Director of Public Prosecutions v Bignill

The appeal before the Supreme Court was brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions against the decision of a Local Court Magistrate in a matter involving an individual charged with driving while over the prescribed concentration of alcohol. The defendant was found to have a breath alcohol concentration of 0.054 and subsequently a blood alcohol concentration of 0.049. The legal issue at the heart of the appeal was whether the Local Court Magistrate had correctly interpreted a deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013, specifically Schedule 3, clause 31. The defendant sought to rely on this clause to discharge the onus of proof regarding the concentration of alcohol in their system at the time of driving.

The Supreme Court considered the proper construction of the deeming provision in question. The defendant argued that the provision allowed reliance on either the breath or blood alcohol concentration reading, whichever was more favourable. The prosecution contended that the deeming provision only operated in favour of the reading relied upon by them. The Court examined the wording of the clause and the context in which it was applied, ultimately concluding that the Local Court Magistrate had erred in their interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the deeming provision did not permit the defendant to choose between two readings; instead, it applied to the reading that was relied upon by the prosecution. Consequently, the Court found that the Local Court Magistrate had misapplied the statutory provision, leading to an incorrect outcome.

Given the misinterpretation of the statutory provision, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the decision of the Local Court. The matter was remitted to the Local Court for reconsideration in light of the correct interpretation of the deeming provision. The Court did not make any further orders beyond allowing the appeal and directing the matter be reheard.