| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S CR 2016 0092
BETWEEN
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| STEPHEN JOHN ASLING |
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JUDGE: | KAYE JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 3 March 2017 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 6 March 2017 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Asling (Ruling No 8) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2017] VSC 84 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Evidence – Admissions of guilt by accused out of court – Directions to jury – Whether jury should be directed that must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to admissions – Jury Directions Act 2015 ss 61, 62.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr A Tinney SC with Ms S Flynn | Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr M O’Connell SC with Mr M Goldberg | Stary Norton Halphen |
HIS HONOUR:
The witnesses, witness P and witness C, have each given evidence as to admissions that the accused made to them as to his involvement in the murder of Graham Kinniburgh. An issue has arisen whether I should, or should not, direct the jury that, in order to rely on the evidence of witness P or witness C as to those admissions, the jury must be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that their evidence is truthful and accurate, and that the admissions made to them by the accused were truthful. The particular issue, that has arisen, is whether I should, or indeed whether I am permitted to, direct the jury that those matters must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Mr Tinney SC, who appears with Ms Flynn for the prosecution, has contended that such a direction would not have been necessary at common law, and that, in any event, s 61 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (‘the Act’) precludes a judge from giving such a direction to the jury.
In particular, Mr Tinney submitted that the prosecution case is not dependent, either solely or substantially, on the evidence of witness P or witness C or both of them, as to the admissions made to them by the accused. He submitted that apart from the evidence of those two witnesses, as to those admissions, there is other evidence on which the jury would be entitled to convict. That evidence includes the evidence of the witness, witness A, in combination with other circumstantial evidence, including the evidence of witness P relating to the theft by him and the accused of the blue Ford vehicle (which witness P identified as being the vehicle that was burnt near the scene of the killing) and the evidence of witness P that in the early hours of 13 December 2003 Blewitt and the accused both visited him at his home looking as if they had both been out for the night. Accordingly, Mr Tinney submitted that, at common law, a judge would not have been obliged to have given the prudential direction that is now in issue.
In any event, Mr Tinney submitted that s 61…
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- Case
- [2017] VSC 84
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the jury should be instructed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the truth of any admissions of guilt made by the defendant outside of court. This required an examination of the relevant statutory provisions and their implications for the jury's role in evaluating such admissions. The court needed to determine whether the statutory language mandated a beyond reasonable doubt standard for such admissions or if another standard of proof was applicable. The interpretation of these provisions was crucial as it would impact the weight given to out-of-court admissions in the trial.
The court, in its reasoning, closely analysed the statutory language of sections 61 and 62 of the Jury Directions Act 2015. It found that the legislative intent was to ensure that the jury's role in evaluating evidence, including admissions of guilt, was clearly defined and consistent with the principles of justice. The court concluded that the statutory provisions did not explicitly require the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to out-of-court admissions. Instead, it determined that the jury should be directed to consider such admissions as part of the overall evidence and assess their credibility and weight in the context of the entire case. The court's interpretation was guided by the need to balance the reliability of out-of-court admissions with the protections afforded to the accused under the criminal justice system.
The court's decision was that the jury should not be directed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to any admissions of guilt made by the defendant outside of court. Instead, the jury was to be instructed to consider these admissions as part of the evidence, assess their credibility, and determine their weight in the context of the entire case. This ruling provided clarity on the application of the Jury Directions Act 2015 in cases involving out-of-court admissions and ensured that the jury's evaluation of such evidence was fair and in accordance with the law.
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