Director of Public Prosecutions (State) v Shaw - [2011] SADC 40

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
DPP (STATE) v SHAW
[2011] SADC 40
Ruling of His Honour Chief Judge Worthington
30 March 2011
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION - GENERALLY
Applications by a probationer for two sets of enforcement of bond proceedings brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions under s57 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 to be dismissed - staff members at ODPP who prepared and filed the proceedings not legal practitioners - whether proceedings invalid - whether Director required to elect to pursue only one set of enforcement proceedings.
Held: applications dismissed - enforcement proceedings not invalid - Director not required to elect.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s57, s56, s58; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Regulations 2000 r7; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 s4, s6. s6A, s7, s9; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 s21; District Court Criminal Practice Direction 11.1; District Court Civil Rules 2006 r98(1); District Court Practice Directions Form 1; District Court Rules 1992 r46.04(1)(g), referred to.
Department of Family and Community Services v C (1997) 190 LSJS 1; Tarasenko v Boylan (1992) 58 SASR 587, considered.

DPP (STATE) v SHAW
[2011] SADC 40

On 20 May 2009 the respondent, Robert Colin Shaw, was sentenced in this court to 12 months imprisonment with a non parole period of seven months for the offences of false imprisonment and aggravated threatening to cause harm. That sentence was suspended on his entering into a bond in the sum of $200 to be of good behaviour for two years. Included in the conditions of the bond was a requirement that he be under the supervision of a community corrections officer for 18 months and obey the lawful directions of that officer.
Two applications for enforcement of that bond, alleging a number of breaches, have been filed by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (“ODPP”). The first (file 09-1893) is based on offences committed in June 2009 and failure to comply with the condition requiring him to obey the lawful directions of his assigned community corrections officer. The second application (file 10-2010) is based on offences committed in October 2009, December 2009 and January 2010.
The respondent has applied for orders dismissing both applications on the ground that they are invalid. In case this matter is taken further I should state that I have not limited my treatment of the respondent’s grounds to the manner in which they are set out in the applications filed on 30 November 2010 and 21 January 2011. That is mainly because the applications overlap and the respondent’s application in the first file (09-1893) was not made until part way through the hearing of his application in the second file (10-2010). Mr Nitschke, for the Director, was content for the hearing to proceed in that fashion.
Before dealing with the history of these matters I refer to s57 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (“CLSA”) under which the enforcement proceedings have been brought, which relevantly provides:
57—Non-compliance with bond
(1) If it appears to a probative court, by evidence given on oath, that a probationer may have failed to comply with a condition of the probationer's bond, the court may—
(a) —
(i)     issue a summons to the probationer requiring the probationer to
appear before the court at the time and place specified in the
summons; or
(ii)     issue a warrant for the probationer's arrest; and
(b) issue a summons to any guarantor.
(2)     If a person fails to appear before the court as required by a summons issued under this
section, the court may issue a warrant for the person's arrest.
(3)     ...   … . …   …
(4)     …   …   …   ….
.
(4a) If a probationer is found guilty of an offence by a court of an inferior jurisdiction to
that of the probative court, being an offence committed during the term of the bond,
the court of an inferior jurisdiction must—
(a)     sentence the probationer for the offence and remand him or her to the
probative court to be dealt with for breach of the conditions of the bond; or
(b)     remand the probationer to the probative court to be sentenced for the offence
and dealt with for breach of the conditions of the bond.
(5)     The court dealing with a probationer for breach of condition must hear any evidence
adduced tending to establish that the probationer has failed to comply with a condition of the bond and any evidence or representations that the probationer may wish to adduce or make in reply.
(6)     In this section—
court of an inferior jurisdiction means—
(a)     if the probative court is the Supreme Court—the District Court, the ERD
Court or the Magistrates Court;
(b)     if the probative court is the District Court or the ERD Court—the Magistrates
Court;
court of a superior jurisdiction means—
(a)     if the probative court is the Magistrates Court—the Supreme Court, the
District Court or the ERD Court;
(b)     if the probative court is the District Court or the ERD Court—the Supreme
Court.
HISTORY
I shall deal with each application by the respondent separately but there is some overlap between the two of them and it is necessary to refer to the history of both matters in this court.
