Director of Public Prosecutions v Bariamis
[2013] VSC 457
•6 SEPTEMBER 2013
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. S CR 2013 0068
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| V |
| LOUKIA BARIAMIS |
---
JUDGE: | BELL J | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 19 AUGUST 2013 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 6 SEPTEMBER 2013 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v BARIAMIS | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2013] VSC 457 | |
---
CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – chief financial officer of group of companies - three charges of obtaining financial advantage by deception – false information provided to bank to obtain loan extensions – book debts inflated by nearly $12,500,000 – continuing criminal enterprise – serious examples of offence charged – exceptionally strong constellation of factors in mitigation – early expression of strong remorse and plea of guilty – high degree of assistance provided to police (at significant personal cost) – good character to date and prospects of rehabilitation – severe and recurrent depression contributed to offending – little need for specific deterrence – offender already sentenced for Commonwealth offence – commencement date of State sentence taking end of non-parole period under Commonwealth sentence into account – Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 6H, 6I, 6AAA(2), 16(4)(b).
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Ms S Borg | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr D Grace QC | The Office of David Grace QC |
HIS HONOUR:
Loukia Bariamis, you have pleaded guilty to three charges brought against you by indictment that on 13 November 2009, 5 October 2010 and 26 November 2010 you obtained a financial advantage by deception contrary to s 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
Obtaining financial advantage by deception is a serious crime, the maximum penalty for which is imprisonment for 10 years. As the value of the financial advantage which you obtained in each case exceeds $50,000, each of your offences is a continuing criminal enterprise offence under s 6H(1) and cl 1(e) of sch 1A of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). As you are guilty of three continuing criminal enterprise offences, s 6H(1)(c) specifies that you are liable under s 6I(1) to a double maximum penalty of imprisonment for 20 years in respect of each offence.[1]
[1]R v Roussety (2008) 24 VR 253, 270 [32]-[33] (Nettle JA, Ashley and Redlich JJA agreeing).
Your plea of guilty was given at the earliest availability opportunity. According to the applicable sentencing principles, this must be reflected in appropriate mitigation of sentence. The plea is strongly indicative of genuine remorse, as is the assistance which, at significant personal cost, you are providing to the police and prosecution authorities, for which you also deserve substantial mitigation of sentence.
I take into account that, prior to being charged in February 2013, you had no prior convictions and were of good character. You do have a subsequent conviction which is connected to the charges for which you are now under sentence. That charge was of obtaining a financial advantage by deception contrary to s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The maximum penalty for that charge is imprisonment for 10 years. You pleaded guilty to and, on 28 June 2013 in the County Court of Victoria, were sentenced on this charge.
His Honour Judge Lacava sentenced you on the charge to imprisonment for 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years. Pursuant to s 6AAA(1) of the Sentencing Act, he declared in the sentence that, but for your plea of guilty, he would have sentenced you to imprisonment for 5 years with a non-parole period of 3 years. In fixing sentence, his Honour also took into account that you had undertaken to co-operate with law enforcement authorities in proceedings relating to an offence. Pursuant to s 21E(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), he declared that he had reduced your head sentence and non-parole period by a further period of 12 months respectively. In summary, but for your plea of guilty and undertaking to co-operate, his Honour would have sentenced you to imprisonment for 6 years with a non-parole period of 4 years, not 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years.
The State charges for which I must sentence you are so serious that an immediate term of imprisonment is called for. By reason of s 16(4)(b) of the Sentencing Act, I am required to direct when the term of imprisonment is to commence. The commencement date can be no later than immediately after the completion of the non-parole period which was set by his Honour in respect of the Commonwealth offence.
You have been in custody since 27 May 2013 when you were remanded pending sentence for the Commonwealth offence. As I have mentioned, his Honour sentenced you for that offence on 28 June 2013. He declared that you had served 31 days of pre-sentence detention. The non-parole period of 2 years ends on 26 May 2015. Under s 16(4)(b), I can direct that the sentence in respect of the Victorian offences is to begin as early as today but no later than 27 May 2015. Taking into account the principle of totality, I can therefore make an order for commencement of your sentence which takes into account your imprisonment on the Commonwealth offence. I intend to do so. Both counsel for the prosecution and your counsel informed me, and I accept, that service of the sentence on the Commonwealth offence does not count as pre-sentence detention in respect of the State offences and I will not take it into account as such.
As the Commonwealth offence occurred first in time, it is convenient to begin with it. The offence was that between 9 September 2004 and 14 June 2005 – a period of about 9 months – you lodged with the Australian Taxation Office 131 false business activity statements in respect of various taxpayers (including the Viking group of companies) for whom you were acting in your capacity as a registered tax agent and auditor in the accounting practice Greenfield Fox. As a result, you obtained GST and PAYG tax refunds in the sum of $1,820,939 to which you were not entitled and which you diverted into bank accounts which you controlled. In doing so, you abused the trust which you had as a registered tax agent. This was systematic offending on a large scale over a period of time. The proceeds of the crime were never recovered and most of the money was used for gambling and personally extravagant expenditure.
In sentencing you, Judge Lacava took into account a number of considerations besides your plea of guilty and undertaking to co-operate. As set out in his Honour’s carefully reasoned sentence, he took into account that you had no prior convictions, were previously of good character and had good family, friends and antecedents, that you suffered from moderately severe anxiety and depression (which was not relevant under principle 1 but was relevant under principles 2-6 of the Verdins principles)[2] and that you were deeply remorseful and had good prospects for rehabilitation.
[2]R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) (‘Verdins’).
You have been in protective custody for the entire period of your imprisonment to date under the Commonwealth sentence, at first in 23-hour lockdown and now in 12-hour lockdown. You will likely remain in protective custody for the remaining part of that sentence and for the entire period of the sentence of imprisonment which I will impose under the State sentence. Protective custody is more restrictive than normal custody and involves a degree of added hardship for the prisoner which I will take into account.
Turning now to the State offences, by the events which have happened, the sentencing process in relation to the Commonwealth offence has become split from the sentencing process in relation to the State offences. It would have been preferable for all of the offences to have been considered together. However, as the prosecution responsibly concedes, when sentencing you in respect of the State offences I can apply the principle of totality so as to ensure that complete justice is done, taking into account that you have already been sentenced in respect of the Commonwealth offence.
As set out in the indictment, the particulars and statement of the Victorian offences are as follows:
CHARGE 1 The Director of Public Prosecutions charges that LOUKIA BARIAMIS at Melbourne in Victoria on the 13th day of November 2009 dishonestly obtained for herself or another namely PFL Transport and Logistics Proprietary Limited, Viking Fleet Service Proprietary Limited, Viking Transport Express Proprietary Limited and Viking Asset Management Proprietary Limited a financial advantage namely financial lending facilities totalling $12,150,000 from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited namely by falsely representing the financial position of the Viking Group and that the Aged Debtor Trial Balance Reports dated 21 August 2009 for PFL Transport and Logistics Pty Ltd, Viking Fleet Service Pty Ltd and Viking Transport and Logistics Pty Ltd were genuine.
Statement of Offence – Obtaining a financial advantage by deception contrary to s 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958
CHARGE 2 The Director of Public Prosecutions charges that LOUKIA BARIAMIS at Melbourne in Victoria on the 5th day of October 2010 dishonestly obtained for herself or another namely PFL Transport and Logistics Proprietary Limited, Viking Fleet Service Proprietary Limited, Viking Transport Express Proprietary Limited and Viking Asset Management Proprietary Limited a financial advantage namely financial lending facilities totaling $17,400,000 from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited namely by falsely representing the financial position of the Viking Group and that
(a)the Aged Debtor list for PFL Transport and Logistics Pty Ltd undated was genuine;
(b)the reports headed “Aged Debtor Trail Balance Jun-10” for Viking Fleet Service Pty Ltd and Viking Transport and Logistics Pty Ltd were genuine.
Statement of Offence – Obtaining a financial advantage by deception contrary to s 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958
CHARGE 3 The Director of Public Prosecutions charges that LOUKIA BARIAMIS at Melbourne in Victoria on the 26th day of November 2010 dishonestly obtained for herself or another namely Viking Asset Management Proprietary Limited a financial advantage namely a financial lending facility in the sum of $4,000,000 from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited namely by falsely representing the financial position of the Viking Group and that
(a)the Aged Debtor list for PFL Transport and Logistics Pty Ltd undated was genuine;
(b)the reports headed “Aged Debtor Trail Balance Jun-10” for Viking Fleet Service Pty Ltd and Viking Transport and Logistics Pty Ltd were genuine.
