Director of Public Prosecutions v 623452924Hav Pty Ltd
[2025] VCC 379
•28 March 2025
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
AT BENDIGO
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CR 23-02076
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| 623452924HAV PTY LTD |
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JUDGE: | HER HONOUR JUDGE QUIN |
WHERE HELD: | Bendigo |
DATE OF HEARING: | 11 November 2024, 12 November 2024, 13 November 2024, 14 November 2024, 15 November 2024, 18 November 2024, 19 November 2024, 20 November 2024, 21 November 2024, 22 November 2024, 25 November 2024, 26 November 2024, 27 November 2024, 28 November 2024, 29 November 2024, 2 December 2024, 18 March 2025 |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 28 March 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v 623452924Hav Pty Ltd |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VCC 379 |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject: CRIMINAL LAW
Catchwords: Charge of failing to provide or maintain a plant that was safe and without risks to health
Legislation Cited: Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, Sentencing Act1991
Cases Cited: DPP v Frewstal Pty Ltd,
Sentence: Convicted and fined $400,000.00
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Mr P. Matthews SC with | OPP |
For the Accused | Mr S. Russell | Mills & Oakley |
HER HONOUR:
1Hav Pty Ltd (the company) was found guilty by a jury on 2 December 2024 of failing to provide or maintain a plant that was safe and without risks to health contrary to ss 21(1) and 21(2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (the Act). The charge arose out of a WorkSafe investigation that followed the death of an employee of the company, Harley Muir. Mr Muir died from crush injuries sustained on 1 February 2021 at 79 Calder Highway, Bridgewater, Victoria (the workplace). At the time of his death Mr Muir was working on a machine, known as the multibaler, part of which was referred to as the 'main line'.
2By their verdict, the jury found that:
i.There was a risk to the company's employees of serious injury and/or death from having body parts crushed (the risk) in the main line between the frame for strappers 3 and 4 and the cutter box (that is the danger area);
ii.It was reasonably practicable for the company to eliminate or reduce the risk by installing a light curtain on the main line to prevent access to the danger area (the measure); and
iii.The company failed to provide or maintain plant that was, so far as was reasonably practicable, safe and without risks to health of employees, in that the company failed to implement the measure.
3The trial ran for approximately three weeks in November 2024. At the commencement of the trial, an inspection or View by the jury of the workplace took place. I accompanied the jury, along with counsel, to the workplace, and my associate pointed out various aspects of the machine and its operations at the workplace as agreed between counsel. (see Transcript 37-39 on 15 November 2024 regarding a description of the View)
4A number of witnesses from the workplace or employees, Worksafe, the partner of Mr Muir, and other experts were called, and a significant amount of documents/reports relating to the machine and internal documents from the company where contained in the jury book and tendered. Additionally, photographs of the multibaler and CCTV footage of the workings or operations of it, including of the incident, were also tendered at the trial.
5The maximum penalty or fine that can be imposed on a company for this offence is 9,000 penalty units, or at the current penalty value unit value $1,486,980.
The incident
6On the day of the incident Mr Muir was working on a part of the multibaler machine known as the 'main line'. The main line on the multibaler had moving parts, including five separate 'strapping heads', which put straps around hay bales. Of these, parts known as 'strappers 3 and 4' were mounted on a sliding frame known as the strapping arch, which would move horizontally in order to apply straps to the bales at designated points.
7During Mr Muir's shift which commenced at 6 am, there was a recurring issue with the main line straps becoming misaligned.
8At around 12:20 pm, CCTV footage showed Mr Muir standing at the area near strappers 3 and 4, adjacent to the strapping arch from where he could monitor the machinery. At around 12:24 pm he stepped on a guard rail and looked into the machine. About a minute later, the strapping arch moved, and Mr Muir was crushed between it and another metal surface of the machine, known as the cutter box.
9When Mr Muir was crushed, the machine showed that strapper 3 had faulted and caused an alarm to sound. Other employees went to the area, stopped the machine and called for help. When the machine stopped, Mr Muir was released and fell to the floor, and was unresponsive. He had significant head and chest injuries and did not regain consciousness. Tragically he was pronounced dead by attending paramedics.
The trial
10The issue at the trial was whether the prosecution had proven that the company had not taken all reasonable practicable steps to protect the health and safety of its employees in the operation of the machine when working on the main line, from the risk of crushing in the danger area.
