SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2016 0046
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| SUSAN FALZON | Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | WARREN CJ and OSBORN JA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 22 April 2016 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 27 May 2016 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2016] VSCA 122 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | Director of Public Prosecutions v [RM] and Falzon and [BT] [2016] VCC 2 (Judge Lewitan) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Review of a refusal of trial judge to certify that the decision of sufficient importance to justify its determination on an interlocutory appeal – Respondent charged with cultivation and trafficking of Cannabis L and other related offences – One of co-accused the respondent’s husband – Trial judge ordered the respondent be tried separately from co-accused – Whether risk of unfair trial if tried together – Whether the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion open – Application refused.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr Y K Hardjadibrata | Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr R Edney | Stary Norton Halphen |
WARREN CJ:
OSBORN JA:
The applicant applies under s 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 for a review of the trial judge’s refusal to certify an interlocutory decision under s 295(3) so that an application for leave to appeal may be brought.
In the proceedings below, the trial judge granted an application made by the respondent for her to have a separate trial from her co-accused. Her Honour then refused to certify, under s 295(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, that her decision was of sufficient importance to the trial to justify it being determined on an interlocutory appeal.
Background facts
The respondent and two co-accused, RM (the respondent’s husband)[1] and BT, were the subject of six charges relating to the cultivation and trafficking of cannabis and the theft of electricity, which were paraphrased by the trial judge as follows:
[1]All initials used in these reasons are pseudonyms.
1.[RM] and [the respondent], at Sunshine North and other locations in Victoria, between 24 July 2013 and 17 December 2013, cultivated Cannabis L in not less than a commercial quantity.
2.[RM] and [the respondent] at Sunshine North and divers other locations in Victoria, between 24 July 2013 and 17 December 2013, trafficked in Cannabis L in not less than a commercial quantity.
3.[RM] and [the respondent], at Sunshine North, between 24 July 2013 and 17 December 2013, stole electricity.
4.[BT] at Sydenham and Williamstown, between 15 August 2013 and 17 December 2013, cultivated Cannabis L.
5.[BT] at Sydenham and Williamstown, between 15 August 2013 and 17 December 2013, trafficked in Cannabis L.
6.[RM], [the respondent] and [BT] at Sydenham, between 15 August 2013 and 17 December 2013, stole electricity.
In the summary of prosecution opening,[2] it was alleged that, on the execution of search warrants on 17 December 2013 at four properties (two in Sunshine North sited contiguously, and one in each of Sydenham and Williamstown), police located quantities of cannabis plants growing…
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- Case
- [2016] VSCA 122
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues for the court's determination were whether the trial judge's decision to try Falzon separately was within the scope of their discretion and whether the risk of an unfair trial, if she were tried together with her co-accused, was sufficient to warrant certification. The court was required to consider whether the trial judge's decision was open to challenge on the basis of it being an abuse of discretion or otherwise.
The court found that the trial judge's decision to try Falzon separately was within their discretion, and the potential risk of an unfair trial was sufficient to warrant the separate trial order. The court held that the trial judge's decision was not an abuse of discretion, and therefore, the matter was not of sufficient importance to warrant an interlocutory appeal. The application for certification was refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an interlocutory appeal under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (Vic). The Director of Public Prosecutions sought a review of the trial judge's decision to refuse certification of the interlocutory appeal. Prior to this, the trial judge had already ordered that Falzon be tried separately from her co-accused, including her husband. The primary decision was made in the County Court of Victoria, and the appeal was brought before the Court of Appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge’s decision to try Falzon separately from her co-accused, including her husband, was an exercise of the trial judge’s discretion.
2. Whether there was a risk of an unfair trial if Falzon was tried together with her co-accused.
3. Whether the trial judge’s refusal to certify the decision as being of sufficient importance to justify its determination on an interlocutory appeal was appropriate.
Held
1. The court held that the trial judge’s decision to try Falzon separately from her co-accused, including her husband, was a proper exercise of the trial judge’s discretion.
2. The court found that there was no risk of an unfair trial if Falzon was tried together with her co-accused.
3. The court held that the trial judge’s refusal to certify the decision as being of sufficient importance to justify its determination on an interlocutory appeal was appropriate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the trial judge's decision to try Falzon separately from her co-accused, including her husband, and examined whether this decision was an exercise of the trial judge's discretion under the relevant statutes. The court noted that the trial judge had carefully considered the circumstances and found that there was no prejudice to Falzon in being tried separately. The court concluded that the decision to try her separately was within the trial judge's discretion and was justified by the particular circumstances of the case.
In assessing whether there was a risk of an unfair trial if Falzon was tried together with her co-accused, the court examined the nature of the offences and the potential for prejudice. The court determined that the evidence did not indicate any specific risk of prejudice that would render a joint trial unfair. The court found that the trial judge’s decision was reasonable given the evidence and the potential for prejudice was minimal.
Finally, the court reviewed the trial judge’s refusal to certify the decision as being of sufficient importance to warrant an interlocutory appeal. The court held that the trial judge's decision not to certify was appropriate, given that the decision was not of significant importance and could be adequately addressed at the trial or on appeal following the final determination of the case. The court noted that the discretion to certify a matter for interlocutory appeal should be exercised sparingly, and the circumstances did not warrant such a certification in this case.