Director General, NSW Department of Industry and Investment v Mato Investments Pty Ltd
[2010] NSWLEC 56
•24 March 2010
Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION: Director General, NSW Department of Industry & Investment v Mato Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] NSWLEC 56 PARTIES: PROSECUTOR
Director General, NSW Department of Industry & InvestmentFIRST DEFENDANT
Mato Investments Pty LtdSECOND DEFENDANT
Dzeladin CemanTHIRD DEFENDANT
FOURTH DEFENDANT
James Coomes
Ian BennettFILE NUMBER(S): 50052; 50053; 50054; 50055; 50056; 50057; 50058; 50059; 50060; 50061; 50062; 50063; 50064; 50065; 50066; 50067 of 2009 CORAM: Preston CJ KEY ISSUES: PROSECUTION :- trial - application by prosecutor for joint trial of co-defendants - 16 prosecutions for four environmental offences against four defendants - one defendant opposed application and sought separate trial - joint trial ordered LEGISLATION CITED: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 29
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 125(1)
Fisheries Management Act 1994 s 220ZD(1)CASES CITED: R v Annakin (1989) 17 NSWLR 202
R v Demirok [1976] VR 244
R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66
R v Jones (No 1) [2007] NSWSC 769
R v Middis (NSWSC, Hunt J, 27 March 1991, unreported)DATES OF HEARING: 24 March 2010 EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 24 March 2010 LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: PROSECUTOR
I Lloyd QC with him T HowardSOLICITORS
Crown Solicitors OfficeFIRST, SECOND AND FOURTH DEFENDANTS
THIRD DEFENDANT
J Webster SC
C R Ireland
JUDGMENT:
THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
PRESTON CJ
24 MARCH 2010
50052-50067 OF 2009
DIRECTOR GENERAL, NSW DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY & INVESTMENT v MATO INVESTMENTS PTY LTD & ORS
Application is made for a joint trial of prosecutionsJUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: The prosecutor in each of the prosecutions, the Director General of the New South Wales Department of Industry and Investment, by notice of motion seeks an order of the court that 16 prosecutions for various offences be heard and determined together under s 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (“the CP Act”). There are four defendants, each charged with four offences. Mr Coomes is one of the defendants. Mr Coomes opposes the order for a joint trial sought by the prosecutor. The other three defendants do not oppose the order.
The offences charged
2 The offences against the defendants fall into two categories: one is an offence against s 220ZD(1) of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) (“the Fisheries Act”) and the second is an offence against s 125(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (“the EPA Act”).
3 In relation to the first category of offences against s 220ZD(1) of the Fisheries Act, there are three offences charged, one in relation to a type of listed endangered ecological community, and the other two in relation to two threatened species of fish. The section contravened in each case is the same, although its application varies depending upon whether the offence concerns the ecological community or the threatened species. The offence against s 220ZD(1) is that:
- “(1) A person must not, by an act or omission, do anything that causes damage to any habitat (other than critical habitat) of a threatened species, population or ecological community if the person knows that the area concerned is habitat of that kind.
Maximum penalty: 1,000 penalty units or imprisonment for 1 year, or both.”
4 In relation to the second category of offence against s 125(1) of the EPA Act, the allegation is that development was carried out otherwise than in accordance with a condition, condition 16, of a development consent that had been granted. The condition imposed a prohibition on removal of snags and woody debris from a river without complying with certain procedural steps.
The prosecutor’s case and evidence
5 The prosecutor’s case concerning the offences against s 220ZD of the Fisheries Act is that a contractor by the name of Michael Hanger and his employees removed snags and woody debris from waterways adjacent to a property known as “Kunanadgee” on the Murray River. These snags and woody debris comprised habitat of the particular endangered ecological community and of the two threatened species of fish. The prosecutor alleges that four persons were legally responsible for that damage. The first person was Mato Investments Pty Limited (“Mato”). This was the company that owns the property “Kunanadgee” and was carrying out the ecotourism development pursuant to the relevant development consent, for the purposes of which development the snags and woody debris were removed. Next, the prosecutor alleges that two directors of Mato, namely Mr Bennett and Mr Ceman, were legally responsible either by giving directions or instructions to Mr Hanger to remove the snags and woody debris or by reason of being a director of Mato. Finally, the prosecutor alleges that Mr Coomes was legally responsible by reason of his appointment as a project manager who was legally responsible for the carrying out of the ecotourism resort and, it is alleged, gave directions to Mr Hanger to remove the snags and woody debris.