Statement of Offence – Obtaining a financial advantage by deception contrary to s 82(1) of the Crimes Act 1958.
The circumstances of the offending were that, by reason of the State offending, you ceased to be a certified accountant and surrendered your tax agent and auditor registration in 2005. You then commenced working in-house for the Viking group of companies in 2006. You were the chief financial officer of the group and a member of its executive management team. Most of the members of the group banked with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd. Between 2004 and 2009, on behalf of the group you were responsible for managing its relationship with the bank. In doing so during that early period, you legitimately obtained loans for the group in the amount of many millions of dollars through the provision of accurate financial information to the bank. In the latter period during which the offending took place, you obtained substantial extended loan facilities through the provision of false information.
More particularly, the loan facilities with the bank were based upon the value of the book debts of the group, ie the amounts owed to members of the group by their customers. In the early period of legitimate activity, you built up a degree of trust with the bank by providing it with accurate financial information in relation to the total amount of the book debts. In the latter period of dishonest activity, you systematically falsified the documentation so as to obtain substantial increases in the flow of loan funds from the bank to the group.
As specified in the charges, by this means on 13 November 2009 you obtained for the group the financial advantage of lending facilities totalling $12,150,000. I was informed that the advantage constituted by that facility was obtained by a fraudulent overstatement of debtors in the amount of $5,257,831.69. On 5 October 2010, you obtained the advantage of facilities totalling $17,400,000 with an overstatement of $7,221,022.28. A little later, on 26 November 2010 you obtained the advantage of further facilities totalling $4,000,000 with that same overstatement.
The State offending is connected to the Commonwealth offending. The Viking group was a victim of the Commonwealth offending, for which you felt responsible. You agreed to assist the group by working as an in-house chief financial officer and ended up falsifying the information which went to the bank so that increased cash flows could be obtained. It appears that, during the period of the offending, you would work ridiculously long hours, often into the early hours of the morning. You were not paid a salary or wage as such, but did have access to a credit card on the basis that the expenses would be met. You gained very little if any direct benefit from the money which was obtained, although you did benefit indirectly through your employment with the group and through that of your husband as the chief executive officer.
I note that you committed the State offences in the period during which there was a delay in the disposition of the Commonwealth offence. You committed the State offences while functioning at quite a high level as the chief financial officer of the group. In the circumstances, it cannot be suggested that you were not conscious of the criminality of your conduct.
Because the Viking group went into liquidation, the loan moneys owing to the bank were never recovered. The bank lost a total of $48,630,000 under the facilities left owing by the Viking group. Of that amount, $33,550,000 is attributable to the extended fraudulent facilities which were obtained by your deception. It is to be noted, however, that the total amount of falsification of book debts by which the facilities were so extended was (rounded off) $12,500,000.
There are ongoing criminal investigations into the collapse of the Viking group and the members of its executive management team, including its executive officer, Vasilis (Bill) Bariamis, who is your husband. Charges have been brought against certain individuals and may be brought against others. You have previously provided substantial assistance to the police in relation to the investigations. The police have described the level of your co-operation as unprecedented. You have also undertaken to give evidence in the trial of the charges, if called upon to do so. As I have indicated, Judge Lacava took this into account when sentencing you in respect of the Commonwealth offence. It is strong evidence of remorse and a desire on your part to atone for your criminal offending.
Now you have gone a significant step further. In response to contact made by the police with your counsel, you have made a further statement. You have undertaken before me to assist the police in relation to the contents of the statement and to give evidence in court if called upon to do so. This is very relevant to the State charges which are now before me. The personal cost to you of providing this assistance and undertaking, which was the subject of submissions at the plea hearing, has been established by the evidence and I take this into account.
The information which you have provided is very high in quality and detail. Among other ways, the information was provided through the preparation of several statements, one very long. A great deal of effort was required of you in doing so. The police have said that your assistance and cooperation will save months of investigative work. You have assisted and co-operated with the police and the prosecuting authorities to a very great degree and, as I have mentioned, at significant personal cost. According to the well established sentencing principles, the undertaking to assist and co-operate which you have given in this court is deserving of a substantial sentencing discount, certainly near the top of the range for cases of this nature.[3] Further, the nature and degree of your assistance and co-operation is strongly indicative of remorse.
[3]R v Johnston (2008) 186 A Crim R 345, 349-51 [15]-[21] (Nettle JA, Buchanan and Ashley JJA agreeing); Nguyen v The Queen (2011) 31 VR 673, 685-688 [44]-[52] (Maxwell P, Redlich JA agreeing).
In determining the extent of the sentencing discount, I do not think it is appropriate to ignore the assistance which you have already provided merely because Judge Lacava took it into account. In view of the inextricable connection between that assistance and the further assistance which you are now providing, I think it would be highly artificial to do so. Moreover, I am sentencing you for three charges, each of which is more serious than the one for which his Honour sentenced you. I am conscious that, if the charge before his Honour had been determined at the same time as the charges which are now before me, as would have been preferable, the assistance provided would have been taken into account on a global basis. The level of the discount would have been determined on that basis. I do not think you should be disadvantaged in sentencing terms in any way by the splitting of the sentencing process. In the end, it is sufficient to say that the further assistance which you are now providing is very great, both in itself and when viewed against the background of the assistance which you have already provided, and is deserving of a substantial sentencing discount.
Your date of birth is 14 October 1961 and you are aged 51 years. You have been married to Bill Bariamis since 1984 and you have two children, a girl aged 20 years and boy aged 17 years, both students. The boy suffers from Asperger’s Syndrome. The marriage has encountered difficulties, as yet unresolved. You are visited regularly in prison by your husband and children, who continue to reside together in the matrimonial home. In 2004, your mother-in-law committed suicide, which greatly affected you.
You completed primary and secondary schooling and a bachelor’s degree in accounting. Before giving up your accounting registrations, you had various full-time positions in that capacity. You were declared bankrupt in 2007.
As I have noted, you have no prior convictions. It has been accepted by the prosecution that you were previously of good character.
In relation to the Verdins principles, it was submitted by your counsel that principles 2-6 apply. This was not disputed by counsel for the prosecution, although it was submitted that only a certain weight should be given to these principles. I think there should be some moderation of general deterrence and, in view of your good prospects for rehabilitation, there is very little need for specific deterrence. In view of your mental ill-health, imprisonment will weigh more heavily on you than on a person of normal mental health and, further, it will likely exacerbate your condition. All of these matters are mitigatory.
There was dispute in relation to the application of principle 1, namely whether your mental ill-health should affect the assessment of your moral culpability for the offences such that a lesser sentence is just in all the circumstances and denunciation is less likely to be a sentencing consideration. Your counsel submitted that this principle applied because, even though you understood the difference between right and wrong, you were in a state of mental ill-health during the period of offending and your condition was connected with your criminal behaviour. Counsel for the prosecution disputed those submissions. To determine those submissions, I must address the medical evidence.
You have an extensive medical history which was documented in that evidence. In summary, you have been suffering from depression since about 1998. You have experienced a range of other medical problems since then, including removal of your gall bladder in 1999, surgery for stress incontinence in 2003, hypertension in 2004, dermatitis in 2008-2009 and suspected breast cancer in 2011 (which thankfully has not eventuated). Your depression has worsened over the years. By 2005, you were close to a breakdown after a dramatic escalation of your depression. By 2012, your mental condition had worsened to a major depressive disorder of severe intensity.
Turning to your mental condition in more detail, you were treated by Dr Michael Heffernan, a psychiatrist, between 2006 and 2008. That was after the Commonwealth but before the State offending. Dr Heffernan reports that you were suffering from depression, anxiety and insomnia. He worked co-operatively with Dr Jennifer Majoor, also a psychiatrist, who treated you from 2005 to 2008. She diagnosed major depression of moderate severity and saw you regularly for psychotherapy. She reports that you were highly remorseful and regretful for your Commonwealth offending. Unfortunately, that did not deter you from committing the State offences.