11The defence case was that Mr Muir had deliberately placed himself in that position, and acted in the manner in which he did, as an act of suicide; that there was no operational reason either normal or unexpected for Mr Muir to place his head, or any other part of his body in the danger area; that the company had taken all reasonably practicable steps to avoid the risk to the health and safety of employees in the danger area.
12The jury by their verdict rejected the defence argument that all reasonable practicable steps had been taken by the company to avoid the risk of crushing in the danger area.
13However, the finding of guilt did not mean that the jury did not accept that the actions taken by Mr Muir were deliberate, so as to cause self‑harm or death. The prosecution ultimately went to the jury submitting that if they were satisfied that Mr Muir had suicided, that they should put the evidence of his death out of their mind, and that they could find the company guilty by failing to protect employees from the risk of entering the danger area.
Findings on the plea
14The company is to be sentenced on the basis of the jury's verdict and the Court's findings about any aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the offence of which the company has been found guilty. Any aggravating circumstance must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The parties requested I consider this aspect prior to hearing of the remainder of the plea, given the consequence of that finding as to the admissibility of victim impact statement material filed by family and friends of Mr Muir.
15If determined by me, beyond reasonable doubt that the actions of Mr Muir were not attributable to suicide it was accepted that the victim impact statement were admissible (except as where indicated in Schedule 1). That is, that Mr Muir was properly characterised as a 'victim' as that term is defined in the Sentencing Act1991, and his death occurred as a direct result of the offence.
16Both the parties filed detailed submissions, supplemented by oral argument regarding this issue.
17The defence relied on evidence from the trial as set out in relevant paragraphs in written submissions:
i.from other employees, (paras 59-66);
ii.Worksafe investigators (para 67 – 68 and 73-74); and
iii.other relevant professionals (paras 69-72).
18It was submitted that the evidence was to the effect:
i.that there was no operational reason for Mr Muir to climb up in the manner in which he did, within the danger area, where the incident took place – nothing could be seen from there and the cutter box was not accessible from there;
ii.the workings of the machine including the timing of movement, and noises associated with that movement, were well known to those who worked on the main line including Mr Muir who was an experienced employee;
iii.there was no evidence that anyone had ever ventured into or had been observed in, the specific area the subject of the incident or the danger area, in the course of employment on any other occasion;
iv.that a viewing of the CCTV footage of the incident, showed a deliberate and considerable effort on the part of Mr Muir to place his head in the relevant gap when in the danger area.
19Further, it was submitted, on the basis of the evidence of Mr Muir's psychiatric history (para 76(a-e), SMS texts (para 78-83) revealing disappointment regarding his contact arrangements with his children, and the evidence of Dr Davis, psychiatrist, that this material supported a finding of a deterioration in Mr Muir's mental health, months and days leading up to the incident. That this should be considered in the context of Mr Muir's history of psychiatric issues, that required medication and his inconsistent compliance with that.
20It was submitted that on consideration of all of these matters, that I should not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Muir's actions were not suicide.
21The Prosecution pointed to other evidence that supported a finding that Mr Muir's actions were not suicidal or were deliberate beyond reasonable doubt, in written submissions (see para 12 (a-e) namely:
i.A viewing of the CCTV footage at the workplace on the day of the incident showed Mr Muir carrying out his usual work tasks and being consistently focussed on his work tasks, including immediately prior to the incident;
ii.Mr Muir had prearranged to meet his partner and children for lunch, not something that was his usual practice;
iii.Analysis of SMS messages revealed a close and supportive relationship between Mr Muir and his partner – although there is reference to a 'panic attack', the tone and content of relevant and contemporaneous texts was unremarkable. It was submitted that caution should be exercised in analysing or interpreting abbreviated and potentially ambiguous texts as a form of communication;
iv.Dr Davis, the defence expert, gave evidence of the rare, unusual manner and particularly painful mechanism utilised in this incident as a means of suicide;
v.The evidence of Ms Sullivan as to her relationship with Mr Muir.
22Further, the prosecution highlighted the deficiencies in the evidence of Dr Davis (see para 13) and that the defence argument that there was no operational reason for Mr Muir to do what he did, was not to the point. Rather what was important was what Mr Muir thought he might be able to see or achieve, as part of his work duties, by entering the danger area. Further, that although the machine itself had regular motion and sounds of which Mr Muir would have been aware, it was open to find he was focussed on his work task in placing himself where he did in the danger area and in the manner in which he did. .
FINDING
23I have re-watched the relevant CCTV footage, particularly that relating to the time of the incident. Additionally, as I indicated, I attended the View at the workplace and observed the workings of the machine, workplace and danger area. These were both, along with the other evidence at the trial, of significant benefit in assessment of the size, the operation of the main line and the work to be performed in the vicinity of the danger area.
24I accept that Mr Muir may have been having some family law difficulties at the time and expressed disappointment regarding the outcome of a recent court decision. Additionally, it is clear that he has required psychiatric treatment in the past which included medication.
25It was not disputed that there was no evidence of any employees accessing the relevant area where the incident took place or the danger area. There was no operational reason for Mr Muir to do what he did, and the evidence from other employees was that there was nothing to access or to be able to be seen from that position.
26However, considering the following matters:
i.CCTV footage including of the operation of the machine on other occasions and the day of the incident; employees worked in close proximity to the danger area, such work including that it was necessary to ensure the strapping system on the main line was functioning properly;
ii.Evidence from other employees as to the need for consistent appearance and ensuring the quality of the bales;
iii.Observations of the machine operating at the View, including the size and actual workings of the main line and strapping machines and necessity for correction;
iv.Evidence of Ms Sullivan as to the nature of the relationship between her and Mr Muir, the immediate and future plans they had made, and the tone of the SMS messages between them; and
v.The rare and unusual nature of the method chosen by Mr Muir to suicide, including that being in the presence of other workmates.
27I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt the actions of Mr Muir were not deliberate. Rather he was acting in the course of his work in placing himself in the position he did, entering in the danger area, and resulting in his death.
Victim Impact Statements
28The prosecution filed a total of 16 victim impact statement. As indicated, I was satisfied the actions of Mr Muir were not attributable to a suicide, therefore his death occurred as a direct result of the offence, and he is a 'victim' under the Sentencing Act1991.
29I was provided with a significant amount of material by a close friend and family members. His mother, his partner, his siblings, two sons, four daughters, two stepsons and three stepdaughters. The material provided an insight into the kind of person that Mr Muir was and importantly, for sentencing purposes, the impact this offence has had on his friend and numerous family members. Quite clearly there have been major consequences, and understandably his death has had a significant impact on each of those who were close to him, and will continue to do so.
30Although an offence under Workplace safety legislation is not made more serious by the fact that in this case, the risk of death to an employee eventuated, the sentencing court is nevertheless required to take into account the impact of the offending by the company on those affected by it.
31Many of the family members and friends were able to attend Court and either read their own statement or had their contents read by the learned prosecutor. Others preferred that the Court read them. I have considered all the admissible contents of each of them including that provided by Mr Muir's younger children by way of illustrations.
32The understandable grief, pain and anger that was eloquently expressed by each of them, reveal what can only be described as the absolutely devastating impact on his friend and family because of the death of Mr Muir. They reveal the traumatic circumstances of discovering his death, learning of the way that it occurred, the detrimental impact to their own mental health, and the difficulties encountered in accepting his death. It is clear that circumstance of this incident occurring during COVID made the grieving process for multiple family members all the more challenging and difficult.
33Mr Muir provided both support and joy to his siblings, mother and partner, that is sadly missed by each of them.
34His sister Georgia notes:
Although I have tried my best to put my feelings on paper, I can't really explain how the loss of Harly has impacted on me as it has been like losing a part of myself. I do not have words to explain how this devastating life changing experience has forever altered our (the family’s) futures
35His son Jay states simply:
There is so much I am missing out on by not having Dad, even little things like something that is his, we get told you’ll get when you are older but what if they forget and we never get it.
The biggest thing I miss about Dad is when he would try to make me laugh, if that did not work he would then try something else, even if it was like a joke where he hurt himself, he would do it to make us laugh.
36In cases like this, it is natural that that the family members and friends of a person who lost their life will focus primarily on the fact of the death. Nothing this Court can do will bring Mr Muir back, but I have taken into account the impact on others of his death in sentencing the company.
Objective Gravity
37The objective seriousness of a contravention of the Act is the primary factor in determining the appropriate sentence. In DPP v Frewstal Pty Ltd,[12] the Court of Appeal outlined the principles by which a sentencing court should be guided when assessing the objective seriousness of offending against this Act.
