Director of Public Prosecutions v Gill

Case

[2025] ACTSC 124

25 March 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:  DPP v Gill
Citation:  [2025] ACTSC 124
Hearing Date:  25 March 2025
Decision Date:  31 March 2025
Before:  Christensen AJ
Decision:  See [61]

Catchwords: 

CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – drive motor vehicle

without consent – drive motor vehicle at police – aggravated dangerous driving – use number plate not properly issued for vehicle – repeat offender – reduction in sentence for plea of guilty – some remorse and insight into offending – no leniency available

with reference to criminal history – unstable accommodation –
whether drug and alcohol treatment order suitable and

appropriate – likelihood of severe substance use disorder – offender of older age and maturity – offender has not had previous opportunity for intensive supervision in community – treatment order provides ‘wrap-around’ support – treatment order imposed

Legislation Cited:  Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 29A
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 12A, 80M, 80T, 80S
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 318
Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) s 32
Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999
(ACT) s 7
Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) 1999 Act (ACT) s 22
Cases Cited:  DPP v Allred [2023] ACTSC 184
DPP v Djerke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341
R v Crawford (a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 166
R v Rowlands (No 2); DPP v Rowlands [2024] ACTSC 143
R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152
Parties:  Director of Public Prosecutions
Barry Gill (Offender)
Representation:  Counsel
E Bayliss; G Meikle (DPP)
J Masters (Offender)
Solicitors

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Peter Agoth & Associates (Offender)

File Numbers:  SCC 186, 187 of 2024
CHRISTENSEN AJ: 
Introduction 
1․  Barry Gill is to be sentenced with respect to a number of driving offences committed on
14 January 2024. The charges involved are:
Drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code 2002

(ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or

both (CAN 2024/4382);

- Drive motor vehicle at police contrary to s 29A of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes
Act), carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment (CAN 2024/4380);
- Aggravated dangerous driving (repeat offender) contrary to s 7(1)(b) of the Road
Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), carrying a maximum
penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/4379). An
automatic minimum 12 month period of licence disqualification applies;
- Drive while disqualified (repeat offender) contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Road Transport
(Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 1 year
imprisonment, 100 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/5977). An automatic minimum
24 month period of licence disqualification applies; and
- Using a numberplate which is not properly issued for the vehicle, contrary to s 22 of
the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) 1999 Act (ACT), carrying a maximum
penalty of a fine of 20 penalty units (CAN 2024/4383).
2․ Mr Gill accepts that periods of imprisonment are warranted to reflect the seriousness of
his offending. He seeks that the term to be imposed be served by way of a drug and
alcohol treatment order (treatment order): s 12A Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT)
(Sentencing Act). The prosecution does not oppose the imposition of such an order,
per se, but caution that Mr Gill may not demonstrate the commitment to rehabilitation
that a treatment order requires.
3․ ACT Health Services have found Mr Gill suitable for a treatment order, having regard to
his established substance dependency, and the role this has in his offending behaviour.
A therapeutically recommended treatment program is available for him. ACT Corrective
Services find Mr Gill not suitable for a treatment order, with reference to his history of
noncompliance with community based orders.
4․ It is trite that the Court’s decision as to whether to impose a treatment order is not
determined by the assessments, but with reference to the considerations provided in

ss 12A, 80T and 80S of the Sentencing Act. Having considered those matters, I am satisfied that Mr Gill is eligible for a treatment order, and such an order is an appropriate

and suitable one for him. The reasons for this conclusion follow.

The offending

Background

5․ On 3 July 2023, Mr Gill was served with a Court Attendance Notice that required him to
attend court with respect to minor driving offences. Mr Gill did not attend court as
required and a warrant came to be issued for his arrest on 6 December 2023.
6․ Between the hours of 12:00pm on 18 December 2023 and 12:00pm on 9 January 2024,
a burglary occurred at an address in Pearce. During the burglary, keys belonging to a
white Volkswagen Polo (the Polo) were taken from inside of the premises and the Polo
was taken from the driveway of the residence.

