SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v DISORGANIZED DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 139
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Lovell
11 August 2020
COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY
The applicant brought proceedings seeking restraining and forfeiture orders over a property at Ponde, which belongs to the respondent, Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd. The basis of the application is the location of a damaged Toyota Echo, buried on the property, suspected to be linked to the murder of Mark Boyce.
In June 2019, Joshua Grant was convicted of murdering Boyce. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal ('CCA') and his appeal was refused.
Application for recusal where Judge has previously sat on CCA matter – facts disputed in these proceedings accepted as established beyond reasonable doubt in CCA matter– whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Held:
1. The application for recusal is allowed.
Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) s 24, s 220, referred to.
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, considered.
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v DISORGANIZED DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
[2020] SASC 139LOVELL J.
Overview
The applicant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, brought a claim under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) (‘the Act’) for restraining and forfeiture orders over a property at Ponde (‘the Ponde property’) owned by the respondent, Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd.
On 21 June 2019, Joshua Grant was convicted of murdering Mark Boyce (‘the deceased’). At trial, the prosecution alleged that Grant, in the company of two others, arrived at the scene of the murder in two vehicles, one of which was a blue Toyota Echo. In September 2019, police located a damaged Toyota Echo, buried on the Ponde property. The location of the Toyota Echo on the Ponde property is the basis of the claim for the restraining order.
Grant appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal on which I sat as a member of the coram. Before judgment was delivered in Grant v The Queen,[1] I informed the parties of this potential issue. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Wells QC, applied for me to recuse myself from determining these proceedings.
[1] [2020] SASCFC 61.
After hearing submissions, I recused myself from the matter, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons for making that order.
Background
On 30 January 2017, the deceased was confronted by three men while sitting in a vehicle outside of his house on Hill Street, Elizabeth South. The deceased got out of his car and was chased down the street. One of the men chased the deceased on foot, before restraining and assaulting him. The other men followed the chase in their cars. Once they reached…
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 139
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles of judicial recusal, emphasizing that a judge should not hear a case if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that the onus was on the party applying for recusal to establish that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend bias. The court acknowledged that the test is objective, based on the need for public confidence in the judiciary, and not purely on the assessment of the judge's capacity or performance. The court also noted that where a judge has previously expressed clear views on a live and significant issue in the subsequent case, it may create a reasonable apprehension of bias.
After considering the submissions, the court concluded that the respondent had discharged the burden of proof for recusal. The judge found that their involvement in the earlier appeal and the acceptance of certain facts as proven beyond a reasonable doubt may create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current proceedings. The court determined that the judge's resolution of the matter might be coloured by the facts accepted during the appeal, which were disputed in the current proceedings. The court allowed the application for recusal and ordered the judge to recuse themselves from the case.
This decision highlights the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and the need for judges to avoid even the appearance of bias. The court's decision to recuse themselves demonstrates the commitment to impartiality and the importance of upholding the integrity of the legal system.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the judge’s prior involvement in the Court of Criminal Appeal, where certain facts were accepted as proven, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current matter?
2. If a co-accused of the appellant were to be arrested and charged with murder, would the judge’s involvement in the appeal disqualify them from hearing the co-accused’s trial if the co-accused elects for trial by judge alone?
3. Are the facts which the judge accepted in the previous appeal fundamentally inconsistent with the respondent's position in the current matter, and does this inconsistency create a reasonable apprehension of bias?
4. Does the requirement to determine the reasonableness of suspecting a co-accused in the current matter, based on facts accepted in the previous appeal, result in a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge?
5. Considering the judge's acceptance of certain facts as proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the previous appeal, is there a reasonable apprehension of bias in making a restraining order under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) based on those facts on a balance of probabilities?
Held
1. Does the judge’s prior involvement in the Court of Criminal Appeal, where certain facts were accepted as proven, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current matter?
The court concluded that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge may not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the current matter. The result was the judge's recusal from the case.
2. If a co-accused of the appellant were to be arrested and charged with murder, would the judge’s involvement in the appeal disqualify them from hearing the co-accused’s trial if the co-accused elects for trial by judge alone?
The court concluded that the judge’s involvement in the appeal would disqualify them from hearing the co-accused’s trial if the co-accused elects for trial by judge alone.
3. Are the facts which the judge accepted in the previous appeal fundamentally inconsistent with the respondent's position in the current matter, and does this inconsistency create a reasonable apprehension of bias?
The court concluded that the facts accepted in the previous appeal are fundamentally inconsistent with the respondent's position in the current matter and that this inconsistency creates a reasonable apprehension of bias.
4. Does the requirement to determine the reasonableness of suspecting a co-accused in the current matter, based on facts accepted in the previous appeal, result in a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge?
The court concluded that the requirement does result in a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge.
5. Considering the judge's acceptance of certain facts as proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the previous appeal, is there a reasonable apprehension of bias in making a restraining order under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) based on those facts on a balance of probabilities?
The court concluded that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in making a restraining order under the Act based on those facts on a balance of probabilities.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: LOVELL J
Counsel for the Director, Mr Longson, submitted that Grant’s admissions at trial (regarding A’s presence) was a tactical decision. He submitted that the fair‑minded lay observer would be informed of the reasons for those admissions and would not apprehend that I would not bring an impartial mind to the determination of these proceedings. Mr Longson, however, submitted that if a co-accused of Grant was arrested and charged with murder, my involvement in Grant’s appeal would disqualify me from hearing the co-accused’s trial, if he elected for trial by judge alone.Consideration The question to be resolved is whether a fair-minded lay observer may reasonably apprehend that I may not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the Director’s application. The crux of the submission is that my resolution of the matter may be coloured by the facts which I accepted as a member of the Court of Criminal Appeal but which are disputed in these proceedings. The trial Judge will be required to rule on the reasonableness of suspecting A in the murder of the deceased. Grant’s trial proceeded on the basis that A was not only suspected to be involved, but that he was the principal offender. It was accepted at Grant’s trial that A drove to the deceased’s home in the blue Toyota Echo the subject of this matter. These facts were taken as proven beyond a reasonable doubt on appeal. To make the restraining order under the Act, the trial Judge need only be satisfied of these facts on a balance of probabilities.[7][7] Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) s 220(2). In making my decision, I have considered Mr Longson’s concession that I would have to recuse myself from hearing a trial by judge alone of Grant’s alleged co-accused. The difficulty in proceeding is that I have expressly embraced a version of events which is fundamentally inconsistent with the respondent’s position in this matter. The legal test of recusal involves an evaluative judgment and the test does not offer a bright line where cases clearly fall on one side or the other. In this case, there are respectable arguments both for and against recusal. However, and not without hesitation, I find that the respondent has discharged the burden of proof. For those reasons, I allow the application for recusal.