Director-General of Social Services v Rosemary Chaney

Case [1980] FCA 83


I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY)

No.

G 4 0 of 1980

)

GENERAL

D I V I S I O N

)

BETWEEN :

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Appel lant

-

AND:

ROSEMARY

CHANEY

Respondent

Coram:

Bowen C. J.

4

J u n e

1 9 8 0 .

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BOWEN

C . J . :

Davies

J.

s i t t i n g as the

Adminls t ra t ive

Appeals

Tr ibunal he ld

tha t

h e h a d l u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t a i n

an

appeal

from a

d e c i s i o n of

the Director-General g lven on

14 Apr i l

1 9 8 0 and

an

appea l

aga ins t

t he dec i s ion

of

Danes

J.

has

been

lodged which

w i l l be heard

by

the Fu l l Cour t

on

1 8 June

next .

To h i s dec i s ion wh ich

c o v e r t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e

meantime

Davies

J . ,

i n

was

given on

22

May

1 9 8 0 ,

made

an o rde r

pursuant

t o

sub-s .41(2) tha t

he

would

suspend the

o

rder

o

r

d e c i s i o n of

1 4 A p r i l

1980

and

added:

. .

. / 2

- 2 -

"I th ink I had better say as from the

s t a r t

of

t h e n e x t p e n s i o n p e r i o d u n t i l t h e h e a r i n g

and de t e rmina t lon o f t h i s

renew

or

o r d e r

made

p r i o r

t o

t h a t d a t e . "

H i s Honour

i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e

was

so

dec id lng havlng

mind t o h u r r y i n t o t h e h e a r i n g

t ak ing p re s su re o f f t he T r ibuna l and t o avo id hav ing

i

n

or

d e c l s l o n i n t h e

matter,

whlch

could be

a

s i g n i f i c a n t m a t t e r b e c a u s e

it

was

t h e f i r s t

a p p l l c a t i o n u n d e r t h e

Social

Se rv ices

A c t .

I

t h i n k

it

is

p l a i n t h a t D a v i e s

J.

in t ended by h i s

i n t e r i m o r d e r

t o

suspend t he ope ra t ion o f t he D i rec to r -

Gene ra l ' s dec i s ion o f

1 4 A p r i l

1980

In such

a

way

t h a t t h e

pens ion as

from

the nex t pens ion pe r iod wou ld be r e ins t a t ed

u n t i l t h e h e a r i n g .

Considerable argument has taken place before

me

as

t o

whether

he

had

power

t

o

d o t h i s h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e f a c t

t h a t he

i s

au tho r i sed

by

t h e s e c t i o n , t o w h l c h

I

have

r e f e r r e d , t o

make

" a n o r d e r s t a y i n g o r o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t i n g

t h e o p e r a t i o n

or

implementa t ion of the dec is ion" o f the

Director-General.

It was

a r g u e d t h a t

i n

t h e

case

of

an

order s imply

confirming

an

earlier

o r d e r r e f u s l n g

a

pension the

power does not

extend to

maklng an order

leading

t o t h e

payment of

pension.

I t

was

a l so a rgued be fo re

m e

t h a t t h e

power

which

I

have

under

sub-s.44A(2)

of

the

Admlnistrative

Appeals

Trlbunal

-

Act

which

i s i n similar

terms,

t o make

a n " o r d e r s t a y i n g o r

o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t l n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o r i m p l e m e n t a t l o n o f t h e

d e c i s i o n " , w h i c h r e f e r s t o t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e T r i b u n a l ,

i s

.

. .

/ 3

- 3 -

no wider.

I n o t e

t h a t

o n e o f

t h e g r o u n d s

i n

t h e n o t l c e o f

appeal

to be heard

by

the Ful l

Cour t on 18 June

1980

i s

t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n

of

Davies

J.

t o s u s p e n d t h e d e c i s i o n o f

1 4 A p r i l

1 9 8 0 had

no

effect

w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s

e n t i t l e m e n t t o

a

pension,

so

t h e power

t o make

i n t e r i m

o r d e r s

w i l l ,

t h e r e f o r e ,

be

argued before

the

Ful

l

Cour t .

In the meant ime,

I

have

t o make

a

dec is ion whether

it

is

i n my

power

t o make

an order which

w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o

what was the

obv

ious

i n t en t ion

o

f

Dav ies

J.

I have

found

t h i s a

v e r y

d i f f i c u l t

q u e s t i o n .

The

o r l g l n a l

form

of

in te r im order which might be

made

by

the Tr ibunal and

by

the

Cour t

was

s imply

an

o rde r

" s t ay ing"

dec l s ions .

Th i s

having been found inadequate in the

case

of nega t lve

orders

o

r

dec i s ions , add i t iona l words g iv ing power t o a f f ec t t he

"opera t ion or implementa t ion" o f dec is ions

were

added by

A c t N o .

143 of

1 9 7 9 .

I

t h i n k t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c e r t a l n l y

has been t h e C o u r t o r

t o p l ace

t he T r ibuna l

and ,

i n

app ropr i a t e

cases,

a

Judge

i n

the

p o s i t i o n o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e

in t e r im s l t ua t ion adequa te ly , even where t he re

was

a

negat ive

dec

ls

lon

under

appea l .

