Director of Public Prosecutions v Dingey
[2020] VCC 2061
•15 December 2020
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CR 20-01129
AP 20-1267
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| CAMERON DINGEY |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE McINERNEY |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 25 November |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 15 December 2020 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Dingey |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VCC 2061 |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject: CRIMINAL LAW
Catchwords: Sentence – Plea of guilty – Sentence appeal
Legislation Cited: s. 18, s. 74, s. 77A Crimes Act 1958
Cases Cited: Dalgliesh [2017] 91 ALJR 1063 - O'Brien [2019] VSCA 254 - Maslen v The Queen [2018] VSCA 90 - DPP v Meyers [2014] 44 VR 486 - Hogarth v The Queen [2012] VSCA 302 - Bourke [2020] VSC 130
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Ms S. Lenthall | Office of Public Prosecutions |
For the Accused | Mr W. Blake | McFarlane Criminal Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
1Firstly, is Mr Deery listening today?
2MS LENTHALL: He is, Your Honour.
3HIS HONOUR: I want to thank Mr Deery for being part of these proceedings and for providing the information he has. I also in fact want to thank everyone. These proceedings could not have occurred without the benefit of the WebEx facility, but they are, and do require an amount of cooperation, in particular from Mr Dingey and his counsel, so that this plea can proceed. It is not to be desired to sentence someone who is not present in the Court. However, given the issues of COVID-19, we have had no alternative, if the business of the Court is to run. I therefore thank all parties for their cooperation.
4Mr Dingey is aged 33. He was born on 2 June 1987. He came before this Court by way of a plea on 25 November 2020. On that day, Mr Blake appeared for him, as he does today. For the Director, Ms Lenthall appeared, as she also does today. I reiterate my thanks to everyone for the proceedings being conducted via WebEx and I formally note that these proceedings were conducted via WebEx, given the COVID-19 circumstances.
5The plea was to four charges in indictment number L11444495. All of these crimes occurred on 15 June 2020. The first charge is of home invasion. The elements which make it a home invasion, as against any other charge, is pursuant to s.77A, that the entry occurred while Mr Dingey had in his possession a firearm and was in company with his underage co-accused. The point that needs to be made is that the entry was not made in any way by utilising the firearm, which Mr Dingey had in his possession. He was in fact holding a spirit level.
6Pursuant to s.77A of the Crimes Act, as recently amended, the charge is particularly serious as is indicated by the fact that Parliament has prescribed a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment. It is also a charge which is designated as a Category 2 offence under the Crimes Act, for which pursuant to s.5(2H) of the Sentencing Act, only a custodial sentence can be imposed, unless under the terms of that section, there is a submission otherwise which is accepted by the Court. There is no such submission in this case.
7Charge 2 is intentionally causing injury to Mr Kevin Deery. That charge is an offence against s.18 of the Crimes Act, for which the maximum penalty prescribed is 10 years imprisonment.
8Charge 3 is one of theft, pursuant to s.74, for which the maximum penalty prescribed by Parliament is 10 years imprisonment. The theft of Mr Deery's property being a mobile phone, a wallet and a portion of cannabis.
9Charge 4 is also one of theft, but in this instance, the theft of a motor vehicle owned by Mr Deery, which I will describe later, which is subject to the same maximum penalty as I have detailed in Charge 3.
10Mr Dingey’s counsel Mr Blake also pleaded guilty, on Mr Dingey's behalf, to the summary offence, that pursuant to s.145 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 is being transferred to this Court, being under s.30B of the Bail Act committing an indictable offence while on bail. It is Charge 15 of the summary charges and the maximum penalty prescribed by Parliament for such is three months imprisonment. It is to be noted that upon the plea to Charge 15, the prosecution withdrew Summary Charge 16.
11The provisions of s.16(3C) Sentencing Act 1991 apply to the sentence in this matter, where each of these offences has been committed whilst on bail. Such section provides that the sentences I pronounce must be cumulative, unless otherwise directed. There are two disposal orders, which I have signed, and there is also an order to be made pursuant to s.89(4) of the Crimes Act, for the charge of car theft of cancellation and suspension of Mr Dingey’s licence.
12There were two co-offenders in this matter. The underage co-offender is of an age where her matters are to be dealt with in the Children's Court and Mr Cameron is charged with aggravated burglary, that is in the summary stream I understand at the Latrobe Magistrates' Court and to date, neither matter has been dealt with.
13Mr Dingey comes before the Court with limited priors, indeed there are no matters of any similarity to these offences, but for a dated matter which occurred in 2007, when he was convicted of recklessly cause serious injury and received a community correction order for a period of six months. It is to be noted that at the time, Mr Dingey was 19 years old. I have been provided with a number of outstanding warrant matters in Queensland, but I note there are no convictions in Queensland, but for a conviction on a bail matter in November 2017 and a contravention of a domestic violence matter in April of 2018.
14Coming then to the offending. Mr Blake accepted that Exhibit A, the prosecution opening discloses the facts upon which I am to sentence his client. The actions of Mr Dingey are truly appalling. Mr Dingey’s priors, as I have just indicated, provide no indication, apart from the matter that I have referred to which occurred when he was 19, of him being a person likely to be involved in such serious criminality. Such occurred because of Mr Dingey’s mental condition at the time, aggravated by the persistent use of drugs and in particular, the use of ice, and reasons of pent-up revenge, having been asked to remove himself from accommodation by the victim, because the victim said Mr Dingey had stolen property from him. As I say, by way of pent-up revenge and pique, exaggerated or exacerbated by a week of abuse on ice, Mr Dingey was in such a rage that he decided to proceed round to Mr Deery's house, to assault him.
15As detailed in Exhibit A, Mr Dingey and his girlfriend and a fellow offender, had previously lived with Mr Deery, who was 61 at the time. As I said, they had been thrown out for allegedly stealing property approximately three weeks before this offending. As Mr Dingey himself has said, in his letter of apology to the Court, Exhibit 4, and in the letter that he proposed to give to the victim, which the victim has determined that he does not want to see, the path to these crimes being committed by him was fuelled by his own built-up bitterness and the exaggeration or exacerbation thereof caused by drugs.
16Mr Dingey forced his way into the house, as the door was being opened by Mr Deery. Mr Dingey had a bandana on his face. He was carrying the yellow spirit level and was in possession of a firearm. He entered with an underage co-offender hence the elements of the first charge are established, that is, the charge of home invasion. It is, as a matter of logic, difficult to discriminate or precisely understand the difference between s.77A and s.77B Crimes Act 1958. That is, the charge under s.77A of home invasion and that of aggravated home invasion, but that s.77B involves a larger number of persons entering at the same time. The discrimination of those two charges is not really necessary here given the plea, however, of course one notes the same sentence applies for both charges.
17Coming back to the facts, as Mr Dingey entered into the home, he hit the victim with the spirit level. Today tendered as Exhibit F, the photograph at p.245 of the depositions shows the spirit level used. The victim dropped to the ground immediately, and to protect himself put up his hands, when he was then hit at least four times by Mr Dingey with the spirit level. Those assaults being the circumstances which make up Charge 2.
18It is important to state again that but for being in the possession of Mr Dingey, the firearm was not used in any way as a part or element of Charge 2, albeit that it was later used to threaten the victim when put to the victim's head. As I have clarified with the prosecutor today, that action and then the giving of the pistol to his co-accused, who also held it at the victim's head, does not make up any part of the offence, nor does it aggravate the crimes that I am dealing with today. However, in regard to the victim, the Court acknowledges the terror that such must have been brought upon him.
19A further offender in fact entered the premises, Mr Cameron, approximately ten minutes later. That difference in time saves Charge 1 from being an aggravated home invasion, as I have described it. Albeit both charges have the same penalty as prescribed by Parliament, the difference is that an aggravated home invasion brings with it a set non-parole period under s.11 of the Sentencing Act.
20After having so assaulted Mr Deery, Mr Dingey ransacked the home, apparently looking for drugs. Thereafter, he stole Mr Deery's wallet, his mobile phone and some cannabis, which are the items referred to in Charge 3. Then subsequently, Mr Dingey stole Mr Deery's Mitsubishi Outlander, which was valued at the time at $6,000, Charge 4 on the indictment. Incomprehensively to me, and this often seems to occur, that car was subsequently burnt out. However, Mr Dingey is not before the Court in regard to that burnout.
21Coming then to Charge 2, which as I have said, is the intentional infliction of injury upon Mr Deery. The injuries are detailed specifically at Exhibit D, photographs 104 to 107, which graphically demonstrate the beating handed out to Mr Deery. Also tendered in the plea was Exhibit E, which was the discharge summary from the Latrobe Regional Hospital, where Mr Deery was treated for three days after this assault. Those injuries are described from [14] and [15] of Exhibit A, the prosecution opening. It is pointed out, as agreed today, the reference in the victim impact statement by Mr Deery to him suffering a brain bleed is a misunderstanding of his injuries and did not occur.
22[13] reads as follows:
'An ambulance arrived, followed by the police. As a result of the offending, the victim suffered:
(a) A left sided ulnar shaft fracture with overlying swelling. That is the left forearm fracture.
(b) A comminuted third metacarpal neck fracture. That is the right hand fracture.
(c) Abrasions to the left cheek and forehead.
(d) Multiple scalp lacerations with associated hematomas'.
23[14]:
'The pattern of injuries was consistent with trauma from a blunt object, with moderate force, causing the lacerations, and significant force, causing the fractures'.
24As I said, these are the matters that make up Charge 2, the intentionally cause injury. Mr Deery has filed a victim impact statement which was read out by the prosecutor. Mr Deery has indicated in that statement the stress and anxiety that he suffered, as a result of the attack. If I read from his victim impact statement in the second paragraph, Mr Deery says:
'I was taken by ambulance to Latrobe Regional Hospital and spent three days in hospital. I had stitches under my left eye and over my eyebrow. I had 35 stitches in total, over the back of my head. My knuckles were smashed and hand bones were broken, when the man kept hitting me with a spirit level, while I was trying to protect myself. I now have limited movement in my left arm and hand and continue to see a physiotherapist. I don't know how much I'll improve. Both arms ache a lot'.
25Mr Deery went onto say he had bad bloodstains on his carpets and suffered a loss therein. Insofar as his interests in life, he now cannot garden because it is too physically demanding for his hands and arms. Mr Deery has become hypervigilant at home. His doors are always locked. He is paranoid about knocks on the door and has installed security. All of those costs and losses come about as a result of this crime and the beating imposed upon him.
26Mr Deery has been required to see a psychologist to help him deal with his stress and anxiety, because he is hoping to get back to where he was mentally, prior to this happening to him. I point out fortunately, despite the beating, in regard to the physical injuries, he has not been left with as severe consequences as he could have been, but for those issues that need to resolve in regard to his hands. I thank Mr Deery again for coming before the Court, providing the Court with details as to those injuries.
27As I assess the facts as detailed by the learned prosecutor and from the depositions, whilst certainly the elements of home invasion are established, the more serious offending here is the assault carried out in Charge 2, despite the differences between Charge 1 and 2 insofar as maximum penalty is concerned. It is my view therefore that Charge 1 is a valuable plea in the circumstances, by way of the need to establish proof of the element of trespassing, had this matter proceeded to trial. That would not necessarily have been an easy task, given the particular circumstances of the entry and the time of the assault.
28I accept the submissions of the prosecutor that Charge 1 is of course, an inherently serious charge, given the maximum penalty. It could be argued that from the time that the victim opened the door, we have the beginning of the assault committed upon him. In saying that, I do accept the features as to the criminality, detailed in Exhibit C in particular, [4](a)-(d) thereof, which are also accepted by Mr Blake.
29As to the assault charge, Charge 2, I also accept the features set out by the prosecutor in [4](e), (f) and (h). Insofar as the reference at [4](g) to the firearm, I have already classified the manner in which that occurred and the fact that it is not the basis of any charge in this indictment. I classify thereof the culpability in Charge 1 as low, but high in regard to Charge 2. The other charges in the indictment are consequential upon the entry and assault.
30I accept the authorities tendered to me by the learned prosecutor and detailed in the table, Exhibit C. They, and all cases referred to are guideposts. Further as the High Court said in Dalgliesh [2017] 91 ALJR 1063, 1075, Mr Dingey is entitled to an individualised just sentence based upon the actual circumstances of this case.
31Mr Blake accepted that culpability and criminality here were high in regard to Charge 2 and pointed out the discriminating factors in regard to Charge 1. Mr Blake further referred the Court to a similar case of O'Brien [2019] VSCA 254. However, in O'Brien, there was a far more pronounced trespass as an element of Charge 1, by which the entry was obtained by the use of a sledgehammer and the breaking of windows.
32It seems to me that the circumstances of this case are far more analogous to the case of Maslen v The Queen [2018] VSCA 90, in which I was the Sentencing Judge, where the only substantial difference as to the entry was that it was an entry at night, but again the victim was known. There was a knock on the door in that instance, whereby investigation by the victims was made. The door was not opened, as against the circumstances facing Mr Dingey, a marked trespass in Maslen took place thereafter, whereby there was a concerted kicking and smashing down of the door by three masked assailants, who overwhelmed the victims who were trying to hold the door shut against such physical assault on the door. I should also make the point that Mr Maslen had much graver priors than Mr Dingey.
33I, of course, accept the utility of the statements in DPP v Meyers [2014] 44 VR 486, [36] and the statements made in O'Brien, already referred to at [25]. In referring to sentencing decisions for aggravated burglary, being a charge under s.77, such decisions having been made subsequent to the pronouncements of the Court of Appeal in Hogarth v The Queen [2012] VSCA 302 and the statement made in O'Brien, that the change of sentencing practice as to aggravated burglary, that is s.77, after Hogarth, is also material to the sentencing exercise in a charge of home invasion, albeit that it must always be understood that a home invasion is a defined Category 2 offence.
34Coming then to Mr Blake's plea. Mr Blake tendered his written plea, Exhibit 1 and spoke to such orally. He referred me to the personal history of Mr Dingey, in particular, as set out in [2](b), (c) and (d). The factor that stands out there is the good employment record of Mr Dingey, subsequent to him leaving school.
35The first matter Mr Blake relied upon was the early plea. He referred to the utility in regard to the victim, in ensuring the matter did not proceed as a trial. As I have already said, the plea itself was, given the circumstances of my finding as to low culpability, as to Charge 1, and the potential issue if that trial went as to the issue of trespass, what I view as a very valuable plea.
36The other matter about the plea is in the sense recently referred to by the Supreme Court in Bourke [2020] VSC 130, [33], that the plea is of great assistance to the Courts at this time of crisis, and has been listed in such time. The other matter of course, as to early plea, is that this plea is almost unique in expedition in my experience, given the seriousness of the crimes. The offending took place in June 2020, we are now sentencing Mr Dingey in December of the same year. All of those matters in regard to the early plea and its ramifications, are taken into account by me and discounts provided.
37The second matter referred to was the issue of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, the period of remand is now 182 days, served almost totally during a period where the prisons have been seeking to exist under the COVID-19 situation. I might say, that they have done spectacularly successfully, in the sense that there has been no community transmission within the prisons at all to date. An achievement which seems to me remarkable. However, I do take into account the stress of being in such a situation and the stress of being concerned about contracting such disease in a prison circumstance. The fact that necessarily the restrictions meant no visitors, no programs, albeit digitally, Mr Dingey has undertaken the program set out at Exhibit 5, as best he could.
38Mr Blake also put to the Court the productive time that Mr Dingey has spent in prison on remand. Mr Dingey has been working. He has achieved, as he said in his letter of apology, Exhibit 4, self-realisation of the enormity of the crime, the suffering caused to Mr Deery and a level of insight in regard to that. Mr Blake has tendered the letter which I have referred to of apology to the Court, Exhibit 4. Mr Blake has also sought to tender a letter to Mr Deery, however I fully understand Mr Deery refusing to accept it. As I have said, Exhibit 5 shows a number of courses undertaken while in gaol and today, in support of the productive time in prison has been the further negative screens undertaken and being Exhibit 6, being the three screens from 13 November of this year to 23 November.
