Director of Public Prosecutions v Bignill

[2015] NSWSC 668

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

DPP v Bignill [2015] NSWSC 668

Hearing dates:

29 May 2015

Decision date:

01 June 2015

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Adamson J

Decision:

(1) Allow the appeal.

(2) Set aside the order of Magistrate Pierce, made on 5 September 2014 at Downing Centre Local Court, dismissing the charge against the defendant of drive with low range PCA (second or subsequent offence) contrary to s 110(3)(a) of the Road Transport Act 2013.

(3) Remit the matter to the Local Court to be dealt with according to law.

(4) Unless either party makes a written application to my Associate within seven days for a different order, order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – appeal from Local Court to Supreme Court pursuant to Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 56 – low range PCA offence – breath analysis recorded reading of 0.054 – subsequent blood analysis recorded reading of 0.049 – whether Local Court Magistrate erred in holding that defendant entitled to rely on deeming provision in Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Sch 3 cl 31 to discharge onus or whether deeming provision only operated in favour of reading relied on by prosecution – consideration of proper construction of clause – appeal allowed

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 56
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 33
Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), ss 110, 114, Sch 3 cll 1, 4, 5, 21, 31, 35
Traffic Act 1909 (NSW), ss 4E, 4G

Cases Cited:

Commissioner for Railways v Bain [1965] HCA 5; 112 CLR 246
DPP v Sadler [2013] NSWSC 718
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503
Police v Dunstall [2014] SASCFC 85; 120 SASR 88
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355
R v Relton (Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 28 July 1994, Meagher JA, Abadee and Blanch JJ)
R v West (1974) 3 PSR 1273
Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; 250 CLR 664
Ujvary v Medwell (1985) 39 SASR 418

Texts Cited:

House of Assembly Hansard, 4 December 1968

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)
Thomas Mason Bignill

Representation:

Counsel:
A Mitchelmore (Plaintiff)
P Doherty SC/D Morgan (Defendant)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff)
Pinnacle Lawyers (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2014/37-632

Publication restriction:

---

Judgment

Introduction

1. The Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) appeals pursuant to s 56(1)(a) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) against the order made by Pierce LCM on 5 September 2014 dismissing a charge against Thomas Bignill, the defendant, of drive with low range Prescribed Concentration Alcohol (second or subsequent offence) contrary to s 110(3)(a) of the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) (the Act).

2. The plaintiff, in a summons filed on 17 December 2014, relied on the following grounds of appeal, each of which was accepted to involve a question of law alone:

“1 holding that the defendant was entitled to rely on a deeming provision, namely cl 31(3) of sch 3 to the Road Transport Act 2013, in relation to evidence adduced by the defendant as to the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood;

2 taking into account the above erroneous finding in determining whether the defendant had discharged the onus prescribed under cl 31(3)(c) of sch 3 to the Road Transport Act 2013;

3 applying the wrong test in determining whether the defendant had discharged the onus prescribed under cl 31(3)(c) to the Road Transport Act 2013; in that the court below failed to consider whether the defendant had established, on the balance of probabilities, that the concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s breath or blood was less that 0.05 grams of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood at the actual time of driving; and

4   failing to give adequate reasons for its determination.”

The Facts

3. On Saturday 19 April 2014 at around 9am Senior Constable Luke Polak was conducting Random Breath Testing (RBT) on Clark Road, Neutral Bay. He stopped the defendant who was driving a Toyota Kluger with four passengers: an adult woman and three children. He asked the defendant whether he had had any alcohol that day, to which the defendant responded: “Last night I did.”

4. Senior Constable Polak conducted a passive test which detected alcohol in the defendant’s breath. He then conducted a non-passive test which returned a positive sample of 0.063. The defendant was arrested and taken to the North Sydney Police Station where he underwent a breath analysis which was completed at 9.36.38am. The results of the analysis were 0.054g of alcohol in 210 litres of breath. Senior Constable Polak issued a certificate under Sch 3 of the Act and printed out a docket on which the test results appeared (the Police Result).

5. Senior Constable Polak offered the defendant the opportunity of having his blood tested which the defendant accepted. Senior Constable Polak took him to Royal North Shore Hospital. At about 10.35am a registered nurse at the hospital took a sample of the defendant’s blood with an authorised kit. A test of the sample revealed a reading of 0.049g/100ml (the Hospital Result).

