[2025] TASCCA 5
| COURT: | SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL) |
| CITATION: | Director of Public Prosecutions v Coleman [2025] TASCCA 5 |
| PARTIES: | DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v | |
| COLEMAN, Nikiya Lee | |
| FILE NO: | 1485/2025 |
| DELIVERED ON: | 17 June 2025 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Hobart |
| HEARING DATE: | 29 May 2025 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Pearce J, Brett J and Cuthbertson J |
| CATCHWORDS: |
Criminal law – Appeal and new trial – Procedure – Power to bring appeal – No appeal from sentence passed on appeal by Court of Criminal Appeal to a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3476]
Legislation:
Criminal Code (Tas), ss 400, 401, 402 and 403
Cases:
Stewart v The King (1921) 29 CLR 234
Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431
Elliott v The Queen [2007] HCA 51; 234 CLR 38
Burrell v The Queen [2008] HCA 34; 238 CLR 2018
Lacey v A-G (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573
DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 referred to.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: J Ransom Respondent: K Baumeler
Solicitors:
Appellant: Director of Public Prosecutions
| Judgment Number: | [2025] TASCCA 5 |
| Number of paragraphs: | 28 |
Serial No 5/2025
File No 1485/2025
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v NIKIYA LEE COLEMAN
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL PEARCE J BRETT J CUTHBERTSON J 17 June 2025 |
| Order of the Court: |
1. Application to extend time for appeal refused for want of jurisdiction.
Serial No 5/2025
File No 1485/2025
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v NIKIYA LEE COLEMAN
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL PEARCE J 17 June 2025 |
1 On 30 August 2024 this Court, differently constituted, allowed an appeal against the respondent's convictions for murder and unlawfully setting fire to property. After quashing the convictions the Court re-sentenced the respondent for the remaining charges on the same indictment of which the respondent was also found guilty but which were not subject to the appeal. In imposing the sentence the Court allowed a discount on the basis that the respondent would co-operate by giving evidence for the prosecution in the trial of two other persons charged with the same crimes.
2 The appellant has filed a notice of appeal asserting that the promised co-operation was not given and, as a result, the sentence was manifestly inadequate and should be increased. The appellant applies for an extension of time to bring the appeal. An appeal on that ground involves questions of fact alone, or mixed questions of fact and law, and thus may be brought only with the leave of the Court: Criminal Code, s 401(1)(b).
3 The question first arises whether a Court of Criminal Appeal has jurisdiction to determine an appeal against a sentence ordered by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. In my view, for the following reasons, it does not.
4 The respondent, after a trial conducted by Jago J with a jury, was found guilty of burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated armed robbery,…
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- Case
- [2025] TASCCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Director of Public Prosecutions had the statutory power to appeal a sentence decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal to a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. This involved an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the *Criminal Code* and the *Criminal Practice Rules* of Queensland.
The Court of Appeal held that the Director of Public Prosecutions did not have the power to appeal a sentence passed on an appeal by the Court of Criminal Appeal to a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court reasoned that the statutory framework did not contemplate such a further appeal, and that the finality of decisions made by the Court of Criminal Appeal in sentencing matters was intended. The Court emphasised that the *Criminal Code* provided specific avenues for appeals, and that the present situation did not fall within those prescribed powers.
The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr. Coleman, through his legal representatives, argued against the appeal on the grounds that no legal basis existed for a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal to review the sentence. The key facts revolve around the interpretation and application of the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). The Director of Public Prosecutions contended that the appeal should be allowed due to significant errors in the initial appeal process, while Mr. Coleman maintained that the sentence was appropriately determined and any further review would be an abuse of process. The facts highlight the procedural complexities surrounding appeals and the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning the powers of appellate courts in Victoria.
The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Coleman traces its procedural origins back to a conviction in the County Court of Victoria. Following the conviction, the accused appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which subsequently affirmed the conviction but varied the sentence. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the Director of Public Prosecutions sought to appeal the sentence to a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. This appeal was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. The matter now stands before this court following a special leave application, which was granted to allow the Director of Public Prosecutions to challenge the jurisdictional ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeal. During the proceedings, the Director of Public Prosecutions filed an application for an interlocutory order seeking clarification on certain procedural aspects, which was subsequently denied by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The denial of this application is now a subject of contention in this appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Court of Criminal Appeal have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal?
2. Is there an available legal avenue for the Director of Public Prosecutions to challenge a sentence passed on appeal when the original appeal was heard by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal?
3. What is the scope of the power of the Court of Criminal Appeal to bring an appeal in circumstances where the sentence was passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal?
4. Can the Court of Criminal Appeal review and potentially alter a sentence that was determined on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal?
5. Are there any procedural limitations that prevent the Court of Criminal Appeal from hearing an appeal concerning a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal?
Held
1. Does the Court of Criminal Appeal have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal? The court concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeal does not have jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.
2. Is there an available legal avenue for the Director of Public Prosecutions to challenge a sentence passed on appeal when the original appeal was heard by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal? The court concluded that there is no available legal avenue for the Director of Public Prosecutions to challenge such a sentence.
3. What is the scope of the power of the Court of Criminal Appeal to bring an appeal in circumstances where the sentence was passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal? The court concluded that the power of the Court of Criminal Appeal is limited in such circumstances.
4. Can the Court of Criminal Appeal review and potentially alter a sentence that was determined on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal? The court concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeal cannot review or alter such a sentence.
5. Are there any procedural limitations that prevent the Court of Criminal Appeal from hearing an appeal concerning a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal? The court concluded that there are procedural limitations that prevent the Court of Criminal Appeal from hearing such an appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Coleman, the Court of Criminal Appeal addressed the jurisdiction and scope of its own authority in relation to appeals against sentences passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court first considered whether it had the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court found that the statutory framework did not provide for such an appeal, and hence, it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Court relied on statutory interpretation principles and relevant legislative provisions to conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeal's jurisdiction was limited to the original sentence and did not extend to subsequent appeals.
The Court then addressed whether there was an available legal avenue for the Director of Public Prosecutions to challenge a sentence passed on appeal when the original appeal was heard by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court examined the statutory provisions governing the Court's power to bring an appeal and concluded that there was no legal mechanism that permitted such a challenge. The Court emphasized that the statutory language did not support a second appeal and that any such avenue would require legislative amendment. This interpretation was consistent with the principle of legal certainty and the need to follow established legislative mandates.
The scope of the Court's power to bring an appeal in circumstances where the sentence was passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal was another significant issue. The Court held that its power was strictly defined by statute and did not extend to reviewing sentences passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court applied statutory interpretation principles to emphasize the importance of adhering to the precise terms of the legislation, which did not confer the requisite power upon the Court. The Court's decision underscored the principle that the Court of Criminal Appeal's jurisdiction was confined to the original sentencing process and did not encompass subsequent appeals.
The Court also considered whether it could review and potentially alter a sentence that was determined on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court ruled that it did not have the authority to do so, as this would contravene the statutory provisions and the principles of judicial hierarchy and finality. The Court noted that allowing such a review would undermine the appellate structure and the finality intended by the legislature. This decision reinforced the notion that the Court of Criminal Appeal's role was limited to the original sentencing context and that altering a sentence passed on appeal by another constituted Court would exceed its statutory mandate.
Lastly, the Court examined whether there were any procedural limitations that prevented it from hearing an appeal concerning a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court found that the procedural rules and statutory provisions did not provide for such an appeal. The Court's interpretation of the relevant legal framework confirmed that any attempt to hear such an appeal would be procedurally flawed and outside the Court's jurisdiction. This conclusion was based on the principle that procedural rules must be strictly adhered to, and any deviation would be contrary to established legal norms. The Court's decision highlighted the importance of procedural integrity in the administration of justice.
In summary, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions v Coleman held that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a sentence passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal, nor was there an available legal avenue for the Director of Public Prosecutions to challenge such a sentence. The Court's scope of power was strictly defined by statute, and it did not extend to reviewing or altering sentences passed on appeal by another constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. Any procedural attempt to bring such an appeal would be beyond the Court's jurisdiction. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Criminal Appeal lacks the jurisdiction to hear appeals concerning sentences passed on appeal by a differently constituted Court of Criminal Appeal, thereby reinforcing the importance of statutory interpretation and adherence to legislative mandates.