Director of Public Prosecutions of the Cth & Anor v Kainhofer

[1995] HCATrans 92

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B12 of 1995

B e t w e e n -

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Applellant

REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

Second Appellant

and

MARIA KAINHOFER

Respondent

Application for issue of warrant of arrest

TOOHEY J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 20 APRIL 1995, AT 11.32 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

___________________

MR N.J. WILLIAMS:   May it please the Court, I appear for the appellants.  (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth))

Your Honour, this is an application under section 21(6)(e) of the Extradition Act 1988 for an order for the arrest of the respondent in these proceedings. The application is brought by way of summons dated 19 April. On 10 March of this year, this Court granted special leave - this Court constituted by their Honours Justices Brennan, Deane and Gaudron granted special leave to appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court given on 14 September of last year.

The decision of the Full Federal Court allowed an appeal by the respondent against orders that she be committed to prison to await a surrender determination by the Attorney‑General.  The Full Court ordered that a magistrate order the respondent’s release from custody, and that was done on 16 September 1994.  At the time of the special leave application, 10 March this year, the respondent was actually outside Australia.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I gathered that.

MR WILLIAMS:   She had left Australia on 15 February of this year and returned on 13 March of this year.  She has been on bail throughout the proceedings with a couple of overnight exceptions, throughout the proceedings before the magistrate’s court in Brisbane.  At the conclusion of the proceedings before the magistrate she was remanded into custody on 1 November 1993.  An application was then made for an order of review in the Supreme Court of Queensland.  Bail was sought in those proceedings and his Honour Mr Justice Derrington refused bail.

Her Honour Justice White dismissed the application for an order of review, an appeal was brought on 22 December 1993 to a Full Court of the Federal Court and Justice Spender on 24 December 1993 granted bail to the respondent upon strict conditions.  The respondent entered that bail and as with all previous bail conditions has complied strictly with the conditions of that bail.  On 14 September the respondent obtained the benefit of the Full Court order and was subsequently released on the 16th.  The position of the appellant in relation to the matter is that the respondent is presently under no legal constraint from leaving Australia.  While the evidence to which I will take the Court briefly in a moment does not point to a likelihood that she will flee the jurisdiction, it does point to, in our respectful submission, a real possibility that she will and, to that end, in order to secure compliance with Australia’s treaty obligations with the Republic of Austria, application is brought to this Court for an order of arrest.

HIS HONOUR:   Mr Williams, let me come to what I see as the difficulty or matter that you need to address some submissions to me on, and that is that, assuming I have power, about which there does not seem to be any doubt, the respondent has been in Australia for how long?

MR WILLIAMS:   She was in Australia briefly in the early ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   No, I mean how long had she lived in Australia?

MR WILLIAMS:   She lived briefly in Australia in the early 1980s and has lived here continuously since around the middle of 1990, with the exception of the one month exception early this year.

HIS HONOUR:   So she has lived here for about five years continuously and in the last five years, save for that time overseas when she went overseas and came back, returned voluntarily to Australia.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   It just seems to me to be a fairly drastic step for me to take to issue a warrant for her arrest, even accepting the fact that she would no doubt apply for bail and on past performance there may well be no opposition from the present appellant to a grant of bail.  At the moment she is a person who has in her favour an order of the Federal Court, which entitles her to be released from custody or released from any obligation to comply with bail conditions.  True there is a special leave that had been granted, so it must be assumed that the appellant satisfied three Judges of the Court that there is an arguable case to be aired on appeal, but it just seems to me there might be other ways of dealing with this situation.  Is there any difficulty in locating the respondent at any given time? 

MR WILLIAMS:   There have been in the - - -

HIS HONOUR:   I know there have been in the past, but at the moment is there?

MR WILLIAMS:   We would not anticipate so, your Honour, no.

HIS HONOUR:   Say she agreed to surrender her passport, for instance.  Might not that meet the situation?

MR WILLIAMS:   That may well, your Honour; that and perhaps related conditions as to approaching points of overseas departure and changing address without notice and the like may meet the situation.  Could I address very briefly the matters that your Honour has raised in turn?

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.  I also think you need to bear in mind too that the appeal itself will be heard in June.  Of course, when judgment will be delivered is another matter, but the appeal process is moving along fairly speedily.  By all means address me on those matters, but having in mind that if any concerns that the appellant may have about locating the responding it becomes necessary to locate her at any given time, that they can be met by some arrangement by which she surrenders her passport and enters into some arrangement with the appellant of the sort that you have canvassed, that to issue a warrant in those circumstances, as I say, seems to me a fairly drastic step.

MR WILLIAMS:   I apprehend your Honour’s concerns.  If I might address them in turn.  First it is appropriate that I should indicate what the position of the appellants would be were the respondent to be arrested.  I am instructed to inform the Court that should an order for arrest be made, bail would not be opposed, although conditions would of course be sought.  It would be conceded upon any such application that a combination of matters amount to special circumstances, so bail would not be opposed and there would be the concession.  Secondly, in relation ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   Just before you leave that, that still involves the arrest process, does it not?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Either a police officer turns up at her door and takes her into custody or no doubt some arrangement could be made possibly for her to report to a police station for the purposes of an arrest and then an application for bail but, whatever happens, an arrest has to be made.

MR WILLIAMS:   Perhaps, rather than going to the circumstances that may justify such an arrest, could I address your Honour’s concern in this way:  there may be the capacity in the court in its inherent jurisdiction to make orders for the surrender of a passport and orders that the respondent not approach points of overseas departure, reside at a certain address and notify any changes of address.  That power may or may not subsist or may or may not extend precisely to the circumstances of the present case where there is a direct statutory regime.  If I could take your Honour briefly to the statutory regime.

The Extradition Act 1988 in section 21(6) provides for orders in paragraph (e) for the court to make an order for the arrest of the person. In paragraph (f)(iv) if such an order is made and the person is arrested, if there are special circumstances justifying such a course the court may:

order the release on bail of the person on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit.

Those provisions ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   Sorry, that reference to special conditions - - -

MR WILLIAMS:   That is (f)(iv), your Honour.  If I could just check the reprint that your Honour has.

HIS HONOUR:   It does not seem to be in the print that I have, although I do have some amendments that have been made.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.  There have been two amendments to the Act.  Your Honour will find that the provision in question has been amended by Act No 76 of 1990, specifically by section 6(6).

HIS HONOUR:   I do not seem to have that one.  What was the effect of it, Mr Williams?

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, perhaps if I could hand up a reprinted version.  In paragraph (f)(iv) - it is marked there.

HIS HONOUR:   But that really is to bring it into accord with the special circumstances provisions relating to the granting of bail by - - -

MR WILLIAMS:   A magistrate.

HIS HONOUR:   Where an appeal is not pending.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, the power of a magistrate to grant bail. 

HIS HONOUR:   Do you read that as empowering the court to order the arrest of a person and grant bail in the same order or does it require some application by the person arrested before the court would exercise its power to grant bail?

MR WILLIAMS:   It would be more convenient if it were the former, your Honour, but the structure of the section, in my respectful submission, does not lend support to that construction.  It does appear that there is a two stage process:  the first being the arrest; and then, in the alternative, in paragraph (f), the alternative orders.  It appears to contemplate, although it does not directly say so, that the person will be brought before a court.       The court will then order that they be kept in custody or, in the alternative, released on bail if there are special circumstances.

HIS HONOUR:   It would be unusual to grant bail other than on the application of the person arrested.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.  The significance of paragraph (f)(iv), in my respectful submission, is that it constrains the discretion otherwise unfettered except by the general objects of the Act, to which I will go in a moment, vested in the court as to whether arrest should be ordered.  If the legislative regimen of the Act as a whole is that bail may only be granted by any court if there are special circumstances then, in my respectful submission, that gives rise to an inference that the otherwise general discretion in paragraph (e), “the court...may order the arrest of the person”, has been to that extent at least, fettered.  That construction may also be supported by reference to the principal objects of the Act contained in section 3 of the Act.

HIS HONOUR:   It cuts both ways a bit, does it not?  You might read the section overall as warranting a view that if the special circumstances are necessary in order to grant bail that the court should be slower, perhaps, in ordering the arrest of a person unless that arrest is really warranted by the particular circumstances.

MR WILLIAMS:   That construction, with respect, is available.  My submission is that there is an overall legislative regime that, once proceedings have been commenced, a person is ordinarily to be kept in custody, leaving aside the special leave situation there, where a person has the benefit of a Full Court decision.  A person is ordinarily to be kept in custody unless there are special circumstances creating bail.  It is consistent also with the objects of the Act.  In section 3(c) of the Act, the principal objects of the Act are stated to be:

to enable Australia to carry out its obligations under extradition treaties.

The relevant treaty with Austria confers an obligation on the contracting parties to extradite persons who fall within the scope of the treaty and it is consistent, in my submission, with a construction of the Act which limits the circumstances in which a person who is brought within the operation of the Act may be set at liberty or may be at liberty. 

Those are the submissions I would wish to put in relation to arrest.  There may be evidence to which I need to take your Honour concerning that, but perhaps if I might address - there certainly is evidence which in my duty on an ex parte application to which I would need to take your Honour concerning the question of arrest, if your Honour is minded to entertain that further.  But if I could address your Honour’s concern more directly, there are two authorities in this Court concerning the circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised under the Extradition Act.

HIS HONOUR:   To what end are you taking me to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court?

MR WILLIAMS:   Well, your Honour has raised with me the possibility of some form of an arrangement or order which would lead to the surrender of the respondent’s passport.

HIS HONOUR:   Well, no, I did not have in mind, at this stage, the making of an order but simply the possibility of an arrangement if the respondent was alerted to the application before the Court, of the parties making some arrangement by way of surrender of passport and otherwise, perhaps, that would satisfy the applicant that it, being the applicant, could carry out its obligations under the treaty arrangement.

MR WILLIAMS:   The difficulty that I apprehend in reaching such an arrangement is that, from the time when the respondent is notified of the application in this Court and the intention to seek such orders, there would be no constraint upon her from leaving Australia forthwith, no legal means by which the appellant could apprehend her at an airport if she were to flee immediately.  The incentive to flee must increase as the level of the judicial hierarchy at which the matter is under consideration increases and the matters raised by the members of the Court on the special leave application, in my respectful submission, would not give the respondent cause for complacency as to her prospects of success in this Court.

HIS HONOUR:   That is true.  On the other hand, what do we know about her situation in Australia so far as assets are concerned, home and so on?  There were a couple of affidavits handed to me, almost literally as I was coming through the door.

MR WILLIAMS:   I should take your Honour to those.  There are three affidavits ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   The shorter of the two I have read very briefly, but the longer one I have not read yet.

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, there are three affidavits on which I rely.  The first is the longer affidavit of Francis James Walsh, sworn on 13 April of this year.  It is a substantial affidavit in volume.

HIS HONOUR:   That is the affidavit lodged at the time that the summons was lodged.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I have that.

MR WILLIAMS:   There are two other affidavits.  The second is also of Francis James Walsh.  It was sworn on 9 March of this year.

HIS HONOUR:   Well, that was the one I was shown just before I came into Court.

MR WILLIAMS:   And the third, your Honour, is the affidavit of Wendy Anne Barber of 9 March 1995.

HIS HONOUR:   Well, that is the one I was also just handed, but I have not read that one yet.

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, that may be the most convenient starting point in that it annexes an affidavit, both of the respondent and of her de facto husband, sworn in the proceedings before Justice Spender in relation to bail.  That sets out the respondent’s case in relation to bail.  It sets out the circumstances and, in the body of the affidavit itself, your Honour will find, briefly summarised, the matters that are contained in the two affidavits which are annexed.

HIS HONOUR:   Assuming that this information is current - and I take it there is no reason to think otherwise - the respondent lives in an apparently permanent relationship and she has a 12-year-old daughter.  She speaks of not her owning a home but he, being the man concerned, owning a home but he and the respondent being proprietors of a business.  There is certainly nothing about that, unless you can take me to any particular portion of it, Mr Williams, which would point to anything other than the likelihood that she will remain here.

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, I must concede that there is a likelihood that she will remain here.  The application is brought not because of that likelihood but because of what is, in my respectful submission, a real possibility that she may not.  We would put the case no higher than that, nor, with respect, in my submission, do we need to.  A real possibility that she will flee the jurisdiction, in my respectful submission, is sufficient to enliven the Court’s jurisdiction.

HIS HONOUR:   I am not sure what you mean by “enliven”, but certainly the jurisdiction is there ‑ or the power is there perhaps rather than jurisdiction - but the question in my mind is still:  should I exercise the power in the circumstances as they are presently known to the Court?

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, perhaps I should begin by saying what would be said on the respondent’s behalf were she represented here.  She does have substantial ties in the jurisdiction, reflected in the matters to which I have taken the Court.  She did, whilst in custody in Queensland during the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings, find a period of custody very difficult, as did her daughter who has developmental difficulties and who particularly suffered in the absence of her mother.

Those are the principal matters to which I should refer your Honour, although there are matters referred to - the general circumstances are summarised in the judgment of Justice Spender.  In relation to the circumstances which point in favour of the exercise of the jurisdiction, I rely first on the existence of the treaty obligation, the construction of the Act to which I have alluded which, in my respectful submission, points to the constraining of the discretion in the way that I have indicated.  Thirdly, to the fact that she is a foreign national who has previously fled her country of origin in breach of bail conditions that she not flee, not hide and that she report weekly.  I can take your Honour to the evidence of that.  She has indicated in her affidavit an intention to pursue whatever avenues are available to her in Australia to avoid extradition to Austria.

There have in the past been difficulties in locating her for the purposes of service.  I do not seek to make too much of those, your Honour, but the fact that the affidavit of Mr Walsh, the earlier affidavit of Mr Walsh which your Honour read shortly before coming in, does give rise to an inference that there was an evasion of service in relation to the commencement of the special leave application in this Court.  I do not wish to make too much of it but that is consistent with a possibility that the respondent will flee.  While the respondent has been in Australia for most of the last five years, much of which time, I might say, she has been constrained to be here by orders of the court, I do not seek to detract thereby from the fact that she has been here for five years, or the better part of five years.  That is a relatively short period of time in the lifetime of a person of just over the age of 40 years.

Finally I seek to rely on the strength of the appellant’s case, and your Honour has read the special leave transcript and I would not wish to say more than that.

Your Honour, the appellant I am sure will co-operate in any way with arrangements which seek to minimise the period in which the respondent would be held in custody.  The appellant is mindful of the imposition on her liberty that is involved in the arrest and the concession as to bail and as to the existence of special circumstances reflects the appellant’s attitude in that respect.

HIS HONOUR:   Mr Williams, when the matter has got this far, that is that there has been special leave to appeal to this Court, is the power to grant bail confined to this Court?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   So the powers of other judicial officers along the way have ceased to operate?

MR WILLIAMS:   Regrettably, your Honour, that is the construction which I place on section 21(6); it does refer to the court to which the appeal is made and there may be some inherent jurisdiction of the Jennings Construction v Burgundy Royale type that subsists in the Full Federal Court, but bail under the Act, as I read the Act, could only be granted by this Court.

HIS HONOUR:   Well, let me tell you what I am thinking at the moment and invite you to comment.  I am not minded to dismiss the summons.  I am not presently persuaded that I should make an order in terms of the summons, because of the consequences involved in an arrest, notwithstanding that an application can be made for bail and will not be opposed, and also having regard to the particular provisions of the Extradition Act, which really put a person,  the subject of the Act, in a rather different position from a person who is charged with an offence and is subject to the ordinary criminal laws regarding arrest, custody and bail, but I wonder if there is not some midway course, at least as an immediate way of dealing with this, namely to adjourn the application either certainly for a short time, but either to a fixed date or leave it open with liberty to come back at short notice and see if it is possible for the applicant to approach the respondent and be satisfied as to arrangements which will ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is meeting its treaty obligations.

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, could I raise one matter with your Honour and then seek instructions?

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.

MR WILLIAMS:   Would your Honour be minded, within such an order, adjourning the application to grant liberty to the appellants to approach the Court on an urgent basis at any time?

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, there would not be any question about it.

MR WILLIAMS:   In that event, we may be able to obtain an order were she to arrive at the airport, for example?

HIS HONOUR:   I assume that given the status of the applicant that airports could be notified anyhow, and without necessarily without an order of the Court to alert the applicant should there be any approach in that direction.  But, certainly, it would be no problem so far as I am concerned in granting liberty to restore the matter as a matter of urgency.  It would not necessarily come back to me, of course.

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, the situation that I am contemplating: whilst the respondent could be put on the pass alert system, which would cause the responsible officer to be notified were she to appear at an airport.  There would be no power to do anything without an order of this Court, which order may need to be obtained within an hour or two.  Would your Honour excuse me while I obtain instructions?

Your Honour, I am instructed the appellant would consent to a course whereby the matter was stood over for a period, perhaps of seven days - perhaps 10 or 14 might be more appropriate - and that the appellants would in the meantime make contact with the respondent’s advisers in order to try to secure an arrangement, and by agreement, if liberty were to be given, to approach the Court on an urgent basis at any time.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.  I appreciate the way in which you approach the matter, Mr Williams, bearing in mind that it is an ex parte application and directing me to considerations that can be urged on behalf of the respondent as well as those that can be urged on behalf of the applicant.  It seems to me probably better to adjourn the matter to a date to be fixed because if you have liberty to restore the matter to the list as a matter of urgency a precise date may not matter.  Although what I could do is I could adjourn it to a date when the next sittings of the Court take place and although I will not be rostered as the Chambers Judge I would be prepared to continue to deal with the matter unless it came up as a matter of urgency in the meantime, in which it would have to go to another judge because I would not be here.

MR WILLIAMS:   May it please the Court, whatever course is most convenient to the Court.

HIS HONOUR:   There is only a week between the end of these sittings and the commencement of the next sittings, so if we adjourned it to, say, 14 days that would be the Friday of the first week of the next sittings.  I am not sure what the date is, but somebody can no doubt tell me.  There seems to be a shortage of calendars around.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, I have not brought my own diary, your Honour.  Your Honour, could I raise one other matter.  I am conscious of the pressures on your Honour today.

HIS HONOUR:   No, not at all.

MR WILLIAMS:   Could I raise one other matter.  Would your Honour be minded to make interim orders that she not approach points of overseas departure until the matter were to be returned before the Court?

HIS HONOUR:   Have I got that power?

MR WILLIAMS:   In the inherent jurisdiction, your Honour - perhaps I should take your Honour to the decision of the Chief Justice in Zoeller v Attorney‑General, which is ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   That was given before the present regime involving orders by this Court came into force, did it not?

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honour, Zoeller, as I recall, was the first application made under the 1988 Act.  It did not involve at that time special circumstances for the granting of bail by an appellant court.

HIS HONOUR:   But it was a bail application.

MR WILLIAMS:   It was, pending special leave.  His Honour the Chief Justice held that bail could not be granted.  There was no power.  The Act did not extend to the situation of a special leave application.  It did extend to an appeal by this Court.  By inference it would extend to an appeal by this Court, but it did not extend to the position of a special leave application.  His Honour did allude to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

HIS HONOUR:   Just take me to that, please.

MR WILLIAMS: Your Honour, it is reported in 90 ALR 161. The crucial passage in relation to the inherent jurisdiction appears on page 164.

HIS HONOUR:   But where do I find something that assists in dealing with what you propose?

MR WILLIAMS:   At the top of page 164, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   But what do you seek to do:  extend those remarks in relation to bail to the sort of interim order that you are asking me to make now?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.  In Narain v Director of Public Prosecutions Justice Brennan referred to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to preserve the subject matter of the litigation, referring to Jennings Construction v Burgundy Royale [No 2].

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I am familiar with those authorities.  They generally of course arise in a rather different context, but I see what you are putting to me.

MR WILLIAMS:   It is a question of preserving the subject matter of the litigation.  In a very real sense the subject matter of the litigation is the respondent’s presence in Australia.

HIS HONOUR:   What are you asking me to do, Mr Williams, by way of interim order?

MR WILLIAMS:   To make an order that the respondent surrender her passport and not approach points of overseas departure until the matter is brought again before this Court.  The question for the Court, if I can put what Mr Jerrard would no doubt put on her behalf, is whether the inherent jurisdiction subsists in the light of the express statutory scheme.  In my respectful submission, it does.  It extends to a position where the Court is not minded to order arrest and yet nevertheless there is reason to seek to secure the subject matter of the litigation in Australia, the subject matter of the appeal.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I am prepared to make an order in those terms.

MR WILLIAMS:   May it please the Court.

HIS HONOUR:   Now, what orders are you seeking?  That the summons be adjourned?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Until Friday, 5 May, let us say, at 9 am?

MR WILLIAMS:   May it please the Court.

HIS HONOUR:   Liberty to restore the summons to the list as a matter of urgency and, what, until further order the respondent surrender her passport?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Is that sufficient description?

MR WILLIAMS:   Surrender her passport on demand to an officer of the Australian Federal Police.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.

MR WILLIAMS:   And not apply for any other passport or travel document and that the respondent not approach points of overseas departure until further order.

HIS HONOUR:   Is that a well understood term?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   It is not confined to airports, presumably.

MR WILLIAMS:   It is a term that is very commonly imposed in the criminal courts, your Honour.  Justice Spender imposed such a condition.  Perhaps I should get the precise formulation of it.  I am sorry, your Honour, “not attend at any port of international departure” are the terms of Justice Spender’s order.

HIS HONOUR:   Any port of international departure?

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Those are the only conditions that you are asking?

MR WILLIAMS:   Would your Honour excuse me briefly?  Yes, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR:   I think as a matter of the sequence of the order, it probably should be expressed in terms that the summons be adjourned until 5 May at 9 am, then, until further order, the respondent surrender her passport on demand to an officer of the Australian Federal Police and not apply for any other passport or travel document or attend at any port of international departure and then, thirdly, liberty to restore the summons to the list as a matter of urgency, because it may well be that it is the respondent who might want to have the matter brought back in order to deal with those conditions.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honour.  Would it assist your Honour if we were to prepare a short minutes of order ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   I will be here during the day.  If you like to send up something to give effect to that, I will initial it.

MR WILLIAMS:   Thank you, your Honour.  We will send that up as soon as we can.

HIS HONOUR:   The matter, if necessary, can come before me on 5 May at 9 am and I will ask my associate to let me know if that is a possibility.  If it is unnecessary from the point of view of either side that it come back, then perhaps you could let the registry know and that could be taken out of the list.

MR WILLIAMS:   As the Court pleases.

HIS HONOUR:   Thank you for your assistance, Mr Williams.  The Court will adjourn.

AT 12.14 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED