Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Voitin
[2025] VCC 1395
•22 September 2025
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CRIMINAL DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
Case No. CR-22-01365
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (CTH) |
| v |
| JOHN VOITIN |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE MEREDITH | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 1 & 22 September 2025 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 22 September 2025 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP (Cth) v Voitin | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VCC 1395 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject:
Catchwords:
Legislation Cited:
Cases Cited:R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430; DPP (Cth) v Gregory [2011] VSCA 145
Sentence: Total Effective Sentence – 3 years, 2 years suspended
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP (Cth) | Mr N. Robinson KC with Ms R. McEwan | Solicitor for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Ms L. Thies | SLK Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
1John Voitin, you have pleaded guilty to two charges of obtaining a financial advantage by deception for another.
2Each offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.
3Charge 1 concerns you, between 25 March and 28 November 2011, with another, Peter Smith (PS),[1] obtaining for Voitin Lawyers a financial advantage, being an interim dividend which was paid to Mandamus Commodities Limited, by deception, by falsely representing that Keith Ondarchie was indebted to the company, Mandamus Commodities Limited, in the amount of $5.2m.
[1]Pursuant to order of 26 February 2025 this individual is referred to by this pseudonym
4Charge 2 concerns you, again with PS, between 25 March 2011 and 18 January 2013, obtaining an interim dividend for Voitin Lawyers that was paid to Mandamus Commodities Limited by deception, by falsely representing that Anthony Dage was indebted to Mandamus Commodities Limited in the amount of $4.2m.
5In addition, you pleaded guilty to Charge 3 of attempting to pervert the course of justice carrying a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment. Namely, that between 17 May and 26 July 2011, you did acts that attempted to pervert the course of justice pursuant to common law. They are particularised as follows.
·That on or about 17 May 2011, you caused Simon Nixon, a solicitor, to institute Supreme Court of Victoria debt recovery proceedings said to be owed to the company, Mandamus Commodities Limited, by both Ondarchie and Dage.
·Secondly, on or about 27 May 2011, you presented an Overarching Obligation Certificate to your wife, Clare Voitin, the Director of Mandamus Commodities Limited, for her signature without explaining the nature or purpose of the document.
6Tendered on the hearing of your matter was a prosecution summary of the circumstances of your offending. What follows is a briefer summary suitable for the purposes of these sentencing reasons.
7At the relevant time, you were a founding partner of Voitin Lawyers, a legal firm practising in the bankruptcy and insolvency areas. The charges against you relate to the manipulation of the bankruptcy and insolvency system on behalf of two of your clients, Keith Ondarchie and Anthony Dage. The scheme involved the use of a company controlled by you (through your wife, Clare Voitin) to create fictitious personal debts for clients with the objective of obtaining a more favourable outcome from the bankruptcy or insolvency process, as well as a financial benefit to Voitin Lawyers.
8This also involved the initiation of proceedings based on false and backdated documentation. These proceedings were intended to be used to substantiate the fictitious debts by making them appear legitimate to third parties.
9The purpose behind this activity was to satisfy the relevant bankruptcy trustee that the false debt was in fact legitimate and to facilitate the return of funds through the false creditor to the legal firm as well as the debtor or client. This meant that less was paid to real creditors and genuine debts were thereby evaded and funds were received by the legal firm.
10The entity used in the offending was Mandamus Commodities Limited. This was a private limited company incorporated in December 2010 in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Your then wife, Clare Voitin, was the sole director and shareholder throughout the relevant period. You induced her to sign relevant documents without explaining to her the use of those.
11In greater detail, Charges 1 and 2 concern Anthony Dage and Keith Ondarchie. At the relevant time, they were directors of the Sagamore Group. Sagamore was involved in sheet metal design, manufacturing and assembly, having been founded in 2005. In 2010, Sagamore was experiencing financial problems.
12In early 2011, a creditor of Sagamore, Selection Steel, had obtained a default judgment against Sagamore in the sum of approximately $43,000. This saw Dage and Ondarchie being referred to Voitin Lawyers through an accountant.
13On or about 10 March 2011, an administrator was appointed to Sagamore. That afternoon, Ondarchie and Dage met with PS at the offices of Voitin Lawyers. Voitin Lawyers commenced an application in the Supreme Court of Victoria in an effort to forestall Sagamore’s liquidation and winding up. On 23 March 2011, that application was dismissed.
14Dage and Ondarchie had provided certain personal guarantees to creditors of Sagamore. As a result of this, they were exposed to Sagamore’s financial liabilities.
15The scheme that was implemented involved the use of personal insolvency agreements (PIAs). A PIA is a legally binding agreement under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) between a debtor and their creditors by which the debtor offers to pay their creditors either in full or in part and is an alternative to entering into bankruptcy. If a person wished to enter into a PIA, instead of going bankrupt, they were required to:
(a) identify and appoint a ‘Controlling Trustee’, who was a person with the authority under the Bankruptcy Act to manage the PIA process on their behalf; and
(b) sign and file a 'Controlling Trustee Authority' and a 'Statement of Affairs' with the controlling trustee, who would then file them with the Official Receiver.
16Once a Controlling Trustee had been appointed, they were required to arrange a meeting of all creditors to decide whether the debtor should enter a PIA. Crucially, at that meeting, a PIA proposal would only be accepted if:
(a) a numerical majority of the creditors voted in favour; and
(b) the creditors who voted in favour also held at least 75 per cent of the total debt value.
17On 25 March 2011, Ondarchie and Dage met with PS at Voitin Lawyers. At this meeting, PS explained the effect of entering into bankruptcy, listed Ondarchie’s and Dage’s personal debt exposures on a whiteboard, and explained that a PIA was the best option for them in the circumstances.
18You, Mr Voitin, met with Dage and Ondarchie, and you suggested that a new creditor could be created with the voting power to ensure that a majority of creditors would agree to a payment that would release the debt owed to each creditor. You explained the effect of the scheme to Ondarchie and Dage as being: that you had a way of making the situation go away through the PIA pathway; that you would get a friendly company to vote on a scheme that would solve their problems; that the situation could be solved without a bankruptcy and they could get on with their lives; that you used Nixon, another lawyer, to represent the new major creditor; that you would create new creditors who would make up more than 50 per cent of the total value of the creditors in monetary value and creditor numbers, who would then vote to approve the proposed PIA; and that the value of yours and Nixon’s legal fees would be paid out of the distributions to the new creditor and you would return 50 per cent of those distributions to Ondarchie and Dage.
19Ondarchie and Dage duly considered their position and agreed to pursue a PIA.
20As earlier referenced, Mandamus Commodities was the company to be used in the creation of a large fictitious debt. Given that Ondarchie had a potentially greater exposure than Dage, it was agreed that his PIA should proceed first.
21In or around April 2011, Ondarchie began to prepare the necessary paperwork required to commence the PIA process. On 12 April, Dage and Ondarchie met with you at the offices of Voitin Lawyers. At that meeting, both Dage and Ondarchie signed a document which was described as a fundraising agreement which had been prepared based on information Dage and Ondarchie had previously provided. PS was directed to assist Ondarchie in finalising his PIA paperwork.
22This fundraising agreement was backdated to 10 December 2010. It was expressed to be between Ondarchie and Dage. It provided that both Ondarchie and Dage jointly and severally had agreed to arrange an investment in Mandamus Commodities in the amount of $5.2m on or before 28 February 2011. It provided that Mandamus Commodities warranted and represented that it would use the investment to establish a business supplying Chinese manufactured electronic goods to Australia.
23This fundraising agreement was false because there was never any investment agreement between Mandamus Commodities and Dage and Ondarchie, and it had been falsely backdated to 10 December 2010 to create the appearance of it being a genuine document for the purpose of allowing the claim to be relied upon in pursuit of the PIA.
24On 13 April 2011, Ondarchie attended a meeting of Sagamore’s creditors and explained the circumstances leading to the administrator’s appointment. A PIA deed proposed that Ondarchie would distribute the sum of $295,000 to his creditors in proportion to and in full satisfaction of the various liabilities. Ondarchie had raised that amount from friends and his wife.
25On 28 and 29 April 2011, Ondarchie signed a Statement of Affairs, a draft PIA deed and a Controlling Trustee Authority pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act, which had the effect of appointing an individual as his Controlling Trustee in Bankruptcy and saw to these documents being filed with the Official Receiver.
26In accord with the process set out by you, Mr Voitin, Ondarchie’s Statement of Affairs falsely described a number of persons and entities as being Sagamore creditors when in fact they were not. This included Mandamus Commodities.
