Director-General of Social Services v Rosemary Chaney

Case

[1980] FCA 83

4 Jun 1980

No judgment structure available for this case.

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY)

No.

G 4 0 of 1980

)

GENERAL

D I V I S I O N

)

BETWEEN :

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Appel lant

-

AND:

ROSEMARY

CHANEY

Respondent

Coram:

Bowen C. J.

4

J u n e

1 9 8 0 .

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BOWEN

C . J . :

Davies

J.

s i t t i n g as the

Adminls t ra t ive

Appeals

Tr ibunal he ld

tha t

h e h a d l u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t a i n

an

appeal

from a

d e c i s i o n of

the Director-General g lven on

14 Apr i l

1 9 8 0 and

an

appea l

aga ins t

t he dec i s ion

of

Danes

J.

has

been

lodged which

w i l l be heard

by

the Fu l l Cour t

on

1 8 June

next .

To h i s dec i s ion wh ich

c o v e r t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e

meantime

Davies

J . ,

i n

was

given on

22

May

1 9 8 0 ,

made

an o rde r

pursuant

t o

sub-s .41(2) tha t

he

would

suspend the

o

rder

o

r

d e c i s i o n of

1 4 A p r i l

1980

and

added:

. .

. / 2

- 2 -

"I th ink I had better say as from the

s t a r t

of

t h e n e x t p e n s i o n p e r i o d u n t i l t h e h e a r i n g

and de t e rmina t lon o f t h i s

renew

or

o r d e r

made

p r i o r

t o

t h a t d a t e . "

H i s Honour

i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e

was

so

dec id lng havlng

mind t o h u r r y i n t o t h e h e a r i n g

t ak ing p re s su re o f f t he T r ibuna l and t o avo id hav ing

i

n

or

d e c l s l o n i n t h e

matter,

whlch

could be

a

s i g n i f i c a n t m a t t e r b e c a u s e

it

was

t h e f i r s t

a p p l l c a t i o n u n d e r t h e

Social

Se rv ices

A c t .

I

t h i n k

it

is

p l a i n t h a t D a v i e s

J.

in t ended by h i s

i n t e r i m o r d e r

t o

suspend t he ope ra t ion o f t he D i rec to r -

Gene ra l ' s dec i s ion o f

1 4 A p r i l

1980

In such

a

way

t h a t t h e

pens ion as

from

the nex t pens ion pe r iod wou ld be r e ins t a t ed

u n t i l t h e h e a r i n g .

Considerable argument has taken place before

me

as

t o

whether

he

had

power

t

o

d o t h i s h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e f a c t

t h a t he

i s

au tho r i sed

by

t h e s e c t i o n , t o w h l c h

I

have

r e f e r r e d , t o

make

" a n o r d e r s t a y i n g o r o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t i n g

t h e o p e r a t i o n

or

implementa t ion of the dec is ion" o f the

Director-General.

It was

a r g u e d t h a t

i n

t h e

case

of

an

order s imply

confirming

an

earlier

o r d e r r e f u s l n g

a

pension the

power does not

extend to

maklng an order

leading

t o t h e

payment of

pension.

I t

was

a l so a rgued be fo re

m e

t h a t t h e

power

which

I

have

under

sub-s.44A(2)

of

the

Admlnistrative

Appeals

Trlbunal

-

Act

which

i s i n similar

terms,

t o make

a n " o r d e r s t a y i n g o r

o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t l n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o r i m p l e m e n t a t l o n o f t h e

d e c i s i o n " , w h i c h r e f e r s t o t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e T r i b u n a l ,

i s

.

. .

/ 3

- 3 -

no wider.

I n o t e

t h a t

o n e o f

t h e g r o u n d s

i n

t h e n o t l c e o f

appeal

to be heard

by

the Ful l

Cour t on 18 June

1980

i s

t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n

of

Davies

J.

t o s u s p e n d t h e d e c i s i o n o f

1 4 A p r i l

1 9 8 0 had

no

effect

w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s

e n t i t l e m e n t t o

a

pension,

so

t h e power

t o make

i n t e r i m

o r d e r s

w i l l ,

t h e r e f o r e ,

be

argued before

the

Ful

l

Cour t .

In the meant ime,

I

have

t o make

a

dec is ion whether

it

is

i n my

power

t o make

an order which

w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o

what was the

obv

ious

i n t en t ion

o

f

Dav ies

J.

I have

found

t h i s a

v e r y

d i f f i c u l t

q u e s t i o n .

The

o r l g l n a l

form

of

in te r im order which might be

made

by

the Tr ibunal and

by

the

Cour t

was

s imply

an

o rde r

" s t ay ing"

dec l s ions .

