CITATION:Director of Public Prosecutions v Fuller [2018] NTSC 44
PARTIES:DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
FULLER, Tony John
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:52 of 2011 (21114602)
DELIVERED: 29 June 2018
HEARING DATES: 21 May 2016, 26-27 July 2016, 30-31 January 2017
JUDGMENT OF: Barr J
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE – Application for forfeiture order in relation to crime-derived real and personal property – property restrained by previous court orders – respondent an objector – as objector respondent bears onus of proving that property not crime-derived – balance of probabilities – applicant bears onus of proving that property is crime-derived – also balance of probabilities – objection not made out – dismissed – held more likely than not that the restrained property is crime-derived – formal order that the restrained property be forfeit to the Territory.
Criminal Property Forfeiture Act s 6(a), s 10(2), s 11(1), s 12(1), s 41(2), s 43(2), s 44(1), s 44(1)(a), s 44(3), s 50(3), s 59, s 64(1)(b), s 95(2), s 95(3)(b), s 97
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; Fuller v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 10, referred to.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant:R Jobson, S McGregor
Respondent: in person
Solicitors:
Applicant:Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent: N/A
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: Bar1806
Number of pages: 23
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINDirector of Public Prosecutions v Fuller [2018] NTSC 44
No 52 of 2011 (21114602)
BETWEEN:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Applicant
AND:
TONY JOHN FULLER
Respondent and Objector
CORAM: BARR J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 29 June 2018)
On 25 May 2011, the applicant obtained restraining orders under the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (“the CPFA”),[1] including an order restraining real property at 187 (6466) Lee Point Road Wanguri (“the house”), a partly completed house registered in the name of the respondent and his wife, Wilaiwan Fuller. The orders also restrained (inter alia) the respondent’s Commonwealth Bank Streamline account, his Mariner 34-foot motor cruiser (“the boat”) and his Holden utility (“the vehicle”).
The restraining orders were granted on the basis that the Court found that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the house and other property were “crime-derived property”,[2] that is, property derived in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, from an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or more.
The applicant subsequently made application under s 95(2) CPFA for an order that the restrained property be forfeit to the Territory. Under s 97 CPFA, the Court must make a forfeiture order if satisfied that it is more likely than not that the property is crime-derived.
Objections to the restraint of the property were filed pursuant to s 59 CPFA by the respondent and Wilaiwan Fuller.[3] The respondent claimed that he had acquired all the restrained property with income lawfully obtained, or through his inheritance. He also said that Anastasios Poullas had, for legitimate…
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- Case
- [2018] NTSC 44
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the evidence presented by both parties and found that the onus placed on the objector to demonstrate that the property was not crime-derived was not met. The objector failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the property was derived from criminal activity. The court held that it was more likely than not that the restrained property was crime-derived, and the objection was dismissed. The court's decision was based on a thorough analysis of the evidence and the applicable legal principles.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the applicable statutory provisions and the legal principles that govern criminal property forfeiture. The court held that the objector had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the property was not crime-derived, and the applicant had successfully demonstrated that it was more likely than not that the property was derived from criminal activity. The court made a formal order that the restrained property be forfeited to the Territory, in accordance with the statutory provisions that govern criminal property forfeiture.
The court's decision in this case underscores the importance of the onus of proof in criminal property forfeiture proceedings. The objector bears the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the property is not crime-derived, while the applicant must prove, also on the balance of probabilities, that the property is crime-derived. The court's decision also highlights the importance of a thorough analysis of the evidence and the applicable legal principles in determining whether property should be forfeited to the Territory.
Background
Background to the litigation
The DPP, on the other hand, needed to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the property was indeed crime-derived. The proceedings involved extensive evidence and submissions from both parties, with the court carefully considering the material presented. The evidence included financial records, witness testimonies, and other documentation that related to the source and ownership of the property in question. The court found that it was more likely than not that the restrained property was derived from criminal activities and dismissed Fuller's objection.
Consequently, the court made a formal order that the restrained property be forfeited to the Territory, in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. The decision hinged on the court's assessment of the evidence provided and the respective burdens of proof for both the applicant and the objector.
The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Fuller concerns an application for a forfeiture order in relation to real and personal property suspected to be derived from criminal activities. The matter came before the court following an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions under the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. The respondent, Fuller, objected to the application, arguing that the property was not derived from criminal activities. The court had to determine whether the property was crime-derived, a question requiring proof on the balance of probabilities. The applicant bore the onus of proving that the property was crime-derived, while the respondent had to show that it was not.
Prior to this application, the property in question had been restrained by previous court orders, which were put in place following an earlier stage in the proceedings. The respondent's objection was dismissed by the court, which found that it was more likely than not that the restrained property was indeed derived from criminal activities. This determination was based on the evidence presented during the proceedings and the applicable legal standards. The court proceeded to make a formal order that the restrained property be forfeited to the Territory, concluding the matter in accordance with the law and the evidence submitted.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the respondent, as an objector to the application for forfeiture, bore the onus of proving that the restrained property was not derived from criminal activity, on the balance of probabilities.
2. Whether the applicant, as the party seeking the forfeiture order, bore the onus of proving that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity, on the balance of probabilities.
3. Whether the respondent successfully discharged their onus of proving that the restrained property was not crime-derived.
4. Whether it was more likely than not that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity.
5. Whether the restrained property should be formally ordered to be forfeited to the Territory.
Held
1. The court held that the respondent, as an objector to the application for forfeiture, bore the onus of proving that the restrained property was not derived from criminal activity, on the balance of probabilities.
2. The court held that the applicant, as the party seeking the forfeiture order, bore the onus of proving that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity, on the balance of probabilities.
3. The court held that the respondent did not successfully discharge their onus of proving that the restrained property was not crime-derived.
4. The court held that it was more likely than not that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity.
5. The court held that the restrained property should be formally ordered to be forfeited to the Territory.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Fuller, the court addressed the issue of whether the respondent, as an objector to the application for forfeiture, bore the onus of proving that the restrained property was not derived from criminal activity, on the balance of probabilities. The court reasoned that, as the objector, the respondent had the responsibility to demonstrate that the property in question was not derived from criminal activity. This principle was grounded in established legal precedent, which placed the onus of proof on the objector in such cases, as it is the objector who has an interest in the property and seeks to prevent its forfeiture.
Further, the court considered whether the applicant, as the party seeking the forfeiture order, bore the onus of proving that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity, on the balance of probabilities. The court confirmed that the applicant's burden was to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the property was derived from criminal activity. This principle aligns with the general rule in forfeiture proceedings, where the party seeking the forfeiture must establish their case to the requisite standard of proof.
The court then examined whether the respondent had successfully discharged their onus of proving that the restrained property was not crime-derived. In evaluating the evidence presented, the court found that the respondent had not met the required standard of proof. The court meticulously assessed the evidence and concluded that the respondent's arguments were not sufficient to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the property was not derived from criminal activity.
In considering whether it was more likely than not that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity, the court undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence provided by both parties. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicant strongly supported the conclusion that the property was derived from criminal activity. The court's decision was based on a comprehensive review of the factual circumstances and the applicable legal standards, leading to the conclusion that it was more likely than not that the restrained property was derived from criminal activity.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the restrained property should be formally ordered to be forfeited to the Territory. Having determined that the applicant had discharged their onus of proving the criminality of the property and that the respondent had failed to demonstrate otherwise, the court concluded that the restrained property should be forfeited. The court's decision was grounded in the statutory provisions governing forfeiture proceedings and the established legal principles regarding the onus of proof and the standard of proof required in such cases. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in criminal property forfeiture proceedings, the objector bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the property is not derived from criminal activity, and if this onus is not discharged, the property may be forfeited to the Territory.