you change job or change address you must notify the Secretary or delegate. Do you understand that?
64 OFFENDER: I do, yeah.
65 HER HONOUR: Now, in addition to those core conditions, so far as the three year order is concerned, the following additional conditions apply:
· you must perform 100 hours of unpaid community work over a period of three years, as directed by the regional manager;
· all hours of treatment and rehabilitation satisfactorily undertaken are to be counted as hours of unpaid community work for the purposes of this unpaid community work condition;
· if you fail to comply with the unpaid community work condition, the Secretary to the Department of Justice, or delegate, may give you a direction to perform additional hours of unpaid community work in accordance with s 83AU of the Act;
· you must be under the supervision of a Community Corrections officer for the period of three years;
· you must undergo any mental health assessment and treatment and that may include psychological, neuropsychological, psychiatric or treatment in a hospital or residential facility, as directed by the regional manager; and
· you must participate in programs or courses that are consistent with achieving the purpose of treatment and rehabilitation, and that may include employment, educational, cultural or personal development programs, as directed by the regional manager.
66 Do you understand the effect and conditions of these orders?
67 OFFENDER: Yes.
68 HER HONOUR: And do you consent to them being made?
69 OFFENDER: Yes.
70 HER HONOUR: All right. Given the circumstances in which I am sentencing today, I'll clearly note that you have given your verbal indication of your understanding of the effect of the conditions of the order and your verbal consent to it. You may be required to sign a document evidencing that later, but you must understand, Mr Hibberd, that your verbal consent is binding upon you, and if you do not abide by the conditions of the order then you can be brought back to be dealt with for breach of the order.
71 If you breach the order by non-compliance you can be brought back and dealt with, and if you breach the order by committing further offences then you would be brought back before me to be dealt with and it may well be open to cancel the order and to resentence you for these original offences. Do you understand all of that?
72 OFFENDER: Yes.
73 HER HONOUR: And it's with those additional explanations I've given you that you indicate that you consent to the orders being made. Yes?
74 OFFENDER: Yes, sorry.
75 HER HONOUR: I declare, pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act that, had you not pleaded guilty to these charges, I would have sentenced you to a term of imprisonment, rather than a community correction order, and that would have been a total effective sentence of four years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two.
76 By law, I am required to cancel all licences held by you and to disqualify you from obtaining any further licences for a minimum period of 18 months in respect of Charge 1. I do not propose, in the circumstances, to increase that period of disqualification beyond the mandatory minimum, but all licences are cancelled and you are thereby disqualified for a period of 18 months from obtaining a further licence. I must warn you that driving whilst disqualified is an offence punishable by imprisonment, Mr Hibberd.
77 OFFENDER: Yeah.
78 HER HONOUR: You will remember that in terms of the community correction orders that you have now been placed upon.
79 I hope that you can do justice to the extraordinary compassion, forgiveness and understanding of Mr Roszak's family by abiding by the conditions of the orders, by not committing any further offences and by never coming back in front of me or another court again. You owe it to Alex and to his family.
80 OFFENDER: Yep.
81 HER HONOUR: Any further orders that are required to be made?
82 MR GRANT: No, thank you, your Honour. No.
83 MR TAAFFE: No, your Honour.
84
HER HONOUR: Can I thank you, Mr Grant and Mr Taaffe, for your assistance, and can I thank you again - Mr Roszak, Ms Roszak and
Ms Roszak - for your dignity, your understanding, and your compassion. I hope that your path through your grief continues and you will be able to treasure the memory of your son and brother as time goes on, as you are doing. It is clear that there are lovely memories of the lovely young man that he was. That continues, despite his death, and I hope, as time goes on, you will be able to focus more on that than on your loss. Thank you.
85 MR ROSZAK: Thank you, your Honour.
86 MS G. ROSZAK: Thank you, your Honour.
87 HER HONOUR: Thank you. We'll now adjourn.
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