Director of Public Prosecutions v Finnegan

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[2011] TASCCA 3

COURT:        SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)

CITATION:                 Director of Public Prosecutions v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3

PARTIES:  DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
  v
  FINNEGAN, Anthony Colin
  SHAW, Leon

FILE NO/S:  1015/2010
DELIVERED ON:  21 April 2011
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  3 March 2011
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford CJ, Evans and Tennent JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Evidence – Credibility – Prior inconsistent statements – Generally – Application by Crown to cross-examine own witness – Factors relevant to exercise of discretion whether to permit cross-examination – One purpose of application to satisfy requirements to enable Crown to tender prior inconsistent statement as evidence of truth of contents.

Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), ss38, 43, 192.
R v Adam (2001) 207 CLR 96, applied.
Tasmania v Mayne [2009] TASSC 82; Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84; Houston and Stanhope v R (1982) 8 A Crim R 392, referred to.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [2872]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  T J Ellis SC and P Dixon
             First Respondent:  T Jago SC and K Edwards
             Second Respondent:  T Jago SC and K Edwards
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             First Respondent:  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania
             Second Respondent:  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania

Judgment Number:  [2011] TASCCA 3
Number of paragraphs:  50

Serial No 3/2011
File No 1015/2010

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v ANTHONY COLIN FINNEGAN and LEON SHAW

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CRAWFORD CJ
EVANS J
TENNENT J
21 April 2011

Orders of the Court

  1. That the appellant be granted leave to appeal against the acquittal of each respondent on the count of assault.

  2. That the acquittal of each respondent on that charge be quashed.

  3. That each respondent be retried on that charge.

Serial No 3/2011
File No 1015/2010

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v ANTHONY COLIN FINNEGAN  and LEON SHAW

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
  CRAWFORD CJ
  21 April 2011

  1. I agree for the reasons stated by Evans and Tennent JJ that leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed.  I also agree that the appropriate order is that the acquittal of the respondents be quashed and that there be a re-trial. 

File No 1015/2010

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v ANTHONY COLIN FINNEGAN and LEON SHAW

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

EVANS J
21 April 2011

  1. I agree with Tennent J's reasons for judgment and the consequential orders that she proposes, and I add the following.

  1. When ruling on the prosecutor's application to cross-examine Mr Watkins, pursuant to the Evidence Act 2001, s38(1)(a) and (b), Blow J left open the question of whether subpar(a) applied and concluded that subpar(b) applied. That being so, his Honour addressed the matters that s192(2) provides that a court is to take into account in deciding whether to grant leave. As no criticism has been made of the manner in which his Honour dealt with the matters raised by s192(2)(a), (d) and (e), there is no reason to address what his Honour said…

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Details
Case
[2011] TASCCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania against the acquittal of the respondents on a charge of assault. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement made by a Crown witness, and the Crown's ability to cross-examine its own witness to tender that statement as evidence of its truth.

The Full Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in refusing to permit the Crown to cross-examine its own witness regarding a prior inconsistent statement. Specifically, the court had to consider the factors relevant to the exercise of the trial judge's discretion in such circumstances, and whether the refusal to allow cross-examination prevented the Crown from satisfying the requirements to tender the prior inconsistent statement as evidence of the truth of its contents.

The Full Court reasoned that the trial judge had misapplied the principles governing the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. It held that the Crown should have been permitted to cross-examine its witness, as the prior statement was relevant to the witness's credibility and potentially to the truth of its contents, provided the necessary conditions for its admission were met. The court emphasised that the purpose of allowing cross-examination in these circumstances is not solely to impeach credibility but also, where appropriate, to adduce substantive evidence.

Consequently, the Full Court granted the appellant leave to appeal, quashed the acquittal of each respondent on the charge of assault, and ordered that each respondent be retried on that charge.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. That the appellant be granted leave to appeal against the acquittal of each respondent on the count of assault.

2. That the acquittal of each respondent on that charge be quashed.

3. That each respondent be retried on that charge.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established