On 2 November 2009 the ODPP filed an application for enforcement under s57 of the CLSA requesting the court to issue a summons to the respondent to appear on a date to be fixed: file 09-1893. The application was prepared by Frances Reid who described herself as a law clerk at the ODPP. It is common ground that Ms Reid is not a legal practitioner but that she is a Public Service employee at the ODPP within the meaning of s6(2)(b) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (“the DPP Act”).
The application contains an allegation of breach because of offences committed on 5 June 2009 for which the respondent was convicted and sentenced in the Holden Hill Magistrates Court on 31 July 2009. It also contains allegations of failure during June, July and August 2009 to observe conditions of the bond because of non-compliance with lawful directions given by the respondent’s community corrections officer. For present purposes it is unnecessary to go into details of either the offences or the failure to comply with directions. Although not in the conventional form of an affidavit, the document is sworn before a Justice of the Peace and has annexed to it the relevant court records and an affidavit by a community corrections officer setting out the facts on which the allegations of non-compliance are based.
That material was put before a judge of this court who signed a summons on 5 November 2009 ordering the respondent to appear in this court on 7 December 2009. The seal of the court was affixed to the summons. It was served on the respondent and he appeared on the due date. After adjournments for various reasons he was arraigned before me on 8 February 2010 and admitted breach of the bond as particularised in the application.
Because the respondent had drug and mental health issues in unrelated matters that were being dealt with in the Magistrates Court, the parties asked the court to defer sentencing so that programs being undertaken in that court could run their course. In the circumstances that was appropriate. The application was called on for mention a number of times during the year for reports on progress in the Magistrates Court. By late September it became apparent that these programs had not been successful and that other breaches of bond may have occurred.
On 13 September 2010 he appeared in the Holden Hill Magistrates Court and pleaded guilty to three offences that were committed in December 2009 and January 2010. Details of those offences are not relevant but because they were committed during the term of the bond, the magistrate before whom he appeared remanded him to appear in this court on 21 September 2010 (the next due date before me) for sentence on those offences, and so that this court could deal with him in relation to any breach of bond it found proved. An application for enforcement relying on those offences was filed on 21 September 2010. It is unnecessary to refer to that application in detail. It was withdrawn after it had been replaced by a further application for enforcement filed by the Director on 9 November 2010: file 10-2010.
The fresh application referred to the offences to which he had pleaded guilty in the Holden Hill Magistrates Court on 13 September 2010 and added another offence committed on 17 October 2009 to which he had pleaded guilty on 26 August 2010 in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. That application was prepared by Shaun Helbig, similarly described as a law clerk employed at the ODPP, and it was sworn before a Justice of the Peace. Annexed to it were the relevant Magistrate Court records. No summons was sought in relation to that matter. The respondent had been remanded by the magistrate to appear before me and ultimately he did so on 30 November 2010. That was his first appearance in this court after being remanded by the magistrate, having failed to appear on 21 September 2010 and 9 November 2010. No further action has been taken with regard to that application for enforcement pending determination of the current applications by the respondent.
I come then to the applications made by the respondent. The first concerns file 09-1893 and the second concerns file 10-2010. It is also contended by the respondent that, in any event, the Director cannot have two applications before the court and that the Director must elect to proceed on one of them.
File 09-1893
These proceedings were commenced under s57(1) of the CLSA, which as relevant here, provides that if it appears to the court, by evidence given on oath, that the respondent may have failed to comply with a condition of his bond, the court may issue a summons for him to appear. The court will then conduct a hearing in accordance with s57(5) and, depending on the outcome, if the court is satisfied that there has been a failure to comply with a condition of the bond, it may make one or more of the orders set out in s58 of the CLSA.
Regulation 7(1) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Regulations 2000 (“the Regulations”) is relevant to proceedings under s57(1) of the CLSA. It provides as follows:
7—Enforcement of bonds and guarantees (section 57)
(1) If, pursuant to section 57(1) of the Act, a probative court decides to issue a summons or a warrant of arrest to bring a probationer before the court on a written application made by the Crown alleging breach of bond, the court must endorse the application accordingly.
