Director of Public Prosecutions v Andrews

Case

[2021] VCC 1125

11 August 2021

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

Case No. CR-20-00838

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
BRETT ANDREWS

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JUDGE:

HIS HONOUR CHIEF JUDGE KIDD

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

7 July 2021

DATE OF SENTENCE:

11 August 2021

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Andrews

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2021] VCC 1125

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject:Criminal law – sentence.

Catchwords:              Sentence – recklessly causing serious injury – judge alone trial –unprovoked assault – youthful offender – intoxication – Aboriginal offender – previous good character – offer to plead guilty – remorse – reasonable prospects for rehabilitation – youth justice centre order.

Legislation Cited:      Crimes Act 1958; Bail Act 1977; Sentencing Act 1991.

Cases Cited:DPP v Andrews [2021] VCC 476; DPP v Russell (2014) 44 VR 471; Winch v The Queen (2010) 27 VR 658; R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235; Azzopardi v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43; Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169; R v Madex [2020] VSC 145; R v Biba [2021] VSC 327; Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214.

Sentence:                  20 months’ detention under a youth justice centre order.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the DPP Ms D. Caruso Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr L. Cameron Maloney Anderson Legal

HIS HONOUR:

Preliminary

1      Brett Andrews, you are now 20 years old. You were 18 years old at the time of committing this offending.

2      You were charged on indictment with intentionally causing serious injury (Charge 1) and recklessly causing serious injury in the alternative (Charge 2).  Your matter proceeded before me by way of a judge alone trial.

3      I found you guilty of Charge 2, recklessly causing serious injury.  You were acquitted of Charge 1, being intentionally causing serious injury.  

4      The offence for which you were convicted, namely recklessly causing serious injury, has a maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment.[1]

[1] Crimes Act 1958 s 17.

5      At your plea hearing, you also entered a plea of guilty to the related summary offence of failing to answer bail.  This offence has a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.[2]

[2] Bail Act 1977 s 30(1).

Circumstances of the offending

6      The circumstances of the related summary offence are that you were bailed to appear at a committal mention for this matter on 7 January 2020 and you failed to appear on that date.

7      The circumstances of your offending and the basis upon which I found you guilty of recklessly causing serious injury are set out in my reasons for judgment dated

[3] DPP v Andrews [2021] VCC 476.

21 April 2021.[3]

8      I will briefly repeat the circumstances of your offending.

9      In the early hours of 5 October 2019 you launched an assault against the complainant, Mr Dean Anderson.  You were with friends at the time and
Mr Anderson was also with a friend.  Both of your groups had recently left Dom’s Nightclub in Mildura.  Mr Anderson’s group was about to be picked up by a friend.

10    Your attack upon Mr Anderson was unprovoked.  The assault involved a clenched-fist blow to Mr Anderson’s head, followed by another clenched-fist blow to his head, causing him to fall to the ground.  You then kicked Mr Anderson whilst he was down.  It is not clear from the evidence where this kick landed, or where you intended for it to land.  However, I have concluded that the kick did in fact connect with

[4] DPP v Andrews [2021] VCC 476 [173].

Mr Anderson’s body and that you delivered the kick with some vigour.[4]  Seconds later, as Mr Anderson was attempting to get up, you delivered a final clenched-fist blow to his head.

11    As a result of this assault, you broke Mr Anderson’s jaw in two places.

12    I will return to the nature and circumstances of the assault and the details of the injury in more detail.

13    On 10 October 2019, five days after the assault, you presented at Mildura police station where you were arrested, interviewed and remanded into custody.  You actively participated in an interview with police.

14    You were then granted bail the next day, on 11 October 2019.

Objective gravity of the offending

15    As your counsel properly acknowledged, your offending is serious.

16    There are some features of this assault that make it particularly serious in my view.

17    First, all of your punches were aimed, with considerable force, at Mr Anderson’s head.  The head is an obviously vulnerable part of the body; the risk of severe harm was palpable.

18    Second, Mr Anderson was defenceless throughout the assault.  The first blow was effectively delivered from behind.  Mr Anderson did not see it coming; he had no opportunity to avoid the blow or protect himself.  The same can be said of the subsequent blows.  When Mr Anderson went to the ground after the second punch, you did not desist. You saw that he was effectively incapacitated and decided to continue your attack upon a vulnerable, defenceless victim.  What makes this attack particularly insidious is not simply that your victim was defenceless, but that you knew he was defenceless and decided to take advantage of that vulnerability.

19    Third, your assault involved multiple blows; three punches and one kick in total.  Although I accepted your counsel’s submission at trial that the serious injury may have been caused by the first punch, the fact of the matter is that this is not a ‘one punch’ case.  Your assault persisted for what must have felt like a long time for
Mr Anderson.  It was, to some degree, a sustained attack, not a split-second solitary strike, quickly regretted.  I want to emphasise here that I am by no means underestimating the seriousness of one punch cases; a single punch can, and often does, result in grave consequences.  The point is that your offending went beyond this.  The number of blows delivered by you informs the objective gravity of this offending and your moral culpability.

20    Fourth, your attack on Mr Anderson was completely unprovoked.  As much was accepted by your counsel.

21    Your counsel did make the submission that you were responding to what you perceived (however wrongly) to be some need to intervene and assist your friend because of some verbal altercation.  I understand that this argument is made only to make the point that this was not a pre-meditated or planned attack – that it was a spontaneous decision.  Insofar as that goes, I accept that, and I sentence you upon that basis.  The fact that you viciously assaulted someone because of some verbal altercation between your two groups prior to the assault does not, however, mitigate your offending.

22    It is also not a mitigating factor that you were intoxicated or disinhibited by alcohol, though, to some extent, this provides the unfortunate and all too familiar context to this kind of offending.

23    The fifth matter I want to raise about the nature of this offending concerns the severe impact that your offending has had on your victim.  The injury suffered by
Mr Anderson is not at the most catastrophic end, but it is a serious injury and has had a profound impact on Mr Anderson both physically and psychologically.  By definition, it is substantial and protracted.  As much was never disputed by you at the trial.

24    Mr Anderson suffered two fractures to his jaw, one on each side of his face.  The fracture to the right side was multi-fragmented.  He required surgery to repair the fractures.  This involved the insertion of metal plates and screws on both sides.  Without surgical intervention, it was Dr Schreiber’s opinion that Mr Anderson was likely to remain disfigured in the face, experience ongoing pain and have significant problems with eating solids and speaking, for the rest of his life.

25    Unfortunately, the surgery has not returned Mr Anderson to how he was before the assault.  He continues to see and feel his injuries every day.  He has a scar on his neck and feels shooting pain in his jaw when he eats.  Mr Anderson is still seeing a specialist because of these ongoing physical problems.

26    Mr Anderson says that one of the biggest impacts of your offending has had on him is to his social life.  He says that he used to be a social person and played a lot of sport.  He now does not go out as much and does not socialise like he used to.  He feels as though this experience has changed his personality.

27    Mr Anderson was understandably traumatised by this incident.  He could not sleep and suffered nightmares, although this has abated with time.

28    As Mr Anderson emphasised in his victim impact statement, he did nothing to ask for this.  I accept this, totally.

29    There are of course aggravating features absent from your offending.  I have mentioned a few such as the absence of planning or premeditation.  However, the absence of these features does not detract from my finding that this is a serious instance of the offence.  For example, the fact that a weapon was not used does not necessarily render this a mild example of this offence.  The capacity of the clenched fist to inflict severe injury should not be underestimated.[5]

[5] DPP v Russell (2014) 44 VR 471 [51].

30    Determining the seriousness of a particular instance of this offence involves considering both the degree of probability that serious injury would result, and the seriousness of the probable injury foreseen.[6]  I am conscious that when considering this that the threshold for serious injury under the current provision is higher than it used to be.  In this case, the serious injury was - elementally - ‘a substantial and protracted injury’.  In my view, the probability of an injury at this level resulting from your actions was high.  As to the severity of the probable injury foreseen, consistent with my finding in respect of your guilt, you foresaw the probability that substantial and protracted injury would follow.  That, in itself, carries a significant level of moral culpability.  I will return to the question of moral culpability when considering your youth.

[6] Winch v The Queen (2010) 27 VR 658, 665 [36].

Personal circumstances

31    You were born in Mildura in 2001.  Your parents separated when you were an infant and you were raised by your mother and maternal grandparents.  You developed a particularly close bond with your maternal grandmother.

32    You first met your father when you were seven years old and you have had almost no contact with him over the past two decades.

33    Your mother re-partnered when you were about 9 or 10 years old, and you had a positive relationship with your step-father.

34    Prior to completing Year 11, you left school in 2017 to live and work with your cousins in Gladstone, Queensland, contributing to their fencing business.  You enjoyed this work and you later commenced a mechanic apprenticeship in early 2019.

35    In May 2019, when you were 17 years old, your maternal grandmother passed away.  This was a devastating loss for you; you described her as effectively a second mother.  Your counsel described this point as the ‘beginnings of the crashing halt to the positive steps’ you had started to make in your young adulthood.  You began to drink alcohol regularly in an attempt to manage your grief.  You started to associate with a negative peer group, and it was after about five months of this negative association and drinking that you committed the assault that brings you before the court today.

36    This background to your offending does not provide an excuse for your offending.  It does, however, provide some context.

Previous good character and subsequent offending

37    I turn to your previous good character and to your subsequent offending.

38    You come before the court as a first-time offender, and as I will say in a moment, a young first time offender.  You do not have any prior convictions and that stands to your credit.

39    There are, however, some subsequent matters which are relevant to my assessment of your prospects of rehabilitation.  

40    They are also relevant to considerations of totality: in sentencing you today, I will take into account all sentences that you have received for your subsequent offending.  

41    You were arrested for this matter on 10 October 2019.  After your release on bail for this matter on 11 October 2019, you commenced using methylamphetamine and committed further offending.  You were sentenced in the Magistrates’ Court in December 2019 for this offending.  You were convicted of one count of theft of a motor vehicle, one count of theft, and one count of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail, and you received a community correction order for a period of six months.

42    In 2020, your use of methylamphetamine escalated and you were involved in further offending, breaching the community correction order imposed on you in December 2019.  On 7 January 2020, you failed to appear at the committal mention for this matter at Mildura Magistrates’ Court and a warrant was issued for your arrest.  This subsequent offence is being dealt with today as a related summary offence.

43    In April 2020, you committed further offending including theft of a motor vehicle and arson.  On 15 April 2020 you were arrested and remanded in custody, and your bail with respect to this matter was revoked.  It was at this time where you also committed the offence of causing damage to a police gaol.

44    On 25 June 2020 you were granted bail on this matter on the condition that you reside at and engage in treatment at Wiimpitja Healing Centre (‘Wiimpitja’).  Wiimpatja is a residential facility providing drug and alcohol rehabilitation for young Aboriginal men.

45    You completed your first 12-week stay at Wiimpitja in September 2020.  After you left, you continued to engage with your former negative peer group and recommenced using drugs, including heroin.

46    On 23 November 2020, you were sentenced in the Magistrates’ Court for the offending that you committed in April 2020.  You were sentenced for five counts of theft of a motor vehicle and two counts of arson, and you received a community correction order for a period of 12 months.

47    In December 2020, you again committed further offending.  You were promptly sentenced for this offending in the Magistrates’ Court in December 2020.  You were sentenced for two counts of theft of a motor vehicle, two counts of burglary, one count of theft and one count of committing an indictable offence whilst on bail.  You were also sentenced for one count of causing damage to a police gaol in relation to your conduct in April 2020.  For these matters, you were sentenced to an aggregate term of two months’ imprisonment.

48    On 17 February 2021, your bail in relation to this matter was varied by the County Court and you again attended Wiimpitja Healing Centre upon your two-month prison sentence lapsing.  I will say more about this second period you spent at Wiimpitja later.

49    You have a pending charge of contravention of a community correction order that is currently listed for hearing in the Magistrates’ Court on 18 August 2021.

Youth

50    As I said, you were 18 years old at the time of committing this offending, and you are only 20 years old now.  The principles relevant to the sentencing of youthful offenders have application in your case.[7]

[7] R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235, 241; Azzopardi v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43, 53-6 [34]-[40], 57 [44]-[45].

51    In assessing your moral culpability, I must take into account your age.  The law recognises that young people are more prone to engaging in rash, impulsive, thoughtless decision making and may act without the ‘insight, judgment and self-control’ of those who are older.[8]

[8] Azzopardi V The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43, [34].

52    I think these factors did play a role in this senseless offending.  Your moral culpability is therefore reduced as a result of your youthfulness.

