Director of Public Prosecutions v B Makoi

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

DPP v B Makoi; K Makoi; N Matot; A Matot; A Dau

Citation:

[2023] ACTSC 22

Hearing Dates:

7 February 2023, 8 February 2023, 9 February 2023, 10 February 2023, 15 February 2023, 16 February 2023, 20 February 2023

DecisionDate:

20 February 2023

Before:

Baker J

Decision:

The application for a temporary stay of the proceedings is dismissed.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judge alone verdict – interlocutory application – application for a temporary stay of proceedings – where no opportunity to cross-examine witness

Legislation Cited:

Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth)

Cases Cited:

Macdonald v R; Maitland v R [2016] NSWCCA 306

Munro v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 11

Prasad v R [2020] NSWCCA 349

R v Edwards [2009] HCA 20

R v Hatfield [1999] NSWCCA 340

Parties:

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT DPP)

Biech Maker Makoi (First Accused)

Kock-Kedhia Maker Makoi (Second Accused)

Nyalat Matot (Third Accused)

Achan Matot (Fourth Accused)

Akim Dau (Fifth Accused)

Representation:

Counsel

T Hickey (ACT DPP)

A Doig (First Accused)

S Robinson (Second Accused)

D Ager (Third Accused)

S McLaughlin (Fourth Accused)

S Baker-Goldsmith (Fifth Accused)

Solicitors

ACT DPP

Tim Sharman Solicitors (First Accused)

Andrew Byrnes Law Group (Second Accused)

Hugo Law Group (Third Accused)

Legal Aid ACT (Fourth Accused)

Fraser Criminal Law (Fifth Accused)

File Number:

SCC 3 of 2022

SCC 4 of 2022

SCC 13 of 2022

SCC 14 of 2022

SCC 15 of 2022

SCC 16 of 2022

SCC 49 of 2022

SCC 50 of 2022

SCC 139 of 2022

BAKER J:

Introduction

  1. The accused, Kock-Kedhia Maker Makoi (also known as “KK”), Biech Maker Makoi (also known as “Tabisa” Makoi), Achan Matot, Nyalat Matot and Akim Dau are each charged with joint commission aggravated burglary, joint commission assault occasioning actual bodily harm, joint commission damage property and joint commission threat to kill. In brief, the prosecution case is that on 22 June 2020, the accused entered Ms Achol Garang’s unit without her permission, and that whilst inside the unit they assaulted Ms Garang and damaged her property. The Prosecution alleges that Ms Achol Bol was also in the unit at the time of the offences, and that Ms Bol was also assaulted by one or more of the accused.

  1. On Thursday 16 February 2023, which was the sixth day of the trial, Ms Bol was called to give evidence on behalf of the prosecution. The Court was informed that Ms Bol was giving evidence via audio-visual link (“AVL”) from a university in Victoria.

  1. Ms Bol completed her evidence in chief and commenced cross-examination. Approximately 15 minutes into that cross-examination, Mr Doig, who appeared for the accused Tabisa Makoi, asked the following question:

My friend, the prosecutor, has asked you some questions and unfortunately, I’ve got to go back there and ask you similar questions. Because as the prosecutor has indicated, some of the things you’ve said today are different to what you told…

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Details
Case
[2023] ACTSC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought charges against five individuals: Biech Maker Makoi, Kock-Kedhia Maker Makoi, Nyalat Matot, Achan Matot, and Akim Dau. Each is accused of joint commission of aggravated burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, damage to property, and threat to kill. The prosecution alleges that the accused unlawfully entered the residence of Ms Achol Garang on 22 June 2020, assaulted both Ms Garang and another individual, Ms Achol Bol, and caused damage to property within the unit. Ms Bol was called to give evidence on behalf of the prosecution, but she disconnected from the audio-visual link from which she was testifying and did not return. This led to an application by some of the accused for a temporary stay of the proceedings until Ms Bol could be brought before the court to give the remainder of her evidence.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the trial should be temporarily stayed in light of Ms Bol's sudden departure from the proceedings. The court had to determine whether the absence of Ms Bol would cause such unfairness to the accused that it would necessitate a temporary stay of the trial. The court also had to consider whether the potential unfairness could be sufficiently mitigated by other means, such as the exclusion of evidence under the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) or by giving appropriate directions to the jury.

Justice Baker considered the submissions made by the parties and examined relevant legal principles. The court noted that while it has the inherent power to direct a temporary stay of proceedings to prevent injustice, a stay should only be granted to the extent necessary to relieve against unfair consequences. The court also noted that the absence of cross-examination does not necessarily create unfair prejudice and that other remedies, such as the exclusion of evidence or the giving of warnings or directions to the jury, may be available. Justice Baker was satisfied that the risk of unfairness arising from Ms Bol's absence could be sufficiently mitigated by the exclusion of evidence and/or the giving of directions, including a forceful Mahmood direction if Ms Bol's evidence were excluded. The application for a temporary stay was therefore dismissed.

The court's final order was that the application for a temporary stay of the proceedings is dismissed. The trial proceeded without a stay, and the court considered other available remedies to address any potential unfairness caused by Ms Bol's absence.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves five accused individuals: Biech Maker Makoi (also known as Tabisa Makoi), Kock-Kedhia Maker Makoi (also known as KK), Achan Matot, Nyalat Matot, and Akim Dau. They are jointly charged with aggravated burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, damaging property, and threatening to kill. The alleged events transpired on 22 June 2020, when the accused entered the unit of Ms Achol Garang without permission. The prosecution contends that while inside the unit, the accused assaulted Ms Garang and one or more of the accused also assaulted Ms Achol Bol, who was allegedly present at the time of the offences. They further claim that the accused damaged Ms Garang's property during the incident.

