SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2016 0018
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| BOBBY ALEXANDER (A PSEUDONYM)[1] | Respondent |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the respondent.
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| JUDGES: | WEINBERG AP, COGHLAN and FERGUSON JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 14 April 2016 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 6 May 2016 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2016] VSCA 92 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Alexander] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Stuart, 21 January 2016) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory Appeal – Charges in relation to multiple sex offences against six separate complainants on same indictment – Coincidence evidence – Trial judge ruled evidence not cross-admissible and ordered six separate trials – Basis of ruling identifiable dissimilarities – Appeal by Crown –Analysis of offending against each complainant unduly detailed – Basic underlying unity for allegations in relation to three complainants – Features of alleged offending significant and distinctive – Charges in relation to three complainants cross-admissible – Trials in relation to same three complainants capable of being heard together – Appeal allowed in part.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Dr N Rogers SC with Mr A McKenry | Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr M Sharpley | Robert Davies, Barrister & Solicitor |
WEINBERG AP:
I agree with Coghlan JA.
COGHLAN JA:
The Director of Public Prosecutions (‘Director’) filed an indictment in the County Court at Melbourne charging the respondent with a total of 18 sexual offences. The charges involved six boys (hereafter designated ‘TK’, ‘ME’, ‘RF’, ‘PC’, ‘AA’ and ‘SP’) all of whom were, or had at one time been, residents at a suburban boys home (‘the Home’). The offences were said to have been committed between September 1972 and November 1980.
The respondent was at all material times involved in or had been involved in the supervision of the boys at the Home. He stayed overnight at the Home.
The Director gave notice pursuant to s 97 of the Evidence Act 2008 (‘the Act’) that the Crown would seek to rely upon tendency reasoning (evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of the respondent to prove that he had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind). Accordingly, the Crown was obliged to satisfy the Court that the evidence sought to be led would have ‘significant probative value’ and, ultimately, pursuant to s 101 of the Act, that the probative value of that evidence would substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect that it might have upon the accused.
The s 97 notice was, in part, in the following terms:
4.The tendency sought to be proved is the tendency of [BOBBY ALEXANDER] to act in a particular way, namely;
(i)engaging in sexual activities with six boys who were current or former residents of [the Home]
(ii) doing so by commencing with inappropriate touching (cuddling, caressing) at the instigation…
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- Case
- [2016] VSCA 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the features of the alleged offending against the three complainants and found that they were significant and distinctive. The court held that the charges in relation to those three complainants were cross-admissible and that trials in relation to them could be heard together. The court found that the trial judge's analysis of the offending against each complainant was unduly detailed and that there was a basic underlying unity for the allegations in relation to the three complainants. The appeal was allowed in part, and the court remitted the matter to the trial court for further consideration.
The court held that the charges against three of the complainants were cross-admissible and that trials in relation to those complainants could be heard together. The court found that the trial judge's analysis of the offending against each complainant was unduly detailed and that there was a basic underlying unity for the allegations in relation to the three complainants. The court allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter to the trial court for further consideration. The court did not address the charges against the remaining three complainants, leaving it to the trial court to determine whether those charges could be heard together or required separate trials.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter first came before the court on an interlocutory appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The initial decision to order six separate trials was made by the trial judge based on the view that the evidence against the six complainants was not cross-admissible. The Crown filed an appeal against this ruling, arguing that the evidence against three of the complainants was sufficiently similar to be tried together. The appeal was heard by the court, which reviewed the trial judge’s decision and the arguments presented by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the evidence of the offences against all six complainants was cross-admissible and could be tried in a single trial.
2. Whether the evidence of the offences against three of the complainants was sufficiently similar to allow those offences to be tried together.
3. Whether the trial judge’s order for six separate trials was correct or if the appeal should be allowed in part.
Held
1. The evidence of the offences against all six complainants was not cross-admissible and could not be tried in a single trial.
2. The evidence of the offences against three of the complainants was sufficiently similar to allow those offences to be tried together.
3. The trial judge’s order for six separate trials was incorrect and the appeal should be allowed in part.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court of Australia considered an interlocutory appeal brought by the Crown regarding the admissibility of evidence and the appropriateness of separate trials for multiple sex offences against six separate complainants. The court was tasked with determining whether the evidence was cross-admissible for a single trial and whether the evidence of offences against three complainants was sufficiently similar for those offences to be tried together. The appeal against the trial judge's order for six separate trials was also reviewed.
In addressing the first issue, the court examined the nature of the evidence and the specific circumstances of each complainant's case. It found that the evidence against all six complainants was not cross-admissible, primarily due to identifiable dissimilarities in the nature of the offences. The trial judge’s decision to order separate trials was affirmed as the evidence did not meet the criteria for cross-admissibility under the common scheme or plan principle. The court emphasized that each complainant's case had distinct characteristics that did not allow for a unified trial.
For the second issue, the court conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence concerning three of the complainants. It identified a basic underlying unity in the allegations against these three complainants, characterized by significant and distinctive features of the alleged offending. The similarities in the modus operandi and the nature of the offences against these three complainants were deemed sufficient to allow for a joint trial. The court found that the trial judge's analysis of the offending against each complainant was unduly detailed and did not adequately consider the overarching similarities in the allegations.
In relation to the third issue, the court concluded that the trial judge's order for six separate trials was incorrect regarding the three complainants whose offences were found to be sufficiently similar. The appeal was allowed in part, with the court ordering that the charges in relation to these three complainants be tried together. This decision aligns with the principle that offences can be tried jointly if they are part of a common scheme or plan and share significant and distinctive features.
The court's decision highlights the importance of a balanced approach in assessing the admissibility of evidence in multiple offence cases, ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected while also considering the efficiency and fairness of the judicial process. The ratio decidendi of this case is that while evidence against multiple complainants may not always be cross-admissible for a single trial, there can be circumstances where offences against a subset of complainants share sufficient similarities to warrant a joint trial.