Agreed facts

7․ On Sunday 14 January 2024 at about 5:30pm, police were called to the Amaroo Playing
fields in relation to a group of five people drinking and making a bong in a vehicle. This
vehicle was later identified as the Polo taken following the burglary in Pearce. When
police arrived at the fields, checks ascertained that the number plate on the Polo was
not the correct one, and that the plate belonged to a vehicle located in Evatt.
8․ The six people were near to the Polo. When police approached, four of the people
rushed into the Polo. Police activated emergency lights and parked their vehicle near
the Polo. The police officers got out of their vehicle and yelled at the driver to stop several
times. The driver of the Polo was later identified to be Mr Gill.
9․ Mr Gill reversed the Polo and nearly hit the front passenger side of the police vehicle,
where police were standing. The police feared they would be struck by the Polo and
moved backwards away from the police vehicle. The police continued to yell “stop”,
before the Polo commenced driving forward.
10․ Police immediately turned the police vehicle around and commenced following the Polo.
The police emergency lights and sirens were activated, but the Polo did not stop for
police.
11․ A pursuit was not commenced due to the manner in which Mr Gill was driving, being on
the wrong side of the road, travelling at high speeds (estimated to be 100 km/h), and
switching between the correct and incorrect side of the road. This was driving along
Horse Park Drive towards the Taylor area, with a medium level of traffic.
12․ Police returned to the fields and located and identified the two males who did not get into
the Polo. They provided information as to who the driver and passengers of the Polo
were.
13․ Police commenced a search for the Polo and received information that it was at an
address in the Belconnen area that belonged to one of the passengers. Police attended
at the location. On arrival, the Polo was observed to exit the location at high speed.
14․ Shortly after, police commenced a search of the Belconnen area and located two of the
passengers from the Polo. Police were informed that they had been dropped off by Mr
Gill, that they were not aware that the Polo was stolen, and that they were not aware
where Mr Gill was travelling to. Police continued their search for the Polo without
success.
15․ On 16 March 2024 at about 10pm police attended at an address in Dunlop as they
suspected Mr Gill to be staying there. An occupant of the premises informed police that
no one else was present, and consent to search the premises was provided. Police
entered and located Mr Gill curled up in the rear back seat of a vehicle in the garage. He
was arrested.
16․ There is no information provided as to whether any others allegedly involved with the
stolen vehicle were charged, and I infer from this that there is no application of the parity
principle in the sentencing exercise.
17․ At the time of Mr Gill’s driving on 14 January 2024, he was a disqualified driver. The
agreed facts provide that his licence was disqualified by the ACT Magistrates Court on
25 March 2008, being an order for disqualification for a period of 1 year on 25 March
2008 and continuing until further order of the Court.

Assessment

18․ The most serious of the offending was clearly the driving at the police officers. Any
offending of this type warrants a stern sentence that particularly reflects the sentencing
purposes of denunciation, deterrence, and accountability. The driving of a vehicle, even
in a reckless manner, that puts the safety and welfare of police at risk is not to be
tolerated. Police officers are entitled to expect that they can undertake their duties
without such risks to their safety.
19․ In this matter, the safety of two police officers was put at risk. While it appears the driving
at the time was brief and involved a low speed, it was driving done with a deliberate
intention to ignore the police requests to stop, and it appears that it was only the police

officer’s actions that ensured they were not struck with the vehicle. There is a high degree of recklessness in the offender’s conduct, and it involved the greater objective

seriousness of driving ‘at’ the police officers.
20․ The manner in which the drive at police offence occurred appears to me to not be
factually comparative with the authorities provided by the prosecution for the purposes
of current sentencing practice: R v Rowlands (No 2); DPP v Rowlands [2024] ACTSC
143 and DPP v Allred [2023] ACTSC 184; R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152; R v Crawford
(a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 166. These authorities, in which higher speeds and
different circumstances were involved, resulted in sentences ranging from 36 months
(before reduction for a plea of guilty) to 13 months (reduction for plea of guilty not
specified). Here, the offending has the aggravating feature that the police officers were
outside of the vehicle at the time they were driven at, but it does not have the aggravating
feature of high speeds.
21․ The duration and distance of the driving of the stolen vehicle is not specified in the facts.
It appears that the aggravated driving was within one suburb, and that the driving of the
stolen vehicle was across multiple suburbs. Mr Gill had possession of, and drove, the
stolen vehicle for a relatively lengthy period. It is apparent that either directly, or
indirectly, Mr Gill’s involvement in the vehicle had a role in it being unavailable to the
owners for a lengthy period of time, and that the vehicle was damaged. The manner in
which Mr Gill and his associates were using the vehicle before police arrived
demonstrates the complete disregard he had for the valuable property of another
community member.
22․ During the driving, Mr Gill drove with passengers in the vehicle. His driving commenced
with the statutorily aggravated aspect that he is a repeat offender, and that he failed to
stop for police. He maintained this failure to stop and engaged in a determined police
pursuit. It is inherently serious that he drove the vehicle deliberately to avoid police
detection, putting police officers, his passengers, and other road users at risk. He drove
in a manner that involved other forms of aggravation, being the high speeds and driving
on the incorrect side of the road. There is no suggestion of his having entered
intersections against lights, travelled on footpaths, evaded tyre deflation devices, or that
he caused other vehicles to take evasive action.
23․ In relation to the authorities provided by the prosecution as to current sentencing practice
for the offence of aggravated dangerous driving, which included authorities in addition to
those identified above, sentences from six months imprisonment to 24 months
imprisonment have been imposed. The authorities also suggest that there is a wide
variety of circumstances that this offence involves, with distinctions in the distances
travelled and the features of the dangerous driving.
24․ There are a number of serious aspects to each of the offences, although it is relevant to
observe from the outset that the offending is inextricably linked. Where there are
features of aggravation that are separately charged, this will be reflected in the
appropriate penalties and the structure of the sentences.
25․ The sentences to be imposed must plainly only be ones of imprisonment for the driving
of the stolen motor, the driving at police, and the aggravated driving given the
seriousness of this offending. As to the disqualified driving, for reasons explained below
(at [52]), I am satisfied that imprisonment is the only appropriate penalty, but only a
nominal term is appropriate. As to the numberplate offence, this carries only a maximum
penalty of a fine. That the stolen vehicle had numberplates that were affixed with an
apparent intention to deceive from detection by police will be taken into account with
respect to all of the driving offending, and the order to be made for the offence will reflect
this.

Effect on the victims

26․ The owner of the stolen vehicle that Mr Gill drove in the offending provided a victim
impact statement. While Mr Gill is not criminally responsible for the theft of the vehicle,
his conduct in driving the stolen vehicle still had significant effects on the owners, as
explained in the victim impact statement.
27․ The vehicle was one that was relied upon by the family, and the absence of the vehicle
was disruptive, inconvenient, costly, and time-consuming. The family also experienced
deep emotional impacts, experiencing a feeling of violation of autonomy and
vulnerability. The owner describes that the vehicle was recovered by police almost six
weeks after it was taken, with Mr Gill obviously driving the vehicle during that time. When
it was returned, there were alterations and damage to the vehicle that the owner
describes as being deeply unsettling. The family was caused stress and frustration that
permeates every aspects of their lives.
28․ The victim impact statement serves as a valuable reminder of the significant impacts that
the use by offenders of stolen vehicles has on the owners of such vehicles.

Pleas of guilty and remorse

29․ Mr Gill pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court before provision of the brief of evidence.
The prosecution accepted this was an early plea of guilty that warrants a full reduction
to reflect the extent of utilitarian value. A reduction in the sentence in the order of 25
per cent is appropriate.
30․ As to his remorse and insight into the offending, Mr Gill attributes his offending to
substance use. He is described as expressing that he was under the influence of
methamphetamine at the time of the offences, and that he was committing offences in
order for him to “survive being homeless”. He feels “embarrassed” and an “idiot”. In an
initial report, Corrective Services describe that he “appeared to minimise his
responsibility, and he failed to demonstrate victim empathy”. In a subsequent report, Mr
Gill is described as claiming to accept responsibility for his actions, but stated that he
had “taken the wrap” for some of the offences. He informed Corrective Services that he
wished to distance himself from anti-social peers, having come to realise that these
people were not his friends.
31․ In the most recent report, Mr Gill is described as having “verbalised remorse” for the
victims of the offences. It appears that during the period in custody, Mr Gill’s remorse
and insight has developed, but it clearly needs to develop further if it is to act as a
deterrence from further offending.
32․ Corrective Services advised that they were in contact with the “victim(s) of the offences”
and “they noted they did not have concerns regarding their need for protection from
violence or harassment from the offender”. It is not clear which of the victims this relates
to, but the information addresses that there are no concerns as to the eligibility criteria
pursuant to s 12A(2)(b)(iii) of the Sentencing Act.

