| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2024 0050
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Crown |
| v | |
| MICHAEL GAUCI | Accused |
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JUDGE: | TINNEY J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATES OF HEARING: | 16 & 17 September 2025 |
DATE OF RULING: | 18 September 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Gauci (Ruling No 5) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 593 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Trial – Jury Directions Act 2015 discussions – Question whether prosecution should be permitted to rely upon two aspects of the conduct of the accused as incriminating conduct – In aftermath of incident in which complainant set alight, the accused directed his partner to terminate a call to triple 0 – Accused and family then immediately drove away from the scene – Accused drove to police station – Question whether the two items of conduct passed the test for use as incriminating conduct in s 20(1)(b) of the Act – Evidence permitted to be relied on as incriminating conduct – Jury Directions Act ss 18-21.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Ms A Moran with Mr S Tamburro, solicitor advocate | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr D Dann KC with Mr T Marsh | Marshall Jovanovska Ralph Criminal and Migration Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
The accused is charged with attempted murder (charge 1), intentionally causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence (‘ICSIGV’) (charge 2), and reckless conduct endangering a person (‘reckless conduct’) (charges 3 and 4). The evidence has concluded in the trial and discussions under the Jury Directions Act 2015 (‘the Act’) have taken place.
An issue has arisen as to whether the prosecution should be permitted to rely upon two items of the conduct of the accused following the incident in which Shari Grey, the alleged victim of charges 1 and 2, was set alight and sustained serious burns.
Facts
The facts of the case can be stated fairly briefly in the context of the issues to be determined in this ruling.
Ms Grey lived with others in a unit at 2/9 Rivercoast Road, Werribee South. The accused, his partner Blane Sarah, and their two children, lived next door at number 11. It is alleged by the prosecution that following a dispute about noise being made by Ms Grey and others during the evening of 27 December 2022 and into the early hours of the next day, the accused became angry at Ms Grey, and decided to do something about it. It is alleged that he invited her out the front of the properties intending to attack her. He had with him a blue bucket containing accelerant, a blow torch, and, at some point at least, a loaded sawn-off .22 calibre rifle. On the prosecution case, he invited Ms Grey over towards him on the nature strip near his front gate, threw the accelerant over her upper body, then ignited the propellant using the blow torch which he was holding, causing Ms Grey to burst…
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- Case
- [2025] VSC 593
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court encompassed the interpretation and application of sections 18 to 21 of the Jury Directions Act, particularly in determining what constitutes incriminating conduct and whether such conduct could be relied upon by the prosecution. The court had to evaluate whether the actions of Gauci, taken post-incident, were relevant and admissible as incriminating evidence that could support the prosecution's case. The defence argued that these actions did not meet the criteria for incriminating conduct as they did not directly relate to the offence of arson itself.
The court concluded that the actions taken by Gauci were indeed incriminating conduct under the relevant provisions of the Jury Directions Act. The court found that the conduct of directing his partner to terminate the emergency call and leaving the scene immediately after the incident, along with the subsequent actions of going to the police station, were relevant and could be used to support the prosecution's case. These actions demonstrated a conscious attempt by Gauci to evade responsibility and avoid detection, which was pertinent to the nature of the charges against him. Consequently, the court allowed the prosecution to rely on these actions as incriminating conduct.
The final orders of the court permitted the prosecution to use the specified conduct of Gauci as incriminating evidence in the trial. This decision reinforced the importance of the Jury Directions Act in guiding how certain post-incident actions of an accused can be considered in criminal proceedings. The ruling clarified the parameters for what constitutes incriminating conduct and provided a framework for future cases involving similar circumstances.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi