Reported Decision:
59 NSWLR 9
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Director of Public Prosecutions v Harney [2003] NSWCA 350 HEARING DATE(S): 17 November 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
17 November 2003JUDGMENT OF: Meagher JA at 18; Giles JA at 1; Ipp JA at 19 DECISION: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed. Orders one, two, three, four, five and ten in the Notice of Appeal. Remit the matter to the District Court for any further orders if that is necessary. The respondent to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act. CATCHWORDS: Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th) - loss of superannuation benefits if convicted of a "corruption offence" - relevantly meant that commission of offence involved an abuse of the offender's office as an employee - offender was employed by Australia Post at a parcel centre - stole articles in the course of post from the parcel centre - abuse did not mean a corrupt use - was abuse of office as employee. PARTIES :
Director of Public Prosecutions - Claimant
John Norris Harney - OpponentFILE NUMBER(S): CA CA 40177/03 COUNSEL: T Muir - Claimant
T Molomby SC & B Vasic - OpponentSOLICITORS: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions - Claimant
Kerrison, The Law Firm, Camden - Opponent
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC (Crim Div) 01/11/0083 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Backhouse DCJ
CA 40177/03
Monday 17 November 2003MEAGHER JA
GILES JA
IPP JA
1 GILES JA: This application for leave to appeal has been heard as an appeal on full submissions, so that if leave to appeal be granted the appeal can immediately be decided. The issue is whether the judge correctly held that the offence of which the opponent was convicted was not a “corruption offence” within the meaning of the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (“the Act”).
2 The opponent was employed with Australia Post at the South Parcel Centre, Kingsgrove from July 1989. In January 2000 he became senior parcel officer and supervisor on the night shift. For about a year prior to the detection of his activities in October 2000 he stole articles in the course of post, particularly coins and Franklin Mint merchandise but also CD’s, cassettes, watches, books, computer software and a set of golf clubs. The opponent placed small articles in his lunch bag, and placed large articles in the day shift supervisor’s office and then took them as he left work. He was aware that he was not entitled to take articles from the post.
3 After his activities were detected the opponent pleaded guilty to charges of stealing articles in the course of post contrary to s 85K(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1914. He was convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment with a recognisance release order of 18 months.
4 The Act provides for application for the making of a “superannuation order”. Application may be made in respect of a person who…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWCA 350
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was to determine the correct interpretation of "corruption offence" under the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether the commission of an offence by an employee, involving an abuse of their office, necessarily required proof of a "corrupt use" of that office, or if the mere abuse of the employee's office was sufficient to satisfy the definition.
The Court of Appeal, comprising Meagher, Giles and Ipp JJA, reasoned that the Act did not require proof of a corrupt use of office, but rather that the commission of the offence involved an abuse of the offender's office as an employee. Applying this interpretation to the facts, the Court found that Mr Harney's theft of articles in the course of his employment at the Australia Post parcel centre constituted an abuse of his office as an employee, thereby falling within the definition of a "corruption offence" under the Act.
Consequently, leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed. The Court made orders reflecting this decision and remitted the matter to the District Court for any necessary further orders. The respondent was also granted a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed. Orders one, two, three, four, five and ten in the Notice of Appeal. Remit the matter to the District Court for any further orders if that is necessary. The respondent to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act.
Background
Background to the litigation
The respondent appealed against the decision of the District Court to forfeit his superannuation benefits, arguing that his conduct did not amount to an abuse of his office as an employee, and therefore did not constitute a corruption offence. The appeal was heard by the Supreme Court, which allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the District Court for any further orders if necessary. The Court held that the relevant meaning of "abuse of office" in the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th) did not include a corrupt use, but rather referred to an abuse of the offender's office as an employee. The Court found that the respondent's conduct did not amount to an abuse of his office as an employee, and therefore did not constitute a corruption offence for the purposes of the Act. The Court also held that the Director of Public Prosecutions was not entitled to a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act, as the appeal was not frivolous or vexatious.
The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Harney originated in the District Court of New South Wales where the respondent, Harney, was convicted of stealing articles from a parcel centre where he was employed by Australia Post. The conviction led to the loss of his superannuation benefits under the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th), which stipulates that such benefits can be forfeited if the convicted offence is a "corruption offence". The respondent appealed the District Court's decision to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, arguing that his actions, while a misuse of his position, did not constitute an abuse of his office as an employee, and thus, should not be considered a corruption offence. The Court of Criminal Appeal considered the appeal and subsequently made an order granting leave to appeal. Following the hearing of the appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's actions did not involve an abuse of his office as an employee in the context required by the legislation. The Court further ordered that the matter be remitted to the District Court for any further orders if necessary and mandated that the respondent be issued with a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the offence of stealing articles in the course of post from the parcel centre constituted an "abuse of office" for the purposes of the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th).
2. If the offence did constitute an "abuse of office," whether the offence was also a "corruption offence" under the Act.
3. Whether the Director of Public Prosecutions' interpretation of "corruption offence" as involving a corrupt use is accurate.
4. If the interpretation of "corruption offence" is incorrect, whether the respondent is entitled to retain their superannuation benefits.
5. Whether the trial judge correctly applied the relevant statutory provisions and principles of statutory interpretation in the primary decision.
Held
1. The court held that the offence of stealing articles in the course of post from the parcel centre constituted an "abuse of office" for the purposes of the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th). As a result, the appeal was allowed on this point.
2. The court held that even if the offence constituted an "abuse of office," it did not necessarily mean it was a "corruption offence" under the Act. Therefore, the appeal was allowed on this point.
3. The court held that the Director of Public Prosecutions' interpretation of "corruption offence" as involving a corrupt use was not accurate. As a result, the appeal was allowed on this point.
4. Given the incorrect interpretation of "corruption offence," the court held that the respondent was entitled to retain their superannuation benefits. The appeal was allowed on this point.
5. The court held that the trial judge did not correctly apply the relevant statutory provisions and principles of statutory interpretation in the primary decision. Consequently, the appeal was allowed on this point.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Harney, the Federal Court addressed the interpretation of the term "corruption offence" under the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th). The court's reasoning focused on whether the offence committed by the respondent, which involved stealing articles from the post while employed at a parcel centre, constituted an "abuse of office." If so, the court further examined whether such an offence qualified as a "corruption offence" within the meaning of the Act, and consequently, if the Director of Public Prosecutions' (DPP) interpretation of "corruption offence" was accurate. Finally, the court considered whether the trial judge correctly applied statutory provisions and principles of statutory interpretation.
The court began by examining whether the respondent's offence constituted an "abuse of office." It held that "abuse of office" does not necessarily equate to a corrupt use of office. Instead, it means the misuse of the office as an employee. Given that the respondent was entrusted with handling parcels and used this position to steal items from the post, the court found this to be an abuse of office. The court relied on the ordinary meaning of the words and the context in which they were used, aligning with the principles of statutory interpretation that require a plain meaning reading unless the language is ambiguous or unreasonable.
Next, the court assessed whether the abuse of office constituted a "corruption offence." It clarified that a "corruption offence" involves an abuse of office but not necessarily a corrupt use of office. The court emphasized that the statutory language does not require a corrupt intent or use. Instead, any significant misuse of the office is sufficient. This interpretation aligned with the broader legislative intent to penalise misuse of public or employment positions. The court distinguished this from prior cases that required a corrupt use, affirming that the abuse of office alone was sufficient to qualify as a "corruption offence."
The court then scrutinized the DPP's interpretation of "corruption offence" as involving a corrupt use. It concluded that this interpretation was too narrow. The statutory language and context did not support the requirement of a corrupt use. Instead, the court adhered to the broader definition of "abuse of office," finding that the DPP's interpretation was incorrect. This decision aligned with the plain meaning of the statutory language and the legislative intent to penalise misuse of office positions.
Following this, the court considered whether the respondent was entitled to retain their superannuation benefits given the incorrect interpretation of "corruption offence." Given that the court found the DPP's interpretation too restrictive, it held that the respondent's offence did not qualify as a "corruption offence" under the correct interpretation. Consequently, the respondent was not entitled to retain their superannuation benefits.
Finally, the court examined whether the trial judge correctly applied the relevant statutory provisions and principles of statutory interpretation. It found that the trial judge had misconstrued the meaning of "corruption offence" by requiring a corrupt use. The court held that the trial judge should have interpreted the term more broadly, focusing on the abuse of office rather than a corrupt use. The court's interpretation adhered to the principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing the importance of a plain meaning reading and legislative intent.
In conclusion, the court granted the appeal, allowing the orders specified in the Notice of Appeal. It remitted the matter to the District Court for any necessary further orders and ordered that the respondent receive a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that an offence constitutes a "corruption offence" under the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (C'th) if it involves an abuse of office as an employee, without requiring a corrupt use of office. The court departed from prior authority that required a corrupt use, instead adopting a broader interpretation that aligns with the statutory language and legislative intent.