6 The prosecutor would also need to establish the knowledge element of the offence against s 220ZD, that is, that the defendants in question caused the damage knowing the area concerned was habitat of the particular endangered ecological community or threatened species of fish.
7 The prosecutor’s case in relation to the offence against s 125 of the EPA Act is that Mr Hanger and his employees did the acts of removal of the snags and woody debris contrary to condition 16 of the relevant development consent, and that each of the four defendants were persons who carried out that development contrary to condition 16. The prosecutor will rely on the same matters alleged for the s 220ZD offences to establish that each of those persons were legally responsible for those offences.
8 The evidence upon which the prosecutor will rely will comprise both oral evidence and documentary evidence. As far as the oral evidence is concerned, the prosecutor has served affidavits and statements of evidence from various witnesses. The prosecutor has affidavits of Mr Michael Hanger who will be a principal witness giving evidence in relation to the persons who gave directions and instructions to Mr Hanger to carry out the works of removing the snags and woody debris from the river. In addition, the prosecutor has provided an affidavit of Adrian Hanger and has provided records of interview of Geoffrey Damen and Timothy Root. Each of Messrs Adrian Hanger, Geoffrey Damen and Timothy Root were employees who worked under Mr Michael Hanger in carrying out the works.
9 The prosecutor has also served affidavit evidence of a Mr Harris concerning the existence of habitat of the two species of fish and the endangered ecological community. The prosecutor has provided evidence of four officers from the Department of Fisheries being Messrs Tilbrook, McBurnie and Potter, and Miss Fairfull. Messrs Tilbrook and McBurnie will provide evidence about the species of fish in the area, that no permit had been granted, and that there was no consultation as might have been required under the conditions of development consent. Mr Potter was the investigator and undertook the records of interview and took photographs and will provide evidence in relation to those matters. Miss Fairfull provides evidence of searching the register kept under the Fisheries Act.
10 The prosecutor has given notice that it will adduce evidence from Mr Bobby Parr, a council officer, in relation to the development consent and condition and in relation to the documents that accompanied the development application that resulted in the development consent. This included a species impact statement which apparently identified the area to be habitat of the endangered ecological community the subject of the charges.
11 Finally, the prosecutor will rely on the affidavit evidence of Mr McHugh, a council officer to whom the incident was reported and who undertook an initial investigation.
12 In addition to that oral evidence, the prosecutor will seek to tender records of interview undertaken with Messrs Bennett, Ceman and Coomes. It is with respect to the three records of interview that Mr Coomes bases his objection to there being a joint trial. He says that the justice of the situation requires that there be separate trials or at least a separate trial in relation to Mr Coomes.
13 Evidently, the records of interview with each of the defendants would be admissible into evidence only against each of the defendants concerned. That is to say, in the proceedings against Mr Coomes, only the record of interview with Mr Coomes would be admissible into evidence against Mr Coomes; the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman would not be admissible into evidence against Mr Coomes.
The prosecutor’s submissions for a joint trial
14 The prosecutor submits that the circumstances in s29(2)(b) and (c) of the CP Act are applicable to the 16 prosecutions in this case. The prosecutor says that each of the 16 offences arise out of the same set of circumstances, or alternatively form a part of a series of offences of the same or similar character. Furthermore, the prosecutor submits that having a joint trial would meet the convenience of the court and the justice system. It would assist in ensuring the disposition of the trials in a timely and cost effective manner. It would meet the convenience of all of the witnesses, including Mr Hanger who resides in Melbourne and would need to be brought to Sydney to give evidence at the trials.
15 The prosecutor notes that the prosecutions brought in the Land and Environment Court are dealt with summarily by a judge sitting alone without a jury. The judge is therefore in a position to control any prejudice that could possibly be caused to any defendant by the admission into evidence of a record of interview against any other defendant.
16 The prosecutor submits that the central probative evidence comes from Mr Michael Hanger and that evidence is common to all of the defendants. The prosecutor refers to the commonality of evidence given by every witness and that the only point of difference between the evidence that would be adduced against each defendant relates to the records of interview.
17 The prosecutor submits that any risk of prejudice relating to those isolated pieces of evidence which would be the records of interview, can be cocooned by the judge making appropriate directions to him or herself to not take into account evidence that is not admissible and has not been admitted against a defendant.
18 The prosecutor finally submits that it would make clear which items of evidence are admissible against each defendant and there would be no confusion at the trial and no unfairness from the outset.
19 The prosecutor referred to various principles governing joint or separate trials referred to in the authorities including R v Jones (No 1) [2007] NSWSC 769, R v Demirok [1976] VR 244, R v Middis (NSWSC, Hunt J, 27 March 1991, unreported) and R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 and the cases referred to in those cases.
The defendant’s submissions for separate trials
20 Mr Coomes accepts that the circumstances referred to s 29(2) of the CP Act are applicable to the proceedings in this case. However, Mr Coomes submits that it is in the interests of justice that the matters be heard and determined separately, relying on s 29(3) of the CP Act.
21 Mr Coomes’ arguments as to why it is in the interests of justice for there to be separate trials can be grouped under four headings. Firstly, and primarily, Mr Coomes says that significantly different evidence would need to be adduced in the defendants’ different matters. The significantly different evidence relates to the records of interview. Mr Coomes says that the records of interview with the other defendants, Messrs Bennett and Ceman, contained material that would be highly prejudicial to Mr Coomes in two respects.
22 The first respect is that there are apparently concessions made by Messrs Bennett and Ceman in their capacity as directors of Mato. As I understand the content of these concessions, they relate to accepting some responsibility for directing or instructing Mr Hanger to remove, or having knowledge of Mr Hanger removing, snags and woody debris from the river. Mr Coomes says these concessions have the inherent potential to prejudice Mr Coomes’ defence even though they would not be admissible in the prosecutions against him. It is not immediately apparent to me why, if the concessions are of the nature said, they would be prejudicial to Mr Coomes’ defence. If anything they would seem to be corroborative of Mr Coomes’ defence which I understand will be that he was not the person responsible for directing or instructing Mr Hanger to carry out the works of removal of the snags and woody debris from the river.
23 The second and perhaps more important respect in which Mr Coomes says the material in the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman might be prejudicial to Mr Coomes is that Messrs Bennett and Ceman in their records of interview apparently attribute Mr Coomes with responsibility for supervising Mr Hanger who was engaged to carry out the works. Mr Coomes denies that he was so responsible.
24 Mr Coomes submits that there is a risk that the judge, being the trier of fact in the absence of a jury, would impermissibly allow the evidence in the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman to influence or affect the fact-finding in the proceedings against Mr Coomes. Mr Coomes relied upon the three cumulative principles in R v Middis. Mr Coomes submits that the material in the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman would be highly prejudicial to Mr Coomes in the two respects stated, although it would not be admissible against him, and that the evidence against Mr Coomes is significantly weaker and different to that admissible against Messrs Bennett and Ceman or Mato itself. Mr Coomes then submits that, putting those two factors together, there is a real risk that the weaker prosecution case against Mr Coomes would be made immeasurably stronger by reason of the prejudicial material in the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman. In those circumstances, Mr Coomes submits that a separate trial should be ordered according to the principles in R v Middis.
25 Secondly, Mr Coomes submits that it is in the interests of justice that a separate trial be ordered because he was only a project manager. Mr Coomes submits that it might be appropriate that the proceedings against the corporation Mato and the directors of the corporation be heard and determined together. However, the fact that Mr Coomes is a third party, being a project manager, meant that there was not the same degree of affinity as there was between a corporation and its directors. Mr Coomes submitted that it has been uncommon for such a third party to be tried together with a corporation and directors.
26 Thirdly, Mr Coomes submits that the joint trial would lead to Mr Coomes incurring additional costs associated with the joint trial which would be longer and more complex than if a separate trial were to be conducted of Mr Coomes alone. Mr Coomes submits that the additional cost would result from having longer cross-examination by each of the defendants and longer submissions. This would result in a considerable lengthening of the trial and hence an increase in cost to Mr Coomes.
27 Finally, Mr Coomes submits that there are no countervailing public interest considerations which would overwhelm the potential unfairness and costs to Mr Coomes if a joint trial were to be held. Mr Coomes notes the fact that Mr Hanger, who apparently has been given an indemnity by the prosecution, would be required to give evidence twice rather than once but submits that this factor should be given limited, if any, weight. Certainly, Mr Coomes submits, it should not outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice to him that might be caused by a joint trial.
A joint trial should be ordered
28 The principles that should be applied were not in contest. It is sufficient to note that they are summarised in the cases referred to by the parties and are conveniently set out in R v Jones at [15] – [18] and R v Fernando [199] – [211] and the cases therein cited.
29 I consider that the 16 proceedings relating to the offences against each of the four defendants should be heard and determined together for the reasons advanced by the prosecutor. I am not of the opinion that the interests of justice require the matters to be heard and determined separately and in particular I am not of the opinion that the proceedings for the offences brought against Mr Coomes should be heard and determined separately from the other proceedings.
30 I do not consider that the circumstances where courts in the past have held it is appropriate to order separate trials apply in the circumstances of this case. The only evidence that might contain material highly prejudicial to Mr Coomes are the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman. However, such records of interview would not be admitted into evidence in the proceedings for offences brought against Mr Coomes. The judge would appropriately direct him or herself only to make findings of guilt on the evidence that is admissible in the proceedings against Mr Coomes, and not have regard to any other evidence that is not admitted although it may be admitted in other proceedings against the other defendants. The judge is a professional and there is no reason to expect that the judge would not make appropriate directions and decide the prosecutions against Mr Coomes on the basis of the evidence admissible against Mr Coomes alone. There is not a “real” risk (to use the words in R v Middis) that the judge would err in law in making findings of fact on the guilt of Mr Coomes on evidence that is not admitted against Mr Coomes. Furthermore, there is nothing about the nature of the evidence in the records of interview with Messrs Bennett and Ceman that would make it difficult for the judge to ignore or put out of his or her mind the evidence in deciding the guilt of Mr Coomes.
31 There is no “real” risk that the judge would be overwhelmed and unable to dispassionately and objectively make findings on the evidence admitted against Mr Coomes and on that evidence alone. I do not consider that each of the principles, and in particular, the third principle in R v Middis is satisfied. I consider the factors referred to by the prosecutor in its submissions and in the cases quoted, particularly in R v Jones, R v Annakin (1989) 17 NSWLR 202 and R v Demirok [1976] VR 244, are appropriate in this case. As was said in R v Annakin at 207:
- “In the ultimate, each case must be dealt with according to the evidence and by reference to the considerations relevant to whether prejudice will be caused so as to prevent an accused being given a fair trial and, of course, this is essentially a matter for the trial judge”.
32 I consider this can be done in this case. The trial judge can make appropriate directions and deal with the prosecutions according to the evidence so as to avoid prejudice to Mr Coomes and ensure that Mr Coomes is given a fair trial.
33 I do not consider the fact that Mr Coomes is a project manager and not a director of the corporation, to be material. The circumstances in which joint trials are appropriate are not closed. The fact that in the past there may have been joint trials between a corporation and directors of the corporation does not exhaust the circumstances where it is appropriate to have a joint trial. By reason of the commonality of the facts and the evidence, it is appropriate that there be a joint trial of each of the defendants in this case.
