Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: DPP v Bignill [2015] NSWSC 668 Hearing dates: 29 May 2015 Decision date: 01 June 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Adamson J Decision: (1) Allow the appeal.
(2) Set aside the order of Magistrate Pierce, made on 5 September 2014 at Downing Centre Local Court, dismissing the charge against the defendant of drive with low range PCA (second or subsequent offence) contrary to s 110(3)(a) of the Road Transport Act 2013.
(3) Remit the matter to the Local Court to be dealt with according to law.
(4) Unless either party makes a written application to my Associate within seven days for a different order, order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – appeal from Local Court to Supreme Court pursuant to Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 56 – low range PCA offence – breath analysis recorded reading of 0.054 – subsequent blood analysis recorded reading of 0.049 – whether Local Court Magistrate erred in holding that defendant entitled to rely on deeming provision in Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Sch 3 cl 31 to discharge onus or whether deeming provision only operated in favour of reading relied on by prosecution – consideration of proper construction of clause – appeal allowed Legislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), s 56
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 33
Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), ss 110, 114, Sch 3 cll 1, 4, 5, 21, 31, 35
Traffic Act 1909 (NSW), ss 4E, 4GCases Cited: Commissioner for Railways v Bain [1965] HCA 5; 112 CLR 246
DPP v Sadler [2013] NSWSC 718
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; 250 CLR 503
Police v Dunstall [2014] SASCFC 85; 120 SASR 88
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355
R v Relton (Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 28 July 1994, Meagher JA, Abadee and Blanch JJ)
R v West (1974) 3 PSR 1273
Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; 250 CLR 664
Ujvary v Medwell (1985) 39 SASR 418Texts Cited: House of Assembly Hansard, 4 December 1968 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)
Thomas Mason BignillRepresentation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
A Mitchelmore (Plaintiff)
P Doherty SC/D Morgan (Defendant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff)
Pinnacle Lawyers (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2014/37-632 Publication restriction: ---
Judgment
Introduction
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The Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) appeals pursuant to s 56(1)(a) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) against the order made by Pierce LCM on 5 September 2014 dismissing a charge against Thomas Bignill, the defendant, of drive with low range Prescribed Concentration Alcohol (second or subsequent offence) contrary to s 110(3)(a) of the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) (the Act).
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The plaintiff, in a summons filed on 17 December 2014, relied on the following grounds of appeal, each of which was accepted to…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 668
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court considered the proper construction of the deeming provision in question. The defendant argued that the provision allowed reliance on either the breath or blood alcohol concentration reading, whichever was more favourable. The prosecution contended that the deeming provision only operated in favour of the reading relied upon by them. The Court examined the wording of the clause and the context in which it was applied, ultimately concluding that the Local Court Magistrate had erred in their interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the deeming provision did not permit the defendant to choose between two readings; instead, it applied to the reading that was relied upon by the prosecution. Consequently, the Court found that the Local Court Magistrate had misapplied the statutory provision, leading to an incorrect outcome.
Given the misinterpretation of the statutory provision, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the decision of the Local Court. The matter was remitted to the Local Court for reconsideration in light of the correct interpretation of the deeming provision. The Court did not make any further orders beyond allowing the appeal and directing the matter be reheard.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the Local Court of New South Wales where Mr. Bignill was charged with a low-range PCA offence. Following a trial, the Local Court Magistrate accepted the defendant's argument that he was entitled to rely on the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31, and discharged him without conviction. Dissatisfied with this decision, the Director of Public Prosecutions lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), section 56. The appeal was heard by the Supreme Court, which subsequently allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Local Court for further proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Local Court Magistrate erred in holding that the defendant was entitled to rely on the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31 to discharge the onus of proving his breath alcohol concentration at the time of the offence.
2. Whether the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31, only operated in favour of the reading relied on by the prosecution or if it could also be used by the defence.
Held
1. The court concluded that the Local Court Magistrate erred in holding that the defendant was entitled to rely on the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31 to discharge the onus of proving his breath alcohol concentration at the time of the offence. The appeal against the decision of the Local Court was allowed in this regard.
2. The court found that the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31, did not exclusively operate in favour of the reading relied on by the prosecution, and could also be used by the defence. However, this conclusion did not affect the outcome of the appeal as the deeming provision was found to have been improperly relied upon by the Local Court Magistrate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the proper construction of the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31, and its application to the facts of this case. The court noted that the deeming provision was intended to assist in cases where the accused has not provided a breath sample or the sample is of poor quality. However, in this case, a breath sample was provided and the quality of the sample was not in issue. The court found that the Local Court Magistrate erred in applying the deeming provision to discharge the onus on the defendant, as it was not appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The court also considered the issue of whether the deeming provision only operated in favour of the reading relied on by the prosecution, and concluded that it could be used by the defence as well. However, this conclusion did not affect the outcome of the appeal as the deeming provision was found to have been improperly relied upon by the Local Court Magistrate. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the deeming provision in the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW), Schedule 3 clause 31, is not a substitute for the onus of proof on the prosecution, and should only be applied in appropriate circumstances where the accused has not provided a breath sample or the sample is of poor quality.