38An offender is punished according to the gravity of the breach owed under the Act, not according to the result or consequences of the breach. That is, in this instance, the tragic death of Mr Muir does not of itself make the offending more serious.
39The gravity of the breach is measured by two factors:
1)The seriousness of the breach itself; that is, the extent to which the offender has departed from its statutory duty; and
2)The extent of the risk of death or serious injury which might result from the breach.
40An assessment of the extent of the risk itself, that is that second factor, involves consideration of two factors:
i.The likelihood of the occurrence of an event as a result of the breach such as the event that occurred in the particular case endangering the safety of employees or others; and
ii.The potential gravity of the consequences of such an event, particularly where the risk is of death or serious injury.
41It was not disputed between the parties that the gravity of the consequences of the breach was high. However, what was in dispute was the seriousness of the breach in the circumstances, meaning the degree of departure from the statutory duty owed by the company to Mr Muir.
42Dealing first with the Prosecution arguments in respect of the objective seriousness.
Seriousness of the breach
43The Prosecution submitted that the degree of departure from the company's statutory duty was significant; that was so as:
i.the extent of risk of serious injury was obvious to the company – this was so, it was submitted – given the nature of the machinery itself, that the danger area was easily accessible by employees, that the efficient running of the main line meant that the strappers required frequent attention and employees working in close proximity to the danger area.
Reliance was also placed on the evidence on Mr Edwards, an expert engineer prosecution witness, as to the potential hazards of crushing of various body parts within the danger area (see Transcript p411).
ii.that the company knew of the specific risk. Reference was made to relevant portions of the Technigraphica Report and evidence of Mr Schultz (T335+336), internal company documents, the Standard Operating Procedure relating to the Mainline Press Operation, Company Work Safety Instruction re the Main Bale Press. That the company were aware of checking for 'trapping hazards' or crushing, with a risk rating of high or that death could result.
Further, it was submitted that in a general sense, given the incidents that had occurred at the workplace some 18 months before this incident, the company were aware of the need for guarding in other areas of the plant at the workplace.
iii.adequate controls were necessary to mitigate the risk and the Company knew of the measures. An employee is required to be proactive with respect to meeting risks in the workplace. There were no physical or engineering controls to stop access to the danger area and this was so, despite them being utilised in other areas at the workplace. The administrative controls put in place by the company were inadequate and reliance was placed on the evidence of the witness Edwards regarding reduced value of administrative controls with human error. (Edwards at Transcript 415)
44Additionally, the measure or introduction of light curtain was simple, inexpensive and readily available to the company.
45The prosecution submitted that when those matters were considered in combination, that it entailed a significant departure from the statutory duty owed by the company.
Extent of risk of death or serious injury
i.The likelihood of occurrence of an event as a result of the breach such as the event that occurred in the particular case endangering the safety of employees or others. That is, the likelihood that someone would do as Mr Muir did in this instance, that is go into the danger zone and do what he did.
46The prosecution conceded on the evidence available, that the likelihood of the event occurring such as that which occurred here, could not be put higher than low. (See Transcript p26) The prosecution focussed however on the easy accessibility of the area, workings of employees that took place in the vicinity of the danger area, company directions regarding presentation of the bales and importance of keeping the machine running for efficiency and frequency of problems with the machine. In addition, on the day of the incident it was clear that there were problems with the machine and Mr Muir spoke only minutes before the incident with a work colleague regarding an issue with internal straps.
ii.As to the potential gravity of the consequence of such an event, particularly whether there is a risk of death or serious injury, given the clearly grave consequences in this instance if the risk materialised, that was not disputed.
Defence
47Turning then to defence submissions regarding the objective seriousness:
Seriousness of the breach
48It was submitted on behalf of the company that at the time of the incident it had safety systems in place, and had conducted reviews and risk assessments over the relevant period. It is readily apparent that was the case at the time of the incident, with the significant amount of safety measure in place in respect of operations of the machine and the workplace generally. (See paras 15-48).
49The machine had operated over a number of years without any incident similar to that which occurred on this occasion, or any incident in the danger area.
50Counsel for the company disputed the prosecution analysis regarding its level of departure from its statutory duty, in particular challenging the submission that the risk was obvious and specifically known to the company.