27A meeting of Ondarchie’s creditors was convened for 3 June 2011 and notice given to each of the creditors listed in Ondarchie’s Statement of Affairs.
28Before this took place, however, in order to give an air of verisimilitude to the PIA, Supreme Court of Victoria proceedings for debt recovery were instituted at your behest, Mr Voitin, in relation to Mandamus Commodities.
29This provided a documentary basis for Mandamus Commodities' status as an ostensible creditor of Ondarchie and Dage prior to their PIAs proceeding.
30Two notices of demand were prepared on behalf of Mandamus, one for each of Ondarchie and Dage.
31On 25 May 2011, Nixon, following instructions from you, Mr Voitin, filed a written statement of claim with the Registry of the Supreme Court of Victoria against Ondarchie and Dage on behalf of Mandamus Commodities. Nixon has not been charged in relation to this offending and has been treated as an innocent agent, not involved in the scheme.
32The writ was accepted by the Prothonotary and thus a court proceeding was commenced in the Supreme Court of Victoria.
33The next day, Nixon served the relevant documents on Voitin Lawyers, who were solicitors for Dage and Ondarchie.
34On 27 May 2011, Nixon signed a proper basis certification and Clare Voitin an overarching obligation certification, the combined effect of which was to certify to the court that the proceedings brought against Dage and Ondarchie were appropriate. Both documents were accepted by the Prothonotary on 7 June.
35Your former wife, Clare Voitin, signed this document at the request of you without its contents being explained to her.
36On 26 July 2011, Voitin Lawyers emailed Nixon in relation to these proceedings, stating:
Please refrain from taking any further action in this matter as I understand that our respective clients are in negotiations to settle the dispute and litigation.
Thus, no further action was taken by either party.
37It is the initiation of the legal proceedings on a false basis, knowing that there was no legitimate debt, which comprises the attempt to pervert the course of justice.
38Meanwhile, between late May and early June, Ondarchie’s Controlling Trustee had received 21 Statements of Claim from creditors of Ondarchie, which included 13 fictitious creditors, including Mandamus Commodities asserting a debt owed in the sum of $5.2m.
39On 3 June 2011, Ondarchie attended the creditors’ meeting with the Controlling Trustee and yourself, and a majority of Sagamore’s actual and ostensible creditors voted in favour of the proposed PIA. Of the 19 creditors represented at that meeting, 16 (including all of the fictitious creditors) voted in its favour. There were three remaining creditors voting against the PIA and they were all legitimate. Given the numbers, the PIA was executed on behalf of Ondarchie.
40As part of the PIA process, a creditor is required to lodge a proof of debt. Following on from this, the creditor receives a dividend in proportion to the value of their debt if the Controlling Trustee is satisfied of the legitimacy of the debt. To this end, on 21 June 2011, Mandamus Commodities lodged a fictitious proof of debt with the trustee. This was signed by Clare Voitin, claiming that Ondarchie was indebted to Mandamus in the sum of $4.2m (as this was the amount of the ostensible investment of $5.2m less the $1m in consideration contemplated by clause 4 of that agreement). Annexed to this was the relevant correspondence between Nixon and Voitin Lawyers relating to the sham legal proceedings. This included the Mandamus Commodities’ written Statement of Claim and also a signed copy of the fundraising agreement.
41Clare Voitin signed the proof of debt at your request without the contents having been explained to her.
42A reservation about the legitimacy of the Mandamus Commodities debt was raised by a legitimate creditor. This led to enquiries being made of Ondarchie. In response to this, he provided information supporting the legitimacy of the sham debt.
43On 17 October 2011, the trustee admitted the fictitious Mandamus Commodities debt in full, in addition to various other legitimate debts.
44On 18 November 2011, an interim three per cent dividend was paid to each of Ondarchie’s unsecured creditors in the total sum of $176,686.79. Of this, Mandamus Commodities received the sum of $126,000. This was in proportion to its ostensible share of Ondarchie’s unsecured debt.
45On 21 November 2011, this dividend was then paid into Voitin Lawyer’s trust account. Some $26,500 was transferred from Voitin Lawyer’s Trust Account to an account held by Ondarchie.