Subjective circumstances

33․ Assessments have been undertaken as to Mr Gill’s subjective circumstances in a
presentence report, an intensive correction order assessment report, and reports
prepared by Corrective Services and Health Services for the purposes of suitability for a
treatment order.
34․ He is now 46 years of age and was aged 45 years at the time of the offending. He was
born in Canberra and raised primarily by his grandmother and mother. His mother was
13 years of age at the time of his birth. Mr Gill reports an abusive childhood, but this was
disputed by his grandmother, who was nominated by Mr Gill to verify the information
provided for one of the reports.
35․ The basis for Mr Gill’s claim is not otherwise explained in the assessments. It is
explained that his parents separated when he was aged two, and that thereafter he had
limited contact with his father. His father has since passed away. He reports problems
with his stepfather, leading him to run away when he was 14 years of age. He has not
had a relationship with his mother for an extended period, and has no contact with his

half-siblings. His grandmother and uncle have been his closest familial relationships, but his uncle passed away in recent years and he has had little recent contact with his

grandmother. Mr Gill has three children, two of whom are adults. He has had limited
contact with his children.
36․ Mr Gill has worked in various roles during his adulthood, but his last employment was in
2015. He has been unable to engage with employment due to his substance abuse. He
has obtained various certificates, and has engaged in employment while in custody. He
expresses interest in continuing with employment once in the community.
37․ In recent years, Mr Gill has had unstable accommodation, but he has been approved for
housing with the Justice Housing Program. Corrective Services have found his proposed
accommodation to be suitable, but caution that securing stable housing will be a
considerable focus for the treatment team. It warrants noting that s 80M of the
Sentencing Act contemplates inclusion of the director-general of ACT Housing as a
member of the treatment order team. It is expected that this entity will be available to
assist in supporting a treatment order participant to obtain secure housing.
38․ In terms of prosocial activities, Mr Gill has an interest in bike riding. He otherwise reports
that most of his companions are not prosocial, and that boredom is an issue that leads
to substance use. He has no physical health concerns and reports no mental health
concerns.

Criminal history and custody

39․ As observed by Corrective Services, Mr Gill possesses an extensive criminal history. It
is one that dates back to 2001 and involves convictions for offences in the ACT and in
New South Wales (NSW). His history primarily consists of property related offences,
motor vehicle and traffic related offences, some violence offending, and possession of
prohibited substances.
40․ Mr Gill has been known to Corrective Services since the beginning of his criminal history
in 2001. He was first supervised by Corrective Services under a good behaviour order,
and since that time has been supervised under ten further good behaviour orders and
numerous bail undertakings. He has been sentenced to suspended terms of
imprisonment, and has been imprisoned. Corrective Services describe his compliance
while subject to community-based orders as unsatisfactory. Breach action has been
initiated on numerous occasions, often in relation to failures to accept supervision, or as
a result of re-offending.
41․ His most recent sentence by the Magistrates Court in August 2024 involved a term of
imprisonment that concluded on 25 March 2025. Mr Gill was not subject to any period

of parole with respect to that sentence, having served the sentence to completion, followed by a period on remand with respect to the offences the subject of the sentencing

exercise. A period of six days in presentence custody applies (26 March 2025 – 31
March 2025).
42․ In addition, Mr Gill has been in custody for a continuous period since his arrest on 16
March 2024, with the sentence imposed relating to offences from the same period of
time the subject of the current sentencing exercise. Indeed, the offending the subject of
the earlier sentencing exercise included driving offending involving the same Polo that
was used in the current offending. This is informative in an application of the totality
principle, which has relevance in the sentencing exercise. It is apparent that Mr Gill has
now spent a not insignificant period in fulltime custody in relation to the offending from
this period of time.
43․ The criminal history of Mr Gill demonstrates that the offences the subject of this
sentencing exercise are his most serious examples of driving offending. It also
establishes that on this occasion of offending, he was not on conditional liberty, that is,
he did not breach any community based orders. Nonetheless, no leniency is available
with reference to the criminal history.
44․ The trajectory of this criminal history appears to be consistent with Mr Gill’s reported
substance use history. It is a history which suggests that supporting Mr Gill’s substance
dependency rehabilitation is of importance in order to address his offending behaviour
and to achieve community protection in the sentence to be imposed.

Substance dependency

45․ Mr Gill reports a history of illicit substances and severe alcohol abuse. His substance
use commenced after he began associating with the “wrong type of people”. He began
consuming alcohol as an adolescent, which he continued at a high level of use until the
age of 30 years. He commenced cannabis at the age of 17 years and used this daily
until he was aged 19 years, and thereafter decreased use of cannabis with the
commencement of methamphetamine use. Mr Gill reported commencing use of this at
22 years of age, although in one report he stated that he was 25 years of age, and in
another, 30 years of age. Regardless of when he commenced, it has been a lengthy
history of methamphetamine use with daily use for an extended period. He identified
dependence on methamphetamine as a significant factor in his offending history. He
reported that he uses illicit substances as a coping mechanism to deal with the stressors
in his life.
46․ Mr Gill has had limited engagement in substance use recovery. He reported to the