6. There is no issue about the legality of the procedures that were followed by police.

7. In the Court Attendance Notice the Police Prosecutor alleged that between 9.11am and 10.30am on 19 April 2014 at North Sydney the defendant drove a motor vehicle, a Toyota Kluger, on a road, Clark Road, North Sydney while there was present in his breath the low range prescribed concentration of alcohol, 0.054.

The relevant legislative provisions

8. Section 110 of the Act relevantly provides:

“Presence of prescribed concentration of alcohol in person’s breath or blood

. . .

(3) Offence—low range prescribed concentration of alcoholA person must not, while there is present in the person’s breath or blood the low range prescribed concentration of alcohol:

(a) drive a motor vehicle, or

. . .

Maximum penalty: . . . 20 penalty units (in the case of a second or subsequent offence).”

9. Section 114 of the Act provides:

“Testing for alcohol and other drug use

Schedule 3 contains provisions relating to the procedures for, and the use of evidence obtained from, testing for alcohol or other drug use by drivers and other road users.”

10. Schedule 3 of the Act makes provision for testing for alcohol. Clause 1 of Part 1 includes the following definitions:

“breath analysing instrument means any instrument of a type approved by the Governor by order published in the Gazette as being designed to ascertain, by analysis of a person’s breath, the concentration of alcohol present in that person’s breath or blood.

breath analysis means a test carried out by a breath analysing instrument for the purpose of ascertaining, by analysis of a person’s breath, the concentration of alcohol present in that person’s breath or blood.

breath test means a test for the purpose of indicating the concentration of alcohol present in a person’s breath or blood, carried out on that person’s breath by means of a device, not being a breath analysing instrument, of a type approved by the Governor by order published in the Gazette.”

11. Part 2 of Sch 3 provides for powers to test and take samples. Division 2 of that Part provides for RBT and breath analysis. Clause 3 confers power on a police officer to conduct RBT if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person is or was driving a motor vehicle on a road. If the person fails the breath test, the police officer may arrest the person without warrant: cl 4, Sch 3. The officer may require a person to submit to a breath analysis, after which the officer must deliver a written statement signed by the officer specifying the alcohol concentration of the person’s breath: cl 5, Sch 3.

12. Part 3 of Sch 3 makes provision for requests for additional analysis of samples. Cl 21 provides:

“Request for blood sample to be taken for analysis when person required to submit to breath analysis

(1) A person who is required by a police officer under Division 2 of Part 2 to submit to a breath analysis may request the police officer to arrange for an authorised sample taker to take, in the presence of a police officer, a sample of that person’s blood, for analysis in accordance with Part 4 to determine the concentration of alcohol in the blood at the person’s own expense.

Note. Part 4 provides for the procedures in relation to the taking and analysis of samples taken under this subclause.

(2) A request by a person under subclause (1), or the taking of a sample of that person’s blood, does not excuse that person from the obligation imposed on the person to submit to a breath analysis in accordance with Division 2 of Part 2.”

13. Part 4 of Sch 3 sets out the procedures for taking and analysing samples. There is no suggestion that the correct procedures were not followed in the present case. Part 5 of Sch 3 makes provision for evidential matters. Cl 31 relevantly provides:

“Evidence of alcohol concentration in proceedings for offences against section 110

(1) This clause applies to any proceedings for an offence against section 110 (Presence of prescribed concentration of alcohol in person’s breath or blood).

(2) Evidence may be given in proceedings to which this clause applies of the concentration of alcohol present in the breath or blood of the person charged as determined by:

(a) a breath analysis carried out by a police officer authorised to do so by the Commissioner of Police, or

(b) an analysis of the person’s blood under this Schedule.

(3) In any such proceedings, the concentration of alcohol so determined is taken to be the concentration of alcohol in the person’s breath or blood at the time of the occurrence of the relevant event referred to in clause 3 (1) (a), (b) or (c) if the breath analysis was made, or blood sample taken, within 2 hours after the event unless the defendant proves that the concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s breath or blood at the time concerned was:

. . .

(c) in the case of an offence against section 110 (3)—less than 0.05 grams of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood. . .”

14. Clause 35 of Sch 3 provides that a certificate prepared in the relevant form and signed by an authorised officer is admissible and constitutes prima facie evidence of the particulars stated therein, including the concentration of alcohol determined by the breath analysis instrument.

15. The provisions referred to above derive from substantially similar provisions in the statutory predecessors to the Act set out in the table below. Their equivalence is apparent from the legislation itself as well as the secondary materials, including the Explanatory Notes. Accordingly, authoritative judicial interpretation of earlier provisions remains binding with respect to later corresponding provisions.