Th i s

having been found inadequate in the

case

of nega t lve

orders

o

r

dec i s ions , add i t iona l words g iv ing power t o a f f ec t t he

"opera t ion or implementa t ion" o f dec is ions

were

added by

A c t N o .

143 of

1 9 7 9 .

I

t h i n k t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c e r t a l n l y

has been t h e C o u r t o r

t o p l ace

t he T r ibuna l

and ,

i n

app ropr i a t e

cases,

a

Judge

i n

the

p o s i t i o n o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e

in t e r im s l t ua t ion adequa te ly , even where t he re

was

a

negat ive

dec

ls

lon

under

appea l .

However,

t h e words may

be sald t h i s o b l e c t i v e .

to

b e o f o n l y d o u b t f u l e f f e c t l v e n e s s t o a c h l e v e

In c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n t h e i n t e r i m p e r i o d

the

c i rcumstances,

however ,

I

have

come

t o t h e

I

should

endeavour

t o g i v e e f f e c t

t o

the obvlous

in ten t ion of

Davies

J.

and

t h a t I r emed la l e f f ec t i n t ended

shou ld a l so endeavour t o g ive e f f ec t t o t he obv ious

by

t h e

amendment

brought about

by

A c t N o .

143 of

1 9 7 9 .

. .

. / 4

- 4 -

.

Thls be ing

so,

I

order

in pursuance o f

s u b - s . 4 4 A ( 2 )

o f the Adminis t ra t ive Appeals Tr ibunal

A c t

t h a t t h e o r d e r

of

Davies

J.

be

so

a f f e c t e d t h a t

it

o p e r a t e s t o

d i rec t t h e

payment o f pens lon f rom today un t l l the da te

of

t h e h e a r i n g

o f

t h e

a p p e a l

or

f u r t h e r

o r d e r .

I

e x p r e s s t h e v i e w t h a t

i f

any de l ay t akes p l ace In b r ingmg

on

t h e a p p e a l , t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r order w i l l be

subject to l m e d i a t e revlew

on

t h e

a p p l l c a t i o n

o

f

t h e

r e s p o n d e n t

t o

t h i s

m o t i o n .

I

r e s e r v e

l i b e r t y t o

any

par

ty

to

apply .

I

w i l l s t a n d

t h e

q u e s t i o n

of

costs

over

until

f u r t h e r o r d e r .

I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY)

N o .

G 4 0

of

1 9 8 0

)

GENERAL

DIVISION

1

BETWEEN :

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Appel lant

AND:

-

ROSEAMARY CHANEY

Respondent

Coram:

Bowen

C . J .

4

June

1 9 8 0 .

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BOWEN

C . J . :

Davies

J.

s l t t l n g as

t h e Administrative Appeals

T r i b u n a l h e l d t h a t h e h a d j u r i s d i c t l o n t o

e n t e r t a i n

an

appeal

from a d e c i s i o n of

t h e Director-General

given on

1 4 Apr1.l

1980

and

a n

a p p e a l a g a i n s t t h e d e c l s i o n

of

Davies

J.

has

been lodged which

w i l l be heard

by

t h e F u l l C o u r t

on

18

June

next .

To h i s d e c i s i o n w h i c h

cover

t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e

meantime

D a n e s

J.,

l n

was

glven on

22

May

1 9 8 0 ,

made

an

o r d e r

pu r suan t t o sub - s .41 (2 ) t ha t he

would suspend the order

o

r

d e c l s l o n o f

14

A p r i l

1 9 8 0

and

added:

. . .

/ 2

- 2 -

"I t h ink I had better say as from the

s t a r t

o f t h e n e x t p e n s i o n p e r i o d u n t i l t h e h e a r i n g

and de t e rmina t ion o f t h i s

review

or

o r d e r

made

p r i o r t o t h a t

date."

H i s Honour

i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e

was

so

dec id ing having

i n

mind

t a k i n g p r e s s u r e o f f t h e T r i b u n a l a n d t o a v o l d h a v l n g

t o

h u r r y I n t o t h e h e a r i n g

or

d e c l s i o n i n t h e

matter,

whlch

could be

a

s i g n i f i c a n t matter because

it was

t h e f i r s t

a p p l i c a t i o n u n d e r t h e

Social

Se rv ices

A c t .

I

t h i n k

it

is p l a i n t h a t D a v i e s

J.

in tended by

h i s

i n t e r i m

o r d e r

t o

suspend t he ope ra t ion o f t he D i rec to r -

Gene ra l ' s dec i s ion o f

1 4 A p r i l

1980

i n s u c h

a

way

t h a t t h e

pension

as

f rom the next pens ion per iod would be re ins ta ted

u n t i l

t h e h e a r i n g .