46It is agreed between the parties that the sum of $99,500 was retained of the interim dividend paid to Mandamus Commodities, in payment of fees for Voitin Lawyers assisting Ondarchie’. This is the subject of Charge 1.
47In late June of 2011, in response to Mandamus Commodities’ written Statement of Claim already referred to, Voitin Lawyers filed a notice of appearance in the Supreme Court of Victoria also on behalf of Dage.
48Dage had waited for Ondarchie’s PIA process to be completed and he sought to resolve his own debts. He settled two debts owed respectively.
49Dage dealt largely with PS during his PIA process. You, Mr Voitin, also attended meetings with Dage and PS on two or three occasions. Dage recounts it appearing to him that you were performing a managerial function and PS performing an operative function.
50A similar process to Ondarchie was followed with Dage. Dage was referred to a potential trustee in early October 2012. A Controlling Trustee of Dage’s estate was duly appointed and the same documents that had been filed in respect of Ondarchie were filed. Namely, the signed Controlling Trustee Authority, a Statement of Affairs prepared by Dage and signed by him, and a draft personal insolvency agreement deed. Dage’s Statement of Affairs included that he was indebted to Mandamus Commodities in the sum of $4.2m.
51On 29 October 2012, a meeting of Dage’s creditors was convened for 9 November 2012.
52Each creditor was provided with a statement of claim, which recited the Mandamus Commodities’ debt. This was fictional of course, because the Mandamus Commodities’ debt did not exist. The relevant statement of claim was completed as a result of the following.
53On 7 November 2011, Nixon had emailed Voitin Lawyers a copy of the statement of claim with all required particulars except a signature and date. This was accompanied by a covering letter stating that the form was:
… to be signed by the Director of the creditor company Miss Sowersby. We would be grateful if you would arrange to have the document signed and forward [sic] to Cor Cordis as a matter of urgency.
54Between 7 and 9 November, the Controlling Trustee received a copy of the form, identical to the version sent by Nixon, other than it had been signed by Clare Voitin and dated 1 November 2012. The effect of this document was not explained to her.
55On 9 November, Dage attended his creditors’ meeting. At the recommendation of the Controlling Trustee, Dage’s creditors voted in favour of the proposed PIA.
56As with Ondarchie, the Dage creditors were then required to prove their debts for the purpose of receiving a dividend from the estate.
57On 22 November 2012, on behalf of Mandamus Commodities, PS lodged the fictitious proof of debt which, amongst other things, annexed a copy of the fraudulent fundraising agreement and included the same bundle of correspondence and court documents that had previously been filed with respect to Ondarchie’s claim.
58The Mandamus Commodities’ debt was admitted in full against Dage’s Estate for the same reasons as it had been done so in respect of Ondarchie.
59On 15 January 2013, Dage’s creditors were paid a first and final 2.9 per cent dividend in accordance with the approved PIA. Mandamus Commodities received the sum of $118,714.04 in proportion to its ostensible debt. This amount was paid into Voitin Lawyers' trust account on 18 January 2013, of which sum funds in excess of $80,000 were paid on to Dage. The quantum involved in Charge 2 of obtaining financial advantage by deception is agreed between the parties to be $38,700.
60From the foregoing summary, it can be seen that you have played a prominent role in the offending in question. For example, at the meeting of 25 March 2011, involving Ondarchie and Dage in the presence of PS, you set out the operation of the scheme. You described how you would get a friendly company to vote on the scheme, there would be no need for a bankruptcy, that you would use another lawyer to represent the fake major creditor, and that fees would be able to be paid out of the distributions consequent upon the success of the fraudulent scheme.
61Charges 1 and 2 involve sophisticated offending which relied upon your skill as well as your standing as a solicitor to both instigate and complete the manipulation of the personal insolvency agreement process. The company utilised, Mandamus Commodities, was a company which you controlled through your wife.
62Regarding Charge 3, as a solicitor, and an officer of the court, you knowingly instructed the issue of proceedings on a false basis in order to promote the deception involved in Charges 1 and 2. I note the documentation associated with the sham Supreme Court proceedings was provided to the trustee and doubtless relied upon in accepting the claim by Mandamus Commodities. As a member of the legal profession, an attempt to pervert the course of justice must necessarily be treated particularly seriously. Utilising your skill and position as a solicitor in furtherance of fraudulent activity in breach of your professional obligations whilst an officer of the Court, serves to underpin the seriousness of your offending.
