Director of Public Prosecutions v Carr
[2024] ACTSC 130
•1 May 2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Carr |
Citation: | [2024] ACTSC 130 |
Hearing Date: | 1 May 2024 |
Decision Date: | 1 May 2024 |
Before: | McWilliam J |
Decision: | Offender resentenced to a term of imprisonment of 11 months, suspended after 2 months and 2 days upon the offender entering into a good behaviour order. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – Judgment and Punishment – breach of suspended sentence – obtaining property by deception –whether to resentence – where breach was not especially serious – where offender had taken rehabilitative steps including seeking restoration of children to her care – offender resentenced |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 86, 110, 110(2), 110(4) Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 6, 12, 13, 33(1), 33(1)(a), 33(1)(m), 33(1)(za), 35(2) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 326, 347 |
Cases Cited: | Bukulaptji v R (2009) 24 NTLR 210 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Cooke [2007] NSWCA 2; 168 A Crim R 379 Director of Public Prosecutions v Padreny [2024] ACTCA 4 DPP v Deighan (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 295 DPP v JJ (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 74 Guy v Anderson [2013] ACTSC 5 Gyory v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 28 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 R v Beniamini (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 32 R v Bennett [2017] ACTSC 104 R v Buckman (1987) 47 SASR 303 R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 R v PM (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 358 Saga v Reid [2010] ACTSC 59 Taylor v Bowden [2009] ACTSC 13 |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions Stephanie Felicia Carr (Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel H Robinson (DPP) D Ager (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Peter Agoth & Associates ( Offender) | |
File Number: | SCC 46 of 2023 |
Charge Numbers: | CAN 7844/2023 CAN 745/2024 |
McWILLIAM J:
1․The offender in this matter is before the Court for breaching a good behaviour order, which was part of a sentence imposed by Refshauge AJ on 14 November 2023. His Honour had sentenced the offender to a term of imprisonment of 10 months commencing on 13 November 2023 and concluding on 12 September 2024, which was then suspended after 2 months and 1 day, upon entry into a 12-month supervised good behaviour order (the GBO).
2․That sentence was imposed in relation to the following two charges of using false documents, contrary to s 347 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code):
(a)CAN 7374/2020: the provision of three fraudulent medical certificates on 1 April 2020, 11 June 2020 and 17 June 2020 to account for a failure to report on bail in relation to a previous charge;
(b)CAN 7377/2020: the provision of a fraudulent medical certificate on 1 April 2020 to account for her partner’s non-attendance for his own bail reporting condition.
3․The maximum penalty for an offence under s 347 of the Criminal Code is 10 years’ imprisonment, a fine of $160,000, or both.
The breach of the GBO
4․The offender was released from custody pursuant to the GBO on 13 January 2024. The next day on 14 January 2024, while on conditional liberty by virtue of the GBO, the offender used a stolen bank card to purchase alcohol, cigarettes and a phone charger from the IGA Evatt supermarket, contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code (CAN 745/2024).
5․On 4 March 2024, the offender was sentenced in the Magistrates Court in relation to the following charges:
(a)For the offence of obtaining property by deception, namely using a stolen bank card on 14 January 2024 to purchase alcohol, cigarettes and a phone charger (CAN 745/2024), a term of imprisonment of 3 months was imposed, commencing on 15 January 2024 and concluding on 14 April 2024; and
(b)For the offence of obtaining property by deception, by joint commission, namely using a stolen bank card on 14 January 2024 to purchase $446.70 worth of gift cards, sunglasses and phone credit (CAN 7844/2023), a term of imprisonment for 2 months was imposed, commencing on 25 January 2024 and concluding 24 March 2024.
6․The total effective sentence was 3 months’ imprisonment, commencing 15 January 2024 and concluding on 14 April 2024. The offending that culminated in the above sentence constitutes the breach of the GBO.
The Court’s Task
7․Upon conviction for obtaining property by deception, which is an offence punishable by imprisonment, the GBO must be cancelled: s 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (CSA Act).