34 There may be some additional legal costs incurred by Mr Coomes by reason of having a joint trial. At the outset, it should be noted that this is always the case where there is a joint trial. The very nature of a joint trial is that there are more than one defendant. The presence of the other defendants will always lead to some additional legal costs associated with extra cross-examination or extra submissions. However, the advantages of having a joint trial, referred to in the cases to which I have already made reference, outweigh this additional legal cost being incurred by a defendant.
35 In any event, in the circumstances of this case, I do not consider that the additional legal costs that might be incurred by Mr Coomes by having a joint trial, would be disproportionate or would be so great as to work unfairness or injustice to Mr Coomes. All of the witnesses the prosecutor has given notice that it wishes to call would still be called regardless of whether there is a joint trial or there are separate trials. The records of interview would of course be tendered, although only against the particular defendant who is the subject of the record of interview, but the tender of these records of interview would not take any material time. There would be some extra cross-examination and additional submissions by reason of the defendants all being there. However I do not consider this would be unreasonable.
36 I also note that any additional time in cross-examination or submissions, caused by having multiple defendants in a joint trial, does not necessarily lead to prejudice to the defendant. Of course it is true, as Mr Coomes submitted, that there is a degree of uncertainty as to what might transpire in a joint trial. Nevertheless, there can be advantages to defendants in having a joint trial. This was noted in R v Jones at [27] where Justice Buddin noted that:
- “… the applicant could actually benefit from a joint trial because she would be able to take advantage of any evidence adduced at it which casts doubt upon the Crown’s capacity to establish the principal offence. This may prove to be more difficult for her at a separate trial where, of necessity, the principal parties (and their representatives) will not be able to assist in facilitating such an outcome”.
37 In this case, there are a number of different elements for each of the offences that would need to be established. The matter concerning who is responsible for directing Mr Hanger to carry out the works of removal of snags and woody debris, is one of those elements. It is in relation to this matter that Mr Coomes has expressed concern about the records of interview but there are a number of other elements that would need to be established. It may well be that any advantage the defendants in the other proceedings might gain in casting doubt upon the prosecutor’s case on those other elements, would be beneficial to Mr Coomes in similarly casting doubt on the prosecutor’s case in respect to those elements for the same offences against Mr Coomes. Of course this may not come to pass but I simply note that it cannot be assumed that having a joint trial always and necessarily leads to prejudice; it can sometimes lead to an advantage to a defendant.
38 Balanced against the additional legal costs that might be incurred by Mr Coomes by reason of a joint trial are the savings that would be achieved by having a joint trial. The conserving of costs, improving the efficient dispatch of trials and avoiding inconvenience to witnesses by having to attend a number of trials are factors that have been referred to in the various authorities.
39 These factors are particularly applicable in this case where, as I have said, the prosecutor will call each and every one of its witnesses in a separate trial just as it would in a joint trial. Hence, if there were not to be a joint trial, there would be a wholesale duplication of all of the evidence of the prosecutor and each of those witnesses that I have set out earlier in my reasons for judgment would need to be called again. It is not only Mr Hanger who would need to attend the two trials. Nevertheless this concern is particularly relevant to Mr Hanger because he comes from Melbourne and his evidence is critical in the case against the defendants and it is likely that he would need to be cross-examined for a considerable period of time.
40 It has also been noted in the authorities that there is an advantage in having a joint trial where there is likely to be cutthroat defences, that is where each of the defendants deny they were responsible but will be alleging that other defendants were responsible. This factor has been referred to in the authorities as tending towards establishing that a joint trial would be beneficial, see for example R v Demirok at 251- 253 as well as Webb and Hay v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 88-89 quoted in R v Fernando at [211].
41 I have found the risk of unfair trial to Mr Coomes is not real and that what risk might remain cannot in the circumstances outweigh the other factors that tend to establish the desirability of having a joint trial.
42 In these circumstances, I consider it is appropriate to make the orders sought by the prosecutor.
Orders
43 Accordingly, the Court orders:
2. The parties have liberty to approach the Registrar forthwith to obtain a date for trial of the proceedings.1. Proceedings 50052-50067 of 2009 be heard and determined together.
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3