However,

t h e words may

be sald t h i s o b l e c t i v e .

to

b e o f o n l y d o u b t f u l e f f e c t l v e n e s s t o a c h l e v e

In c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n t h e i n t e r i m p e r i o d

the

c i rcumstances,

however ,

I

have

come

t o t h e

I

should

endeavour

t o g i v e e f f e c t

t o

the obvlous

in ten t ion of

Davies

J.

and

t h a t I r emed la l e f f ec t i n t ended

shou ld a l so endeavour t o g ive e f f ec t t o t he obv ious

by

t h e

amendment

brought about

by

A c t N o .

143 of

1 9 7 9 .

. .

. / 4

- 4 -

.

Thls be ing

so,

I

order

in pursuance o f

s u b - s . 4 4 A ( 2 )

o f the Adminis t ra t ive Appeals Tr ibunal

A c t

t h a t t h e o r d e r

of

Davies

J.

be

so

a f f e c t e d t h a t

it

o p e r a t e s t o

d i rec t t h e

payment o f pens lon f rom today un t l l the da te

of

t h e h e a r i n g

o f

t h e

a p p e a l

or

f u r t h e r

o r d e r .

I

e x p r e s s t h e v i e w t h a t

i f

any de l ay t akes p l ace In b r ingmg

on

t h e a p p e a l , t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r order w i l l be

subject to l m e d i a t e revlew

on

t h e

a p p l l c a t i o n

o

f

t h e

r e s p o n d e n t

t o

t h i s

m o t i o n .

I

r e s e r v e

l i b e r t y t o

any

par

ty

to

apply .

I

w i l l s t a n d

t h e

q u e s t i o n

of

costs

over

until

f u r t h e r o r d e r .

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY)

N o .

G 4 0

of

1 9 8 0

)

GENERAL

DIVISION

1

BETWEEN :

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Appel lant

AND:

-

ROSEAMARY CHANEY

Respondent

Coram:

Bowen

C . J .

4

June

1 9 8 0 .

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BOWEN

C . J . :

Davies

J.

s l t t l n g as

t h e Administrative Appeals

T r i b u n a l h e l d t h a t h e h a d j u r i s d i c t l o n t o

e n t e r t a i n

an

appeal

from a d e c i s i o n of

t h e Director-General

given on

1 4 Apr1.l

1980

and

a n

a p p e a l a g a i n s t t h e d e c l s i o n

of

Davies

J.

has

been lodged which

w i l l be heard

by

t h e F u l l C o u r t

on

18

June

next .

To h i s d e c i s i o n w h i c h

cover

t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e

meantime

D a n e s

J.,

l n

was

glven on

22

May

1 9 8 0 ,

made

an

o r d e r

pu r suan t t o sub - s .41 (2 ) t ha t he

would suspend the order

o

r

d e c l s l o n o f

14

A p r i l

1 9 8 0

and

added:

. . .

/ 2

- 2 -

"I t h ink I had better say as from the

s t a r t

o f t h e n e x t p e n s i o n p e r i o d u n t i l t h e h e a r i n g

and de t e rmina t ion o f t h i s

review

or

o r d e r

made

p r i o r t o t h a t

date."

H i s Honour

i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e

was

so

dec id ing having

i n

mind

t a k i n g p r e s s u r e o f f t h e T r i b u n a l a n d t o a v o l d h a v l n g

t o

h u r r y I n t o t h e h e a r i n g

or

d e c l s i o n i n t h e

matter,

whlch

could be

a

s i g n i f i c a n t matter because

it was

t h e f i r s t

a p p l i c a t i o n u n d e r t h e

Social

Se rv ices

A c t .

I

t h i n k

it

is p l a i n t h a t D a v i e s

J.

in tended by

h i s

i n t e r i m

o r d e r

t o

suspend t he ope ra t ion o f t he D i rec to r -

Gene ra l ' s dec i s ion o f

1 4 A p r i l

1980

i n s u c h

a

way

t h a t t h e

pension

as

f rom the next pens ion per iod would be re ins ta ted

u n t i l

t h e h e a r i n g .

Conslderable argument has taken

place

be fo re

me

a s t o

whether

he

had power

t o

do

t h i s h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e f a c t

t h a t he

i s au tho r i sed by

t h e s e c t i o n ,

t o whlch

I

have

r e f e r r e d ,

to

make

" a n o r d e r s t a y i n g o r o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t i n g

t h e o p e r a t i o n

or

Implementa t ion of the dec is ion" o f the

Director-General.

I t was

a r g u e d t h a t

i n

t h e

case

of

an

order s imply confirming an

ear l ier

o r d e r r e f u s i n g

a

pens

ion

the

power does not

extend to

making an order

leadlng

t o t h e

payment of

pension.

