SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Director of Public Prosecutions v Earle (No 2) |
Citation: | [2023] ACTSC 134 |
Hearing Date: | 31 January 2023 |
DecisionDate: | 31 January 2023 |
Reasons Date: | 31 May 2023 |
Before: | McCallum CJ |
Decision: | Publication of reserved reasons for making the following orders: (1) Pursuant to s 76(1) of Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, leave is granted to the accused to cross-examine the complainant as to previous sexual activities between her and the accused going to the issue of the accused’s understanding of consent on the occasion in the indictment. (2) Dispense with the requirement under s 77(a) to make that application in writing. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – sexual offence proceedings – where counsel for the accused sought to cross-examine her as to previous consensual sexual activities with the accused – whether leave required under s 76(1) of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act – whether leave if required should be granted – where belief as to consent an issue in the trial |
Legislation Cited: | Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT), ss 76, 77, 78 |
Cases Cited: | Bull v The Queen [2000] HCA 24; 201 CLR 443 Gregory v The Queen [1983] HCA 24; 151 CLR 566 |
Texts Cited: | Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Chapter 5: Sexual Offences Against the Person (1999) |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions Thomas Earle ( Accused) |
Representation: | Counsel B Morrisroe ( DPP) J Sabharwal ( Accused) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( DPP) Armstrong Legal ( Accused) | |
File Number: | SCC 151 of 2022 |
McCALLUM CJ:
Thomas Earle was tried by jury on an indictment containing four counts of sexual offences alleged to have been committed against a female friend with whom he had previously been in an intimate relationship.
On the second day of the trial, an issue arose as to whether counsel for the accused, Mr Sabharwal, should be permitted to cross-examine the complainant as to prior consensual sexual activity between her and the accused. After hearing from the parties, I granted leave for that to occur, reserving my reasons. These are my reasons for making that ruling.
It is appropriate to explain how the issue arose. Mr Sabharwal told the jury during his opening address that there was no dispute that the sexual acts alleged by the complainant took place. The issues in the trial were whether the complainant consented to those acts and, if not, whether the accused either knew she was not consenting or was reckless as to whether she was consenting. The accused’s case was that he honestly believed the complainant was consenting the whole time.
During Mr Sabharwal’s cross-examination of the complainant, it became apparent that his line of questioning was heading towards the topic of…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Public Prosecutions v Earle (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] ACTSC 134
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that s 76(1) of the Act generally prohibits the admission of evidence about a complainant's sexual activities without leave from the court. However, s 76(2) disapplies the requirement for leave in respect of evidence of "the specific sexual activities of the complainant with an accused person in the sexual offence proceeding." The court considered whether this provision removed the requirement for leave in relation to any sexual activity with the accused or only to that forming part of the res gestae. The Chief Justice held that the former interpretation was less plausible, but granted leave to cross-examine in the present case because the accused's belief in the complainant's consent was at issue. The Chief Justice also noted that the requirement for leave under s 76(1) should be strictly construed, and that there was authority to the contrary of the interpretation accepted by the parties. The court concluded that the correctness of that interpretation may be doubted and warrants revisiting in an appropriate case.
The court granted leave for the accused to cross-examine the complainant about previous consensual sexual activities with him, and dispensed with the requirement for a written application for leave in the circumstances of the case. The court's decision highlights the importance of strictly construing the requirement for leave under s 76(1) of the Act, and the need for revisiting the interpretation of s 76(2) in an appropriate case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi