Director of Public Prosecutions v DT (Ruling No 3)
[2024] VSC 346
•6 May 2024
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2020 0142
| DPP | Crown |
| v | |
| DT | Accused |
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JUDGE: | Fox J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 27 March, 28 March, 10 April and 11 April | |
DATE OF RULING: | 6 May 2024 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v DT (Ruling No 3) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2024] VSC 346 | 1st revision: 19 June 2024 Para [17] |
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CRIMINAL LAW — Evidence — Child homicide — Advance ruling pursuant to s 192A of the Evidence Act 2008 sought — Accused intending to call good character evidence in a particular respect — Whether prosecution would be permitted to call rebuttal evidence — Advance ruling given in relation to evidence of one prosecution witness only — Evidence sought to be led on behalf of accused otherwise not made sufficiently clear to enable advance ruling — Relevance — Whether rebuttal evidence comes within s 110(3) — Whether probative value outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice — Evidence Act 2008 ss 55, 110, 137 & 192A.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr M Gibson KC, with Mr E Dober | The Director of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr R Nathwani SC, with Ms L Thies | Furstenberg Law |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
The accused is charged with child homicide.[1] A jury is yet to be empanelled. The defence seek an advance ruling pursuant to s 192A of the Evidence Act 2008 (‘Act’) that if they lead evidence of good character in a particular respect, the prosecution will not be permitted to lead the foreshadowed rebuttal evidence.
[1]This proceeding is subject to a suppression order regarding identification. Pseudonyms and initials have been used to prevent identification and minor redactions made.
Overview of proposed good character evidence and rebuttal evidence
It is alleged that on or about 29 November 2017 the accused killed his son, Oscar, who was 26 days old at the time of his death. I have given an earlier ruling in this matter which summarises the prosecution and defence cases. I will not repeat that summary. This ruling should be read together with my earlier ruling.[2]
[2]DPP v DT (Ruling No 1) (Supreme Court of Victoria, Fox J, 6 May 2024).
The accused has fathered six children, including the deceased. He had three children with his ex‑wife, TT, born between 2005 and 2009. He and TT separated around the middle of 2013. He subsequently formed a relationship with MH in January 2014. In February 2015, Christopher was born. In November 2017, Oscar (the deceased) was born. Following Oscar’s death, MH and the accused separated but remained on amicable terms. In September 2018, the couple had a third child, [redacted].
The defence seek to lead that the accused has no prior convictions and nothing pending. The prosecution have no objection to this course and do not seek to lead rebuttal evidence if it is pursued. The prosecution accept that the evidence would entitle the accused to a good character direction.
The defence also seek to lead good character evidence in a particular respect. For convenience and for the balance of this ruling, I will simply refer to this as the ‘good character evidence’ without repeating that it is in a ‘particular respect’.
In written submissions, defence identified the good character evidence as ‘evidence of the accused’s favourable disposition in relation to his behaviour and conduct towards children.’[3]
[3]Further outline of pre‑trial arguments on behalf of the accused, 9 April 2024 at [9].
In oral submissions, senior counsel for the accused further identified the proposed evidence as follows:
(a) The accused’s general demeanour or behaviour towards children, meaning his own children.[4] He has always been a good, patient and kind father to all his children, including the three he had with TT.[5] When asked whether the evidence would be led through prosecution witnesses, counsel responded ‘there are some who would give evidence’, and gave the example of MH.[6]
(b) Evidence as to how the accused was with Christopher and Oscar, which may come from a ‘couple of other witnesses’ who are ‘family friends’, and those witnesses are part of the prosecution case.[7] Counsel stated that there may be ‘one or two witnesses that give other evidence consistent with that’ and ‘may go broader to all of his children’.[8]
(c) That he has not previously assaulted a child, and does not ‘physically assault children’.[9]
[4]T118, 11 April 2024.
[5]T147, 11 April 2024.
[6]T118, 11 April 2024.
[7]T147, 11 April 2024.
[8]T148, 11 April 2024.
[9]T125, 11 April 2024.
The proposed rebuttal evidence is found in the statement of TT. TT is otherwise not a witness in the trial. She and the accused were married in 2002 and had three children: BT, MT and LT. The couple separated in 2013. The statement of TT alleges a history of escalating family violence. Police were never called or involved, and no intervention orders were ever applied for or issued.
The prosecution seek to lead portions of TT’s statement, which in summary allege that:
(a) The accused and TT regularly argued, during which the accused would raise his voice, swear, call her names, threaten her with his fists and punch holes in the wall. These arguments often happened in front of the children, which is a form of family violence and shows the accused was not always a calm, patient and kind father.
(b) The accused smacked the children if they misbehaved, but on occasion he would exceed what could be described as ‘general smacks’. He went ‘too far’ and hit his son BT a ‘couple of times’. On the day TT decided to end their relationship, the accused punched BT in the chest with considerable force.
(c) On another occasion, eight‑year‑old BT went to TT ‘crying and screaming’, complaining that his father had smacked him on the leg. TT observed and then photographed a bruise on BT’s left leg. The photograph was taken on 8 July 2013, and at the time, she and the accused were in the midst of separating.
(d) The accused, by agreement, has had supervised contact with his three children since his relationship with TT ended.
The prosecution seek to lead the rebuttal evidence for the sole purpose of negating the evidence of good character.
Limitations and basis for ruling
Section 192A confers a broad discretion on the Court to give advance rulings. An advance ruling may be particularly useful where, as here, an accused is contemplating raising good character in a particular respect.[10]
[10]Section 192A was inserted into Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) in response to TKWJ v R [2002] HCA 46; (2002) 212 CLR 124. In that case, the defence at trial had not led good character evidence because of the rebuttal evidence that the prosecution had foreshadowed they would call. The High Court held there was no power under the Evidence Act to seek an advance ruling as to how the ss 135 or 137 discretions would be exercised. Also see Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law (Report No 102, December 2005) [16.1‑4].
An advance ruling is necessarily given before the evidence is led. Such a ruling requires a trial judge to consider a hypothetical scenario. While the scenario is hypothetical, there must nonetheless be a sufficient and identifiable basis on which to make the ruling.
Here, the defence application suffers from a lack of clarity. It was not articulated who, other than MH, are the prosecution witnesses who would be asked about the accused’s interactions with Christopher and Oscar. If I had to presume, I would presume they are [redacted] and [redacted], but it is no part of my task to presume what the defence are intending.
In the course of argument, counsel for the accused referred to the decision of Clegg v R,[11] a case where an advance ruling as to character was sought. In that case, the accused’s solicitor provided an affidavit attaching character references which set out the evidence the accused was proposing to adduce. Here, I have no understanding of who the ‘one or two witnesses’ who will give evidence as to how the accused was with Christopher and Oscar are, or what evidence they will give. Counsel’s submission that the evidence from these unidentified witnesses ‘may go broader to all of his children, or subject to the ruling, may [be] just limited to his children’ places the proverbial cart before the horse. I cannot give an advance ruling as to whether the prosecution will be permitted to lead rebuttal evidence if I do not know what good character evidence will be led on behalf of the accused.
[11][2017] NSWCCA 125.
This ruling is limited to the evidence of MH, found in her statement and her s 198B evidence.
If the defence are proposing to call further good character evidence, then they should not assume that this ruling will prevent the prosecution from adducing rebuttal evidence. I make clear that if further good character evidence is contemplated, and any further advance ruling sought, the anticipated good character evidence must be clearly and precisely identified.
Legal principles
When considering whether the prosecution should be permitted to lead the rebuttal evidence, it is appropriate to pose the following questions:
(i) Is the rebuttal evidence relevant?
(ii) If it is, does the rebuttal evidence ‘mirror’ the evidence adduced by the accused so as to negate the operation of the exclusionary rules specified in s 110(2)?
(iii) Should the evidence be excluded pursuant to ss 135 or 137, or its use limited pursuant to s 136? (Here, the defence relied only on s 137).
Relevance is the gateway through which all evidence must pass. I will not rehearse the relevant section or principles.[12]
[12]See DPP v DT (Ruling No 2) (Supreme Court of Victoria, Fox J, 6 May 2024).
Character evidence
Part 3.8 of the Act deals with character and applies only in a criminal proceeding.[13] Section 110 deals with evidence about the character of an accused and states:
(1)The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by an accused to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character.
(2)If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that an accused is generally a person of good character has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is not generally a person of good character.
(3)If evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that an accused is a person of good character in a particular respect has been admitted, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced to prove (directly or by implication) that the accused is not a person of good character in that respect.
[13]The Act s 109.
Section 110 does not make character evidence admissible. Rather, it states that certain exclusionary rules do not apply to such evidence. The section deals with when an accused adduces evidence of good character generally (s 110(2)) or in a particular respect (s 110(3)). Good character evidence may be of considerable benefit to an accused. A failure to call available good character evidence has been found to result in a substantial miscarriage of justice.[14] If the accused adduces evidence of good character, the prosecution may be permitted to adduce evidence in rebuttal.
[14]De Silva v The Queen [2013] VSCA 339, [19]–[24] and the cases referred to therein.
A jury may use evidence of good character in one or both of two ways. One, it may make the accused’s out‑of‑court statements or evidence more credible. Two, it may make it less likely that the accused committed the offence. However, before either of those two ways can be considered by a jury, they must first determine that the accused is a person of good character. The standard direction commences with the words, ‘If you accept that the accused is a person of good character…’. The purpose of rebuttal evidence addresses this requirement. It is admitted to negate the defence’s claim to be of good character.
If evidence has been led to prove that the accused is a person of good character ‘in a particular respect’, then pursuant to s 110(3), the prosecution is confined to leading rebuttal evidence in that particular respect if they seek to avoid the operation of the exclusionary hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules.[15] The sub‑section does not expressly limit the rebuttal evidence to ‘mirror image’ evidence. However, if the proposed rebuttal evidence goes beyond evidence that the accused is not a person of good character in the same particular respect, such evidence may well fall foul of one of the exclusionary rules.
[15]Omot v The Queen [2016] VSCA 24, [20]–[27].
Character evidence, good or bad, invariably employs a form of tendency reasoning. However, ‘bad character’ is not the converse of ‘good character’. At common law, rebuttal evidence was not available to support the prosecution case. It has been held that the common law position continues to apply under the Act.[16] Evidence of bad character cannot go to the likelihood that the accused committed the offence; that is, it does not permit of tendency or propensity reasoning. This applies irrespective of whether good character evidence is led generally or in a particular respect.
[16]R v El‑Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461, [86]–[87] (Tobias JA and Hoeben J and Smart A‑J agreeing).
Section 137
Pursuant to s 137, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The applicable principles governing s 137 have been canvassed in my two earlier rulings.[17]
[17]DPP v DT (Ruling No 1) and DPP v DT (Ruling No 2).
The good character evidence
MH states the accused was always kind and calm with Christopher, who had autism. She never had any issues or concerns about the accused’s behaviour towards Christopher or Oscar. She states he is a wonderful father, who has never been violent towards or in the presence of the children. She describes the accused as kind, loving and supportive.[18]
[18]Depositions, p 145.
At the s 198B hearing, MH agreed that the accused was an involved father throughout the first 18 months of Christopher’s life. He cared for Christopher and helped around the house. The accused took an extended period of leave so he could be home to help with Christopher when Oscar was born. He also helped care for Oscar, including settling him and changing his nappies.
The rebuttal evidence
All the proposed rebuttal evidence is found in the statement of TT. For convenience, the nine paragraphs sought to be led are annexed to this ruling.
Defence submissions
Counsel argued that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are not relevant. They concern general arguments between the accused and his ex‑wife, and it is not unusual for a person to argue with their wife. The fact that it occurs, on occasion, in front of the children, does not rebut the suggestion that the accused does not physically assault children. The evidence is incapable of rebutting the good character evidence or suggesting the accused had a disposition contrary to that adduced on behalf of the accused.
As to paragraph 6, the defence argued that TT is describing lawful chastisement. She describes the smacks as ‘general smacks’; they were within reason and she never had an issue with this. Defence conceded that the last three sentences — namely, ‘I do remember, though, there being a couple of times he went too far and hit BT. These weren’t normal smacks. They concerned me.’ —are relevant.
Defence submit that paragraph 7 is irrelevant, as TT cannot say whether the blow to BT’s chest was accidental or deliberate.
Defence concede paragraph 8 is relevant. However, it occurred five years prior to Oscar being injured, it is only one occasion, and it involves hearsay evidence from an eight‑year‑old child. TT did not witness the alleged incident, and cannot recall if she raised it with the accused. Defence submitted that the evidence would be admissible pursuant to s 110(3), but submit it should be excluded pursuant to s 137.
Counsel submitted that to the extent relevant evidence exists in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, there is a danger a jury would misuse the evidence as tendency evidence, despite any judicial direction to the contrary. Further, counsel argues that smacking an eight‑year‑old child as a form of discipline is quite different to assaulting a baby, and smacking a child does not contradict the argument that the accused has never physically assaulted a child.
Paragraph 9 is irrelevant, and the reasons as to why the accused has had supervised visits with his three children since separation are also irrelevant. There was an agreement made between TT and the accused, but her belief as to why the agreement was put in place is not relevant.
Prosecution submissions
The prosecution submitted that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 must be read as a whole, and the various allegations contained in TT’s statement need to be read collectively. If the matters are viewed in isolation, they may appear to be irrelevant; for example, arguments between TT and the accused. However in context, the arguments achieve relevance as they are happening in front of the children. This rebuts the assertion that the accused has never assaulted a child, and that his general demeanour and behaviour towards children was good. Further and as a ‘fall back’ position, the prosecution argued that even if the arguments did not occur in the presence of the children, it is nevertheless a form of family violence committed by the accused against his children, as the house is a ‘domestic environment and the mother and children are a family unit as a whole’.
With respect to paragraph 6, the evidence that the accused hit BT is relevant. TT’s opinion that the smacks went ‘too far’ is relevant, and shows that what the accused did went beyond what was reasonably necessary to discipline BT. The prosecution argue the rebuttal evidence is excluded from the operation of the opinion rule.
As to paragraph 7, the prosecution argue that while TT says she cannot be sure if the strike to BT was deliberate or accidental, it was sufficiently serious for her to decide ‘enough was enough’ and end the marriage. This shows the strike, which was with a closed fist and made BT gasp for air, must have been forceful and serious.
In dealing with paragraph 8, the prosecution submitted that the fact this occurred five years ago does not mean the evidence has no relevance, given the accused seeks to lead evidence that he has ‘never’ assaulted a child and that his general demeanour and behaviour towards children has ‘always’ been good. If MH is permitted to give evidence that she has been in a relationship with the accused since 2014, and he has been wonderful with the children, this creates a false impression for the jury. The jury would be misled, as they would not know that prior to 2014 and before being with MH, that was not the case.
The prosecution relied on the decision of Omot v The Queen,[19] where the appellant was charged with rape in circumstances where there was violence over and above the sexual penetration itself. The appellant, who had prior convictions for violence, sought to adduce evidence that he was of good character ‘in a particular respect’, as he had never been charged with a sexual offence. In an advance ruling made pursuant to s 192A, the trial judge ruled that if the appellant adduced such evidence, the prosecution would be entitled to lead evidence in rebuttal of the appellant’s prior convictions for violent offending. The Court of Appeal held that the ruling was undoubtedly correct. The Court stated that to have permitted the applicant to introduce evidence that he was of good character in the way sought, without the possibility of rebuttal, would have permitted him to create a false impression of his character.[20]
[19][2016] VSCA 24.
[20]Ibid [24]–[27].
Finally, the prosecution submitted that paragraph 9 shows that the accused’s temper and other conduct was, on occasion, witnessed by the children and led to him having only supervised access after they separated. The evidence is an opinion but s 110(3) excludes from operation the opinion rule.
Consideration
The defence seek to lead evidence, through MH, that when dealing with Christopher and Oscar, the accused was a kind, gentle and caring father. He was never violent towards either of his sons. This is properly described as ‘good character evidence in a particular respect’.
In order to determine relevance, it is necessary to identify the ‘fact in issue’ in the proceeding which the evidence could rationally affect. Here, if the fact in issue is confined to how the accused was around Christopher and Oscar, the proposed rebuttal evidence lacks relevance. If the fact in issue is construed more broadly, and said to be how the accused is as a father generally, then some of the evidence has some relevance.
Dealing first with the evidence that the accused and TT used to verbally argue, and the accused on occasion punched the wall. I accept for these purposes that such conduct comes within the definition of ‘family violence’ on the basis it is ‘psychological abuse’.[21] The evidence has no relevance if the arguments did not occur in front of the children. However, in my view, the evidence that the accused and his ex‑wife used to verbally argue in front of their three children has no relevance to how the accused behaved after 2014 with Christopher and Oscar. If a broad view is taken, and the fact in issue is how the accused has behaved as a father to all his children, then the fact that the arguments occurred in front of the children has relevance.
[21]Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 322J.
Some of the proposed rebuttal evidence concerns how the accused treated his son BT, who was eight years old. I note the accused admits he slapped BT on one occasion, which he says occurred after BT hit his sister, MT. Again, if the issue is how the accused conducted himself as a father to all his children, the evidence has some relevance. However, I consider that the better view is that when considering relevance, the fact in issue is confined to how the accused behaved around, and treated, Christopher and Oscar. In those circumstances, the proposed rebuttal evidence has no relevance.
If, however, this conclusion is wrong, I will go on to consider whether the proposed rebuttal evidence falls within s 110(3).
Pursuant to 110(3), the prosecution may lead rebuttal evidence in the same ‘particular respect’ to that adduced on behalf of the accused, and such evidence is not caught by the hearsay rule, opinion rule, tendency rule and credibility rule. The rebuttal evidence may go beyond the ‘particular respect’, but if it does, those rules will all apply to the evidence. The question is therefore very similar to that posed when dealing with relevance – in what ‘particular respect’ is the accused said to be of good character?
Again, in my view, the ‘particular respect’ in which MH says the accused is of good character concerns his fathering of Christopher and Oscar. The proposed rebuttal evidence goes beyond this, and is therefore caught by the exclusionary rules. Of particular relevance are the opinion rule and rule against hearsay.
Finally and for completeness, even if the evidence was relevant and mirrored the good character evidence led by the accused, thereby avoiding the operation of the exclusionary rules listed in s 110(3), I would nonetheless exclude the evidence pursuant to s 137.
In the circumstances of this trial, the importance of the good character evidence to the accused, insofar as it affects credit, is not high. The accused admits lying to the paramedics, MH, Dr Lobo and the ‘journalist’ about what happened to Oscar. Given that, it is somewhat difficult to see how good character will greatly assist a jury, in a way which is favourable to the accused, when they are assessing the credibility of what the accused said to Dr Chifura. The accused himself admits lying about the crucial issue in the trial, namely what did he do to Oscar to cause his injuries?
The second way evidence of good character may be used by a jury is more significant for the accused. The prosecution case is that he violently assaulted his own baby. The jury will know he has another child, Christopher, and (I assume) a further child, [redacted]. If the accused is able to adduce evidence that he is a person of good character in relation to his interactions with these children, a jury may use it, in his favour, when determining the likelihood he committed the offence.
The probative value of the rebuttal evidence is low. It consists of unproven, historical allegations made by the accused’s ex‑wife. The evidence is vague as to the frequency and timeframe of most of the alleged incidents. It is unclear which arguments occurred in front of the children. It includes hearsay evidence, the source of which was an eight‑year‑old child. It also includes opinions and is equivocal on important issues — for example, when dealing with the strike to BT with a closed fist, TT states that she ‘cannot say whether it was deliberate or an accident’.
In my view, the danger of unfair prejudice is comprised of a number of factors. There are the matters referred to above that reduce the probative value of the evidence. The evidence risks creating a ‘trial within a trial’, including cross examination of TT about how she behaved in the relationship. The material is likely to be highly distracting to a jury and potentially prejudicial. There is a real risk that, despite any direction to the contrary, a jury will use it to reason that the accused is not a ‘good person’, or that he is a ‘violent man’, and reason that this makes it more likely that he lost his temper and deliberately injured Oscar. Given the narrow issue in this trial, I consider that a jury would have real difficulty using the rebuttal evidence to determine whether the accused is or is not of good character in a particular respect, but not go on to impermissibly use the evidence as a type of tendency evidence.
Conclusion
I rule that if the accused leads evidence of his good character in a particular respect, I will not permit the prosecution to lead rebuttal evidence through TT.
For the avoidance of doubt, I repeat what I said earlier in this ruling. This ruling is limited to the evidence of MH, found in her statement and her s 198B evidence. If the defence are proposing to call further good character evidence, then they should not assume that this ruling will prevent the prosecution from adducing rebuttal evidence. If further good character evidence is contemplated, and any further advance ruling sought, the defence must clearly and precisely identify the anticipated good character evidence.
Annexure
Paragraph 1
Before and after LT was born is when DT and I started to have lots of arguments. They weren’t just yelling, his fists came close to my face a few times. DT would get really angry. I remember him punching holes in walls. I would say at last half (½) a dozen times he punched holes in walls. DT would repair the holes in the plaster. He was good at fixing the holes. He would putty, sand and paint. You couldn’t even tell what had happened.
Paragraph 2
I remember one time when DT smashed the front door after an argument when he was storming out. He put his fist right through the fly wire.
Paragraph 3
The arguments between DT and I became quite regular. He would come home from work angry and the arguments would start over anything, no matter how minor. On other occasions, he could be working in the garden and something would happen, even minor, and he would just get angry.
Paragraph 4
I probably yelled at DT during these arguments and I’m not saying he was always to blame but his behaviour escalated over time. It would scare me when he would punch holes in walls and threaten me with his fists. DT’s behaviour escalated. Apart from punching holes in walls he would verbally abuse me. DT would swear a lot, name calling. These arguments, swearing and name calling often happened in front of the kids. I never called the police and that’s my biggest regret.
Paragraph 5
I remember DT was working as a chef in Werribee and would work late afternoon shifts. He would come home upset and I would make sure I was in bed because I was concerned about his temper when he arrived home. DT did yell and the kids often heard this. He would call me names and verbally abuse me.
Paragraph 6
With regards to the kids, DT would smack them if they misbehaved but they were always just general smacks and I didn’t have an issue with this. It was never over the top and within reason. I do remember though, there being a couple of times when DT went too far and hit BT. These times weren’t normal smacks and they concerned me.
Paragraph 7
The day I decided to end our relationship was in June 2013. DT punched BT in the chest. It was so hard I heard BT gasp for air. It was a backhander punch, into BT’s chest. We were in the garden at the time and I think there was a veggie patch we were working in. The kids were running around playing. I remember the kids coming towards us and DT just swinging his arm and punching BT to the middle of his chest. I don’t know what caused it or led up to it. I just remember the kids running towards us, DT swinging and then BT gasping for air. I can’t say whether it was deliberate or an accident but I was right there and definitely saw DT throw his arm back with a closed right fist which hit BT in the chest. It was then after DT hit BT in the chest, that I decided enough was enough. Straight away I told DT to get out.
Paragraph 8
I remember another time in 2013, I was in the bathroom with LT when BT came in crying and screaming. BT was holding his leg. I asked him what’s wrong and he said dad smacked me. BT showed me and there was a bruise on his left leg. Because of the bruise and how evident it was, I took a photo of it. I thought to myself this isn’t right. A smack fair enough, but a bruise to come up like that, it definitely wasn’t right. BT was only eight (8) at the time. I have a photo on my phone which was taken on the 8th of July 2013 that shows the bruise on BT’s leg that DT caused. I have provided police with a copy of this photo (Appendix B). This must have happened when DT and I were in the midst of separating and he was sleeping in LT’s room. I probably had a conversation with DT about it but I don’t recall what it was. This was the only bruise I ever noticed on the kids that I believe DT caused while we were together.
Paragraph 9
The reason DT had supervised visits with the kids was because of his temper. DT never objected to this arrangement/agreement.
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