53    But to be clear, your age is not an excuse for your behaviour, it merely moderates your blameworthiness.

54    Additionally, the emphasis that I place on general deterrence in sentencing you is moderated by your youth.  I must also give more weight to the consideration of your rehabilitation as a result of your youth.

55    A youthful offender should not be sent to an adult prison ‘if such a disposition can be avoided, especially if he is beginning to appreciate the effect of his past criminality’.[9]

[9] R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235, 241.

56    The emphasis on general deterrence in your case, as I have said, is moderated by your youth, particularly in light of your recent efforts towards rehabilitation.  There is a great public benefit in the rehabilitation of an offender, and particularly of a young offender.

57    On the other hand, despite your youth, general deterrence remains an important sentencing consideration.

58    As the Victorian Court of Appeal said in DPP v Russell,[10] random street violence is a scourge on our society.

[10] (2014) 44 VR 471, 473 [1].

59    Your offending is undeniably serious and calls for a sentence that denounces such behaviour and deters others from undertaking similar conduct.

60    It is clear there are conflicting sentencing considerations in your case.  I must find a disposition which punishes you and deters others, but which also promotes and facilitates your rehabilitation, particularly given your age.

61    There is still a need for some weight to be given to the need to protect the community from you, and specific deterrence has a role to play.  This sentence must serve the purpose of deterring you from undertaking similar conduct in the future.  While you are on the pathway to reform, you are by no means there yet, and you are quite capable of appreciating the legal consequences of engaging in this type of offending.

Offers to plead guilty, utilitarian benefit and remorse

62    From the time of your police interview, you have never denied assaulting
Mr Anderson.

63    In fact, I am told that you offered to plead guilty to recklessly causing serious injury on two occasions during these proceedings.  First, at the committal mention stage in the Magistrates’ Court on 16 June 2020, and then again in September 2020 when the matter was in this court’s jurisdiction.

64    I am told that you had also previously offered to plead guilty to intentionally causing injury, however that was prior to Dr Schreiber’s report being received.

65    Your counsel submitted that you are entitled to a material reduction in your sentence by reason of your previous offers to plead guilty to the charge of which you were ultimately convicted, on two separate bases:

(a)the objective benefit of your plea offers, namely their utilitarian value; and

(b)the subjective benefit of your plea offers, namely their reflection of your willingness to facilitate the course of justice, acceptance of responsibility and remorse.

66    I accept this submission.

67    Further, I also accept that because your offers to plead guilty were made during the COVID-19 pandemic, they are worthy of greater weight in mitigation than if they were made when the community and the courts had not been afflicted by the pandemic's effects.  This is because of the utilitarian value of the offers.  Your plea offers therefore attract a greater reduction in sentence than would ordinarily be the case.[11]

[11] Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169 [39].

68    However, as your counsel properly conceded, the benefit that you receive as a result of the subjective aspect of your plea offers is somewhat tempered by the fact that you entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of recklessly causing serious at trial.  While I accept that your plea offers provide some evidence of remorse, this is moderated by your pleading not guilty to the charge at trial.  It was open to you to plead guilty to this charge at trial but to contest the more serious charge of intentionally causing serious injury.

69    Putting your offers to plead guilty to one side, there is other evidence of remorse.  You handed yourself in at Mildura police station five days after the assault.  You actively participated in a recorded interview with police and made significant admissions.  In my view, your record of interview provides evidence of remorse.

70    However, this is not an unqualified finding.  I fall short of accepting your counsel’s submission that you provided a full and frank account in your record of interview.  As I detailed in my judgment,[12] I rejected your underlying claim at trial which formed the basis of your defence at trial, namely that this was an ‘unthinking’ assault in that you gave no real thought to the consequences of your actions.  To the contrary, I concluded that you appreciated the probable consequences of your actions, namely serious injury being caused to Mr Anderson.  I do however find that your interview shows that you acknowledge that your assault was a senseless act and that you are remorseful for your conduct.  Your participation in the interview was, by and large, full and frank.

[12] DPP v Andrews [2021] VCC 476 [222]-[223].

71    Mr Mark Bland, Elder and Manager of Wiimpitja, also gave evidence that demonstrates you are remorseful for your actions.  He said that you now understand the trauma that you have caused to your victim and that you are ashamed of your actions. I accept that.

72    At the end of the plea hearing, I ordered that two reports be provided.  One in relation to your suitability for a community corrections order, and one in relation to your suitability for a youth justice centre order. Both reports reflected positively on you and found you suitable for the respective orders.[13] The authors of the report in relation to youth justice noted your genuine sense of remorse. I will return to this within the context of your rehabilitation.

[13] Community correction order assessment outcome report dated 9 July 2021; Youth Justice pre-sentence report dated 6 August 2021.

73    In all the circumstances, having regard to all the material before, there is significant evidence of your remorse.

Prospects of rehabilitation, community protection and specific deterrence

74    Despite your subsequent offending outlined above, Wiimpitja allowed you a second opportunity to engage with their program.  Since your latest release from custody, you have been on bail for this matter and living at Wiimpitja.

75    From that time, I am told that you have complied with various conditions imposed on you, including:  not leaving Wiimpitja unless in the company of the coordinator or their nominee; not consuming alcohol or using drugs; and, complying with all lawful directions of Wiimpitja staff.

76    You have now been abstinent from alcohol and drugs for a period in excess of six months.  This is a significant period of time.

77    Mr Mark Bland has confirmed that during your most recent stay at Wiimpitja, you have engaged enthusiastically with the various programs offered, including:  a daily work program, involving work such as wood cutting and fencing; alcohol and drug visiting services; elder visits and cultural programs; and, men’s behaviour change programs.

78    During your time at Wiimpitja you have reengaged with your family and maintained your relationship with your partner since late 2020.  I am told that your partner is a positive influence on you and that you intend to move in together in her flat once you are at liberty to do so.

79    Also to your credit, you have a solid work history.  As I mentioned earlier, you were previously employed by your cousin’s fencing business and you have skills and knowledge in that area.

80    I am told that you have options of paid employment.  You have the option of returning to your cousins fencing business in Queensland, and I am told that you also have the option of returning to employment as a Ranger working for an Aboriginal organisation primarily working to protect cultural sites.

81    You have family support and you also have connections to your people and culture, including by learning from the Elders at Wiimpitja.

82    Self-evidently your significant subsequent offending shows that you have experienced a number of ‘missteps’, as they were referred to by your counsel on the plea.  It has not been a smooth road.

83    Your counsel submitted to me that despite your missteps, you have made, for a man of your age and in light of the difficulties you have faced, significant steps towards rehabilitation.

84    I accept that.  It seems that you are now making the most of your second opportunity at Wiimpitja and you are taking really positive steps towards rehabilitation.

85    As I have mentioned, I ordered that two reports be provided in this matter, and both reports were positive.  Insofar as the Youth Justice pre-sentence report is concerned, the author stated:

'The nature of Mr Andrews' offending is one of which is identified as serious and has significant and long-lasting impact toward the victim, which cannot be overlooked.  Mr Andrews has been able to acknowledge the severity of his actions, displaying a genuine sense of remorse and identifying responsibility for the ongoing impact he has imposed upon the victim and furthermore; the victim's family.  Mr Andrews has taken considerably onerous steps to address multiple domains within his life, that had previously been unsupported and were contributing factors to his reactive offending.  His significant substance abuse, deteriorated mental health, and disconnect to community and culture has been addressed through his active and positive engagement at the Wiimpatja Healing Centre.  Mr Andrews has expressed commitment to maintain engagement with support services and programs following his exit from Wiimpatja Healing Centre, whether this be in a Youth Justice custodial setting, or in community'. (p6)

86    Considering all of the evidence, I have concluded that your prospects of rehabilitation are reasonable.  I am encouraged by your progress over the last six months and the evidence of Mr Bland.  I am also encouraged by the fact that the support you have received from the Mallee District Aboriginal Services will remain open to you when you are no longer at Wiimpitja and you are back in the community.

87    I am also encouraged by the two reports that I received  in particular the Youth Justice pre-sentence report.

88    You are beginning to show that you can abstain from alcohol and drug consumption.  I think your prospects depend upon this.  Alcohol played some role in this offending.  The biggest challenge will arise when you are faced with managing these issues while living back in the community.

Pre-sentence detention and delay

89    I turn to the question of pre-sentence detention and to the issue of delay.

90    You have served 74 days by way of pre-sentence detention.  This is constituted by two days you spent in custody after your arrest and the 72 days you spent in custody between 15 April and 25 June 2020.