Traffic Act 1909	Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999	Road Transport Act 2013
S 4E(1D)-(1G)	S 9	S 110
Ss 4E(11) and 4G(8)	S 32	Cl 31, Sch 3

The Local Court hearing

16. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The matter was heard in the Local Court at the Downing Centre on 5 September 2014. The police prosecutor tendered evidence the Sch 3 Certificate and the Police Result. The prosecutor relied on cl 31(3) and submitted that, by reason of the deeming provision, he had proved that the defendant’s alcohol concentration at the time he was driving was 0.054 and that, accordingly, the offence against s 110(3)(a) of the Act had been proved.

17. The defendant tendered the Hospital Result and contended that he was entitled to avail himself of the deeming provision with respect to that result. Therefore, he submitted, his blood alcohol concentration was deemed to be 0.049 at the time of driving and he should be acquitted.

18. The police prosecutor contended in response that cl 31(3) (the deeming provision) applied only to the Police Result and not to the Hospital Result. In support of this submission the prosecutor referred the Magistrate to R v Relton (Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 28 July 1994, Meagher JA, Abadee and Blanch JJ). In order to understand the Magistrate’s reasons it is necessary to set out the facts in R v Relton and how it came to be decided.

19. In R v Relton a single blood sample was taken from the appellant (Relton) within two hours of a collision. It was divided into two portions. The test carried out by the police showed a concentration of 0.078, as a result of which Relton was charged with an offence under s 4E(1E) of the Traffic Act 1909 (NSW), (now s 110(3)(a) of the Act). Relton had a test carried out on his portion of the sample which produced a result of 0.035. Both were admitted into evidence. The prosecutor relied on s 4G(8) (now cl 31). The trial judge held that Relton had not discharged the onus under s 4G(8) of the Traffic Act as he could not be satisfied that the concentration of alcohol in the appellant’s bloodstream at the time of the offence was probably less than 0.05 .

20. On Relton’s application, the trial judge stated a case to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court answered “No” to each of the trial judge’s questions, which were:

(1) Did I err in law where I held that the appellant bore the onus under Section 4G(8) of the Traffic Act 1909?

(2)   If the answer to (1) is no, then did I err in law in holding that the appellant had not discharged that onus?

21. In upholding the trial judge’s approach, Blanch J (Meagher JA and Abadee J agreeing) described s 4G(8) as a provision “which deems the concentration of alcohol in the blood to be the concentration determined pursuant to the appropriate analysis where the sample was taken within two hours”. Blanch J referred to the judgment of Windeyer J in Commissioner for Railways v Bain [1965] HCA 5; 112 CLR 246 at 273 where his Honour explained that the word “deemed” is often used to direct how, notwithstanding the true facts, some situation should be understood. Blanch J said that once the prosecution had proved the conditions which triggered the operation of the deeming provision the onus was then “clearly cast . . . upon the defendant to overcome the state of affairs which are then deemed to exist”.

22. Although Relton called evidence which was inconsistent with the evidence of the prosecution’s blood analysis, Blanch J found that that evidence “left the judge in a position where he could not say he preferred the appellant’s evidence to the prosecution evidence”. Accordingly, Relton had failed to discharge the onus cast upon him.

23. The Magistrate in the present case rejected the prosecutor’s submission that the deeming provision applied only to the Police Result and could not, on a proper reading of cl 31 and R v Relton, apply to the Hospital Result. After hearing argument, his Honour delivered the following oral ex tempore reasons:

“Particularly fastening on the middle paragraph on p 4 of Relton. We don’t have the advantage of knowing precisely what the finding of the District Court judge was, so we have to rely upon what the Court of Criminal Appeal has said it was, admittedly in a brief descriptive way. That paragraph beginning, ‘He held that,’ in the middle of p 4 seems to say this, that he, the District Court judge had held that the onus that rested upon the appellant had not been discharged as he, the judge, could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities, but it appears from the way that is worded that the trial judge simple [sic] had regard to no more than, emphasis on that phrase, no more than the fact that there were two conflicting samples.

One can understand in the circumstances why that would be, with respect to the trial judge, an erroneous way of looking at it, but in our present matter we have gone a little further and we have ventilated the fact that it is known to be a fact, though we don’t have evidence of the amount, that one’s alcohol content in one’s blood dissipates if one is on the down side, as it were, coming down from drinking. It goes up, of course, if you’ve had some alcohol not long before the test, but we don’t know the results. We don’t have any evidence of the rate of dissipation in the facts around … (not transcribable) … and having regard to the particular time, 1 o’clock I gather, but it doesn’t matter whatever the time was, when the last drink occurred and how much drinking had occurred before that, and how that time related to the time of driving.

So in our particular matter I think I am entitled to simply say that the defendant is entitled to rely upon a deeming provision, which is the blood deeming provision, result in the section, to rely upon that as discharging on the balance of probabilities. The other deeming provision that at the time of driving the alcohol was little over 0.05, he is entitled to do that and one has regard to the extreme closeness of the readings, they are very close. It would be different if you had starkly different readings that were a large number of decimal points apart.

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREFORE, THE DEFENDANT IS, IN MY OPINION, ENTITLED TO HAVE REGARD TO THE LATTER READING AND THE CHARGE WILL BE DISMISSED.”

24. The passage from Blanch J’s reasons in R v Relton to which the Magistrate referred in the opening passage in the reasons was as follows:

“He [the trial judge] held that being so the onus that rested on the appellant under section 4G(8) of the relevant Act had not been discharged as he could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities on the evidence before him that the concentration of alcohol in the appellant’s bloodstream was less than 0.05 grams per 100 millilitres of his blood.”

The appeal

25. As the first three grounds concern the construction of the deeming provision they will be dealt with together. The fourth ground, alleged inadequacy of reasons, will be dealt with separately.

Construction of the deeming provision: grounds 1-3

The parties’ submissions

26. The plaintiff contended that the Magistrate was in error in applying the deeming provision to the Hospital Result and argued that, on its true construction, it applied only to evidence adduced by the prosecution that had been obtained in accordance with Sch 3 of the Act. Ms Mitchelmore, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, submitted that the Magistrate’s construction of the deeming provision was at odds with the plain meaning of cl 31, that it failed to take into account the context of the deeming provision, tended to thwart the legislative purpose of Sch 3 and was inconsistent with R v Relton and R v West (1974) 3 PSR 1273. I do not propose to summarise the plaintiff’s submissions at length because they form the basis of the reasons for my decision, set out below, for preferring the construction of cl 31 for which the plaintiff contended.

27. Mr Doherty SC, who appeared with Mr Morgan on behalf of the defendant, submitted that the Magistrate was correct in holding that the defendant was entitled to rely on the deeming provision and there was, accordingly, no error. He contended that the defendant’s right to have a blood sample taken and tested was an important safeguard and that there was no reason why the deeming provision should not apply to a sample obtained and relied on by the defendant as well as to a sample relied upon by the prosecutor. Mr Doherty further submitted that a blood test “trumps” a breath test.

28. Mr Doherty referred to the Second Reading Speech of the Motor Traffic (Amendment) Bill 1968, which introduced the RBT provisions into the Traffic Act, which was the statutory predecessor to the Act. Mr Doherty relied on the following passages from the Second Reading Speech in support of these propositions:

“In the course of our investigation into the system best suited to the conditions of New South Wales, we considered a system based on blood analysis, as is in operation in Britain. Certainly, the most straightforward chemical test for determining the blood-alcohol concentration of a person is the analysis of a specimen of blood. Blood analysis requires, however, the extraction of a sample of venous blood from the driver concerned by a specially trained person and its subsequent analysis by a person qualified in this field. Having regard to the inconvenience to the individual concerned, and the difficulty of obtaining suitably trained and qualified persons in our land of vast distances, we decided upon the breath test system.” (Page 3418, House of Assembly Hansard, 4 December 1968)

“This leads me to another important safeguard for the driver. We have provided that a driver who has been requested to submit to a Breathalyzer test may ask the arresting policeman to arrange that he has a blood sample taken for private analysis.” (page 3419, House of Assembly Hansard, 4 December 1968)

29. Mr Doherty also relied on dicta in Police v Dunstall [2014] SASCFC 85; 120 SASR 88 in which the importance of the person’s right to have a blood sample taken as a safeguard was emphasised. At [75] Gray J cited King CJ in Ujvary v Medwell (1985) 39 SASR 418 who said at 420:

“. . . The blood test is the only means by which a citizen can question the correctness of the result of the breath analysis. It must be the paramount concern of the Courts to ensure that the citizen has ready access to that check.”

30. An appeal against Police v Dunstall has been heard by the High Court but has not yet been determined. As the facts of that case and the applicable legislation are much removed from the question to be decided in the present case, I do not propose to address it further. In any event, Mr Doherty relied on it solely for the proposition, which I understand to be common ground, that the defendant’s right to have a blood sample taken is an important safeguard.

Reasons

The statutory provisions: their text, context, and purpose

31. Statutory construction must begin with the text, in the context of the legislative history and extrinsic materials: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503 at [39]; Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; 250 CLR 664 at [22]. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation is to be preferred: s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW); Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [70], [78].

32. Schedule 3 of the Act is concerned with assisting police to carry out, and prosecute, drivers and other road users who are affected by alcohol and/or drugs. Although a distinction is drawn between a breath test on the one hand and a breath or blood analysis on the other, none is drawn between breath analysis and blood analysis. There is, accordingly, no basis in the statutory wording or otherwise for according greater weight to a blood analysis than to a breath analysis.

33. Read as a whole and in context, cl 31, and the other clauses in Division 1 of Part 5 of Sch 3, are directed at proving the commission of an offence under s 110 of the Act. Any potential ambiguity in cl 31(2), as to the party by whom such “evidence” may be led, is, in my view, resolved by cl 31(3), which provides that the concentration determined by either of the methods identified in cl 31(2) is taken to be the concentration at the time of the occurrence of the relevant event “unless the defendant proves” that the concentration of alcohol in his or her breath or blood testing is within the legal limit “at the time concerned”. The words “at the time concerned” mean the time at which the offence was committed, namely the time at which the defendant was driving.

34. Although the words in cl 31(2)(b) “an analysis of the person’s blood under this Schedule”, whether obtained by the prosecutor or the defendant, could, if viewed in isolation, come within the words in cl 31(3): “the concentration of alcohol so determined”, this construction is inconsistent with the later words in cl 31(3) “unless the defendant proves . . .”. A construction of cl 31 that permits the defendant to rely on the statutory deeming in the first part of cl 31(3) cannot be reconciled with the existence and terms of the express statutory exception in the latter part of the subclause.

35. The defendant derives the benefit of the exception only by establishing that his or her alcohol concentration was within the legal limit “at the time concerned”, namely, at the time of those actions which form the basis of the s 110 charge (in the present case, when the defendant was driving). It cannot be the case that the defendant can also get the benefit of the first part of the clause, which operates to deem the alcohol concentration found through testing undertaken within 2 hours of the driving to be the concentration at the relevant time.

36. Such a construction would also be inconsistent with the generally accepted operation of a deeming provision. On his Honour’s construction, a defendant not only does not have to overcome that state of affairs, but the defendant can also bring about that state of affairs if he or she can lead evidence of a test that meets the criteria in cl 31(2) and (3).

37. In my view, his Honour’s construction not only does not advance the purpose for which the provision was enacted but positively undermines it. If his Honour’s construction of the deeming provision were correct, a defendant would not need to prove a lesser concentration at the time of driving provided he or she obtained a blood sample before the expiry of two hours from the conduct the basis of the charge which was below the prohibited prescribed concentration. In other words, all that the defendant would need to do would be to adduce evidence of a competing test taken within the two hour time period. I regard this construction as irrational and inconsistent with the purpose cl 31, which is designed to facilitate proof (by means of a subsequent test) of blood alcohol concentration at an earlier time, being the time at which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

Relevant authorities: R v Relton and R v West

R v Relton

38. I accept Ms Mitchelmore’s submission that the Magistrate’s construction was inconsistent with R v Relton. In that case, the results of a competing test taken within the time period were not sufficient to discharge the onus, at least where that evidence was not sufficient to outweigh the evidence adduced by the Crown. As the tests of Relton’s sample produced a lower result (for reasons which were not apparent), Relton would have succeeded if the deeming provision had applied to that sample. Accordingly, R v Relton was relevantly indistinguishable from the present case. The construction of s 4E(11) in R v Relton (now cl 31) was binding on the Magistrate.

39. The Magistrate’s reasons in the present case reveal a misreading of what R v Relton decided. His Honour considered that the trial judge (in R v Relton) was in error in concluding that Relton had not discharged the onus because he could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the concentration of alcohol in his bloodstream was less than 0.05. In fact, the trial judge’s approach, which led to his Honour finding that Relton had not discharged the onus, was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

40. Moreover, the Magistrate in the present case sought to distinguish R v Relton on two bases: first, that in the present case there were two samples taken at different times, whereas in R v Relton there was only one sample, which was divided for the purpose of testing; and, secondly, that the readings of the samples were relatively similar in the present case, whereas in R v Relton the results were widely divergent. In my view, these matters neither affected the operation of the deeming provision, as established by R v Relton, nor provided any proper basis for distinguishing it.

41. I infer from his Honour’s decision that he considered that the relative closeness of the readings assisted the defendant. This can only be on the basis that the closeness of the Police Result to the Hospital Result tended to support the reliability of each, given the times at which the underlying samples were taken. So much can be discerned from the following passage from the reasons:

“. . . one has regard to the extreme closeness of the readings. They are very close. It would be different if you had starkly different readings that were a large number of decimal points apart.”

42. The “starkly different readings” envisaged by his Honour were, presumably, readings such as those in R v Relton, which were irreconcilable because they were far apart yet should have been identical as the portions tested derived from the same sample.

43. His Honour’s misreading of R v Relton was significant. His Honour concluded that the defendant could rely on the deeming provision and the later blood test “as discharging on the balance of probabilities”, presumably, the onus in the latter part of cl 31(3). That conclusion was contrary to the terms of the subclause and to the construction approved in R v Relton.

R v West

44. The plaintiff also relied on R v West, a case stated which also concerned the effect of s 4E(11) of the Traffic Act (the statutory predecessor to cl 31). Street A-CJ (sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal with Isaacs and Lee JJ) said at 1274:

“The sub-section [s4E(11)] cast in a context in which the concentration of alcohol at the time of the test would be expected to differ from the concentration of alcohol at the time of the offence, the difference flowing, if from nothing else, merely from the passage of time which would necessarily have elapsed between the offence and the time of the test.

In order to avoid what would otherwise be the virtual impossibility of demonstrating the concentration of alcohol at the time of the offence, sub.s11 deliberately and expressly deems the result of the test on the breath analysing instrument to disclose what was the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the person at the time of the occurrence of the offence.”

45. The opportunity that the section provided for the defendant to prove that there was a lower concentration of alcohol in his blood did not, on Street A-CJ’s analysis, cut down the ordinary significance to be attributed to the statutory deeming earlier in the section. Street A-CJ said:

“The early part of the section [the deeming provision] is absolute and clear in its operation. The concluding part of the section prescribes the circumstances in which the earlier part can be made the subject of an inroad, namely the circumstance in which the defendant proves the concentration of alcohol in his blood was less than that stated.”

46. The interpretation of the deeming provision in R v West is consistent with the way it was later construed in R v Relton. The Magistrate was not referred to R v West. However, what the Court of Criminal Appeal found in R v West is also contained in R v Relton, to which his Honour was referred.

Conclusion

47. I am persuaded that the Magistrate’s construction of cl 31 was at odds with the wording of the provision, the context in which it appears in the Act and its evident purpose. It was contrary to R v Relton and to the approach taken by the Court in R v West. The first three grounds have been made out.

Alleged inadequacy of reasons

48. The principles that apply to the assessment of reasons of judicial officers, including Magistrates, are well known. The relevant authorities were recently summarised by Bellew J in DPP v Sadler [2013] NSWSC 718 at [77]-[82]. There is an obligation to give reasons, but allowance is made for the circumstances in which they are given. Accordingly, more latitude is given to reasons where, as here, they were given ex tempore, particularly in busy Local and District Courts.

49. Because the first three grounds have been made out, the matter must be remitted to the Local Court for determination. Accordingly the fourth ground, which was effectively an alternative ground, can be addressed briefly.

50. I do not consider the Magistrate’s reasons to be adequate. All that is clear from them is that his Honour considered that the deeming provision applied to both the Hospital Result and the Police Result. It is not clear why. Nor is it clear how his Honour read R v Relton as supporting either that construction or, indeed, the defendant’s case, or on what basis the factors his Honour identified as distinguishing the present case from R v Relton affected the construction of the deeming provision. The fourth ground has been made out.

Costs

51. The plaintiff has succeeded. My preliminary view is that the defendant ought pay the plaintiff’s costs but, as I have not heard the parties on costs, I shall make provision in the orders for any other application to be made in writing.

Orders

52. I make the following orders:

1. Allow the appeal.

2. Set aside the order of Magistrate Pierce, made on 5 September 2014 at Downing Centre Local Court, dismissing the charge against the defendant of drive with low range PCA (second or subsequent offence) contrary to s 110(3)(a) of the Road Transport Act 2013.

3. Remit the matter to the Local Court to be dealt with according to law.

4. Unless either party makes a written application to my Associate within seven days for a different order, order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

**********

Decision last updated: 01 June 2015