assessors that his last substance use was in March 2024, immediately prior to be being placed in custody. Testing undertaken in the AMC is consistent with this claim. He

expressed to assessors that he was ready to address his drug dependency and create
a positive life for himself. He has goals to “wean” of the DASL program with a view to
securing employment, and he wants to stay “straight” and keep away from negative
associates.
47․ Corrective Services report that Mr Gill expressed that he would likely benefit from the
intensive support available under a treatment order. He is described as being polite,
engaged and forthcoming with information. He reported having proactively organised a
bank card, identification documents, and researched bus timetables to know his transport
options for court and programs.
48․ Health Services found Mr Gill as presenting with a likelihood of severe substance use
disorder at the time of the offending and find him suitable for a treatment order. A
therapeutically recommended day program that is available for Mr Gill to engage with
from the imposition of any treatment order has been identified.

Disqualification periods

49․ Mr Gill is a repeat offender with respect to the aggravated dangerous driving offending,
having been convicted in April 2020 of failing to stop a motor vehicle for police in August
2019. He was sentenced to the rising of the court for that offence. It was driving that
occurred some four years before the offending that occurred here. It underscores the
limitation to leniency that can be afforded to Mr Gill with respect to driving offences.
50․ The repeat offending as a disqualified driver arises from a conviction in April 2020 for
driving while his licence was suspended in August 2019. As noted above, the offending
having occurred here as a disqualified driver relates to a disqualification order of the
Magistrates Court on 25 March 2008. The criminal history provides that the order was
that Mr Gill is ‘disqualified from holding/obtaining a licence for 12 months, further
disqualified until disqualification set aside by court’. This was for an offence of a special
driver with a prescribed concentration of alcohol in blood that was committed on 6
November 2007 (CAN 2007/11075). Since then, Mr Gill has been convicted of driving
while disqualified in 2008, unlicensed driving in 2016, driving while his license is
suspended by law in 2020, and convicted for two offences of driving while disqualified
that occurred in July 2023 and February 2024.
51․ No submissions were made as to the curious nature of the 2008 disqualification order
and its ongoing impacts on the lawfulness of Mr Gill’s driving some 16 years later. The

curiosity of the implications of this order includes that Mr Gill’s conviction for driving while his licence was suspended in 2020 suggests he has lawfully held a driver’s license since

2008.
52․ In the absence of any submissions as to this, and having regard to the plea of guilty
entered to the disqualified driving offence, it seems that there is nothing to be done other
than to observe that Mr Gill has been aware that he was not to drive for a lengthy period
of time. He has continued to do so. I do not consider it appropriate to impose anything
more than a recognition of this offending by way of a conviction. The disqualified driving
is not a seemingly egregious example of it. That is, it was not, for example, blatant
disregard for a court order imposed shortly before the driving conduct.
53․ The prospect of Mr Gill achieving rehabilitation will be assisted by Mr Gill at some point
having the ability to drive lawfully. This typically facilitates securing employment. I will
therefore order that the automatic minimum disqualification periods that are to apply are
to be served concurrently. It will though seemingly be necessary for Mr Gill to address
the 2008 disqualification order if he is to ever be lawfully licensed to drive.

Consideration

54․ Mr Gill has been granted numerous opportunities for community based orders by the
ACT courts. He has not demonstrated an appreciation for the opportunities afforded to
him, nor does he give confidence from his history as to his prospects of compliance with
a further such opportunity. It can be readily understood why Corrective Services have
found him unsuitable for a treatment order, and that the prosecution caution as to the
imposition of such an order. Mr Gill lacks substantial protective factors, he has multiple
risk factors, and is assessed by Corrective Services as having a high risk of general
reoffending.
55․ Nonetheless, there are a number of factors that weigh towards Mr Gill being someone
for whom a treatment order is a suitable and appropriate one.
56․ Firstly, the offending on this occasion did not occur while on conditional liberty. It appears
that after completion of his last period in custody, Mr Gill was not subject to any
supervision while in the community. He has not yet had the opportunity to demonstrate
whether he would comply with a parole order. He plainly would benefit from supervision
upon release from custody, and a treatment order is a form of community based order
that has not yet been attempted with respect to Mr Gill.
57․ The extent of supervision and judicial oversight of the order will be something that Mr Gill
has not experienced before. He will not have scope to take any advantage of the delays
upon non-compliance that are inherent in the system of enforcement that exists in other

