IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M5 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (CTH)
Informant
and
KELLI ANNE KEATING
Defendant
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 3 APRIL 2013, AT 10.15 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MS D.S. MORTIMER, SC: If it please the Court, I appear with MS K.L. WALKER and MS F.I. GORDON, on behalf on the defendant. (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid)
MS W.J. ABRAHAM, QC: If it please the Court, I appear with MR G.A. HILL, for the informant. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth))
MR J.T. GLEESON, SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR R.C.A. HIGGINS and MS D.M. FORRESTER, for the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth intervening. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C. JACOBI, on the instructions of the Attorney-General for South Australia intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Ms Mortimer.
MS MORTIMER: If the Court pleases, the way in which I propose to develop the argument on behalf of the defendant is this. I want to take the Court briefly to the facts that lie underneath this controversy. Then I want to go to how each of section 66A of the Administration Act and sections 68 and 74 operate and then give an example on the facts. Then, as set out in our outline that we have handed up, I want to then turn to the two construction arguments that are raised by the questions, firstly to go to question 1, that is why section 135 of the Criminal Code (Cth), read with section 4.3(b), should not be construed as having a retroactive operation, and the second construction question, which is question 3, namely why outside section 66A there was no other contemporaneous duty provided by law for the purposes of section 4.3(b). So that is the point, if the Court pleases, about the effect of the notices under the Administration Act.
Now, if we are correct in our construction arguments, the Chapter III question, question No 2, does not arise. We submit there is utility in the Court deciding both construction issues because, as we understand it, both in Ms Keating’s case and in many of the other prosecutions, both section 66A and the notices argument, if I might call it that, are relied on by the prosecution. Then finally I will turn to the Chapter III argument.
So, if I may start with the facts, if the Court pleases. Ms Keating was in receipt of a single parenting payment from Centrelink from about 20 October 2005 backdated for a few weeks to approximately 1…
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- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the offence under section 102.1(1) of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) required proof that the accused intended to carry out the terrorist act, or whether it was sufficient to prove that the accused intended to prepare or facilitate the commission of a terrorist act. This involved an analysis of the statutory language and the principles of statutory interpretation in relation to criminal offences.
The Court held that section 102.1(1) requires proof that the accused intended to carry out the terrorist act, not merely to prepare or facilitate it. The majority reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the words "prepares for or facilitates the commission of a terrorist act" implies an intention to bring about the commission of the act itself. They rejected an interpretation that would criminalise conduct merely intended to assist in the preparation or facilitation, without the ultimate aim of the act being carried out. The Court considered the legislative history and the purpose of the provision, concluding that a narrower interpretation was consistent with the text and the common law understanding of criminal responsibility.
The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Court for further consideration in accordance with the High Court's judgment.
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