Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Duncan [2022] NSWSC 927 Hearing dates: 11 July 2022 Date of orders: 11 July 2022 Decision date: 11 July 2022 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Bellew J Decision: (1) The detention application is dismissed.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – Bail – Where the respondent was convicted by a jury of sexual offending and released on bail pending sentence – Where an amendment to the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) was then introduced governing the release of offenders between conviction and sentence – Where the Director of Public Prosecutions made an application for the respondent’s detention following his release – Whether the amendment applied to the Director’s application – Whether the Director had established that the respondent will be sentenced to a period of full-time custody – Whether there were special or exceptional circumstances – Where senior counsel for the Director conceded that the circumstances pertaining to the respondent’s health were special or exceptional – Where it was accepted by senior counsel for the Director that in light of that concession the application should be dismissed – Detention application dismissed
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Whether an amendment to the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) was retrospective in its operation and thus contravened common law principles or statutory provisions – Necessity for a distinction to be drawn between amending legislation which has a prior effect on past events and amending legislation which bases future action on past events – Amendment in the present case not retrospective in its operation and not in breach of common law principles or statutory provisions
WORDS AND PHRASES – “will” – “special” – “exceptional” – “revive”Legislation Cited: Bail Act 1978 (NSW)
Bail Act 2013 (NSW)
Bail Regulation 2021 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Day [2022] NSWSC 938
Geschke v Del-Monte Home Furnishers Pty Limited [1981] VR 856
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
La Macchia v Minister for Primary Industry (1986) 72 ALR 23
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261; [1957] HCA 7
Mine Subsidence Board v Wambo Coal Pty Limited (2007) 154 LGERA 60; [2007] NSWCA 137
Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57
R v Tapueluelu (Supreme Court of NSW, 5 January 2004 unreported)
Re A Solicitor’s Clerk [1957] 1 WLR 1219
Robertsonv City of Nunawading [1973] VR 819
Texts Cited: D C Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Publishing, 9th Ed, 2019)
Macquarie Dictionary (2022)
Category: Principal judgment Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) – Applicant
Neil Duncan – RespondentRepresentation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
D Morters SC – Crown
R Pontello SC and T O’Rourke
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) – Crown
Aulich Criminal Law – Respondent
File Number(s): 2022/175913 Publication restriction: Nil
Judgment
INTRODUCTION
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By an application dated 17 June…
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- Case
- [2022] NSWSC 927
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the amendment to the Bail Act was retrospective in its operation, which would contravene common law principles or statutory provisions. The court held that the amendment did not have a retrospective effect, as it distinguished between amending legislation that has a prior effect on past events and legislation that bases future action on past events. The amendment in question did not alter past events but rather established conditions for future actions. Regarding the application for detention, the Director's counsel conceded that Duncan's health circumstances were special or exceptional, which was a key factor in the decision-making process. This concession led to the acceptance that the application should be dismissed, as the court found no basis for detention given the special circumstances acknowledged by the Director.
Based on these findings, the court dismissed the Director’s application for Duncan's detention. The court's decision was grounded in the interpretation of the statutory amendment and the acknowledgment of exceptional circumstances related to Duncan's health. The final orders of the court were to uphold Duncan's release on bail pending his sentencing, barring any further detention applications unless new and compelling circumstances arose.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi