Director of Public Prosecutions v Asling (Ruling No 6)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S CR 2016 0092  

BETWEEN

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v  
STEPHEN JOHN ASLING

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JUDGE:

KAYE JA

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

24 February 2017

DATE OF RULING:

24 February 2017

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Asling (Ruling No 6)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2017] VSC 70

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CRIMINAL LAW – Murder – Evidence – Admissions by accused – Probative value outweighs any unfair prejudice –s 90, s 137 Evidence Act 2008.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown Mr A Tinney SC with
Ms S Flynn
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr M O’Connell SC with
Mr M Goldberg
Stary Norton Halphen

HIS HONOUR:

  1. In this matter I gave a ruling on 13 February, before the commencement of the trial, on the admissibility of a number of items of evidence contained in the depositions.[1]  They included a substantial part of the second statement made by the witness, who was referred to as "witness C". 

  1. Witness C made his first statement on 2 March 2010 in which he described admissions which he says were made to him by the accused man while they were both in custody in 2006.  Subsequently, he made a statement on 8 February 2016 which additionally described admissions that he said the accused man made to him in 2008 following witness C's release from prison on 28 December 2007. 

  1. In my previous ruling I held that paragraphs 5, 6 and 12 of that statement were inadmissible because the probative value of the evidence contained in them was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. 

  1. After I gave that ruling, Mr Tinney, of senior counsel, who appears with Ms Flynn for the prosecution, raised with me that he had understood that Mr O'Connell, of senior counsel, who appears with Mr Goldberg for the accused, had not objected to paragraph 12 of witness C's statement, so the prosecution should be entitled to lead it in evidence. 

  1. On the other hand, Mr O'Connell contended that he had in fact argued the inadmissibility of that paragraph. 

  1. Having reviewed the transcript of argument, I am satisfied, as I was then satisfied, that ultimately Mr O'Connell had argued that paragraph 12 should not be admitted into evidence.  However, I also accept that Mr Tinney, on reasonable grounds, did not understand that Mr O'Connell was objecting to that paragraph because, in effect, Mr O'Connell's position relating to the admissibility of paragraph 12 did alter during the course of discussion concerning paragraphs 5 and 6.  I therefore accept that Mr Tinney acted on a genuine and reasonable misunderstanding of the objection ultimately made by Mr O'Connell.  It is for that reason that I advised counsel that in fairness to both sides I would permit the prosecution to argue afresh the question of the admissibility of paragraph 12 and for the defence to be able to object to it. 

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Details
Case
[2017] VSC 70
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Asling (Ruling No 6), the appellant stood accused of the murder of two police officers. The trial judge had ruled that certain admissions made by the accused to his partner, which implicated himself in the crime, were inadmissible under s 90 of the Evidence Act 2008. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed this decision, arguing that the probative value of the admissions outweighed any unfair prejudice to the accused.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion under s 90 of the Evidence Act 2008 in excluding the admissions. The court was required to assess whether the probative value of the admissions was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008. The court also had to consider the impact of the exclusion on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.

The court held that the trial judge had erred in excluding the admissions. The admissions were highly probative of the accused's guilt, directly linking him to the crime. The court found that the probative value of the admissions outweighed any potential unfair prejudice to the accused. The court noted that the admissions were spontaneous and not made in the context of police interrogation, reducing the risk of oppression or unfairness. Furthermore, the court determined that the exclusion of the admissions had a significant impact on the fairness of the proceedings, potentially affecting the outcome of the trial.

The appeal was allowed, and the admissions were ordered to be admitted into evidence. The court's decision highlighted the importance of considering the probative value of admissions against the risk of unfair prejudice when exercising discretion under s 90 of the Evidence Act 2008. The case underscores the need for a balanced approach in determining the admissibility of such evidence in criminal trials.

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