8․The relevant parts of the provision are set out as follows:
110 Cancellation of good behaviour order with suspended sentence order
(1)This section applies if—
(a)an offender’s good behaviour order was made under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005, section 12 (3) (Suspended sentences) on the offender’s conviction for an offence; and
(b)a court is satisfied the offender has breached any of the offender’s good behaviour obligations.
(2)The court must cancel the good behaviour order and either—
(a)impose the suspended sentence imposed for the offence; or
(b)re-sentence the offender for the offence.
...
(4)The Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 applies to the re-sentencing in the same way that it applies to the sentencing of an offender on conviction for the offence.
9․The task for the Court is thus that set out in s 110(2) of the CSA Act above, namely to decide whether to impose the suspended sentence imposed for the offence, or re-sentence the offender for the offence.
Should the Court impose the suspended sentence or resentence?
Applicable principles
10․The applicable principles are uncontroversial. I have recently referred to them in DPP v JJ (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 74 (JJ) at [25]-[31]. They are repeated generally here for convenience.
11․In determining the appropriate response to the breach of a GBO in any given case, various factors may arise for consideration. Non-exhaustively, they include the following:
(a)The proportion of the term of the good behaviour orderthat had been served without breach: R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 (Curtis) at [18];
(b)Any rehabilitation attained by the offender prior to the breach: Curtis at [18];
(c)The nature of the offence which breached the order, including whether it is similar to the offence for which the sentence of imprisonment, then suspended, was imposed: Curtis at [18];
(d)The relative seriousness of the offence so that the imposition of the suspended sentence would be disproportionate to the gravity of the breach offending Curtis at [18];
(e)The prospects of the offender's rehabilitation: Curtis at [18];
(f)The actual facts of the matter for which the offender was first sentenced: see R v Beniamini (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 32 (Beniamini) at [53];
(g)Whether the breach indicates an intention to disregard the obligation to be of good behaviour: Bukulaptji v R (2009) 24 NTLR 210 (Bukulaptji) at [35], cited in R v PM (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 358 (PM) at [22];
(h)Whether the offender has received any warnings with respect to breaches: PM at [28];
(i)The level of understanding of the offender of her obligations under the terms of the order and the consequences of the breach: see PM (No 2) [2015] ACTSC [22]; Bukulaptji at [35]; and
(j)The nature of judicial and community resources previously devoted to the offender: see R v Bennett [2017] ACTSC 104 at [11].
12․There is no presumption in favour of imposing the original sentence that had been suspended: Guy v Anderson [2013] ACTSC 5 (Anderson) at [83]. However, there are many statements by courts across multiple jurisdictions of the principle that generally a breach of the conditions of a good behaviour orderor the like following the suspension of a sentence will result in the offender serving the sentence that was suspended: see, for example, R v Buckman (1987) 47 SASR 303 at 304; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Cooke [2007] NSWCA 2; 168 A Crim R 379 at 386; Taylor v Bowden [2009] ACTSC 13 at [36]; Saga v Reid [2010] ACTSC 59 at [99]–[101], all of which were cited by Refshauge J in Anderson at [87].
13․One of the objects in s 6 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act) is to promote respect for the law and the maintenance of a just and safe society. The statements of sentencing judges to which I have referred reflect that underlying objective. The imposition of a suspended sentence upon breach prevents the justice system, and specifically the suspended sentence regime created by the Sentencing Act, from falling into disrepute.
14․If the Court does not enforce the statutory regime by imposing the suspended sentence (or otherwise re-sentence the offender in a manner that properly reflects the breach), then the incentive to comply with good behaviour obligations might be reduced, which, as I said in JJ at [29], may in turn cause the community to perceive that the suspended sentence regime is merely a ‘toothless tiger’. A reduced incentive to comply with a court order risks the maintenance of a safe society. Community perception about the lack of effectiveness of a particular sentencing measure also has an impact on the respect for the law itself.
15․Accordingly, the Court should decisively communicate to the community, the offender, and anyone else who may be contemplating breaching their obligations under orders of the Court, that people who breach the trust that the justice system places in them in a serious way “will be dealt with swiftly and seriously to reflect that breach of trust”: JJ at [30].
