Director of Public Prosecutions v Francis

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v FRANCIS & ANOR

[2006] SASC 211

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby

18 July 2006

PROCEDURE - CONTEMPT, ATTACHMENT AND SEQUESTRATION - CONTEMPT - WHAT CONSTITUTES - INTERFERENCE WITH COURSE OF JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAW - PREJUDICING FAIR TRIAL OF ACCUSED - NEWSPAPER, RADIO OR TELEVISION REPORT

First defendant a radio presenter and second defendant a radio broadcaster charged with two counts of contempt of court – Guilty plea by each defendant to count one of bringing a judicial officer into contempt or lowering his authority – Whether each defendant guilty of count two being words spoken or calculated to prejudice or pervert the course of justice – Talk back radio program – Discussion of application for bail before Magistrate by an accused person charged with minor indictable offence – Where accused person could elect for trial by jury – Consideration of principles of contempt by publication concerning impending litigation – Whether comments of first defendant had a real and definite tendency to prejudice fair trial of accused person – Comments constituting vilification, contempt and hostility towards accused person and encouragement of others to take similar view – Defendants guilty of contempt on count two.

Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 45, s 46; Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA) r 21; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 7(1)(da); Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 93; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 63A; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 5, s 103(2), s 103(3), s 105(4), referred to.
Hinch v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (1987) 164 CLR 15; John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351; State of Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation (1982) 152 CLR 25, applied.
Attorney-General for New South Wales v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd and Bacon (1985) 6 NSWLR 695; Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1981] AC 303; Attorney-General v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1986) 43 SASR 374; Ex parte Bellanto: Re Prior [1963] NSWR 1556; Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd: Re Truth and Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 242; Ex parte Sanderson [1928] SASR 448; Minister for Community Welfare v Keating (1980) 25 SASR 313; Re Colina: Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386; The King v Dunbabin: Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434; Vine Products Ltd v Green [1966] 1 Ch 484, considered.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v FRANCIS & ANOR
[2006] SASC 211

Civil

BLEBY J:

Introduction

  1. I have before me an inter partes summons issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) alleging two counts of contempt of court against each of two defendants.  The first defendant, Robert Neville Francis (“Francis”) is a radio presenter for Radio Station 5AA operated by the second defendant, Festival City Broadcasters Pty Ltd (“FCB”).

  2. As amended the two counts are as follows:

    Count 1: Bringing a Judicial Officer into…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 211
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Francis, the defendants, a radio presenter and a radio broadcaster, were charged with two counts of contempt of court. The defendants pleaded guilty to count one, which involved bringing a judicial officer into contempt or lowering his authority. The court had to determine whether the defendants were guilty of count two, which related to comments made on a talkback radio program that were alleged to have prejudiced or perverted the course of justice. The comments in question were made during a discussion about an application for bail by an accused person charged with a minor indictable offence.

The legal issues the court had to decide involved the principles of contempt by publication concerning impending litigation and whether the comments made by the radio presenter had a real and definite tendency to prejudice the fair trial of the accused. The court had to assess whether the comments were vilifying, contemptuous, and hostile towards the accused, and whether they encouraged others to take a similar view. The court considered the impact of the comments on potential jurors and witnesses, and the significance of the trial being conducted by a magistrate alone or before a jury.

The court found that the comments made by the radio presenter constituted contempt of court on count two. The comments were found to have a real and definite tendency to prejudice the fair trial of the accused. The comments were considered to be vilifying, contemptuous, and hostile towards the accused, and they encouraged others to take a similar view. The court concluded that the comments had the potential to interfere with the administration of justice in the proceedings against the accused, even though it was not shown that the accused was actually prejudiced by what was said.

The court found both defendants guilty of contempt of court on count two. The matter of penalty for count one was not heard at this stage. The court's decision was based on the likely effect of the comments on the proceedings involving the accused, and the impact of the comments on potential jurors and witnesses. The court considered that the comments had the potential to interfere with the administration of justice in the proceedings against the accused, and that the comments were vilifying, contemptuous, and hostile towards the accused.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

