SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2020 0166
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| ESHAN HANSEN (A PSEUDONYM) |
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| JUDGES: | MAXWELL P, PRIEST and T FORREST JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 16 October 2020 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 1 December 2020 |
| ORIGINATING PROCESS: | Case stated, Tinney J, Supreme Court of Victoria, 26 August 2020 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSCA 307 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Case stated - Referred questions of law – Complicity - Statutory murder – Act of violence causing death – Fatal act committed ‘in the course or furtherance’ of crime of violence (foundational offence) – Accused participated in foundational offence – Co-offender committed act of violence causing death – Co-offender charged with common law murder - Accused charged with statutory murder as secondary party - Statutory complicity provisions – Necessary to prove that accused ‘involved in’ statutory murder - Whether sufficient to prove accused’s involvement in foundational offence – Necessary also to prove accused’s awareness of probability that s 3A murder would be committed — Questions answered accordingly — DPP v Perry (2016) 50 VR 686; [2016] VSCA 152, Duca v The Queen [2020] VSCA 209 considered — Crimes Act 1958 ss 3A, 323, 324, Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 302.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Ms K Churchill with Ms A Roodenburg | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr M Gumbleton with Ms C Dwyer | Emma Turnbull Lawyers |
MAXWELL P
T FORREST JA:
Summary
At common law, a person (A) who by deliberate act causes the death of another person (B) is only guilty of the offence of murder if the act is done with the intention to kill B or cause B really serious injury. By contrast, a person can be found guilty of murder under s 3A of the Crimes Act 1958 (the ‘Act’) without proof of any such intention, where the death is caused by an act of violence done ‘in the course or furtherance’ of a crime of violence (as defined).
Liability for murder under s 3A — ‘statutory murder’ — thus depends on proof of a nexus between the act causing death and the crime of violence, the existence of which is the precondition of liability. In this context, the crime of violence is conventionally referred to as ‘the foundational offence’.
In the present case, the accused, Eshan Hansen[1] (‘EH’), is alleged to have agreed with his two co-accused, Adam Bitar[2] (‘Bitar’) and Haidar Odom[3] (‘Odom’), to commit the offence of intentionally cause injury using baseball bats. Their intended victim was Marius Kato[4] (‘Kato’). The Crown case is that, in the course of the commission of the offence of causing injury, Bitar shot and killed Kato.
[1]A pseudonym.
[2]A pseudonym.
[3]A pseudonym.
[4]A pseudonym.
Bitar is charged with common law murder. The case against EH, however, is that the killing of Kato amounted to statutory murder. That is, Kato’s death was the result of an act of violence (by Bitar)…
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- Case
- [2020] VSCA 307
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court was tasked with interpreting the statutory complicity provisions, specifically focusing on whether it was necessary to prove that Hansen was 'involved in' the statutory murder or if it was sufficient to show that he was involved in the foundational offence. Additionally, the Court needed to determine whether it was necessary to establish that Hansen was aware of the probability that statutory murder would be committed during the foundational offence. These questions were pivotal in understanding the extent of Hansen's liability for the statutory murder charge.
In arriving at its decision, the Court examined the statutory provisions and relevant case law, including DPP v Perry and Duca v The Queen. The Court found that it was necessary to prove Hansen's involvement in the statutory murder, not merely his involvement in the foundational offence. This meant that it was not sufficient to establish his participation in the foundational offence; there also needed to be proof of his awareness of the probability that statutory murder would be committed during the commission of that offence. This interpretation was consistent with the principles outlined in the cited cases and the legislative intent behind the statutory complicity provisions.
The Court answered the referred questions accordingly, providing clarity on the legal standards required for establishing complicity in statutory murder. The final orders were made in accordance with the Court's findings, ensuring that Hansen's charge and potential conviction were based on a correct understanding of the statutory requirements.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the court following a case stated under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The Director of Public Prosecutions referred questions of law to the court regarding the interpretation and application of the statutory complicity provisions in relation to statutory murder. This referral followed the accused's challenge to the charge, arguing that proving his involvement in the foundational offence was sufficient and that it was unnecessary to prove his awareness of the probability that statutory murder would be committed. Prior to this referral, Hansen's case was heard in the lower court, where the charge of statutory murder was upheld.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether it is necessary to prove that the accused was aware of the probability that statutory murder would be committed, in addition to proving their involvement in the foundational offence, under the statutory complicity provisions.
2. How the court should interpret and apply the statutory complicity provisions in relation to statutory murder, considering the foundational offence and the act of violence causing death.
Held
1. The court held that it is not necessary to prove that the accused was aware of the probability that statutory murder would be committed, in addition to proving their involvement in the foundational offence, under the statutory complicity provisions.
2. The court held that the statutory complicity provisions should be interpreted and applied in relation to statutory murder by considering the foundational offence and the act of violence causing death, as well as the context and circumstances of the case. The court found that the accused's involvement in the foundational offence was sufficient to support a charge of statutory murder as a secondary party.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Victorian Court of Appeal considered the issue of whether it is necessary to prove that an accused was aware of the probability that statutory murder would be committed, in addition to proving their involvement in the foundational offence, under the statutory complicity provisions. The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and the case law, including DPP v Perry and Duca v The Queen. The court found that the statutory provisions do not require proof of awareness of the probability of statutory murder, as long as the accused is involved in the foundational offence and the fatal act was committed in the course or furtherance of that offence. The court emphasised the importance of considering the context and circumstances of each case when applying the statutory complicity provisions. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that it is not necessary to prove awareness of the probability of statutory murder, in addition to involvement in the foundational offence, under the statutory complicity provisions. This decision clarifies the scope of the statutory complicity provisions and provides guidance to courts in applying these provisions in cases involving statutory murder.