Conslderable argument has taken

place

be fo re

me

a s t o

whether

he

had power

t o

do

t h i s h a v i n g r e g a r d t o t h e f a c t

t h a t he

i s au tho r i sed by

t h e s e c t i o n ,

t o whlch

I

have

r e f e r r e d ,

to

make

" a n o r d e r s t a y i n g o r o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t i n g

t h e o p e r a t i o n

or

Implementa t ion of the dec is ion" o f the

Director-General.

I t was

a r g u e d t h a t

i n

t h e

case

of

an

order s imply confirming an

ear l ier

o r d e r r e f u s i n g

a

pens

ion

the

power does not

extend to

making an order

leadlng

t o t h e

payment of

pension.

I t

was

a l so a rgued be fo re

m e

t h a t t h e

power

whlch

I

have

under

sub-s.44A(2)

of

the Admlnis t ra t ive Appeals

Tr ibunal

A c t whlch

i s i n s l m i l a r

terms,

t o make

an "o rde r s t ay ing

or

-

o the rwise a f f ec t ing t he ope ra t lon o r imp lemen ta t lon o f t he

d e c i s i o n " ,

w h i c h r e f e r s

t o t h e d e c i s i o n

of

t h e T r l b u n a l ,

1 s

. . .

/ 3

- 3 -

no wider.

I n o t e

t h a t

o n e

o f

t h e

g r o u n d s

i n

t h e

n o t l c e

o f

appeal

t o

be heard by

the Full

Court

on

18 June 1980 is

t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n o f D a v i e s

J.

t o

suspend the dec ls lon of

14

A p r i l

1980

had

no

e f f e c t w l t h r e g a r d

t o the r e sponden t ' s

e n t i t l e m e n t to a

pension,

so

t h e power

t o make

i n t e r i m

orders

w i l l ,

t h e r e f o r e ,

be

argued before

the

Ful l

Cour t .

In the meant ime,

I

have

t o make

a

dec is lon whether

it

is

i n my

power

t o make

an order which

w i l l g i v e e f f e c t t o

what was the

obv

ious

i n t en t ion

o

f

Dav ies

J.

I have

found

t h i s a

v e r y

d i f f i c u l t

q u e s t i o n .

The

o r i g i n a l

form

o f

in te r im order which might be

made

by the Trlbunal and

by

the

Cour t

was simply

an

order " s t ay ing"

dec i s ions .

Th i s

having been found inadequate

In

the case of

negat

ive orders

or

decis ions ,

addi t iona l

words g iv ing

power

t o a f f e c t t h e

"ope ra t ion or

implementation"

of

d e c i s i o n s were

added by

A c t No.

143 of 1979.

I

t h i n k t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c e r t a i n l y

has been the Cour t

t o p l ace

t he T r ibuna l

and ,

In

app ropr i a t e

ca ses ,

or

a

Judge In t he pos i t i on o f dea l ing w i th t he

in t e r lm s i t ua t ion adequa te ly , even where t he re

was

a

negat ive

dec

is

ion

under

appea l .

However,

t h e words

may

b e s a i d t o b e o f o n l y d o u b t f u l e f f e c t i v e n e s s t o a c h l e v e

t h l s o b ~ e c t i v e .

I n the

circumstances,

however,

I

have

come

t o t h e

c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n t h e i n t e r i m p e r l o d

I

should

endeavour

t o g i v e e f f e c t

to

the obvious

in ten t ion of

Davies

J.

and

t h a t I r emed la l e f f ec t i n t ended

shou ld a l so endeavour t o g ive e f f ec t t o t he obv ious

by

t h e

amendment

brought

about

by

A c t No. 143 of 1979.

. .

./4

- 4 -

Thls be ing

so,

I

o rde r i n pu r suance

of

sub-s.44A(2)

of the Adminis t ra t ive Appeals Tr ibunal

A c t

t h a t t h e o r d e r

of

Davies

J.

be

so

a f f e c t e d t h a t

it

o p e r a t e s t o

direct t h e

payment

of

pension from today

until

t h e d a t e

of

t h e h e a r i n g

of

t h e

a p p e a l

o r

f u r t h e r

o r d e r .

I

e x p r e s s

t h e

v i e w

t h a t

If

any

delay

takes

p l a c e i n b r i n g l n g

on

t h e a p p e a l , t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r

w i l l be

subject

to

immediate

review

on

the

a p p l i c a t i o n

of

the

r e sponden t

t o

t h i s

mo t ion .

I

r e s e r v e

l i b e r t y t o any p a r t y t o apply.

I w i l l s t a n d

t h e

q u e s t i o n

of

costs

o v e r u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r .

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

1

Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

0