Director of Public Prosecutions v Grigson

Case

[2025] VCC 1523

16 October 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

Revised

Not Restricted

Suitable for Publication

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

CR-25-00294

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

v

COBY GRIGSON

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JUDGE:

HER HONOUR JUDGE ENGLISH

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

2 September 2025

DATE OF SENTENCE:

16 October 2025

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Grigson

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2025] VCC 1523

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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Subject:  CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING

Catchwords:  Aggravated offence of recklessly exposing an emergency

worker to risk by driving – Causing injury recklessly – Theft –

Possession of a drug of dependence

Legislation Cited:           Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 10A, 18, 73, 317AF(I) – Drugs Poisons

and Controlled Substances 1981 (Vic) ss 73 – Road Safety Act

1986 ss 30(1) – Sentencing Act 1991 ss 5(2H), 16(3D), 63

Cases Cited:                   Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235;

Azzopardi v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43; R v Verdins (2007) 16

VR 269; R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; Hutchinson v the Queen

[2022] VSCA 235; DPP v Taylor [2020] VCC 1594; DPP v Jackson

[2021] VCC 165; DPP v Yilmaz [2023] VCC 767; DPP v Keirl

[2025] VCC 554; Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 145 ALR 408; R

v Garcia [2007] VSCA 194; Vu v The Queen [2020] VSCA 59 [52].

Sentence:  Two years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 months.

Fine of $500. Driver licence cancellation and disqualification for two

years.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel

Solicitors

For the DPP

Ms S. Fetherstonhaugh (at plea)

Ms O. Stevenson (at sentence)

Director of Public Prosecutions

For the Accused

Mr W. Hart

Stary Norton Halphen

HER HONOUR:

1Coby Grigson, you have pleaded guilty to the following charges:  

·One charge of the aggravated offence of recklessly exposing Purvesh Desai, an emergency worker on duty, to risk by driving on 19 October 2024 and the motor vehicle driven was stolen, contrary to section 317AF(I) of the Crimes Act 1958 which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment.

·One charge of recklessly cause injury to Luke Dean on 19 October 2024, contrary to section 18 of the Crimes Act1958 which carries a maximum of five years' imprisonment, but as the victim was an emergency worker, carries a mandatory minimum penalty of six months' imprisonment.

·One charge of theft of car on 19 October 2024, contrary to section 73 of the Crimes Act, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment.  

·One charge of possession of drug of dependence on 20 October 2024, contrary to section 73 of the Drugs Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 which carries a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment, or 30 penalty units, or both.

2You have also pleaded guilty to one related summary charge, namely, summary Charge 8 of drive whilst disqualified, contrary to section 30(1) of the Road Safety Act1986 which carries a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment or 240 penalty units or both. 

Circumstance of offending

3The prosecution tendered a summary of the prosecution opening on your plea which sets out the agreed facts of your offending and I sentence you on the basis of the facts as set out there. 

4Your offending arose from events which occurred on Friday, 18 October 2024 and Saturday, 19 October 2024. In brief they were as follows. 

5On Friday 18 October 2024 Ms Sandra Tole parked her grey 2022 Mazda CX9 outside her home in Point Cook.  Ms Tole returned at approximately 12.30 pm on Saturday 19 October 2024 and noticed her vehicle was no longer parked where she had left it. 

6Ms Tole took CCTV footage to police. It was identified you had stolen this vehicle and this constitutes Charge 3, theft of motor vehicle.

7At approximately 12.55 pm on Saturday, 19 October 2024 police officers Constable Luke Dean and First Constable Purvesh Desai were driving east on Sneydes Road, Point Cook.  They were in a marked police vehicle and Constable Dean was driving. 

8Constable Dean noticed at the intersection of Sneydes Road and Boardwalk Boulevard a dark grey Mazda CX9 stationary in the far right turning lane, approximately three car lengths from the intersection with no vehicles in front of it. It did not have its indicator or hazard lights on. Other vehicles were slowly overtaking it.

9Constable Dean assumed the vehicle was broken down and drove slowly past and looked into the open window.  He observed you seated in the driver's seat and a female in her mid-20s in the front passenger seat, both with your heads down with your chins on your chests. 