91    As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, I accept that your time on remand was more burdensome than it would otherwise have been.[14]

[14] Any further period in custody will likely be more onerous for the same reasons. For example, see R v Madex [2020] VSC 145 [51]; R v Biba [2021] VSC 327 [38]-[39].

92    You have also spent some nine months in residential rehabilitation at Wiimpitja, a rehabilitation centre for young Aboriginal men.  Although this time will not be declared as pre-sentence detention, and is not equivalent to pre-sentence detention in custody, I take the punitive aspects of the residential rehabilitation into account in delivering my sentence.[15]

[15] Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214 [109]-[112].

93    You are away from family and you are not allowed to have a phone whilst at Wiimpitja.  You are only permitted one 15-minute phone call per day.  You undertake daily work programs, and if you fail to abide by any of the rules at Wiimpitja, you may be breached.

94    As mentioned earlier, you also spent a period of about two months in custody in relation to one of your matters and I made reference to some other dispositions.  I take into account, in particular, the fact that you have served two months in custody by way of totality.[16]

[16] See [40] above.

95    I also recognise that this criminal matter has been looming for some 22 months now.  During this time, you have had the prospect of imprisonment hanging over your head.  This is a significant amount of time, particularly for a young person, however this period of delay is not unusual.  It also needs to be noted that you failed to appear whilst on bail at the committal mention stage of these proceedings and that some of the delay can be attributed to your conduct.

96    Overall, whilst delay is a factor in mitigation of sentence, it plays a relatively modest role in this matter.  On the other hand, this period of time has given you the opportunity to show that you can take the path of reform.  At least lately, you have, I accept, taken that chance, and I will take that into account.

Submissions as to sentencing disposition

97    I turn now to the submissions made as to the sentencing disposition.

98    The prosecution submitted that the sentence I impose ought to include a custodial component.  The prosecution said that either a combination sentence (that is, a sentence of imprisonment combined with a community correction order) or a term of detention in a youth justice centre would adequately address the relevant sentencing purposes. 

99    Your counsel submitted that a combination sentence is appropriate in this case.  Your counsel submitted that the time you have already served by way of pre-sentence detention, namely some 74 days, is sufficient to constitute the imprisonment aspect of the sentence, having regard also to the your confinement at Wiimpitja.  Thus, your counsel submitted that it is appropriate for you to be released into the community whilst serving a community correction order.

100   In my view, a sentence involving an incarceration component is necessary in this case.  I have, however, firmed up the view I provisionally expressed at the plea hearing, namely that the sentence must involve more incarceration time than you have already undertaken as pre-sentence detention and taking into account your confinement at Wiimpitja.  In my view, a term involving further incarceration is unavoidable and is the only appropriate sentence having regard to all of the circumstances, including the need to adequately express the court’s denunciation of such grave offending, and to meet the sentencing considerations of just punishment and general deterrence.

101   The question is the form that the sentence will take.

Disposition

102 Section 32(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 provides that a court may make a youth justice centre order if it has received a pre-sentence report and at least one of the following two matters are satisfied:

(a)   It believes that there are reasonable prospects for the rehabilitation of the young offender; or

(b)   It believes that the young offender is particularly impressionable, immature or likely to be subjected to undesirable influences in an adult prison.

103   In this case, as I have said, I have received such a report.  I am satisfied of both of these matters, that is paragraph (a) and paragraph (b).

104   The authors of the pre-sentence report assessed you as suitable for a youth justice centre order.

105   Despite your missteps, I have found that you have reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.

106   The authors of the pre-sentence report also concluded that you would be easily influenced and susceptible in adult custody.  I accept that.

107   Having regard to the nature of the offence and your age, character and past history, I am satisfied that a youth justice centre order is appropriate.[17]

[17] Sentencing Act 1991 s 32(2).

108   In all the circumstances, I have decided to impose a youth justice centre order.  The purpose of such an order is to punish you whilst also promoting your rehabilitation.

Sentence

109   Would you please stand, Mr Andrews?

110   On the single charge of recklessly causing serious injury, you are convicted and sentenced to 20 months’ detention by way of a youth justice centre order.

111   On the charge of failing to answer bail you are convicted and discharged.

112   I declare that 74 days have been served by way of pre-sentence detention.

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Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169
The Queen v Madex [2020] VSC 145