(2) The court should first issue a summons to a probationer alleged to have breached a bond unless the court has reasonable grounds to believe—
(a) that service of a summons is not likely to be effected; or
(b) that the probationer is not likely to comply with a summons.
(3) A summons must be served on the probationer—
(a) personally; or
(b) if personal service is not practicable or the probationer cannot, after
reasonable enquiries, be found, in such other manner as the court may direct,
not later than 2 clear working days before the date specified in the summons for the hearing of the matter.
(4) If a probationer fails to appear before the probative court in compliance with a
summons and the court is satisfied that the summons was duly served on the
probationer, the court may, instead of issuing a warrant, deal with the application in
the absence of the probationer.
(5) If a guarantor fails to appear before the probative court in compliance with a summons and the court is satisfied that the summons was duly served on the guarantor, the court may make orders in relation to enforcing the guarantee in the absence of the guarantor.
(6) If a probationer is found guilty of an offence committed during the term of a bond by a court that has jurisdiction to deal with proceedings for breach of the bond, the court may, on an oral application by the Crown, proceed to hear and determine the
application forthwith if it is satisfied that the probationer has had adequate notice of
the intention of the Crown to make such an application.
The Regulations do not prescribe a form for the application. In certain circumstances it may be an oral application: Reg 7(6). But a summons must comply with Form 7 in Schedule 1 to the Regulations. As relevant to this matter, the combined effect of s57(1) of the CLSA, Regulation 7(1) and Form 7 envisages a written application which sets out allegations of failure to comply with the bond, supported by an affidavit setting out details of the conduct in question and asks that the probationer be brought before the court to answer the allegations, and if it appears to the court that there may have been a breach, a summons will be issued requiring the probationer to appear and show cause why he should not be dealt with according to law.
Mr Mancini, for the respondent, argued that the proceedings in which the application was signed by Ms Reid, are invalid on a number of grounds.
The principal submission was that Ms Reid has no standing to bring the application and that therefore the proceedings are invalid. There is no dispute that the Director has power to make such an application but the primary thrust of the respondent’s submission is that, in the absence of a written delegation of that power to her by the Director, she had no standing to prepare and lodge the application. There is a secondary argument that Ms Reid could not lodge a valid application because she is not a legal practitioner. I mention now that the same arguments were advanced in relation to the application signed by Mr Helbig in file 10-2010. It is necessary to refer briefly to the DPP Act.
The Director is appointed by the Governor (s4 of the DPP Act) and, subject to an exception that is not relevant here, is independent of direction or control by the Crown or any Minister or officer of the Crown (s9 of the DPP Act). The ODPP consists of the Director and the “Public Service employees assigned to work in the Office” (s6 of the DPP Act). The employees working in the ODPP are subject to the control of the Director: s6(3) of the DPP Act. There is no dispute that in preparing and filing the application and associated documents in this matter Ms Reid was acting in the course of her duties as an employee in that Office.
The parties to the application for enforcement are the Director and the respondent. There is no rule or form governing the content of the application but as required by Criminal Practice Direction 11.1, the front sheet is in accordance with Form 1 in Part 2 of the Practice Directions made under the District Court Civil Rules 2006 and it shows that the application is filed “by (or on behalf of)” the Director. In effect the Director is the solicitor on the record for the Crown and as such, it is the Director who owes the usual duties to the court in relation to the proceedings.
The power of the Director to lay charges and prosecute offences is contained in s7(1)(a) and (b) of the DPP Act. Taking enforcement proceedings is incidental to those functions, and power for the Director to do that is contained in s7(1)(i). The respondent argued that such proceedings may only be brought by the Director personally or by a person to whom the Director has delegated that power under s6A of the DPP Act which enables the Director to delegate in writing to a suitable person any of his powers or functions under the Act. It is common ground that there has been no such delegation to Ms Reid.
There is no suggestion that Ms Reid acted irregularly or outside the scope of her assigned duties in the Office. It is common ground that she acted in accordance with established practices emanating from the administration and control of the Office by the Director. That means, of course, that an employee such as Ms Reid could be acting on instructions from the Director himself or could be acting under the supervision of members of staff holding a delegation from the Director under s6A. The respondent does not suggest that the precise circumstances of the handling of this file need to be explored. It is the respondent’s submission that neither option would suffice to enable her to institute these proceedings; she would need a personal delegation from the Director.