10Constable Dean activated the vehicle's emergency lights, performed a
U-turn over the median strip and pulled up in front of the Mazda CX9. Both Constable Dean and First Constable Desai activated their body-worn cameras as they exited the police vehicle. 

11Constable Desai placed ‘stop sticks’ under the passenger wheels of the Mazda.

12Constable Dean then moved to the driver's side window and observed you both to be unconscious, the engine running and the vehicle was in gear. Constable Dean noticed that the vehicle had a ‘button start’ and he could not see any keys. 

13Constable Dean radioed despatch and read the registration of the vehicle. Whilst he was doing this, First Constable Desai reached in and opened the driver's door.  First Constable Desai held you by the right arm and pulled you out of the vehicle. At this time First Constable Desai recognised you, as he had seen internal police circulars for your whereabouts. As he was pulling you out of the vehicle, you tried to pull his arm back. Constable Dean then went to assist First Constable Desai in detaining you.

14Constable Dean and First Constable Desai told you to ‘get on the ground’.  You then yelled that you needed an ambulance and that you will get on the ground.  But you did not get on the ground and rather continued to struggle against both officers.

15Whilst putting his arm around your neck Constable Dean attempted to take your legs out from under you but was unsuccessful.  At some stage during the scuffle it is assumed the female seated in the front passenger seat woke up and ran from the vehicle, although neither officer specifically recalls this.

16During the wrestle you re-entered the vehicle and sat in the driver's seat and both officers yelled at you to get out of the car.

17You then placed the Mazda into drive and accelerated forward into the rear of the police vehicle. 

18The front number plate from the Mazda CX9 was dislodged as a result and fell onto the ground. You then put the vehicle into reverse and accelerated backwards.  This constitutes Charge 1, aggravated offence of recklessly exposing an emergency worker to risk by driving.

19As you then reversed the driver's door was still open. The door struck Constable Dean and he fell to the ground.  Constable Dean then felt the vehicle drive over both legs as you reversed. This constitutes Charge 2, reckless cause injury.

20You then drove in reverse approximately 30 metres along Sneydes Road before driving over a median strip, completing a U-turn and then driving east along Sneydes Road. 

21At approximately 8.00 am on Sunday 20 October 2024 Detective Constable Nixon, Detective Constable Hollander and Detective Acting Sergeant Howe attended your mother's address at Campaspe Way, Point Cook. Police located you in your bedroom and you were arrested and cautioned.

22A search revealed a small vial containing a clear liquid in the front left, front pocket of your pants which police believed to be 1,4-Butanediol. This constitutes Charge 4 of possess a drug of dependence. 

23You were taken to the Werribee police station where you were deemed unfit for interview.

24Enquiries with VicRoads revealed your authority to drive in Victoria was cancelled and you were disqualified from driving for six months from 29 May 24 to 29 November 2024 and this constitutes summary Charge 8 of drive whilst disqualified.

Objective gravity of offending

25Charge 1 which is a charge of recklessly exposing an emergency worker to risk by driving is an aggravated offence, the maximum penalty is 10 years' imprisonment. It is an aggravated offence because you were driving in a stolen car. It is a category 2 offence and in accordance with section 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act the court must impose a term of imprisonment. It was submitted by your counsel that no substantial and compelling circumstances under section 5(2H)(e) are applicable. In accordance with section 16(3D) of the Sentencing Act the term of imprisonment imposed unless otherwise directed by the court, is to be served cumulatively on any uncompleted sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment imposed either before or at the same time as that term.  Your counsel submitted there are good reasons in your case to impose concurrency.

26Charge 2 under section 18 of the Crimes Act of recklessly cause injury requires a mandatory custodial sentence of not less than six months in the case of an adult offender and where the victim is an emergency worker, unless the court finds a special reason exists under s10A. It was submitted by your counsel that no special reason exists.

27Your offending is objectively serious for the following reasons:

You were driving whilst disqualified;

You were on a community corrections order at the time of your offending; and

You were passed out in the car you were driving from the use of GHB in the middle of the day on busy street with your car blocking the right hand turning lane.

28I take into account the maximum penalty for each charge as detailed above.

Personal circumstances

29Your background was outlined in submissions from your counsel and from a psychological report by Dr Mathew Barth. 

30You were 21 years old at the time of offending and recently turned 22.  You are the middle of three children born to your parents. You were raised in Hoppers Crossing and then later in Point Cook where your family still lives.

31Your mother has been a constant in your life and remains a strong source of care and support and I understand she is on the video link watching this sentence. 

32Your father used alcohol and cannabis heavily.  He was verbally and physically abusive to you and other members of your family and your father was intimidatory towards you from an early age. 

33Your older sister also used drugs and alcohol from a young age and was involved in the Youth Justice system.

34You started drinking and smoking cannabis by the age of 12. These activities were normalised and were regularly observed by you during your upbringing.  At a similar time your father suffered a significant brain aneurism and your mother is his carer. 

35Child Protection was regularly involved with your family and although you were never taken from home, into your later years as the use of drugs and physical altercations escalated you would often abscond resulting in homelessness or couch surfing during this period.

36Your education was significantly disrupted.  You received suspensions.  You were disciplined and presented with emotional and behavioural difficulties from a very young age. 

37You had no meaningful education since the beginning of Year 7. Your middle and later teenage ages were characterised by unstable accommodation, association with negative peers, substance use and poor mental health.

38Since your teenage years you have regularly used substances. Dr Matthew Barth has diagnosed a stimulant use disorder at a severe level.

39Your substance use escalated when you left school and began absconding from the family home. 

40Your drug use progressed from GHB, methamphetamines, heroin, cocaine and non-prescribed prescription medications.

41Intoxication has been a significant feature of your prior offending. 

42Hospital admissions on 9 June 2024 and 10 August 2024, tendered by your counsel demonstrate the extent of your drug use in close proximity to the offending before the court.  The use was at a manifestly severe level.[1]

[1]      Werribee Mercy Hospital, ED Clinical Sheets, dated 6 June 2024 & 10 August 2024.

43You have engaged briefly in employment within the community infrequently and for short periods of time, mainly in roof tiling. 

Report by psychologist Dr Mathew Barth

44Your Counsel tendered a report by psychologist Mathew Barth dated 20 August 2025. You report to Dr Barth you are sad and angry due to the turbulence in your upbringing.[2] And that you often felt rejected and resentful due to your father's abusive behaviour.

[2]      Psychologist Report by Dr Mathew Barth, [5].

45You reported to Dr Barth having experienced periods of depression, anxiety and despair which culminated in suicide ideation and Dr Barth identified current depressive and anxiety related symptoms of mild intensity. 

46You were diagnosed with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder and prescribed Ritalin as a child.[3] 

[3]      Psychologist Report by Dr Mathew Barth, [4].

47Dr Barth diagnosed you with ‘conduct disorder’ during childhood and that your maladaptive personality traits are intensely problematic and meet the DSM-5 criteria for an ‘anti-social personality disorder’. His opinion is that you display entrenched anti-social traits and a propensity for emotional reactions, erratic mood and poor decision making. This has traced to instability in childhood and early exposure to drug use and violence. 

48He stated:

'Mr Grigson's behaviour became significantly more disinhibited in the context of his substance addiction and his immersion with anti-social associates.  Compound matters, he is poor at identifying and regulating his emotional reactions to personal stressors and experiences a rapid escalation to erratic behaviour when he feels challenged or overwhelmed.  Therefore, Mr Grigson's ability to manage life stressors is poor.'[4]

[4]      Psychologist Report by Dr Mathew Barth, [7].

49He stated your anti-social personality disorder, cognitive skills and severe substance use have significantly impacted your ability to make rational decisions and exercise appropriate judgment. The offending which brings you before the court is a key case in point.

50He went on to note even the significant impacts of this disorder on your decision making is not sufficiently severe to have obscured your ability to form the requisite of intent to commit the offending or prohibit you from understanding the likely consequences of your behaviour.[5]

[5]      Psychologist Report by Dr Mathew Barth, [7].

51Dr Barth also diagnosed you with severe stimulant disorder. 

52Counsel submits you ruminate on aspects of your childhood and dysfunctional upbringing. Your mental health conditions and impaired function appear – at least to some extent – to be derivative of your child abuse and trauma.

53Abuse of illicit substances have been a coping mechanism for you.  You have attempted to overdose on at least one occasion resulting in hospital admission.