63Whilst the offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice and obtaining a financial advantage by deception for another have differing elements, given that your purpose behind the instigation of the sham proceedings was to augment your deceptions and the sham proceedings were relied upon in furtherance of the deceptions, it would amount to me doubly punishing you if I aggravated the sentence on the deceptions by taking this into account in my sentencing of you on those counts. Accordingly, to avoid doubly punishing you, I will moderate the sentences I impose on the deceptions.
64Your offending was sophisticated, protracted, and involved the misuse by you of your legal knowledge. Both deterrence and denunciation must be appropriately emphasised in my sentencing of you. Others in the legal profession need to understand that such behaviour will not be tolerated.
65In R v Hawkins,[2] the Court stated:
It is of fundamental importance for the courts must recognise that solicitors are persons placed in a special position of trust by the law and the community. Their position is one which in the eyes of the community requires persons of the greatest integrity. Processes established by the courts and legislation seek to ensure that only persons of the highest integrity are permitted to practise. Members of the community put their trust in the honesty of solicitors, and it is because that is so that the profession of solicitor is a large one and one which provides high financial reward. When that trust is abused by the commission of fraud in any form, not only does the client or person defrauded suffer but the integrity of the profession is necessarily called into question and the courts must impose sentences which are calculated to ensure that no solicitor will be left in doubt as to the serious consequences that will follow from such conduct. Deterrence must be used as a part of the weapon of the court to ensure proper standards of conduct in the legal profession.
[2](1989) 45 A Crim R 430
66More generally, so far as what is colloquially described as white collar crime, in the judgement of Charles JA in Bulfin’s case, he stated as follows:
Whatever the motivation, offences of the kind here in question almost invariably involve a carefully calculated course of conduct over a long period, repeated deliberate acts of dishonesty, substantial amounts of money, and, frequently, losses (often tragic in their impact) to large numbers of small investors. The offender often holds a position making it possible, or has the ability, to disguise or camouflage the conduct in question. Detection is difficult, the investigation of the crime usually lengthy and very expensive, and the problems of trial and proof will frequently be extreme. … The result of such considerations, in my view, is that the element of general deterrence will usually carry particular significance in sentencing for crimes such as the present, both in relation to the total effective sentence and the non-parole period; together with a requirement for strong denunciation by the sentencing court.
67Whilst these comments were made having regard to the particular facts of Bulfin, they have been applied generally on many occasions, when sentencing courts have had to deal with what is colloquially referred to as white collar offending.
68The well-known analysis of Charles JA in Bulfin,[3] was essentially adopted in the more recent case of DPP (Cth) v Gregory.[4] At [53] of that decision, the Court said:
In seeking to ensure that proportionate sentences are imposed the courts have consistently emphasised that general deterrence is a particularly significant sentencing consideration in white collar crime and that good character cannot be given undue significance as a mitigating factor and plays a lesser part in the sentencing process.
…
[3](1984) 4 VR 114
[4][2011] VSCA 145
Moreover, general deterrence is likely to have a more profound effect in the case of white collar criminals. White collar criminals are likely to be rational, profit seeking individuals who can weigh the benefits of committing a crime against the costs of being caught and punished. Further, white collar criminals are also more likely to be first time offenders who fear the prospect of incarceration.
69These sentencing principles fall to be considered in the light of your own personal circumstances and mitigatory matters. Your character, antecedence, age and personal circumstances, however, are to be seen in light of the fact that general deterrence must assume prominence in the sentencing exercise.
70You are now 68 years of age, and you have no previous convictions. In 1999 you were fined without conviction for charges relating to animal cruelty. These are of no direct relevance to my sentencing of you.
71You were raised initially in Bulleen where your father was a farmer and your mother occupied in home duties, assisting also on the farm. Your parents emigrated to Australia from Europe after the second world war.
72Your parents relocated to metropolitan Melbourne, and you have two siblings with whom you maintain a supportive relationship, a younger brother living in Sydney, previously a lawyer, and a sister, now 62 years of age, living in metropolitan Melbourne and also a former lawyer.
73On completing secondary school, you obtained legal qualifications, undertaking your articles of clerkship.
74You then commenced working as an inhouse counsel in Yarrawonga for some two years, then working in Dandenong and then as a solicitor before commencing at the Ferntree Gully office of another firm, where ultimately you became a partner in 1985. You remained with that firm for 10 years, and on it splitting, started your own practice, Voitin Walker Davis, with two other partners and some 15 staff.
75In 1999, this firm expanded to the Middle East practising in migration law. You lived in Dubai with your wife for some five odd years and worked at offices in Dubai, Doha, Muscat and India.
76In 2005, after the birth of your then wife Clare’s first son, you returned to Australia and started Voitin Lawyers, which later became Stanton Grant Legal.
77You met your first wife at university, marrying in 1981, however separating in 1995. Together you have one son who is 38 years of age living in London.
78You met your former wife, Clare, whilst you were working as a solicitor. You were married in 2000 and have three sons from that relationship, an 18 year old completing his Year 12 studies, a 20 year old studying, and a 23 year old also studying.
79You and Clare separated in around 2020, however remain on friendly terms and she remains supportive of you.
80It was put on your behalf that you had led a decent, hardworking life, raising a family, running your own business and being successful in that, as well as contributing to your community. Personal references speak highly of you, describing you variously as a kind man, someone who is generous with their time and who is interested in helping others.
81It is not suggested that your offending has arisen as a result of financial need. At the time of your offending you were apparently busy and successfully running your practice.
82Reference was made to the fact that police from the Echo Taskforce raided your legal practice in 2018 and you were as I understand it charged with other offending of which you have ultimately been acquitted.
83Following on from the raid, your practising certificate was suspended and a receiver appointed to the firm. You have not sought to reapply to practice, instructing that you will not do so in the future.
84Following on from the intervention of the Echo Taskforce, your family home was to be the subject of a mortgagee auction. The night before this took place the premises were vandalised, and the auction cancelled.
85In July of 2019 a farmhouse owned by your then wife was burnt down, as a result of a deliberate arson.
86In October of 2019 a vehicle was set on fire at night when it was parked in the driveway of the family home.
87In June of 2020 you were shot whilst arriving at the family home, when your then wife and children were inside the premises.
88The culprits behind these events have not been charged.
89In early 2021 you are described as blacking out whilst driving and on coming to had driven through a farm fence and were driving through a paddock. Consequent upon this, you have had heart bypass surgery.
90You engaged with a psychologist Dr Michael Papasava in July of 2020 and were seen by him on a number of occasions subsequently. Your treatment then lapsed. You re-engaged with Dr Papasava in February of this year and he recommenced treating you.
91Your treating psychologist, Dr Papasava, diagnoses you with PTSD and major depressive disorder and panic attacks. I accept that these conditions will make any term of imprisonment which you serve more onerous than for another not suffering from these conditions.
92Papasava goes on to say:
It is the author's opinion that Mr Voitin's condition would certainly deteriorate if he were to be imprisoned. He would further suffer as a consequence of being separated from children and denied access to his support network and his treatment.
93In response to this, the prosecution have provided a letter from Ashlea Shaune, General Manager Justice Health. This sets forth in a generic way the manner in which treatment of prisoners can be managed. Notwithstanding the generalised assertions contained within the letter, I do accept that there is is a serious risk of imprisonment having a serious adverse effect on your mental health, and I take this into account.
94In addition, I was told that you would serve any sentence as a protection prisoner, and this adds to the burden of your imprisonment.
95I accept that you will miss your former wife and children and feel that you have let them down, that you will experience a degree of anguish consequent upon this, and that you are now elderly and your health is declining. You have blood pressure problems which are controlled by medication, type 2 diabetes and some other health issues. Whilst these can all be treated in custody, all of these factors serve to add to the burden of your imprisonment.
96You are entitled to and will receive a reduced sentence as a result of your pleas of guilty facilitating the course of justice. It has not been necessary to conduct a jury trial of your matters and the cost, time and resources involved in a contested hearing of your matters have been avoided.
97Your guilty plea arose in circumstances which I recounted in an earlier ruling when I refused you leave to change your guilty pleas.[5] Amongst other things, I recounted that:
[5] Ruling of 14 April 2025
Mr Voitin was originally facing trial with his wife, Clare Voitin, and a work colleague, “PS” on a variety of charges.