39The next matter relied upon by Mr Blake was the very limited priors I have already referred to. The fact that this is the first time, at the age of 33, that
Mr Dingey has had to experience gaol, and such while, in the COVID-19 crisis.40Mr Blake also submitted that I should take into account Verdins [2007] VSCA 102, [32] principles, in particular, principle five. In support of that Mr Blake asked me to take into account the opinions of the psychologist Dr Cunningham in his report dated 20 November 2020, tendered as Exhibit 2 during the plea by Mr Blake. If I read from p.5 which is [6] ‘Summary and Opinion’. Dr Cunningham says as follows:
'He presents with a chronic tendency towards aggressive and violent outbursts during times of stress. Both Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and reactions to trauma can underline such outbursts during times of stress. In my opinion, Mr Dingey's Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder stems from the violence and the threats he has been exposed to throughout his life. Most recently, Mr Dingey recalled a kidnapping in 2019, that related to his co-accused.
He struggled to cope with the loss of his children approximately three years ago. His maladaptive reaction to these stresses resulted in the abuse of methylamphetamine. At the time of his violent offence, Mr Dingey had been awake for one week and been abusing methylamphetamine. The impairment from sleep deprivation and methamphetamine would have been significant. I believe Mr Dingey's methylamphetamine abuse and sleep deprivation, were the main contributors to his offence behaviour.
It is likely that his offence would not have occurred if he had not been abusing methylamphetamine and had sufficient sleep. In my opinion,
Mr Dingey's other offences occurred in the context of the recklessness caused by his methylamphetamine abuse. Underlying Mr Dingey's drug abuse and sleep deprivation, Mr Dingey's post-traumatic stress disorder results in a tendency towards misperceiving threat and overreacting.Additionally, Mr Dingey presents with a history of being judged negatively by others. These factors increase the likelihood that Mr Dingey would act violently when confronted. However, [and importantly in regard to
Mr Blake's submission, in my opinion] these factors alone would not have been significant enough to cause the offending in the absence of the drug use and sleep deprivation'.
41Mr Blake went on to make the point, without in any way trying to interfere with the role of the Court, that Mr Dingey presents with poor emotional regulation, has certain personal risks and would be exposed to trauma in a gaol environment that may aggravate his trauma symptoms. That Mr Dingey would benefit from stability in the community through accommodation, employment and ceasing drug use and mental health support. I have no issue, given that last paragraph, in accepting that gaol, because of his mental condition will be harder for him than the average members in the community. Such is confirmed by Mr Dingey’s brother-in-law in Exhibit 3 and by his grandparents. The Prosecutor also accepts that the operation of principle five of Verdins is appropriate to be taken into account, and I do so.
42However, as is clear, and was understood in the manner in which his plea was conducted by his counsel, and indeed by Mr Dingey himself, and by prescription from Parliament, the circumstances of this case, in particular Charge 1 are such that there is of course no alternative, but for a period of imprisonment. But I take into account Verdins principle five by way of mitigation.
43Further, as set out in the written submission of Mr Blake, as I have just said, he accepts the need for a sentence of imprisonment. However, Mr Blake asked the Court to entertain in all the circumstances, in particular, the fact that Mr Dingey has no prior offences imprisonment, a lower than usual non-parole period. Mr Blake submitted that his client is a good candidate for rehabilitation. That of course, Mr Dingey, depends on you, on how you handle your mental issues and how you handle, in particular, your drug affliction.
44If you allow yourself to be the victim of methylamphetamine again, I have no doubt that you will be back before this Court. However, given the particular circumstances that occurred in your family, the particular stresses that led up to you abusing drugs, and the impact of the period in remand and the sentence I am about to pronounce upon you, one must look optimistically upon this. One hopes, that you are able now, with the insight that it said that you have gained while on remand, to rid yourself of the impact of drugs and not be involved in criminality of this type again.
45Realistically, one has to be guarded in those circumstances about rehabilitation, but optimistically, I hope that you can indeed effect the rehabilitation put to the Court, by your counsel. Your counsel also put to the Court, the issue of totality. Mr Blake relied upon the interest to the community of you effecting rehabilitation and the comments made in Azzopardi (2011) 35 VR 43, [35], as to the benefits to be achieved by the community if you can effect rehabilitation. Finally, Mr Blake put to the Court that, despite the seriousness of these crimes, the sentence imposed should not be crushing. Mr Blake asked the Court to take into account, the discriminating issues involving this offending, which I have referred to.