54You have been trialled on anti-depressant medication, Zoloft, without positive results. You are currently on the methadone treatment while remanded in custody. 

55You have reported a stable mood on remand.  You are abstinent from substances at the present, and exercise regularly, and have worked in the timber industry while on remand. 

56Your Counsel describes when not in protective custody and able to work on remand, you have expressed enjoyment for your employment in that environment. You have aspirations to obtain employment upon release and you enjoy hands-on work.

Submissions

57The prosecution submits the principal sentencing purposes are general and specific deterrence, denunciation and rehabilitation.

58The prosecution submit that a head sentence with a non-parole period is within the permissible range of the circumstances of this case. 

59The prosecution accepts the principles of Bugmy apply,[6] given your difficult upbringing.

[6]      Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 (‘Bugmy’).

60The prosecution accepts the relevance of the principles in the cases of Mills and Azzopardi with respect to your youth.[7]

[7]      R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235 (‘Mills’); Azzopardi v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43 (‘Azzopardi’).

61The prosecutor disputed the application of the first limb of Verdins on the basis there is an insufficient nexus between your anti-social personality traits and your offending,[8] although it was conceded it was relevant to the general circumstances of your offending. 

[8]      R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 (‘Verdins’).

62The prosecution noted aggravating features of your offending.  Firstly, your confusion when roused by police submitting that you did have time to acquiesce to the directions but did not. Secondly, the incident, on a public road in the middle of the day exposed other road users to risk.

63You have prior convictions and were on a CCO at the time of offending. 

64It is conceded you have pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.

65You have 361 days of pre-sentence detention not including today's date.

66With respect to section 16(3D) of the Sentencing Act the prosecution accepted that the offences were inherently entwined and the one act exposed Officer Desai to risk and caused injury to Officer Dean. The prosecution noted that there is a presumption of cumulation. In terms of structuring the sentence, Charge 2 carries the mandatory six months' imprisonment.

67Your defence counsel submitted a term of imprisonment is necessitated by your offending and submitted a substantially lower than usual non-parole period should be imposed. It was submitted this would allow you to return to the community in the near future with supervision treatment and support. 

68Your Counsel submitted given the nature of your offending, denunciation, deterrence and just punishment play a role in the sentencing synthesis. It was submitted that relevant to assessing the object gravity of your offending was the extremely short time frame within which the exposure to risk by driving occurred and that your conduct was spontaneous and not premeditated. Counsel submitted the offending occurred in the chaos of you waking up, which was less than a minute and the offending was spontaneous and short.  This is relevant to assessing the seriousness of the incident.

69Your counsel also submitted that because of the entwined nature of Charges 1 and 2 arising from the same conduct. He distinguished the factual scenario in the case of Hutchinson.[9] In your case the same conduct has resulted in two separate charges and this particular factual matrix and the principle of totality justifies a departure from the presumption of cumulation that applies to Charge 1 by virtue of section 63 of the Sentencing Act.

[9]      Hutchinson v the Queen [2022] VSCA 235.

70He noted you have lost consciousness due to your drug use and you woke up from sleep induced by excessive GHB use. Records from Werribee Hospital show your drug use at the time was severe. 

71Your counsel submitted you awoke, drug-affected and panicked, which is in contrast to other cases.  Your offending was not part of a larger pattern of dangerous driving or swerving towards another vehicle. The single act of drive posed the risk in the one charge to Officer Desai and the reckless injury in Charge 2 to Officer Dean.

72He submitted your moral culpability is lowered with respect to the spontaneous decision to escape arrest and reversing the car because of your drug use and impaired rational decision making.  Other contributors are your age and background, but also in connection with the impaired mental functioning identified by Dr Barth.

73In respect of your youth, counsel relied on the principles in the cases of Mills and Azzopardi and with respect of your deprived childhood, the principles of Bugmy applied.

74Your counsel also submitted that Verdins limb 1 applied. He submitted your impairment, namely your anti-social personality, was connected with the offending. He cites Dr Barth that your anti-social personality disorder includes impulsive decision-making and being poor at identifying and regulating your emotional reactions to personal stressors.

75Counsel submitted the convergence of Bugmy and Verdins considerations given the overlap between childhood deprivation, substance use and offending behaviour are relevant to reducing your moral culpability.

76He did not rely on your severe disorder in respect of his Verdins submissions.

Sentencing considerations

77I turn to the principle sentencing purposes in this case, which are general and specific deterrence, punishment as well as rehabilitation and protection of the community.

78I have noted earlier factors which contribute to the gravity of your offending.

79I now turn to the factors in section 5(2) of the Sentencing Act to which I must have regard. 

80The defence has referred me to a number of cases which reflects current sentencing practices, although none are none are on ‘all fours’ with your offending. 

81In Hutchinson v The Queen,[10] the appellant was 21 years old and the charges were recklessly exposing an emergency worker to risk by driving, damaging an emergency service vehicle, recklessly causing injury and dangerous driving. The conduct was more protracted over a longer period and whereby the applicant appeared to be suicidal, filled a jerry can with petrol and a pursuit ensued on the Princes Freeway which was terminated because of his driving and resulted in a charge of dangerous driving. He ultimately collided with a police car and the police officer involved was struck by his own car and thrown three to four metres, suffering fractures and abrasions. On appeal the appellant was re-sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with a 24-month non-parole period.

[10]     Hutchinson v the Queen [2022] VSCA 235.

82In contrast your offending was of short compass, you were roused from an unconscious stupor and panicked. 

83In the cases of DPP v Taylor,[11] DPP v Jackson,[12] DPP v Yilmaz,[13] and DPP v Keirl,[14] I find that they are less comparable as in those cases the impugned conduct was much more protracted and those cases did not involve injury charges. I take into account current sentencing practices as part of the instinctive in synthesis of sentencing.

[11]     DPP v Taylor [2020] VCC 1594.

[12]     DPP v Jackson [2021] VCC 165.

[13]     DPP v Yilmaz [2023] VCC 767.

[14]     DPP v Keirl [2025] VCC 554.

84I turn to your culpability and degree of responsibility for the offences. 

85Whilst your Counsel did not rely on your severe stimulant disorder as part of the Verdins submission, your drug-taking was acknowledged as the reason you passed out in the car from overuse of the drug GHB.[15] 

[15]     Defence submissions on sentence [36]

86Dr Barth diagnosed you with an anti-social personality disorder which was connected with your offending insofar as features include impulsive decision making and being poor at identifying regulating emotional reactions to personal stresses. I accept the circumstances of the offending, namely, your arousal from a drug-induced stupor and erratic behaviour, is indicative of irrational decision making, a feature of that disorder which reduced your ability to exercise appropriate judgment and make calm, rational choices.  This connection to your offending is different to the ability to form intent or understand consequences and I accept that Verdins limb 1 applies to moderate your moral culpability.

87I also accept the principles of Bugmy are relevant to the weight I give your moral culpability. 

88I accept your childhood was a deprived one marked by your father's alcohol and drug use. He was violent towards your mother, yourself and your siblings.  You started drinking and smoking cannabis with him when you were 12. This indicates a complete abrogation by your father of his responsibility as a parent to act protectively. No doubt this contributed to you being unable to commence or complete your secondary school. As such I have moderated the weight I give to general and specific deterrence which is reflected in the sentence I impose. 

89I have read the victim impact statements.  Your actions have had a profound impact on the two police officers involved.  They thought they were going to assist a stranded road user.  The incident quickly escalated and became a charged, dynamic and dangerous situation which has had significant and long-term consequences for both officers. These consequences include a loss of confidence and trust in people in their approach and outlook and their relationship with the world. 

90I take into account your early plea of guilty and I give full weight to its utilitarian value to the justice system in not requiring the time and resources involved in a trial by jury and calling of witnesses. 

91I also accept your plea of guilty expresses your remorse. You have also so reported this to Dr Barth noted in his paragraph [31] of his report.

92I take into account your personal circumstances. 

93I also take into consideration the principles outlined in the authorities applicable to you as an immature young offender lacking insight, judgment and self-control.  At your age there is still the potential for you to be rehabilitated and it is in the community's interests for you to be so. In a youthful offender rehabilitation is usually given greater weight than general deterrence.

94However, you are not a first offender nor is this your first appearance in the adult jurisdiction.  You have relevant prior convictions including for theft of motor vehicle, possession of drugs, driving whilst disqualified and resist an emergency worker on duty.  In the past you have been sentenced to imprisonment and placed on a community corrections order and you were on a community corrections order when this offending occurred.

