Director of Public Prosecutions v B C R

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No 263 of 2010

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
BCR

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JUDGES NEAVE, WEINBERG JJA and T FORREST AJA
WHERE HELD MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING 6 September 2010
DATE OF JUDGMENT 9 September 2010
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION [2010] VSCA 229
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM Ruling dated 9 August 2010 (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Punshon)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory Appeal – Multiple counts of sexual offences against 14 complainants – Admissibility of tendency and coincidence evidence – Leave to appeal – Criminal Procedure Act 2009, s 297(1) – Challenge to correctness of previous decisions relied upon by judge and judge’s application of principles contained in previous decisions – Severance of counts not yet determined – Possibility of further tendency and coincidence notices – Stay applications pending – Interests of justice – Leave to appeal refused.

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Appearances: Counsel Solicitors
For the Director Mr O P Holdenson QC with Ms A Forrester and
Mr J Livitsanos
Mr Craig Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the respondent Ms S Leighfield Stynes Dixon Lawyers

NEAVE JA
WEINBERG JA
T FORREST AJA:

Background

  1. This is an application by the Crown for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision, under s 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (the ‘Act’). The application relates to a pre-trial ruling of his Honour Judge Punshon, made on 9 August 2010, in which the judge refused to admit tendency and coincidence evidence sought to be adduced by the Crown. As s 295(3) of the Act requires, his Honour certified that the evidence, if ruled inadmissible, would eliminate or substantially weaken the Crown case. Further, and in the alternative, he certified that the decision was otherwise of sufficient importance to the trial to justify it being determined on an interlocutory appeal.[1]

    [1]The order granting certification was made on 11 August 2010. His Honour apparently considered it necessary to refer to s 295(3)(b) as well as s 295(3)(a) because in PNJ v DPP [2010] VSCA 88, [33], this Court said that where the question of cross-admissibility was bound up with the question whether separate trials should be ordered, the interlocutory decision should not be characterised as one concerning the admissibility of evidence under s 295(3)(a).

  1. The background to the pre-trial ruling was as follows.  The respondent was presented in the County Court on 40 counts of sexual offences, comprising four counts of buggery, 28 counts of indecent assault on a male person under 16, one count of gross indecency, five counts of indecent assault, one count of taking part in an act of sexual penetration with a person between the ages of 10 and 16, and one count of attempting to take part in an act of sexual penetration with a person between the ages of 10 and 16.[2]  The offences were alleged to have been committed between 1 January 1969 and 31 December 1988 against 14 different complainants who attended three different Roman Catholic schools.  Seven complainants alleged sexual abuse…

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Details
Case
[2010] VSCA 229
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision which had excluded certain evidence from a trial involving multiple counts of sexual offences against fourteen complainants. The defendant argued that the trial judge had erred in excluding the evidence and in his application of previous case law concerning tendency and coincidence evidence. The court was required to decide whether the appeal was an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion under the Criminal Procedure Act 2009.

The court considered the application for leave to appeal under section 297(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, which requires the court to consider whether the appeal raises a question of law of general public importance or whether there is some other compelling reason to grant leave. The court found that the defendant had not demonstrated that the appeal met either of these criteria. The court considered that the challenge to the correctness of previous decisions relied upon by the trial judge was not sufficient to establish that the appeal raised a question of law of general public importance. The court also found that the possibility of further tendency and coincidence notices, and the severance of counts not yet determined, were insufficient to establish that there was some other compelling reason to grant leave.

The court found that the application for leave to appeal did not meet the criteria set out in section 297(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The court found that the defendant had not demonstrated that the appeal raised a question of law of general public importance or that there was some other compelling reason to grant leave. The court held that the interests of justice did not require the grant of leave to appeal.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

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