I t

was

a l so a rgued be fo re

m e

t h a t t h e

power

whlch

I

have

under

sub-s.44A(2)

of

the Admlnis t ra t ive Appeals

Tr ibunal

A c t whlch

i s i n s l m i l a r

terms,

t o make

an "o rde r s t ay ing

or

-

o the rwise a f f ec t ing t he ope ra t lon o r imp lemen ta t lon o f t he

d e c i s i o n " ,

w h i c h r e f e r s

t o t h e d e c i s i o n

of

t h e T r l b u n a l ,

1 s

. . .

/ 3

- 3 -

no wider.

I n o t e

t h a t

o n e

o f

t h e

g r o u n d s

i n

t h e

n o t l c e

o f

appeal

t o

be heard by

the Full

Court

on

18 June 1980 is

t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n o f D a v i e s

J.

t o

suspend the dec ls lon of

14

A p r i l

1980

had

no

e f f e c t w l t h r e g a r d

t o the r e sponden t ' s

e n t i t l e m e n t to a

pension,

so

t h e power

t o make

i n t e r i m

orders

w i l l ,

t h e r e f o r e ,

be

argued before

the

Ful l

Cour t .

In the meant ime,

I

have

t o make

a

dec is lon whether

it

is

i n my

power

t o make

an order which

w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o

what was the

obv

ious

i n t en t ion

o

f

Dav ies

J.

I have

found

t h i s a

v e r y

d i f f i c u l t

q u e s t i o n .

The

o r i g i n a l

form

o f

in te r im order which might be

made

by the Trlbunal and

by

the

Cour t

was simply

an

order " s t ay ing"

dec i s ions .

Th i s

having been found inadequate

In

the case of

negat

ive orders

or

decis ions ,

addi t iona l

words g iv ing

power

t o a f f e c t t h e

"ope ra t ion or

implementation"

of

d e c i s i o n s were

added by

A c t No.

143 of 1979.

I

t h i n k t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c e r t a i n l y

has been the Cour t

t o p l ace

t he T r ibuna l

and ,

In

app ropr i a t e

ca ses ,

or

a

Judge In t he pos i t i on o f dea l ing w i th t he

in t e r lm s i t ua t ion adequa te ly , even where t he re

was

a

negat ive

dec

is

ion

under

appea l .

However,

t h e words

may

b e s a i d t o b e o f o n l y d o u b t f u l e f f e c t i v e n e s s t o a c h l e v e

t h l s o b ~ e c t i v e .

I n the

circumstances,

however,

I

have

come

t o t h e

c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n t h e i n t e r i m p e r l o d

I

should

endeavour

t o g i v e e f f e c t

to

the obvious

in ten t ion of

Davies

J.

and

t h a t I r emed la l e f f ec t i n t ended

shou ld a l so endeavour t o g ive e f f ec t t o t he obv ious

by

t h e

amendment

brought

about

by

A c t No. 143 of 1979.

. .

./4

- 4 -

Thls be ing

so,

I

o rde r i n pu r suance

of

sub-s.44A(2)

of the Adminis t ra t ive Appeals Tr ibunal

A c t

t h a t t h e o r d e r

of

Davies

J.

be

so

a f f e c t e d t h a t

it

o p e r a t e s t o

direct t h e

payment

of

pension from today

until

t h e d a t e

of

t h e h e a r i n g

of

t h e

a p p e a l

o r

f u r t h e r

o r d e r .

I

e x p r e s s

t h e

v i e w

t h a t

If

any

delay

takes

p l a c e i n b r i n g l n g

on

t h e a p p e a l , t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r

w i l l be

subject

to

immediate

review

on

the

a p p l i c a t i o n

of

the

r e sponden t

t o

t h i s

mo t ion .

I

r e s e r v e

l i b e r t y t o any p a r t y t o apply.

I w i l l s t a n d

t h e

q u e s t i o n

of

costs

o v e r u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r .

Details
AGLC
Director-General of Social Services v Rosemary Chaney [1980] FCA 83
Case
[1980] FCA 83
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves an appeal by the Director-General of Social Services against a decision made by Davies J, sitting as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, to suspend a pension payment to Rosemary Chaney. Davies J's decision was made in the context of an ongoing appeal by the Director-General against a decision by Davies J that had initially refused a pension to Ms Chaney. The central legal issue before Bowen C.J. was whether Davies J had the authority to make an interim order that would reinstate the pension payments from the next pension period until the appeal was heard. Bowen C.J. considered whether the authority to make orders affecting the "operation or implementation" of decisions was broad enough to include orders that would lead to the payment of a pension.

Bowen C.J. found the issue to be complex, noting that the original form of interim orders only allowed for the staying of decisions, which was deemed inadequate for negative decisions. Amendments had been made to allow for more significant interim orders, but the language used was considered ambiguous. Bowen C.J. concluded that to achieve the legislative intent of allowing the Tribunal and the Court to adequately address interim situations, even with negative decisions under appeal, the Court should strive to give effect to Davies J's clear intention and the legislative amendment. Bowen C.J. ordered that Davies J's order would direct the payment of pension from the date of the order until the hearing of the appeal or further order, reserving the right for any party to apply for review if there was any delay in bringing on the appeal. The question of costs was to be reserved until further order.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.