16․For the same reason, if the Court determines resentencing is the most appropriate course, the Court ought ordinarily to impose a more severe sentence, because the breach of a good behaviour ordershows that the trust reposed in the offender has been eroded: R v Ogilvie (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 265 at [30]. In resentencing, all relevant sentencing considerations are to be taken into account as required by s 110(4) of the CSA Act: see Beniamini at [52].
17․One of those factors is the aggravating feature of offending while on conditional liberty, as set out by Norrish AJ in DPP v Deighan (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 295. His Honour considered at [93] whether the breach of conditional liberty represented:
… “a betrayal of opportunity for rehabilitation offered by (conditional liberty)”: see R v Tran [1999] NSWCCA 109 at [15]. There are degrees of seriousness of breaches of conditional liberty. For example, offences committed whilst on parole for sentences imposed for like offending may properly be regarded as the most serious examples of breaches of conditional liberty.
Applying the principles to the present breach
18․Here, the nature of the offending which constituted the breach was serious because it was itself criminal conduct. The offences also involved a degree of dishonesty, in that a stolen credit card was used. However, I agree with how the Prosecution described the conduct, namely that the fresh offending “was not an especially serious or sophisticated example of its kind.”
19․The breach also occurred the day following the offender’s conditional release. She signed an undertaking and immediately reoffended. Having heard the offender give sworn evidence, the circumstances indicate that she was spontaneous and reckless, rather than deliberately knowing that she was consciously breaching her obligations to be of good behaviour.
20․I consider the offender to have been thoughtless, which I think even she would fairly accept, but I would not go so far as to say it was cavalier, as the Prosecution submitted, because in my view, that word impliedly carries with it a conscious failure to take into account the seriousness of her obligations and the GBO undertaking itself.
21․There are two reasons which I consider favour a decision to resentence here, rather than to simply impose the remainder of the existing sentence. The first is that the conduct occurred almost immediately upon release. The offender has since spent further time in custody referable to the further offending, being the breach of the GBO, and there has been an additional day in custody which was not taken into account on the sentence for the breach offences in the Magistrates Court.
22․The second is the steps that the offender has taken towards her rehabilitation. She has put in place a number of supports that she did not have when previously released from custody. The evidence disclosed numerous outreach services, medical services and child welfare services that are presently involved in supporting the offender’s reintegration into the community following incarceration. She has her father for support. She has managed to break free of drug addiction and demonstrates that success through regular urinalysis testing with other social service providers outside the justice system.
23․The offender has also taken it upon herself to connect with pro-social groups that support her as a mother, as well as attempting to mentor people who might fall into the category of youth at risk.
24․In addition, the offender has sorted out her medication for her mental health issues, which were previously detailed in the sentencing reasons of Refshauge AJ in respect of the initial offending. She is in the process of reestablishing her training in the auto-electrical industry, a field in which she previously worked and in which she is close to obtaining a formal qualification.
25․In my view, imposing the remainder of the initial sentence would not be in the interests of the community, because it would mean that the offender was returned to custody and then released at the end of her term with no supervisory support, which she clearly needs to transition back to the community successfully.
26․Imposing the remainder of the sentence would also undo all the steps which the offender has proactively taken to raise herself up in terms of rehabilitation. The fact that the Court may still be guarded about her overall rehabilitation prospects does not mean that rehabilitation should not be prioritised, particularly where there are very young children involved in the equation. That is the case here for this offender, as a mother of an 18-month-old child, whose future living arrangements plainly depend on the outcome of this sentence hearing.
27․I therefore consider it appropriate to resentence. Consistently with what has been described (in Gyory v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 28 at [10]) as the Prosecution’s “obligation” where the Court is resentencing, the Prosecution has provided the relevant material to enable the Court to engage in the re-resentencing task in the same way as if it was sentencing the offender on conviction for the offence, applying s 110(4) of the CSA Act. The exhibits before the Court on the initial sentence were tendered as well as the transcript of the sentencing hearing before Refshauge AJ.
Nature and circumstances of the offences (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)
28․I have taken into account and respectfully adopt what was set out by Refshauge AJ, who described the previous offending as constituting a rolled-up charge relating to three purported medical certificates for herself, and the other charge constituting one purported medical certificate for her partner.
29․His Honour set out in detail the circumstances as described in the agreed statement of facts relating to the offending between 1 April 2020 and 17 June 2020. The offending arose out of the offender being granted bail for a separate offence. The grant of bail came with conditions, one of which was that the offender had an obligation to report to the Belconnen Police Station every Wednesday.
Medical certificates presented on 1 April 2020
30․On Wednesday, 25 March 2020, the offender failed to report to the said police station. On 1 April 2020, she subsequently presented, by showing to police on her phone and sending it by email, a medical certificate dated 25 March 2020, which purported to be issued from a doctor at Ginninderra Medical Centre, excusing the non-attendance at the police station.
31․On 1 April 2020, the offender also presented, again by email, a similar medical certificate for her partner dated 19 March 2020, who was also subject to bail conditions, was required to report to the police station, and had failed to do so on 23 March 2020.
Medical certificate presented on 11 June 2020
32․The offender again entered bail conditions which required her to report daily to the Belconnen Police Station. On 9 June 2020, the offender contacted the Police Station, stating she was sick and unable to report as required on 10 June 2020. She then failed to report on that date.
33․The following day (11 June 2020) the offender provided police with a medical certificate, again purporting to be issued by a doctor from Ginninderra Medical Centre on 8 June 2020, seeking to excuse her failure to report on 10 June 2020.
Medical certificate presented on 17 June 2020
34․On 16 June 2020, the offender again contacted the Belconnen Police Station indicating that she was sick and unable to report that day. On 17 June 2020, the offender presented a further medical certificate to police, purporting to be issued by the same doctor from Ginninderra Medical Centre. The medical certificate was dated 16 June 2020.
Ginninderra Medical Centre confirms the certificates are false
35․Investigations with the relevant medical centre from which the medical certificates were purportedly issued confirmed that each of the medical certificates was false. The doctor involved confirmed that none of the medical certificates had been issued or signed by her. On 18 June 2020, the offender attended the Belconnen Police Station, was cautioned and made admissions. She subsequently pleaded guilty.
36․Refshauge AJ dealt with the objective seriousness of the offending, which may be summarised as follows:
(a)His Honour referred to the maximum penalty of the offence (10 years’ imprisonment) as allowing a comparison between the current offence and other offences, taken together with the other relevant factors, and as providing a yardstick, impliedly applying Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [31].
(b)His Honour then referred to the wide variety of circumstances and the necessity to take into account various factors which may mitigate or aggravate the conduct, in accordance with current sentencing practice: s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act.
(c)His Honour determined that the maximum penalty indicated that using a false instrument was a very serious offence, although “not the most serious in the criminal calendar”.
(d)His Honour then expounded on the offender’s purpose in using the false document, as being to influence the exercise of a public duty in not reporting a breach of bail, were the police officers to accept the medical certificates as genuine.
(e)His Honour then referred to various relevant factors, including:
(i) The amount of money involved;
(ii) The degree of premeditation and sophistication;
(iii) The time period over which the offence was committed;
(iv) The repeat nature of the offending as suggesting an intention to continue unless the police became aware of the breach; and
(v) The level of dishonesty or breach of trust.
(f)His Honour found that the document was used to undermine the criminal justice system, that the offender did not abscond or commit further offences as a result of the conduct, that there was clearly some level of premeditation and planning, but that there was no great sophistication.
37․His Honour also referred to the first charge as being a rolled-up charge, and applied R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83, where it was stated at [161]-[164]:
161.As noted in describing the facts of the various offences, a number of the counts are what are known as rolled-up counts. As described in R v Jones [2004] VSCA 68 at [13], a rolled-up count is a collection of counts bundled into a single count. It is different from a representative count. It can only be followed as a procedure with the consent of the accused. Similarly, it can only be used for the purposes of a plea of guilty, else the count would be duplicated.
162. While this is a common approach in other jurisdictions, especially Victoria, it is not regularly used in this Territory. It was, it appears, used as early as 1995: R v Hennessy (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Gallop, Sheppard and Nicholson JJ, 23 May 1996) at 7. In 2013, it was doubted that it was an appropriate way to proceed in Kaye v Siddiq [2013] ACTSC 62 at [21], though his Honour, it appears to have, with respect, been wrong to hold that the prosecution could not, on the plea of guilty, have used a rolled-up charge. In any event, it was made clear in R v Naqvi [2016] ACTSC 345, that the approach was available in the Territory.
163. The rolled-up charge, though comprehending a number of offences, is for sentencing purposes, the one offence: R v Beary [2004] VSCA 229; 11 VR 151 at 157; [14]. The maximum penalty for the offence applies but only one sentence can be imposed. The sentence is not invariably the sum of the individual sentences that could have been imposed had the individual offences been separately charged, though it may be: R v Samia [2009] VSCA 5 at [12]. It, therefore, not only considerably simplifies the task of a sentencing judge, but it provides a considerable benefit to the offender: R v Jones at [13].
164. Nevertheless, the criminality encompassed in a rolled-up count is greater than that of an individual count: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Watson [2016] VSCA 73 at [82]; Ly v The Queen [2014] FCAFC 175; 227 FCR 304 at 331; [125]; R v Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 at [65]. This may also have a bearing on accumulation and concurrency: R v De Leeuw [2015] NSWCCA 183 at [116].
38․I respectfully agree with his Honour’s discussion as summarised above.
39․Refshauge AJ then dealt with the subjective circumstances of the offending set out in a number of paragraphs of s 33(1) of the Sentencing Act, which may be summarised as follows:
(a)The offender was then 42 years of age and her family circumstances were described;
(b)She was unemployed and in receipt of Centrelink benefits, although she did have a desire to return to employment;
(c)She had experiences with serious family violence, with children in the care of Child and Youth Protection Services;
(d)The offender has had physical challenges arising from family violence as well as a car accident, which led to her abstaining from alcohol;
(e)The offender has also experienced mental health issues, resulting in a referral for drug and alcohol assistance, which was not pursued; and
(f)The offender’s history in relation to alcohol and drugs was detailed, as well as the attempts at rehabilitation.
40․Again, those matters weigh into the considerations before the Court, along with the other evidence before the Court, to which I have referred earlier in these reasons.
Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)
41․His Honour also took into account various authorities indicative of the current sentencing practice, including discussion of cases involving partially and fully suspended sentences, which I respectfully adopt without repeating the cases here.
Previous offending and time in custody (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
42․In the original sentencing process, Refshauge AJ referred to the offender’s criminal history as including 31 recorded offences in New South Wales and in the ACT, which dates back to 1996. They involve 10 dishonesty offences, 10 drug offences, 9 traffic offences and 2 falling into more than one category.
43․In June 2023, the offender was also convicted in the Magistrates Court of 7 counts of obtaining property by deception and 1 count of unlawful possession of stolen property, which she served in full time detention for a period of 6 months between 23 December 2022 and 22 June 2023.
44․The offender was committed into custody again on 13 November 2023 pursuant to the charges currently under consideration (CAN 7374/2020 and CAN 7377/2020) and was released on 13 January 2024 upon suspension of the sentence. The latest charges saw her put into custody again on 14 January 2024, following which she has spent a total of 110 days in custody, of which only 19 days are referable to the charges under consideration, the remaining 91 days being referable to charges that were the subject of the GBO breach (CAN 745/2024 and CAN 7844/2023).
45․Here, whilst the breach was not relatively serious, the offence was committed the day after she was released on conditional liberty, and involved a recommission of the offences for which she was previously convicted in June 2023 in the Magistrates Court. The considerable antecedents are the primary reason why I accept the Prosecution’s submission as to rehabilitation prospects being guarded, in particular having regard to Refshauge AJ’s discussion as to the demonstrated difficulties evidence in the offender’s previous commitment to rehabilitation.
