[2020] TASFC 11
| COURT: | SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT) |
| CITATION: | Director of Corrective Services v Nguyen [2020] TASFC 11 |
| PARTIES: | BOURNE, Kristy Lee in her capacity as |
| THE DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES | |
| v | |
| NGUYEN, Duc Van | |
| FILE NO: | 1933/2020 |
| DELIVERED ON: | 9 December 2020 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Hobart |
| HEARING DATE: | 9 October 2020 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Blow CJ, Estcourt J, Geason J |
| CATCHWORDS: |
Criminal Law – Sentence – Post-custodial orders – Parole – Eligibility and release – Cumulative sentences – Commencement of parole ineligibility period for second sentence – Commencement before imposition
and commencement of second sentence.
Corrections Act 1997 (Tas), ss 70(a), 71.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3419]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: J Rudolf Respondent: F Cangelosi
Solicitors:
Applicant: Solicitor-General Respondent: Bold Lawyers
| Judgment Number: | [2020] TASFC 11 |
| Number of paragraphs: | 81 |
Serial No 11/2020 File No 1933/2020
KRISTY LEE BOURNE in her capacity as THE DIRECTOR
OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES v DUC VAN NGUYEN
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | FULL COURT BLOW CJ ESTCOURT J GEASON J (Dissenting) 9 December 2020 |
| Orders of the Court |
1 Declaration that s 71 of the Corrections Act 1997 applies to the calculation of when the respondent will be eligible for parole.
2 Declaration that the non-parole period in respect of the sentence imposed upon the respondent by the Hon Justice Brett on 11 May 2020 commenced on 8 January 2019.
3 Declaration that the non-parole period in respect of that sentence continued without interruption when the respondent was released on parole.
Serial No 11/2020 File No 1933/2020
KRISTY LEE BOURNE in her capacity as the DIRECTOR
OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES v DUC VAN NGUYEN
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | FULL COURT BLOW CJ 9 December 2020 |
1 This application relates to the interpretation of provisions in the Corrections Act 1997 in relation to parole. It concerns a situation in which a prisoner was sentenced to imprisonment, released on parole, and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for a second time, with an order permitting parole. The application raises a question as to when the second parole ineligibility period commences. Does it commence upon the expiration of the first parole ineligibility period, or upon the imposition of the second sentence, or upon the completion of the first sentence? Because the judge who imposed the second sentence, Brett J, expressed a view as to this point, the application has been heard by the Full Court, sitting at first instance.
2 The sequence of relevant events was as follows:
In 2018, Slicer AJ sentenced the respondent to four years nine months' imprisonment with effect from 23 August 2016, and ordered that he not be eligible for parole until he had served half of that sentence. As a result he became eligible for parole on 8 January 2019. He was released on parole on that day. The respondent re-offended. His parole was revoked on 5 April 2019, restored on 18 April 2019,
and revoked again on 11 July 2019. On 11 May 2020…
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- [2020] TASFC 11
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court was the interpretation of section 42(2) of the *Corrections Act 1997* (Tas) in the context of cumulative sentences. This required the Court to determine whether the parole ineligibility period for a second or subsequent sentence of imprisonment could lawfully commence before the imposition of that sentence, particularly when the first sentence was still being served. The Court also had to consider the interplay between the statutory provisions governing parole ineligibility and the common law principles of sentencing.
The Full Court held that the parole ineligibility period for a second or subsequent sentence of imprisonment, as stipulated by section 42(2) of the *Corrections Act 1997* (Tas), could not commence prior to the imposition of that sentence. The Court reasoned that the statutory language indicated that the period of ineligibility was tied to the imposition of the sentence itself. To allow the commencement of the ineligibility period before the sentence was imposed would be inconsistent with the legislative intent and the fundamental principles of sentencing, which require sentences to be imposed and then served. The Court found that the District Court judge had erred in ordering that the parole ineligibility period for the second sentence commence prior to its imposition.
The Full Court made orders quashing the original sentencing orders and remitted the matter back to the District Court for resentencing in accordance with the Court's judgment.
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