At this stage I have not heard any submission as to penalty on count one. I have evidence by way of affidavits relating to the admitted breaches of count one by both defendants and as to the alleged breaches of count two. The facts are not in dispute. The matter for decision at this stage is whether each of the defendants is guilty of count two.The facts The man who was charged in the Magistrates Court with possession of child pornography is a man to whom I will refer as “the accused”. Where his name is mentioned in the transcription of the broadcast I will use the initials, RJW. However, it is to be understood that where I use those initials or any combination of them in relating what the defendant Francis said about the accused, he used the actual name represented by the particular initial. The accused was charged on information with a minor indictable offence.[4] For such an offence an accused may elect to be tried in a superior court.[5] In other words the accused may elect for trial by jury. There are time limits within which an election must be made[6], but that election may be withdrawn at any time before conclusion of the preliminary examination.[7] If no election is made, the matter proceeds in the same way as a charge for a summary offence before a Magistrate.[8][4] Section 63A(1)(a), Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). For the definition of minor indictable offence see s 5, Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).[5] Section 103(2), Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) and Rule 21, Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA).[6] Rule 21, Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA).[7] Section 105(4), Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).[8] Section 103(3), Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA). 26 October 2005 was the day on which the accused’s application for bail was due to be heard before a magistrate in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. It was anticipated that a psychiatric report of Dr Raeside relevant to the application for bail would be available, but it was not. As a consequence, the accused was remanded in custody and the hearing of the bail application was adjourned until the report could be made available to the Court. At that time it was still open to the accused to elect for trial by jury. There is nothing to indicate that the defendants were aware of any decision by the accused not to elect. No plea had been entered. On the evening of 26 October 2005 Francis was the host of a talkback radio program on Radio Station 5AA between 8.07 pm and 11.37 pm. It was during that period that Francis, either in encouraging listeners to telephone him or in the course of conversation with listeners who had telephoned, made the comments which were broadcast over the radio station and which are the subject of the two counts of contempt. Although I am only concerned at this stage with the facts related to count two, it is convenient to set out the words relied on in respect of both counts and the context in which they were spoken, as these all give flavour to and provide a more complete understanding of the words relied on in count two. In the quotations which follow the words in italics are relied on by the DPP as constituting together the breach of count one. The words underlined are those on which the DPP relies in order to constitute the breach of count two. Omissions in brackets within the text have been made to preserve the anonymity of the accused.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Where a person is alleged to have committed some forms of contempt of the Supreme Court there is a procedure prescribed by r 93 of the Supreme Court Rules by which such proceedings are governed. That rule does not apply in its terms to allegations of contempt of this nature. Nevertheless, as a matter of convenience, and without opposition from any party, I directed that the procedure to be followed in these proceedings be that prescribed by r 93.06.Pleas entered and matters for decision At the hearing on 24 March 2006 both defendants through their counsel pleaded guilty to count one. Both defendants pleaded not guilty to count two. At this stage I have not heard any submission as to penalty on count one. I have evidence by way of affidavits relating to the admitted breaches of count one by both defendants and as to the alleged breaches of count two. The facts are not in dispute. The matter for decision at this stage is whether each of the defendants is guilty of count two.The facts The man who was charged in the Magistrates Court with possession of child pornography is a man to whom I will refer as “the accused”. Where his name is mentioned in the transcription of the broadcast I will use the initials, RJW. However, it is to be understood that where I use those initials or any combination of them in relating what the defendant Francis said about the accused, he used the actual name represented by the particular initial. The accused was charged on information with a minor indictable offence.[4] For such an offence an accused may elect to be tried in a superior court.[5] In other words the accused may elect for trial by jury. There are time limits within which an election must be made[6], but that election may be withdrawn at any time before conclusion of the preliminary examination.[7] If no election is made, the matter proceeds in the same way as a charge for a summary offence before a Magistrate.[8][4] Section 63A(1)(a), Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). For the definition of minor indictable offence see s 5, Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).[5] Section 103(2), Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) and Rule 21, Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA).[6] Rule 21, Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA).[7] Section 105(4), Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).[8] Section 103(3), Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA). 26 October 2005 was the day on which the accused’s application for bail was due to be heard before a magistrate in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. It was anticipated that a psychiatric report of Dr Raeside relevant to the application for bail would be available, but it was not. As a consequence, the accused was remanded in custody and the hearing of the bail application was adjourned until the report could be made available to the Court. At that time it was still open to the accused to elect for trial by jury. There is nothing to indicate that the defendants were aware of any decision by the accused not to elect. No plea had been entered. On the evening of 26 October 2005 Francis was the host of a talkback radio program on Radio Station 5AA between 8.07 pm and 11.37 pm. It was during that period that Francis, either in encouraging listeners to telephone him or in the course of conversation with listeners who had telephoned, made the comments which were broadcast over the radio station and which are the subject of the two counts of contempt.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The comments of McHugh JA are equally applicable to cases conducted by magistrates in South Australia. As I have said, one of the factors critical to the likelihood of prejudice will be whether the trial is by judge or magistrate alone or before a jury. The effect of publication of prejudicial matter on potential jurors and on witnesses who might be called assumes major significance, especially where the publication creates an atmosphere of prejudice and hostility to the accused.Consideration As Mr Whitington QC, counsel for Francis, submitted, there are three possible types of contempt into which an allegation of this nature may fall. The first is that the impugned conduct has the actual effect of interfering with the administration of justice. That has not been proved on the evidence in this case. It has not been shown that the accused was in fact prejudiced by what was said or that the proceedings were conducted in any different manner from that which did in fact occur, or that the result for the accused was other than what would have occurred in any event. It was an agreed fact that the accused pleaded guilty to the charge in the Magistrates Court on 17 February 2006, but there is nothing to suggest in fact that he took that course as a result of anything that was said in Mr Francis’ talkback radio show on 26 October 2005, or that his ultimate sentence was so affected. We simply do not know. The second possible type of contempt is that discussed at some length above, namely that there is a real risk of interference in the administration of justice in the accused’s case. This does not require proof of actual interference but an assessment of the likely effect of the publication – whether or not there was a real risk that the words spoken would interfere in the administration of justice in the proceedings against the accused which were then pending. What happened in fact after the publication is not relevant. The third possible type of contempt is where, irrespective of whether the publication has a tendency to prejudice the fair trial of particular proceedings, a publication of this nature tends to interfere with the administration of justice generally. Such was the case in The King v Dunbabin: Ex parte Williams.[36] The DPP submitted that it would do so by diminishing public confidence in the system of law and the integrity and impartiality of judicial officers. I do not accept the submission. It does not form part of the particulars alleged. However, in any event I do not consider that such a consideration is relevant in a case of this nature. Such a consideration does not arise out of the passages of the broadcast relied on by the DPP in support of this count. As the facts in The King v Dunbabin suggest, it is a consideration more appropriate to direct criticism of the courts or of the result in a particular case. It is more appropriate to a consideration of the type of situation the subject of count one in these proceedings. Accordingly, in deciding whether count two in this case has been proved, I will not take this aspect into account but will concentrate on the likely effect of what was said on the proceedings involving the accused.[36] (1935) 53 CLR 434.