51It was submitted that even accepting obvious risk with the size of this machinery and its operations, there was no evidence of any access to the danger area whilst the machine was in operation, by anyone including Mr Muir or on any other occasion. There was evidence that there was no operational reason for Mr Muir to go to the danger area in the manner in which he did or at all.
52Given the sounds made by the machine and the constant and regularly timed movement of it, and that there was no operational reason to go to the danger area, the risk of crushing was reduced.
53There was no evidence of machinery that operated in exactly the same way as that involved in this incident, with the differences in the BALCO machinery to that of this machinery being highlighted.
54Further that the company had knowledge of the specific risk was disputed given:
a)up until the time of changes made in 2019 with the fence/guard to prevent items falling, there was no way an individual would have been able to access the specific spot in the danger area relevant to this incident;
b)after the fence/guard was installed, Mr McIvor from Worksafe observed the machine operating and did not, at that time consider that need for the measure to avoid risk in the danger area. It was however conceded at the time of his inspection, his focus would have been on the implementation of the fence to protect against a different hazard to that which was relevant in this case;
c)similarly, none of the other operators thought that the area where Mr Muir placed his head, or the whole of the danger area involved an obvious risk;
d)Mr Schultz and the Technographica Report (see p1460 of diagram in the depositions) do not identify the specific area where the incident took place, where Mr Muir placed his head, as at risk or as an area that required guarding.
55The material relied upon by the prosecution in supporting the view the company had specific knowledge did not, it was submitted, amount to specific knowledge of the area where the incident occurred, being that entire area from the floor to the top where Mr Muir placed his head. There was no material available to the company prior to the incident relating to the whole of that area.
56In those circumstances it was submitted that the breach of statutory duty was low to mid range.
Extent of risk of death or serious injury
57It was submitted on behalf of the company that given the matters outlined above that the risk of this incident occurring was remote. As noted the prosecution submitted the likelihood was low.
58It was not disputed it was clear that there would be grave consequences if the risk materialised.
Finding
59The jury by their verdict accepted that the risk of crushing in the danger area was reasonably foreseeable by the company.
60The defence submission that the company did not have specific knowledge of the risk associated with that part of the danger area where the incident took place, namely where Mr Muir placed his head, is accepted. It is however somewhat artificial in the circumstances of this case, as the danger zone extended from top to bottom of the area between the cutter box and strappers 3 and 4.
61Access was able to be achieved over the top and at the top end of the danger area resulting in crushing of Mr Muir's upper body and entrapment of his head. It is clear that the company had knowledge regarding the risk of crushing in respect of the movement of the machine between strappers 3 and 4 and the cutting box.
62As I indicated I accept the prosecution has proven his actions were not suicidal; rather he was attempting to carry out his work duties. Although there were some administrative controls in place by the company through training and material regarding trapping hazards in the danger area, tragically in this instance, those administrative controls were insufficient to protect Mr Muir from the risk of crushing, reflective of the ineffectiveness of such controls with human frailty.
63The means by which this incident occurred was partly facilitated by the guard or fence that was installed in 2019, as it allowed Mr Muir to climb up and place himself in the danger area at a height where he thought he may have been able to address potential issues with the machine. Given that no other employee had ever attempted to do that, and that there was no evidence of other employees or even Mr Muir on other occasions in the course of their work, having ever entered any part of the danger zone, Mr Muir's actions were out of the ordinary. Although the likelihood of the risk eventuating was low or remote, the consequences were drastic.
64I accept the company had taken significant steps to ensure the safety of its employees as is clear from the information contained in defence submissions. I accept that this was not a case where there was evidence of the company failing to react to the risk that had materialised in the past by way of a prior incident or near miss in circumstances similar to this. Nor is there evidence of other similar circumstances or instances where the company has shown a disregard for the safety of workers. These aggravating features that are common in some cases were not present here.
65Having considered all of the relevant factors I regard the objective seriousness of this offending as moderate
Matters of Mitigation
66I accept that the company did not ignore the risks associated with the use of the machinery in the danger area. This was not a case of a company that did nothing in the face of an obvious risk the company.
67After the incident in February 2021 the company made changes immediately to stop access to the danger area including fixed guarding and installation of light curtains.
68The company cooperated with the investigation by WorkSafe Victoria.
69The company has no prior convictions for any offences and no outstanding matters.
70The company contested the charge before the jury which was its right. It is not to be punished additionally for doing this but at the same time it does not receive the substantial sentencing discount that is afforded an accused, or a company in these kind of cases, that pleads guilty or shows remorse.
General deterrence
71General deterrence is of particular importance in offending of this kind. The sentences imposed need to draw to the importance of employer's workplace safety, and to send a message to them who fail to maintain a safe workplace by failing to adequately protect their employees from risks associated with the workings of heavy machinery, in this instance crushing, that they will attract significant punishment. Companies must be ever vigilant in providing a safe workplace for its most important asset, its people. Workplace deaths are preventable and an all-too-common tragic occurrence. The sentence imposed must deter other employers from failing to actively monitor risks and to have regard to the effectiveness or adequacy of controls that are in place, particularly considering human frailty. This is especially so when there is an inherent danger in the type of work involved and the potentially drastic consequences. Further just punishment and denunciation are relevant sentencing considerations.
Specific deterrence
72I was informed the company has changed its name and that it is no longer in operation. It has not traded since 2022. I understand that none of the individuals involved with the operations of the company at the time of the incident at Bridgewater are still involved. In those circumstances specific deterrence has limited application.
Current circumstances and history of the company.
73I turn then to the current circumstances and history of the company.
74The company operated in regional areas and provided employment to many residents in rural areas as well as value to farmers in surrounding regions. Many of the company's leadership individuals and shareholders have been involved in community engagement. (See para 109 defence submissions.)
75As to its financial position, as indicated the company has not traded since 2022. At that time, or in its last year of operation, I was informed that it had a profit of approximately $170,000. I was also informed that it currently has funds of approximately $20,000 with liabilities or debts still outstanding. There was very limited material regarding the company's capacity to pay a fine.
Sentencing submissions
76Both parties provided detailed sentencing submissions to which reference has been made in these reasons. I take them into account. The submissions included a reference to current sentencing practices and cases which counsel argued were comparative to that currently before me. I have read and considered those decisions though of course, each case depends on its own facts they provide some guidance to the Court as to an appropriate penalty.
77Additionally, the prosecutor referred to the recent report and some recommendations of the Sentencing Advisory Council in its paper 'Sentencing Occupational Health and Safety Offences Victoria' published in February 2025, it's reference to current sentencing practises and the need for an increase in penalties. However, it is not the role of sentencing in this Court to participate in an incremental lift in penalties for offending of this kind. That is for the Court of Appeal or Parliament.
Sentence
78Taking all relevant matters into consideration I propose to convict and fine the company $400,000.
79Application was made by the prosecution pursuant to s135 of the Act for the Court to order that the company publicise the offence, its consequences, the penalty imposed and any other related matter. The rationale behind such an order is that, in the appropriate case, the result of the case should be known to promote general deterrence by requiring the company to publicise the outcome. The court has a discretion to make such an order, without needing to be satisfied of any particular matter. Counsel for the company opposed the application.
80Counsel were only aware of two occasions in this Court that such an order or an application had been made. That was so, even though the Court's power to do so has existed for a significant number of years. Judge Rozen recently made an order, but that was of his own volition, and Judge Todd made such an order on application of the prosecution recently on 21 March 2025.
81The proposed terms of the Order were provided by the prosecution prior to me imposing sentence. Counsel for defence opposed the application on the basis that much of the information in the terms proposed, particularly that regarding the Court's finding that Mr Muir's actions were not a suicide, was headlined with relevant accompanying information after the plea hearing in the local and Herald Sun newspapers.
82I have considered some of the matters raised in the Sentencing Advisory Council paper on this issue and purposes to be served by such an order, which vary depending on the circumstances of the case (see para 3.109). Factors such as specific deterrence and community protection are of limited relevance in this instance as the company is no longer operating and the individuals who were involved in the running of it are no longer doing so. Damage to the reputation (or that of the business currently running at the workplace at Bridgehaven) that is not connected to individuals involved in this case, would in my view be unfair. I accept that there has already been a significant amount of publicity most recently highlighting the Court's finding regarding Mr Muir's actions. Clearly the proposed notice would again reiterate that, but it is not a situation that that finding has not been publicised and available to members of the rural and broader community, an audience much greater than that anticipated in the proposed notice.
83Having considered all relevant matters I do not in the exercise of my discretion propose it make the order.
84Is there anything further?
85COUNSEL: No, Your Honour.
86HER HONOUR: Thank you. Thank you, I will stand down.
87COUNSEL: Your Honour please.
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