95Your prospects for rehabilitation appeared guarded given your opportunities to complete community-based rehabilitation have not been successful.  Dr Barth in his report outlines intensive treatment necessary for your rehabilitation, some of which you may be able to commit to in the controlled environment of custody.  Your counsel submitted that whilst in custody you have been working and exercising and I take into account your youth and prospects for rehabilitation in setting a non-parole period.

96In your case taking into account the relevant submissions, Charge 1 requires a period of imprisonment to be imposed.

97Charge 2 requires a mandatory period of jail to be imposed of not less than six months. 

98Section 16(3D) provides that the sentence against section 317AF(1)(a) (Charge 1) must, unless otherwise directed by the court, be served cumulatively on any sentence imposed at the same time as that term.

99Your counsel has submitted I should moderate the extent of cumulation I give to Charge 1.  

100Your counsel submitted, accepted by the prosecution, that the two charges of 1 and 2 are inextricably entwined in the same incident. The one incident exposed police officer Desai to a risk to his safety and also recklessly caused injury to police officer Dean.

101I note that where a single act reflects separate harms, as is here, against different people, each may be punished separately even when linked by time and place.  I can impose a separate sentence for each charge which has a different element to reflect the separate criminality that they involved. There are two separate victims from the single episode given rise to the two offences on the indictment. 

102The defence submitted that the principles of totality apply, which requires the sentencing of an offender for multiple offences to ensure that the aggregate term imposed is a ‘just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved’.[16] This principle is not displaced by the operation of section 16(3D). The defence submitted the presumption of cumulation should be moderated to reflect the factual matrix.

[16]     Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 145 ALR 408.

103In Garcia,[17] the Court of Appeal held that, in that case, which related to section 16(3C) of the Sentencing Act, it does not more than negate the presumption of concurrency and does not displace relevant sentencing principles, in particular the principle of totality.[18]  When considering the sentence imposed by the court below, the Court of Appeal stated the court correctly imposed individual sentences on the second presentment to be served concurrently with each other ‘given they necessarily arose from the same set of circumstances in view of the principles of totality’.

[17]     R v Garcia [2007] VSCA 194, [18] (‘Garcia’).

[18]     Garcia, [18].

104The Court of Appeal[19] has indicated a preference for sentences to reflect the sentencing principles of totality and proportionality through the moderation of orders for cumulation

[19]     Vu v The Queen [2020] VSCA 59 [52].

105Given the two offences arise from the one act, in order to impose an appropriate total sentence consistent with the principles of totality I will moderate the mandatory cumulation provision that applies to Charge 1. As such, in accordance with section 16(3D) I otherwise direct that no cumulation be served with respect of Charge 1.

Sentence

106Coby Grigson, I sentence you as follows:

Charge

Offence

Maximum

Sentence

1

Aggravated offence of recklessly exposing an emergency worker to risk by driving contrary to section 317AF(1) of the Crimes Act 1958

10 years imprisonment

24 months

2

Recklessly cause injury contrary to section 18 of the Crimes Act 1958

5 years imprisonment

12 months

3

Theft contrary to section 73 of the Crimes Act 1958

10 years imprisonment

6 months

4

Possession of a drug of dependence contrary to section 73 of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981

1 year imprisonment or 30 penalty unites or both

$500 Fine

Summary Charge 8

drive whilst disqualified contrary to section 30(1) of the Road Safety Act 1986

2 years imprisonment or 240 penalty units or both

2 months

Total Effective Sentence:

Two years with a non-parole period of 16 months

Pre-Sentence detention declaration pursuant to s 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991:

361 days reckoned as served

6AAA Statement:

Four years with a non-parole period of three years

Driver Licence cancellation and disqualification:

Charge 1 all licences held by you are cancelled and you are disqualified from driving for two years.

107A forfeiture order for 1-4 Butanediol was subsequently sought by the prosecution and consented to by defence. This order was made administratively in Chambers on 21 October 2025 and reflected in the amended sentence.

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Cases Citing This Decision

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Cases Cited

13

Statutory Material Cited

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Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37
R v McGaffin [2010] SASCFC 22
Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372