sentence orders. A treatment order is capable of rapidly holding to account any non-compliance and expects of a participant that they genuinely advance their

rehabilitation. If they do not, a return to custody can be expected.
58․ Secondly, Mr Gill is at an age, and maturity and stage of life, such that he would be
regarded as being in the category of “older participants” that are likely to have greater
success on a treatment order: see DPP v Djerke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341 at [23]. The
information before me on sentence suggests that Mr Gill is tired of a life of substance
use, offending behaviour, and homelessness. He is ready to secure stable
accommodation, employment, and live a prosocial life. He has not previously had the
opportunity to engage with a comprehensive alcohol and drug program, nor to receive
the supports that will be available under a treatment order. Mr Gill presents as someone
who is ready to embrace the opportunity to make the changes he seeks.
59․ Thirdly, the subjective information available as to Mr Gill is limited, but sufficient to
conclude that there are likely past traumas and challenges that he needs to address.
Without being presumptive that there are such matters, it appears likely that greater
insights and growth would assist Mr Gill if he is to address the underlying matters that
have informed his substance dependency. A treatment order is a measure that provides
‘wrap-around’, comprehensive supports with a view to addressing the causative factors
of substance dependency in order to support participants to achieve recovery, and
rehabilitation.
60․ I am satisfied, having considered the matters provided in ss 12A, 80S and 80T of the
Sentencing Act that Mr Gill is eligible for a treatment order, and that it is a suitable and
appropriate one for him.

Orders

61․ For those reasons the following orders are made:
(1) On the charge of drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 2024/4382), the
offender is convicted and sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, reduced from
12 months on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 26 March 2025
and end on 25 December 2025.
(2) On the charge of drive motor vehicle at police (CAN 2024/4380), the offender
is convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, reduced from 24
months on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 26 June 2025 and
end on 25 December 2026.
(3) On the charge of aggravated dangerous driving (repeat offender) (CAN
2024/4379), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 9 months
imprisonment, reduced from 12 months on account of the plea of guilty, to
commence on 26 June 2026 and end on 25 March 2027. An automatic licence
disqualification period of 12 months applies in relation to this offence.
(4) On the charge of drive while disqualified (repeat offender) (CAN 2024/5977),
the offender is convicted and sentenced to the rising of the Court. An
automatic licence disqualification period of 24 months applies in relation to this
offence, to be served concurrently with the disqualification period in relation to
CAN 2024/4379.
(5) On the charge of use numberplate not properly issued (CAN 2024/4383), the
offender is convicted and no penalty is imposed.

Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order

(6) A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order pursuant to s 12A of the Crimes
(Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is made for Barry Gill, in respect of the eligible
offences set out in Orders 1 to 3, of which Barry Gill has been convicted, and
for which he has been sentenced to a total term of 2 years imprisonment.
(7) The drug and alcohol treatment order be for 1 year, 11 months, and 25 days,
to commence on 31 March 2025 and end on 25 March 2027.
(8) The Custodial Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order for the eligible
offences be suspended under s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005
(ACT) from 31 March 2025 to 25 March 2027.
(9) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order
be for 12 months, to commence on 31 March 2025 and end on 30 March
2026.
(10) Under s 80ZA of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), Barry Gill be
required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour
obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005
(ACT) from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order, 31 March 2026, until the end of the total
sentence, 25 March 2027, with a probation condition that he accept
supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate
for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person
supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of
the person supervising him.
(11) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the drug and alcohol treatment
order:
(a) The core conditions of the order set out in s 80Y of the Crimes

(Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) be hereby imposed.

(b) Barry Gill undertake any program, treatment or counselling, alcohol

and drug testing or case management, and comply with any direction

as to where he resides, or any curfew that may be required, by any

member of the Treatment and Supervision Team and obey all

reasonable directions of any member of that Team.

(c) If Barry Gill is discharged from or leaves any treatment program, he is

to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business

day.

(d) Barry Gill not return a positive test sample under alcohol and drug

testing.

(e) Barry Gill not consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs and

prescription drugs not prescribed to him.

(f) Barry Gill comply with any directions of the Court from time to time

about attendance at Court in person or by electronic means.

(12) Barry Gill be directed to sign a sealed copy of this Order and an undertaking to
comply with the Order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence
Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period that this Order is in force before
he leaves the Court precincts on 31 March 2025.
(13) Barry Gill be directed to appear in person in Court for DASL Review on Friday,
4 April 2025 at 11:30am.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one [61] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen.

Associate:

Date: 23 July 2025


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R v Crawford (a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 166