Director of Public Prosecutions v Andrew Baker (Ruling No 4)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S ECR 2021 0094

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Crown
v
ANDREW BAKER Accused

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JUDGE:

Jane Dixon J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

14–21 June 2022, 1 February 2023

DATE OF RULING:

7 February 2023

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Andrew Baker (Ruling No 4)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2023] VSC 35

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CRIMINAL LAW – Murder – Evidence – Relationship evidence – Whether evidence should be excluded due to prejudicial effect – Whether probative value is outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice – Danger of unfair prejudice can be cured by giving appropriate directions to the jury – Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 137.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown Mr J Dickie with
Ms N Deltondo
Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr J Saunders with
Ms S Thomas
Tait Lawyers

HER HONOUR:

Background

  1. The accused is charged with the murder of Sarah Gatt (‘S Gatt’). The Crown alleges that the accused murdered S Gatt sometime between 19 and 23 April 2017.[1] On 21 November 2022, I ruled on the admissibility of various hearsay representations (‘Ruling No 1’),[2] as well as on the admissibility of certain letters and notes written by the accused (‘Ruling No 2’),[3] and evidence of incriminating conduct (‘Ruling No 3’).[4]

    [1]The accused’s trial is scheduled to commence in February 2023.

  1. The background to this matter is set out in Ruling No 1, and this ruling should be read alongside Ruling No 1. To summarise, the disputed evidence relates to six incidents of family violence alleged to have been committed by the accused against S Gatt that span from December 2014 to December 2015. Each incident involves disputed representations made either to triple zero call-takers, police or others.

(i)     Incident 1: 27 December 2014;

(ii)  Incident 2: 6 February 2015;

(iii)      Incident 3: 3 April 2015;

(iv)      Incident 4: 8 July 2015;

(v)  Incident 5: 28 August 2015; and

(vi)      Incident 7: 19 December 2015.

  1. As noted in Ruling No 1, the Defence made some general submissions during oral argument about the need for exclusion of evidence under ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (‘EA’) about the disputed hearsay representations, but reserved their position for later, submitting that arguments about their probative value and the danger of unfair prejudice would be impacted by my ultimate rulings. Following those rulings, the parties filed further written submissions.[5] Although the Defence referred to both ss 135 and 137 in their earlier oral submissions, their final written submissions on the disputed evidence focused on s 137 of the EA. Accordingly, this ruling…

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Details
Case
[2023] VSC 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the Director of Public Prosecutions against Andrew Baker, the case before the court was to determine whether certain evidence related to the relationship between the accused and the victim should be excluded from the trial on the grounds that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The matter was heard in the County Court of Victoria. The crux of the legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), specifically section 137, which allows for the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to any party.

The court was required to assess the probative value of the relationship evidence in proving the accused's intent or state of mind at the time of the offence, and to weigh this against the potential for the evidence to unfairly prejudice the jury against the accused. The court considered whether the prejudicial effect could be mitigated by giving appropriate directions to the jury, as required by the legislation. The arguments presented by both parties revolved around the relevance of the relationship evidence and its potential to sway the jury's decision based on emotions rather than facts.

The court found that while the relationship evidence had some probative value in establishing the context of the events, it also posed a significant risk of unfairly prejudicing the jury against the accused. However, the court determined that this danger could be effectively mitigated by providing clear and appropriate directions to the jury, ensuring they would consider the evidence only in the context of its relevance to the accused's intent or state of mind. Consequently, the court ruled that the evidence should not be excluded in its entirety, but that the jury must be directed on how to properly assess its relevance and impact. The final orders of the court mandated that the evidence be admitted, subject to the specified directions to the jury.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established