After committing those offences, you were treated by Graham Burrows, a professor of psychiatry, on referral from your general practitioner. In March 2012, you were diagnosed as suffering from a major depressive episode of moderate intensity and admitted to voluntary in-patient care at a private psychiatric hospital under Professor Burrows’ care for seven weeks. After being treated as an out-patient, you were readmitted in June-July for four weeks and again in July-August for three weeks. Before being imprisoned, you continued to be treated as an out-patient.
It was Professor Burrows’ opinion, which I accept, that your mental state would have contributed significantly to your criminal behaviour. By reason of your medical condition, you worry a lot about what other people think, try to please people and do not take appropriate self-protective action. You are quite vulnerable and need ongoing psychological and psychiatric care.
You have also regularly seen two psychologists, Kerryn Davison and Jeffrey Cummins. Ms Davison confirms your clinical depression and strong sense of remorse. Through therapy, you have come to realise that you have too easily succumbed to the expectations of others and that being a ‘people pleaser’ is a major problem for you. She holds a good opinion of your prospects of rehabilitation.
Mr Cummins has provided two extensive reports on your psychological condition and treatment. Both contain much inadmissible legal discussion and advocacy which should not have been included and which I will ignore. I specifically reject as inappropriate speculation the discussion about what Judge Lacava must have decided about the link between your psychological condition and offending. More helpfully, the reports comprehensively describe your medical and psychological history and gambling addiction, including your attempts to overcome that addiction. Mr Cummins diagnoses you to be suffering from a recurrent major depressive disorder of a severe type. He expressed the view, which I accept, that you committed the three State offences in circumstances where you had a pathological need to be liked. Fulfilling that pathological need by pleasing others provided you with some alleviation of your chronic feelings of anxiety, inferiority, rejection and depression which are symptoms of your recurrent medical condition. When committing the offences, you were not thinking clearly and your judgment was compromised by your medical condition. Your mental health prognosis remains guarded.
According to the applicable principles, which are summarised in Charles v The Queen,[4] principle 1 of Verdins applies where the accused establishes on the evidence and on the balance of probabilities that there was a link between a mental condition and the offence. In particular, it is necessary to consider how the relevant condition affected the mental functioning of the offender at the time of the offence and how it is likely to affect him or her in the future. The offender must establish that the disability had the effect of impairing his or her ability to exercise appropriate judgment, to make calm and rational choices or to think clearly at the time of the offence.
[4](2011) 34 VR 41, 69-70 [162] (Robson AJA, Redlich and Harper JJA agreeing).
In my view, the medical and other evidence to which I have referred clearly establishes that this was so in your case in relation to the three State offences for which you are now under sentence. Your moral responsibility is therefore reduced, although not eliminated. The punishment which is just must take this into account to an appropriate extent. Denunciation, while still of some importance, is not as significant a sentencing consideration as it might otherwise be. Likewise, general deterrent is a lesser than usual consideration, although not eliminated entirely.
In determining what the sentences of imprisonment should be, I take into account the gravity of your offending, which was very great. It is true that there was no individual victim suffering personal hardship. That potentially aggravating consideration is not present. But white-collar crime is not a victimless crime in the sense that there are direct adverse consequences for the bank as an institution and potential indirect consequences for it customers, shareholders and others.[5] Your crimes are very serious examples of the offences charged, among the worst in the history of the State for crimes of this kind. By your dishonest actions, the Viking group obtained loan monies from the bank in the amounts of $12,150,000 (charge 1), $17,400,000 (charge 2) and $4,000,000 (charge 3), totalling $33,550,000. This very great sum of money was never recovered from the group because it subsequently went into insolvency. I take into account that the value of the book debts which were falsified was not $33,550,000 but (rounded off) $12,500,000. Your actions constituted a continuing criminal enterprise for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for twenty years in respect of each offence. Despite your mental illness, there is no doubt that you knew what you were doing. Understanding the difference between right and wrong, you chose to engage in very grave criminal behaviour. By an immediate term of imprisonment, the court must condemn this behaviour and (as far as is proper) deter other persons who might contemplate a similar crime.
[5]Hoy v The Queen [2012] VSCA 49 (7 March 2012) [20] (Redlich JA, Nettle JA agreeing).
On the other hand, an exceptionally strong constellation of mitigatory factors justify a sentence in the order of half of that which would otherwise be appropriate. I have spoken of those factors already. The most important are the high degree of assistance which you are providing to the investigating authorities (at significant personal cost), your early plea of guilty and strong expression of remorse, your good character to date and prospects of rehabilitation, the contribution made by your severe and recurrent depression to your offending, the risk that a long period of imprisonment will significantly worsen your condition and the way in which that condition will make the burden of your imprisonment unusually great. Moreover, there is little need for you to be specifically deterred from engaging in further criminal activity.
In relation to issues of concurrency and cumulation, I take into account that charges 1, 2 and 3 involve the same dishonest system. In each case, while working as the chief financial officer of the Viking group, you produced false financial information to the bank of the group in order to obtain extended loan facilities. Charges 1 and 2 were separate instances in the sense that, on two occasions about one year apart, you provided different information (of the same kind) which was false and thereby obtained two substantial loan extensions for the group. These two instances of criminal behaviour must result in two individual convictions and sentences. However, because the criminality involved the same dishonest system and a continuing course of conduct, there should be some, although not total, concurrency between the two sentences. Charge 3 involved obtaining a further loan extension on the basis of the information which was used to obtain the extension referred to in charge 2 and about seven weeks later. Reflecting that further instance of criminal behaviour, there must be a conviction for, and a sentence must be imposed under, charge 3. However, in view of the connection between charges 1, 2 and 3, and the close connection between charges 2 and 3, there should be full concurrency in relation to the sentence under charge 3.
In the interests of imposing a sentence which is just in the totality of the circumstances, and to ensure that you are not disadvantaged by the splitting of the sentencing process which has occurred, it is appropriate for there to be some practical concurrency between the sentence of imprisonment imposed for the Commonwealth offence by Judge Lacava and the sentence of imprisonment to be imposed by me for the State offences. I think the extent of that practical concurrency should be 12 months, which can be achieved by an order for the commencement of the State sentence of imprisonment 12 months before the end of the non-parole period of the Commonwealth sentence.
I have given careful consideration to the specification of the period at the end of which you will be eligible for parole. I have tried to make this as short as possible in the circumstances. In specifying the period, I have especially taken into account the protective conditions under which you will have to serve your sentence, your mental ill-health and your prospects of rehabilitation. But, having regard to the gravity of the offending and other sentencing considerations, there is a limit to how far I can go in this regard.
On charge 1 in the indictment, dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage on 13 November 2009, you will be sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years.
On charge 2 in the indictment, dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage on 5 October 2010, you will be sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years.
On charge 3 in the indictment, dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage on 26 November 2010, you will be sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year.
Pursuant to s 16(1) of the Sentencing Act, I direct that 2 years of the sentence of imprisonment imposed under charge 2 and none of the sentence of imprisonment imposed under charge 3[6] is to be served cumulatively upon the sentence of imprisonment under charge 1, making a total effective sentence of imprisonment for 6 years. I direct that you serve a minimum term of imprisonment for 4 years before being eligible for parole.
[6]That is, in respect of charge 3, I am not making an order disturbing the operation of s 16(1) which, therefore, will cause the term of imprisonment imposed under that charge to be served concurrently with the sentences of imprisonment imposed under charges 1 and 2.
Pursuant to s 16(4)(b), I direct that your term of imprisonment is to commence on 27 May 2014, that is, one year earlier than the latest date of commencement which is available. This means that you will be eligible for parole three years after the end of the non-parole period which was imposed by Judge Lacava in respect of the Commonwealth offence. By that time you will have been in prison for five years. If then released on parole, you will be on that parole for another two years.
Pursuant to s 6AAA(2), I state that, but for your plea of guilty, I would have imposed a total effective sentence of imprisonment for 12 years with a non-parole period of 8 years. I must note that it is not easy to determine the sentence which would have been given but for your plea of guilty. In this case, that consideration is enmeshed with other significant considerations. In effect, in view of the mitigating circumstances overall, including your early plea of guilty and the assistance you have and are giving to police, I have cut your sentence in half.
There are no days of pre-sentence detention to be taken into account in determining the length of your sentence.
---
9
0