46Given the fact that you are not present here Mr Dingey, another variant on sentencing will take place, you just remain where you are. Coming therefore to sentence you for these crimes and taking into account all of the matters that I have referred to, on Charge 1 of home invasion, you will be sentenced to imprisonment of three years.
47On Charge 2, the intentionally causing injury to Mr Deery, imprisonment of two years. On Charge 3, the theft charge of Mr Deery's personal items, imprisonment of three months and Charge 4, the theft of Mr Deery's car, imprisonment of nine months.
48On the summary offence to which your counsel pleaded guilty on your behalf of committing an indictable offence while being on bail, imprisonment of one month.
49As I have earlier said, the provisions of s.16(3C) of the Sentencing Act 1991 apply in this matter. However, as will be indicated in the sentence I am about to pronounce, given the issue of totality, it is not appropriate to fully cumulate the sentences as prescribed by s.16(3C) and I direct as follows. In regard to Charge 1, such three years will be the base sentence. To be served cumulatively upon that sentence of three years, and upon each other, is six months of the sentence of two years, imposed in Charge 2, and one month of the sentence of nine months, imposed in regard to Charge 4, making therefore a total effective sentence that the Court imposes upon you Mr Dingey, of three years and seven months.
50You must serve two years and three months before being eligible for parole. I note pursuant to s.18 of the Sentencing Act, that you have served on remand 182 days, which I declare to have been service of this sentence and order that such declaration be recorded in the records of this Court.
51It is necessary, according to Parliament, for me to tell you the benefit of your plea of guilty. You are, as a result of your plea, now sentenced to a sentence of three years and seven months, with an non-parole period to serve, less your pre-sentence detention, of two years and three months. Can I tell you that had you not pleaded guilty, the total effective sentence you would have been sentenced to would be a period of four years and nine months, with a minimum of three years to serve.
52I have signed the disposal order sought.
53Insofar as the appeal is concerned, I formally set aside all orders down below. Insofar as the sentences for those matters are concerned, I reimpose such sentences and the only alteration I make is that insofar as the loss of licence imposed by the Magistrate of six months, while I reimpose the order, I order that such order commence on 2 October 2020.
54Insofar as the indictable matters, pursuant to s.89(4) of the Sentencing Act, I cancel all licences held by you Mr Dingey, and order that you be forbidden from applying for a licence for a period of three months from today. That period will be essentially subsumed in the period to be served from 2 October by the appeal and further sentence imposed thereon, but in regard to the six months from 2 October 2020.
55If it was not clear, because the Sentencing Act makes this clear, but I specifically say the sentence imposed in the Magistrates' Court, which has been discharged by me and the further sentence imposed upon you by way of appeal, such sentence is not to be served cumulatively, but pursuant to the Sentencing Act will simply be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in the indictment.
56Are there any other matters that I have to clarify or any matters that you need clarified, either Ms Lenthall or Mr Blake?
57MS LENTHALL: Yes, Your Honour, there was just some other orders in relation to the appeal matters. So for example, there were forfeiture orders as well as compensation ‑ ‑ ‑
58HIS HONOUR: Yes, I have signed those. I am sorry, should formally ‑ ‑ ‑
59MS LENTHALL: As well as the ‑ ‑ ‑
60HIS HONOUR: I should formally indicate, I have signed the forfeitures in the Magistrates' Court Act and I have also signed the s.86 orders.
61MS LENTHALL: Yes, thank you Your Honour.
62HIS HONOUR: Which are compensation to two people who were the victims of the thefts of Mr Dingey.
63MS LENTHALL: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
64HIS HONOUR: Yes thank you all for your assistance. Mr Dingey, I hope that you, as you indicate in your letters to the Court, achieve freedom from drugs and ensure that your serious criminal offending, which has now produced this sentence of gaol, does not occur again in your life, as your priors positively indicate, that it should once you get yourself rid of the influence of drugs. Good luck.
65OFFENDER: Thank you, Your Honour.
66HIS HONOUR: So far as Mr Deery is concerned, I thank you again for your assistance in the Court and for providing the Court with the victim impact statement that you have. Yes thank you all.
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