IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M122 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Applicant
and
GEORGE ELLIOTT DICKSON
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 2012, AT 10.03 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.J.C. SILBERT, SC: If it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.L. SONNET, on behalf of the applicant, and Mr Sonnet will make the submissions. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic))
MR O.P. HOLDENSON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.A. DANN, for the respondent. (instructed by Marshall (C.) & Associates)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Sonnet.
MR SONNET: Your Honours, we say that the special leave point that is identified in this application is of particular importance to the administration of criminal justice in Victoria. The point that we seek to raise is the correct approach to be taken by a sentencing judge when sentencing an offender for offences that have been committed while subject to a parole release order and at the time that the offender falls to be sentenced the offender’s parole sentence has then been reclaimed by the correctional authorities.
That particular scenario plays out on a daily basis in the courts in Victoria and raises a number of important sentencing principles of which there are at least four and there is a considerable degree of interplay between the four relevant principles and those principles are extracted in the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
CRENNAN J: Well, this case had its unusual circumstances in a context of you referring there to these matters playing out recurrently, as did Bradley’s Case also.
MR SONNET: That is so, your Honour.
CRENNAN J: If one looks at page 271 of the application book, paragraph 51, there is a statement there in relation to matters of principle. I particularly draw your attention to the last two sentences and I had some difficulty in those circumstances in appreciating why it was that you thought the point needed to be agitated in the context of this case.
MR SONNET: Well, the point that we seek to raise is the efficacy of the orders made by the trial judge and those orders, obviously, were challenged by the Crown in the Court of Appeal. Those orders, as they ‑ ‑ ‑
HAYNE J: Having been orders that were invited by the prosecution before the sentencing judge.
MR SONNET: That is accepted ‑ ‑ ‑
HAYNE J: How many times then would this man have stood for sentence? I think we are up to about number four, are we not?
MR SONNET: That is so, your Honour.
HAYNE J: Why would it be in the interests of justice in this particular case that the prosecution, having invited a particular sentencing disposition on, I think,…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 65
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of section 401(2) of the *Crimes Act 1958* (Vic). Specifically, the appeal raised the question of whether the prosecution was required to prove that the deception employed by the accused was the sole or principal cause of the financial advantage being obtained, or whether it was sufficient to prove that the deception was a cause of the financial advantage.
In their joint judgment, Hayne and Crennan JJ held that the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of section 401(2). Their Honours reasoned that the statutory language did not require the deception to be the sole or principal cause of the financial advantage. Instead, it was sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the deception was a cause of the financial advantage being obtained. The Court of Appeal's previous finding that the deception must be the sole or principal cause was therefore overturned.
The High Court allowed the DPP's appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, and remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to determine the remaining grounds of appeal that had not been considered.
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