46․Nevertheless, on the evidence that has been given in Court today, which I accept, the offender’s prospects have, as the offender’s counsel submitted, never been better and that is a positive start, which is to be both commended and built upon, in the interests of community safety and personal deterrence. In my view, the best deterrent for an offender is one who is drug free, who has a job, who has pro-social supports, whose mental health issues are under control and who has hope and an increasing sense of self-worth in her life.
Discount for the guilty pleas
47․The offender pleaded guilty in the circumstances set out by Refshauge AJ, being after a number of adjournments. The plea followed negotiations between the parties. Having considered the matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act, and in particular s 35(2)(c), I consider it appropriate to maintain the discretionary discounts imposed by his Honour, which were approximately 11% in respect of the first charge and approximately 10% in respect of the second charge, which I consider to be consistent with the principles discussed in Director of Public Prosecutions v Padreny [2024] ACTCA 4 at [69]-[74].
Totality
48․In terms of totality and structuring the sentence, I will also preserve the sentencing structure that was initially imposed by Refshauge AJ, save as to lengthen the total sentence by 1 month to give effect to the sentencing objectives discussed above in terms of general deterrence and the decision to resentence.
49․I have also taken into account that the offender has now served a further period of imprisonment in respect of the breach offending, which may taken into account: Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 62-63. Given that the offender has only recently been released, I consider that such time may properly be considered as further time weighing in the exercise of the Court’s discretion in thinking about the manner of the sentence to be served and whether there is any necessity for any further period of time in custody to be served in order to properly reflect the overall criminality for which the offender is being sentenced, following the breach. I do not consider that any sentencing objective will be served by the offender being returned to custody, having already served 2 months and 2 days of the sentence to be imposed.
Disposition
50․It will be apparent from the above reasons that I consider nothing other than a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate to reflect the gravity of the offending. To promote rehabilitation and in light of the offender’s current circumstances following her release, it is again appropriate to substantially suspend the sentence imposed, in the hope that this time, drug-free, with extra supports, proper medication, and the potential for family reunion with her children being a strong incentive, the offender will be in a better position to comply with her undertaking to be of good behaviour.
51․I have considered whether, in addition, a fine was appropriate, but in the circumstances (and in particular the offender’s current lack of employment), I do not consider the imposition of a fine to be appropriate in this case.
Orders
52․For the above reasons, the Court makes the following orders:
(1)Pursuant to s 110(2) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (CSA Act), the good behaviour order in respect of Stephanie Felicia Carr is cancelled and the offender is resentenced as follows:
(a)For the first charge of using false documents (CAN 7374/2020), the offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8 months, reduced from 9 months on account of her guilty plea, to be backdated to commence on 29 February 2024 and conclude on 28 October 2024.
(b)For the second charge of using false documents (CAN 7377/220), a sentence of imprisonment is imposed of 5 months, reduced from 5 months and 18 days on account of her guilty plea, to be backdated to commence on 29 August 2024 and expire on 28 January 2025.
(c)Pursuant to s 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), the sentence is to be suspended from 1 May 2024.
(d)Pursuant to s 13 of the Sentencing Act,a good behaviour order is made upon the offender signing or giving an undertaking to comply with the offender’s good behaviour obligations under the CSA Act for the period during which the sentence is suspended (1 May 2024 to 28 January 2025).
(e)As part of the good behaviour order, the following conditions are imposed:
(i) The core conditions pursuant to s 86 of the CSA Act;
(ii) A probation condition whereby the offender must comply with all reasonable requirements of the Director-General or their delegate and obey all reasonable directions for such period as the person supervising deems appropriate;
(iii) All reasonable directions of the person supervising includes any direction as to alcohol and drug testing, attendance at drug rehabilitation programs and any other appropriate counselling or treatment, and not to return a positive result upon any drug and alcohol testing.
THE COURT NOTES: The offender is currently subject to urinalysis obligations with Child and Youth Protection Services and it is not intended for the above conditions to duplicate that requirement; rather the condition is imposed to facilitate cooperation as between supervising bodies so as to ensure any urinalysis conditions are not unduly onerous.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-two numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: |
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