Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Sullivan

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Court of Criminal Appeal
Supreme Court

New South Wales

Case Name: 

Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Sullivan

Medium Neutral Citation: 

[2022] NSWCCA 183

Hearing Date(s): 

18 August 2022

Date of Orders:

18 August 2022

Decision Date: 

26 August 2022

Before: 

Beech-Jones CJ at CL at [1]
Button J at [69]
Hamill J at [70]

Decision: 

(1)   Appeal allowed in part;
(2)   Set aside the trial judge’s decision to reject the tender of the evidence concerning the Respondent’s participation in a “walkthrough” interview with police commencing at about 3.04pm on 19 August 2017;
(3)   Remit to the trial judge the determination of which parts, if any, of the evidence concerning the Respondent’s participation in a “walkthrough” interview with police commencing at about 3.04 pm on 19 August 2017 should be rejected on the basis that the answers given by the accused concern matters of which he has no recollection;
(4)   Appeal otherwise dismissed;
(5)   Within one week of the completion of proceedings at first instance, the Appellant notify the chambers of Beech-Jones CJ at CL accordingly.

Catchwords: 

Interlocutory Appeal – appeal by Director of Public Prosecutions against exclusion of parts of ERISP with accused and entirety of a walk through interview – respondent charged with manslaughter – Crown alleges he fought with the deceased and forced him onto a busy road and was hit by a car – respondent intoxicated at time of fight – interviewed the following day – during interview respondent stated he could not recall parts of fight including how deceased came to be on the road – trial judge accepted respondent was genuinely cooperating in interview – trial judge accepted Crown’s expert that it was likely that lack of memory was due to cognitive impairment at time of fight from alcohol consumption – trial judge found that when respondent indicated a lack of memory his answers “have no greater status than … hypothesis” – exclusion of parts of ERISP and walkthrough “substantially weakened” Crown case – forced Crown to prove dangerousness and causation by inference rather than direct proof – whether trial judge mistook of facts – part of the trial judge’s reasons for finding cognitive impairment relied on evidence of Crown expert relating to different topic – finding still open or reasonably open – whether in finding unfairness trial judge failed to consider extent to which jury could determine reliability of admissions – once trial judge held that answers no more than hypothesis then did not matter that jury could make its own assessment – whether trial judge erred in excluding entirety of walkthrough interview – exclusion of entirety of walkthrough inconsistent with findings in relation to ERISP – respondent’s memory only partly affected – appeal allowed in part – consideration of exclusion of walkthrough remitted to trial judge – appeal otherwise dismissed

Legislation Cited: 

Criminal Appeal Act 1912
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Evidence Act 1995

Cases Cited: 

Brendas v Genter [2018] NSWCA 8
Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA…

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Details
Case
[2022] NSWCCA 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Sullivan, the Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the exclusion of certain parts of an evidence record of an interview with the accused and the entirety of a walkthrough interview. The respondent was charged with manslaughter after allegedly fighting with the deceased and forcing him onto a busy road where he was hit by a car. The respondent was intoxicated at the time of the fight and claimed to have no memory of parts of the incident. The trial judge accepted that the respondent was genuinely cooperating during the interview and that his lack of memory was likely due to cognitive impairment from alcohol consumption. The judge found that the respondent's answers, when he claimed to have no memory, had no greater status than a hypothesis and excluded parts of the evidence record of the interview and the entirety of the walkthrough interview. The Crown argued that the exclusion of these parts of the evidence substantially weakened its case and forced it to prove dangerousness and causation by inference rather than direct proof.

The court was required to decide whether the trial judge had erred in excluding parts of the evidence record of the interview and the entirety of the walkthrough interview. The court also needed to determine whether the trial judge had mistaken the facts, whether the finding of unfairness was open or reasonably open, and whether the trial judge had failed to consider the extent to which the jury could determine the reliability of the admissions. The court considered whether the trial judge had erred in excluding the entirety of the walkthrough interview, given that the respondent's memory was only partly affected.

The court found that the trial judge had erred in excluding parts of the evidence record of the interview and the entirety of the walkthrough interview. The trial judge had failed to make an overall assessment of the probative value of the evidence and had not attempted to weigh the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also found that the exclusion of the entirety of the walkthrough interview was inconsistent with the findings in relation to the evidence record of the interview. The court held that the trial judge should have addressed the application of s 90 of the Evidence Act, which provides that evidence obtained in an oppressive or improper manner is not to be admitted. The court allowed the appeal in part and remitted the consideration of the exclusion of the walkthrough to the trial judge. The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The trial judge’s reasoning in relation to the walkthrough is set out above. As this ground indicates, his Honour relied on s 135 of the Evidence Act to exclude the evidence of the walkthrough interview. Section 135 provides:“135 General discretion to exclude evidenceThe court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might--(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party, or(b) be misleading or confusing, or(c) cause or result in undue waste of time.” The DPP submitted that his Honour’s approach to the exercise of this power was erroneous for a number of reasons. First, his Honour failed to make any overall assessment of the probative value of the evidence. Second, to the extent that his Honour considered the probative value of the evidence, his Honour erred in that issues of reliability should be disregarded when assessing probative value (IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39]). Third, his Honour made no finding to the effect that the admission of the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial much less identify what the prejudice was. Fourth, and consequentially, his Honour did not attempt to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. The Respondent accepted this was so. However, the Respondent submitted that the first part of the extract in [32] above suggests that his Honour also excluded the evidence under s 90. Whether that is so or not is unclear but on any view his Honour should have addressed s 90 as that was the principal basis of the Respondent’s application to exclude the evidence of the walkthrough and the necessity to consider its application arose from his Honour’s findings in relation to the ERISP. Even so there is an inconsistency in the findings in the first paragraph of the extract set out in [32] above. His Honour relied on the evidence of Mr Farrar and noted that the Respondent was “not fully capable of recalling everything” and so his Honour concluded that the entirety of the walkthrough was unreliable. However, his Honour had only excluded those parts of the ERISP that were prefaced by the Respondent indicating he had a lack of memory for the particular aspect of the altercation with Mr Sullivan. Further, to the extent that the trial judge might be taken as having found that the walkthrough involved the Respondent reconstructing the entirety of the fight with Mr Summerfield, then there was no evidence to support that conclusion. Mr Farrar’s evidence does not support that, nor does a view of the recording of the walkthrough. Similarly, there is no evidence to support his Honour’s finding that the walkthrough was an “effort on the part of the police to reconstruct events” if that was meant to suggest that the police were deliberately attempting to have the Respondent reconstruct what occurred by hypothesis rather than from his actual memory (although I do not think it was meant to suggest that). The passage described in [22] demonstrates that is not so.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BEECH-JONES CJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEECH-JONES CJ