On the sixth day of the trial, Ms Bol provided evidence on behalf of the prosecution via audio-visual link (AVL) from a university in Victoria. During the cross-examination, Ms Bol disconnected from the AVL and did not return for the remainder of the day, despite calls from the prosecution. The prosecutor requested an adjournment to attempt to contact Ms Bol and secure her attendance to complete the remainder of her evidence in the trial. The prosecutor informed the court that they were unable to contact Ms Bol over the weekend. The prosecutor did not seek a further adjournment to secure Ms Bol's attendance.

Counsel for Kock-Kedhia Makoi and Tabisa Makoi applied for a temporary stay of the proceedings until Ms Bol could be brought before the court to give the remainder of her evidence. The prosecution opposed this application. Counsel for the remaining accused did not consent to, nor oppose, the application for a temporary stay. The court considered the submissions and determined that the application for a temporary stay should be dismissed. The court found that the risk of unfairness arising from Ms Bol's absence could be sufficiently ameliorated by the exclusion of evidence and/or the giving of directions, including a forceful Mahmood direction in the event that Ms Bol's evidence was excluded. The court concluded that a trial should not be stayed merely because the evidence is incomplete.

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory was presented with an interlocutory application for a temporary stay of proceedings in the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v B Makoi and others. The application arose during the trial, when the key witness Ms Bol, who was giving evidence via audio-visual link from Victoria, abruptly disconnected and could not be recontacted. Counsel for two of the accused applied for a temporary stay of the proceedings until Ms Bol could be brought before the Court to complete her evidence. The application was opposed by the prosecution. The court considered the submissions from both parties and examined the principles governing the exercise of the discretion to order a temporary stay. The court ultimately dismissed the application for a temporary stay, finding that the risk of unfairness arising from Ms Bol's absence could be sufficiently ameliorated by the exclusion of her evidence and/or giving directions to the jury. The trial proceeded without a stay.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the court have the inherent power to order a temporary stay of proceedings to prevent injustice or unfairness to an accused person?
2. Are there circumstances in which the unavailability of cross-examination is not necessarily a source of unfair prejudice, and can other remedies such as the exclusion of evidence or giving directions to the tribunal of fact be sufficient to address any potential unfairness?
3. Can a trial be stayed, whether permanently or temporarily, simply because the evidence is incomplete, or should the fact that the tribunal of fact is called upon to determine issues of fact upon less than all of the material which could relevantly bear upon the matter be accepted as a normal part of trials?
4. If a witness gives evidence in chief but then refuses to continue giving evidence in the face of inconsistencies, can their evidence be excluded under section 137 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), and can directions be given as to the weight that can be given in respect of evidence given by a witness who was unable to be tested in cross-examination?

Held
1. Does the court have the inherent power to order a temporary stay of proceedings to prevent injustice or unfairness to an accused person?
The court concluded that it has the inherent power to order a temporary stay of proceedings to prevent injustice or unfairness to an accused person. The application for a temporary stay was dismissed.

2. Are there circumstances in which the unavailability of cross-examination is not necessarily a source of unfair prejudice, and can other remedies such as the exclusion of evidence or giving directions to the tribunal of fact be sufficient to address any potential unfairness?
The court concluded that the unavailability of cross-examination is not necessarily a source of unfair prejudice and that other remedies, such as the exclusion of evidence and giving directions, can be sufficient to address any potential unfairness. The application for a temporary stay was dismissed.

3. Can a trial be stayed, whether permanently or temporarily, simply because the evidence is incomplete, or should the fact that the tribunal of fact is called upon to determine issues of fact upon less than all of the material which could relevantly bear upon the matter be accepted as a normal part of trials?
The court concluded that a trial should not be stayed simply because the evidence is incomplete, and the fact that the tribunal of fact is called upon to determine issues of fact upon less than all of the material should be accepted as a normal part of trials. The application for a temporary stay was dismissed.

4. If a witness gives evidence in chief but then refuses to continue giving evidence in the face of inconsistencies, can their evidence be excluded under section 137 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), and can directions be given as to the weight that can be given in respect of evidence given by a witness who was unable to be tested in cross-examination?
The court concluded that a witness's evidence can be excluded under section 137 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) if their probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and directions can be given as to the weight that can be given in respect of evidence given by a witness who was unable to be tested in cross-examination. The application for a temporary stay was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in DPP v B Makoi carefully considered the application for a temporary stay of proceedings made by the defence counsel due to the unavailability of a key witness for cross-examination. The court acknowledged the inherent power to order a temporary stay to prevent injustice or unfairness to an accused. However, the court held that such a stay should only be granted if potential unfairness cannot be sufficiently remedied by other means such as the exclusion of evidence or directions to the tribunal of fact. The court applied the principle that the unavailability of cross-examination is not necessarily a source of unfair prejudice in itself, and that the tribunal of fact should be able to determine issues of fact even if not all relevant material is available.

In dismissing the application for a temporary stay, the court relied on the principle that a trial should not be stayed simply because the evidence is incomplete, as the absence of some material does not necessarily render a trial unfair. The court also held that the risk of unfairness from the witness's absence could be sufficiently mitigated by excluding her evidence under section 137 of the Evidence Act if necessary, and by giving appropriate directions to the jury regarding the weight to be given to the un-cross-examined evidence.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a court should not grant a temporary stay of proceedings merely because a key witness is unavailable for cross-examination, if the potential unfairness can be sufficiently remedied by other means such as the exclusion of evidence and directions to the tribunal of fact. The court distinguished prior authority by holding that the unavailability of cross-examination is not, in and of itself, a source of unfair prejudice, and that the tribunal of fact should still be able to determine issues of fact even if not all relevant material is available.