The effect of the respondent’s submission is that no officer in the ODPP could take any step in an action in the name of the Director without a delegation; being subject to the control, direction and supervision of the Director as an employee in the ODPP would not suffice. I do not accept the submission.
The issue is the preparation and filing of the application. There is no issue concerned with any appearance by or on behalf of the Director in court. Section 7(7) of the DPP Act permits the Director to appear, inter alia, by a staff member of the Office who is a legal practitioner, and the Director has been represented by such a practitioner at each hearing in this court. The filing of an application to enforce a bond is an everyday incident in this court and it has long been the practice for applications for enforcement to be prepared and filed by employees in the ODPP who describe themselves as law clerks.
There is no authority directly on point but it is instructive to look at the decision of Olsson J in Department of Family and Community Services v C (1997) 190 LSJS 1 in which the issue was whether an officer of the Department for Family and Community Services (“FACS”) could bring an application in the Youth Court for a warrant to apprehend a youth under s57(1) of the CLSA because of failure to observe a condition in an obligation requiring him to perform community service. Olsson J held that the application was incompetent. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to explore the reasons in detail but in reaching that conclusion, his Honour said at page 6:
The CLSA is silent as to the form of application to be made and who may make it. However, as is already apparent, Regulation 5 [now Regulation 7] of the Regulations clearly envisages that any application will be made by or on behalf of “the Crown”. That expression is not specifically defined, but it has always been taken, in the higher courts, to mean the Director of Public Prosecutions, as being the prosecuting authority on behalf of the Crown. . . . . . . . . . . In practice applications are brought by an officer on the Director’s staff, and, where a summons is sought to be issued, this is supported by an affidavit of a person directly cognisant of the facts – normally the relevant probation officer.
[Italics mine.]
He went on to find that s57 does not contemplate an officer of FACS lodging applications for enforcement.
In my opinion Mr Nitschke correctly summarized the position in saying that the application for enforcement was made by the Crown through its prosecuting authority, the Director of Public Prosecutions and, in accordance with the internal practice established in the ODPP, the officer who took those proceedings, Ms Reid, did so under the supervision and control of the Director. Whether that supervision and control was by the Director himself or by someone holding a delegation from the Director is irrelevant. In those circumstances no personal delegation to that officer is required.
There is support for this conclusion in s56 of the CLSA which provides as follows:
56—Enforcement must be taken under this Part
(1) Proceedings for enforcement of a sentence may not be commenced except under and in accordance with this Act.
(2) Without derogating from the powers of any other public employee, proceedings for enforcement of a bond, community service order or other order of a non-pecuniary
nature may be taken by a community corrections officer.

Subsection 2 was inserted by the Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 2000 which was assented to on 20 July 2000 and as applicable here, came into operation on 31 March 2001. As is common with portfolio bills, the Act brought together a number of amendments to legislation within the Attorney General’s Portfolio some of which, as can be seen from the Second Reading Speech in the House of Assembly on 4 July 2000 (Hansard 4 July 2000 at pp 1585-1589), had been under consideration for some time. In this instance, there were amendments to 16 Acts. The judgment of Olsson J was delivered on 13 February 1997.
The effect of s56(2) is that apart from any other public employee who may do so, community corrections officers may bring proceedings for enforcement of a bond, community service order or other order of a non-pecuniary nature. In the Second Reading Speech, the Minister with conduct of the legislation in that House said (Hansard at p 1585) in relation to this amendment:
There has also been a question raised over the capacity of officers of the Department for Correctional Services or the Department of Family and Youth Services to bring action for the enforcement of community service orders. The Bill will amend the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act to make it clear that such officers may bring action for the enforcement of community service orders.
The problem described by the Minister was the effect of the judgment in Department of Family and Community Services v C, even though that decision was not specifically mentioned. Having regard to that and what was said by Olsson J about the longstanding practice in the higher courts, there is no reason not to give the words “any other public employee” in s56(2) of the CLSA their ordinary meaning, which, for the purpose of proceedings in the higher courts, would include an officer on the Director’s staff.
While this does not by itself necessarily provide a definitive answer, it supports the proposition put by Mr Nitschke. There is no support for Mr Mancini’s argument that “any other public employee” should be construed to mean the Director or someone holding a written personal delegation from the Director to bring enforcement proceedings. A major difficulty with that submission is that, given the terms of the DPP Act, the Director is not an employee. But in any event, it is inherently unlikely that Parliament intended that the power to bring enforcement proceedings in the higher courts was limited to the Director or his personal delegate unless the person in question happened to be a community corrections officer.
The second ground on which the respondent seeks to have the application for enforcement dismissed is that a law clerk is not entitled to prepare such a document because it is prohibited by s21 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (“the LPA”) and must be done by a legal practitioner. I have already said why the application can be prepared and filed on behalf of the Director by Ms Reid, who is not a legal practitioner. In my opinion s21 of the LPA is not relevant.
Section 21 deals comprehensively in subsections (2) – (5) with what constitutes practicing the law but for present purposes I need set out only subsection (1) which reads as follows:
21—Entitlement to practise
(1) A person must not practise the profession of the law, or hold himself or herself out, or permit another to hold him or her out, as being entitled to practise the profession of the law unless—
(a) in the case of a natural person, the person—
(i) is a local legal practitioner; or
(ii) is an interstate legal practitioner; or
(b) in the case of a company, it holds a practising certificate issued and in force
under this Act.
Maximum penalty: $10 000.
Section 21 is one of a number of sections in Part 3 Division 3 of the LPA that provide penalties if persons are charged and found to have engaged in conduct prohibited by the Act. That is not the nature of the proceedings before me. When pressed in argument about how the court could have resort to s21 in these proceedings, and what findings that would be based upon, Mr Mancini submitted that, in the absence of statutory authority, a law clerk cannot take a step in proceedings or prepare a legal process because of what he described as a policy reason of which s21 is an example. In my opinion, this does not take the submission of invalidity any further.
It was mentioned briefly by Mr Mancini that the front sheet is endorsed “Settled by: Frances Reid” and that in effect, such an endorsement is inappropriate unless the document is settled by counsel. Provision for the endorsement “Settled by” is in Form 1 which, as mentioned earlier, is to be attached to the application: Criminal Practice Direction 11.1. Form 1 is a generic front sheet applicable to many types of documents filed in the civil jurisdiction of the court and that endorsement is not necessarily appropriate for all of them. Unlike the requirement, for example, in rule 98(1) for all pleadings to be endorsed with a solicitor’s certificate, there is no provision in the Civil Rules 2006 or the Practice Directions specifying the need for, or the significance of, the endorsement on Form 1. That form adopts, essentially unchanged, Form 1 from the District Court Rules 1992 which did contain a rule referring to the need for counsel to settle pleadings in civil actions: rule 46.04(1)(g).
There is merit in Mr Mancini’s proposition that settling pleadings is a function of counsel or at least that of a legal practitioner. His submission has also pointed up what may be an anomaly in Part 2 of the Practice Directions under the Civil Rules 2006, but this is not the occasion to explore that. However, there is nothing in either of those points that advances his argument for a finding that the application itself is of no moment.
Mr Mancini submitted also that there were irregularities in relation to the summons issued on 5 November 2009. There is no dispute that the summons complies with Form 7 in Schedule 1 to the Regulations but he made submissions about the sufficiency and form of the evidence on oath provided with the application, whether the judge signing the summons itself was sufficient compliance with the requirement in Regulation 7(1) that the application be endorsed, and whether in exercising a discretion under s57(1) the judge was required to sit in open court.
It is unnecessary to refer to those submissions. Whatever their merit, and I make no comment about that, they are no longer relevant. The function of the request, the supporting evidence on oath and the summons has been exhausted. The respondent has appeared and admitted the breaches as particularised in the application. Thus, if the application is valid, and I have held that it is, the respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
File 10-2010
The respondent comes before the court by orders made in the Magistrates Court under s57(4a) of the CLSA and on 21 September 2010 an application was filed for enforcement of the bond based on the offences to which he had pleaded guilty and which had been referred to this court. As mentioned earlier, that application was withdrawn and replaced by the application filed by Mr Helbig on 9 November 2010 which is the application by the Director in file 10-2010. Because s57(1) of the CLSA does not apply, nothing arises in relation to the issue of a summons.
In addition to the application itself, which is in a similar form to that filed by Ms Reid and also sworn before a Justice of the Peace, there are certificates of record from the Magistrates Court in relation to the offences to which the respondent pleaded guilty and in addition, a certificate of record from the Magistrates Court in relation to the matter which has been added: the offence to which he pleaded guilty in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 26 August 2010.
It is common ground that the circumstances of Mr Helbig’s employment and duties are exactly the same as those of Ms Reid, including the fact that he does not hold any personal delegation from the Director to bring enforcement proceedings. Mr Mancini adopted the same submissions in regard to Mr Helbig’s lack of standing to prepare and file the application as he advanced in relation to Ms Reid. There is no need to repeat them and the claim of invalidity must fail.
In the event that I am found to have erred in rejecting Mr Mancini’s submissions that the proceedings are invalid, I should deal briefly with an alternative argument put for the Director. Mr Nitschke submitted that, as this matter is before the court because the respondent was remanded under s57(4a)(b) of the CLSA to appear here, the application is unnecessary and it would not matter if it were a nullity. I do not accept that submission.
The court’s jurisdiction is enlivened by the referral but that does not provide a complete answer. Once seized of the matter the court has to conduct a hearing in accordance with s57(5) of the CLSA which contemplates the probationer being given proper notice of the allegations of breach, evidence being presented to the court, submissions and a decision by the court. That litigation needs a mechanism and this is provided by an application by the Director who will have conduct of those proceedings and will adduce the evidence tending to prove breach of bond referred to in s57(5). It is to be noted that in the circumstances covered by Regulation 7(6) the court can hear proceedings based merely on an oral application by the Crown if it is satisfied that the probationer has had adequate notice. However, the point to be made is that even then, some form of application by the Crown is needed.
Whether the DPP must elect
Finally, Mr Mancini put forward an argument that there cannot be two applications before the court concerning the same bond. Both of these applications are travelling together. Mr Mancini argued that there can be only one set of proceedings before the court and that the DPP is required to elect which of the two applications is to proceed. Initially he submitted that to do otherwise would be an abuse of process. However, in the course of argument, he abandoned the submission based on abuse of process.
Nonetheless, Mr Mancini continued to maintain that there should not be two applications before the court. The basis for that submission is unclear but for completeness, I should state briefly why in my opinion there is no difficulty with the Crown proceeding on the two applications. I emphasize that his submission is not concerned with whether it would be appropriate for the Director to consolidate the applications, but whether they can both proceed.
On any occasion that a probationer fails to comply with a condition of a bond that person is liable to be required to show cause why the bond should not be enforced and if so, whether the court should make any of the various orders available under s58 of the CLSA. Those orders include excusing the breach, estreatment of bond monies, revoking a suspended sentence and re-sentencing. Whether an application for enforcement will be made under s57(1) of the CLSA or after a referral to this court under s57(4a) of the CLSA, will depend on the circumstances. Here, the application and summons under s57(1) in file 09-1893 relates to offences committed in June 2009 and failure to comply with directions in the period June-August 2009, and the breaches were admitted. While that application was being held over at the respondent’s request, he committed the offences in December 2009 and January 2010 that form the basis of the application in file 10-2010. That application also alleges a breach in relation to an offence committed on 17 October 2009 which was dealt with in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 26 August 2010. The offences have been admitted but he has not yet been arraigned in relation to breaching the bond as that awaits the outcome of his current applications. In file 10-2010, he is also to be sentenced for the offences committed in December 2009 and January 2010.
All these matters are before the court for submissions with a view to disposition of them at the one time. The incidents giving rise to each allegation of breach of bond are separate but to the extent appropriate, they have been grouped in each application. The two applications are being heard together. Not only is there no basis for finding that it would be unfair to the respondent to proceed to hear both applications together, to do so would be consistent with the desirability of the court disposing of all matters involving a particular offender where it is practicable to do so: Tarasenko v Boylan (1992) 58 SASR 587 per King CJ at 592-593. In my opinion that is an appropriate course of action in these matters.
For these reasons I dismiss each application by the respondent. The applications by the Director for enforcement will proceed.