Mr Voitin at that time faced a total of six charges. He was jointly charged with PS on five of these, including one charge where Mr Voitin, his wife and PS were charged, and he faced one charge on his own. …………
In the lead up to, and as at the time Mr Voitin’s matter resolved, he had undertaken a number of preliminary examinations of prosecution witnesses, and argument had been undertaken regarding admissibility of evidence and severance, with Mr Voitin seeking a separate trial from “PS” on Charges 1 – 5, amongst other issues.
As part of the pre-trial matters cross examination had taken place of the two principal prosecution witnesses, Ondarchie and Dage, as well as other witnesses.
………………………….
The prosecution contended that this scheme was a business practice of Voitin Lawyers implemented with respect to each of the charged offences.
Prior to Mr Voitin’s matter resolving his then co-accused PS had also undertaken examination of witnesses and it was plain that the seeds were being sown for a potential cut-throat defence to have been run, whereby blame was to be attributed to Mr Voitin for various offending conduct.
Submissions filed on behalf of PS also made it clear that this was a likely manner in which a joint trial of both would be conducted. In that scenario it was likely that as part of Mr Voitin’s defence he may have contended that PS bore responsibility for the offending which they were jointly charged with, and PS would respond that it was Voitin.
……………………….
In addition Clare Voitin, Mr Voitin’s wife, was also seeking to negotiate a resolution of her matter. Ultimately the prosecution discontinued her prosecution.
Mr Voitin’s matter duly resolved, to a negotiated resolution of the charges which he faced.
On 7 December 2024, Mr Voitin was arraigned and pleaded guilty to a plea indictment containing only three charges, Charges 1 and 2 of obtaining property by deception for another, namely Voitin Lawyers, and I charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice, Charge 3. Mr Voitin now applies to change his plea of guilty to one of not guilty on the 2 deception charges and seeks leave to enable this to occur. He does not make application to change his plea on Charge 3 of attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Shortly prior to jury empanelment in the trial of “PS”, some three months after Mr Voitin’s matter had resolved, the prosecution against “PS” was discontinued.
……………………….
From the recitation of the above facts it is clear that at the time Mr Voitin’s matter resolved he was facing a joint trial of the majority of the counts with PS.
PS had foreshadowed that a cut-throat defence would be run by him.
Counsel for Mr Voitin acknowledged this as a realistic outcome of a joint trial and expressed the view that PS would seek to 'elicit a substantial body of incriminatory evidence over and above that sought to be led by the prosecution.
Having been involved in this case for some time now, this accords with my own understanding of material that arises from the depositions. What material aside from this that may have been available I am not aware, however, at various times it was alluded to that there was further material available that could be sought to be introduced.
……………………….
I find that Mr Voitin was aware of and concerned that “PS” would on a joint trial seek to introduce material that was harmful to his successful defence of the charges and having read aspects of the depositional material, such as the statements of Ashley Joseph, Mr and Mrs Williamson and their son, I find that this was realistically a likely outcome from a joint trial.
Thus not only did Mr Voitin’s resolution of his matter lead to a substantial reduction in the charges which he faced it also avoided any reliance in open court on material that had the potential to be highly damaging to him. By resolving his matter Mr Voitin clearly received a benefit in the form of a reduced number of charges and avoided a joint trial where material detrimental to his interests may have been introduced by his then co- offender "PS".
98In rejecting your application to change your guilty pleas on the two deception charges, in conclusion I stated:
Mr Voitin has not satisfied me that his guilty pleas were anything other than conscious, voluntary and deliberate, given freely by him, in circumstances where he well knew what he was pleading guilty to and that he was receiving a benefit in the nature of reduced charges and avoiding a joint trial were he feared the outcome. He was competently represented at the time.
I must dismiss his application and hold him to his guilty pleas.
99Whilst you have pleaded guilty, you have not in my view however fully accepted responsibility for your conduct. For example, after entering your guilty pleas, when you became aware that charges against PS had been discontinued, you sought to change your guilty pleas on Charges 1 and 2. At that change of plea application, you gave evidence, which I rejected, that you believed you were innocent at the time you entered your guilty pleas before me.
100You have told your treating psychologist that ' I accept that I am guilty of the three charges'. …. Regarding Charges 1 and 2, you told the psychologist, 'at the time of the transactions I didn’t turn my mind to the fact that Voitin Lawyers would receive a financial advantage…… I should have turned my mind to the offence'.
101Regarding Charge 3, you told your treating psychologist that:
I caused proceedings to be issued without cause. I didn't turn my mind to the fact that issuing of the proceedings was a criminal act. I accept my failure to properly consider the impact of issuing proceedings is no defence…..
102These self-serving assertions beggar belief and I reject them.
103Your history of seeking to change your guilty pleas on Charges 1 and 2 and your self-serving statements to your treating psychologist, indicate to me that you have not fully accepted responsibility for your actions and your insight into the nature of your offending appears less than complete.
104This suggests that you are yet to acknowledge how serious your actions were or to achieve proper insight into your offending.
105Despite various of your referees referencing your remorse, in my view it is not complete. In your case, whilst I accept you exhibit a degree of remorse for your conduct, it is not in my view unqualified.
106Turning next to the considerable delay between your offending and my sentencing of you. This is relevant in a number of ways. By way of background:
·Your offending occurred between 2011 and 2013, with much of it taking place in 2011.
·Ondarchie and Dage were both charged with their roles in the offending and resolved their matters to charges of knowingly signing a false declaration as a bankrupt, agreeing to give evidence against you, respectively in March and August of 2016.
·The Echo Taskforce raided your legal practice.
·You declined to participate in an interview with investigators in August of 2018.
·You were charged with a raft of matters including those before me in October of 2020. All other charges have been resolved in your favour.
·You entered your guilty pleas in November of 2024 and foreshadowed an application to change your guilty pleas on Charges 1 and 2 in February of 2025.
·I rejected your change of plea application on 14 April 2025.
·I must sentence you now on 22 September 2025.
107Given the nature of your offending, it is not uncommon in the case of sophisticated white collar offending for there to be a period required in which investigation and related matters are required to occur. Here, Ondarchie and Dage were both charged with their roles in the offending and had resolved their matters respectively in March and August of 2016.
108Here, on any analysis, you have had the matters before me hanging over your head and the consequent stress and anxiety of what your sentence may be, for a considerable period of time and I take this into account in your favour.
109As I have earlier outlined, whilst you are yet to fully acknowledge the extent of your offending, you are in my view not likely to re-offend.
110The fact of the matter is that you have not been convicted of any other offending in the interim period and I take this into account as evidencing your positive rehabilitative prospects. Material that was foreshadowed to be introduced against you in a joint trial by PS is untested and has not been established to the criminal standard.
111In your case you are an ageing, somewhat diminished, individual with health concerns, who has lost his reputation, livelihood, and I am told been the subject of considerable adverse media attention. In addition, you have been targeted and shot, and whilst it is not suggested that this relates to the offending before me, it is nonetheless reflective of the diminished manner in which you now present.
112In arriving at an appropriate sentence of you, I have had regard to the sentences imposed on your co-offenders, Ondarchie and Dage. There are obvious differences between you and those two, which militate toward a different sentencing outcome in your case. The differing charges which you face, your role and personal circumstances, all militate to the imposition of differing sentences from the non-custodial dispositions which they received.
113Balancing all matters I will impose a total effective sentence of three years' imprisonment and direct that you serve one year of that sentence before suspending the balance of two years for an operational period of three years.
114This is made up of the following individual sentences.
115On Charge 1, 18 months' imprisonment.
116On Charge 2, nine months' imprisonment.
117On Charge 3, two years’ imprisonment.
118Charge 3 is to be the base sentence and I cumulate on it and on each other nine months of the sentence imposed on Charge 1 and three months of the sentence imposed on Charge 2.
119I will declare what I understand to be presentence detention of 21 days.
120Finally, pursuant to 6AAA of the Sentencing Act, I am required to state the sentence which I would have imposed but for your guilty pleas in this matter. I note that this is a highly artificial exercise as it involves plucking one matter out in isolation and seeking to ascribe a value to it, a process which is far removed from sentencing in practice. Nonetheless, doing the best I can, but for your guilty pleas, I would not have considered a partially suspended sentence and would have imposed a total effective sentence of four years' imprisonment and fixed a non-parole period of two years' imprisonment.
121Are there any further orders required?
122COUNSEL: No, Your Honour.
123HIS HONOUR: All right. Thank you both for your assistance. Mr Voitin can be returned to custody thanks.
124COUNSEL: As the court pleases.
125HIS HONOUR: All right, we will stand down until the next matter.
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