Director General, Department of Family and Community Services and Brooks
[2012] FamCA 179
•22 February 2012
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES & BROOKS | [2012] FamCA 179 |
| FAMILY LAW – CHILD ABDUCTION - HAGUE CONVENTION – access time for the father with the child – best interests of the child – interim or final orders to be made – Regulations 25, 25A Child Abduction Convention Regulations – where only access to child is sought |
| Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) |
| De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services and Anor (1996) 187 CLR 640 McCall and State Central Authority; Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (Intervenor) (1995) FLC 92-551 Shailer & Shailer [2007] FamCA 1312 State Central Authority v Peddar [2008] FamCA 519 |
| APPLICANT: | Director General, Department of Family and Community Services |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Brooks |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 4663 | of | 2011 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 22 February 2012 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Le Poer Trench J |
| HEARING DATE: | 13 February 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Ms Harstein |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Legal Services, Department of Family and Community Services |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Boyle |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mullan & Lindsay |
Orders
Each of Ms Brooks (“the mother”) and Mr D (“the father”) are to ensure that each has an up to date email address for the other at all times during which these orders are operative. The parties may thereafter communicate for the purpose of arrangements relative to the child J born … July 2006 (“J”).
The father is to communicate with and spend time with (have access to) J as follows:
(a) By letter addressed to J, care of the mother, or email addressed to the mother’s email address, at a frequency of not more than one occasion each week. The mother is to read any such letters or emails to J and to show him any photographs of the father and his family which the father may attach to such letters or emails;
(b) By Skype on Sunday 18 March 2012 at 5.00pm Australian Eastern Standard Time (“AEST”) for approximately 15 minutes;
(c) By Skype on Sunday 25 March 2012 at 5.00pm AEST for approximately 15 minutes;
(d) By Skype on Sunday 1 April 2012 at 5.00pm AEST for approximately 15 minutes;
(e) By Skype on Sunday 8 April 2012 at 5.00pm AEST for approximately 15 minutes;
(f) Thereafter by Skype on each Sunday at 5.00pm AEST for approximately 30 minutes;
(g) Should J appear to the mother to be happy to continue talking to the father on any of the occasions referred to in sub-orders (b) to (f) above at the expiration of the time limit specified, then the mother is to permit the extension of such time for a further reasonable period.
For the purpose of orders 2 (b) to (f) hereof the father is to initiate the Skype calls at the appointed times and the mother is to ensure the computer she makes available for J to participate in the communication is switched on and ready to receive the father’s call. She is also to ensure J is in the close vicinity of the subject computer ready to participate in the call.
In order to participate in these orders each of the mother and father is to ensure their computers are ready to communicate by Skype and each has programmed the appropriate information into the computer to ensure that J can see and hear the father during the access and that the father can see and hear J.
In anticipation of the father commencing face to face access to J each of the parents is to forthwith contact the N Contact Centre and make application for the centre to accept the family for supervised access between the father and J.
Provided the father has participated fully in the access with J as provided for in order 2 hereof, then upon the father providing 28 days prior notice to the mother and the N Contact Centre, the father is to have access to J as follows:
(a) Subject to the availability of the N Contact Centre, during the first week of the July (mid year) school holidays for 2 hours per day supervised at the N Contact Centre for 3 consecutive days. This may be extended to 7 days should the parents agree in writing to same at that time.
(b) Subject to the availability of the N Contact Centre, during the second week of the July (mid year) school holidays, 3 hours per day supervised at the N Contact Centre for 5 consecutive days. This may be extended to 7days should the parents agree in writing to same at that time.
In the event of the parties agreeing that the access between the father and J proceeded satisfactorily then the parents are to agree to further and extended time for J to spend with his father during school holiday periods in the event of the father being able to travel to Australia to exercise that time. Any agreement is to be evidenced in writing. In the event of the parents being unable to agree on the extent or nature of further time for J with his father then they are to consult with the N Contact Centre for the purpose of having a consultant appointed to assist the parties in reaching an agreement about access.
The orders made on 22 August 2011 are discharged.
Each of the parents are to provide to the other details of any change of residential address for themselves and/or J not less than fourteen days prior to any such change, if that be possible, or as soon as possible thereafter.
The mother is to authorise any school J attends to provide to the father, at his request and cost, copies of any letters notes, or publications provided to the mother by the school together with copies of any school report created for J and details of how and when he might obtain copies of J’s school photos.
Prior to 18 March 2012 the mother is to send to the father an email which provides the father with details of J’s interests, extra curricular activities and other relevant activities which might provide the father with a list of topics about which he may talk to J during the scheduled Skype meetings.
I note that the matter has now concluded in the Court.
NOTATION
A. The Court notes that the mother has requested that the father provide some photographs of himself and his family members when he communicates with J by mail.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Director General, Department of Family and Community Services & Brooks has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 4663 of 2011
| Director General, Department of Family & Community Services |
Applicant
And
| Ms Brooks |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Before the Court is an application by the Director-General of the Department of Family and Community Services (“the Director General”) filed on 3 August 2011 pursuant to the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) 1986 (Cth) (“the Regulations”).By that application the Director General seeks orders, inter alia, that Mr D, born in 1985 (“the father”) have access to his son J born in July 2006 (“the child”). The Director-General relies on regulations 23, 24 and 25.
On 24 October 2011 Ms Brooks born in 1979 (“the mother”) filed an answer. She supported that answer with an affidavit sworn by herself and an affidavit sworn by her mother (“the maternal grandmother”). She also relied on an affidavit by her medical practitioner Dr M sworn 18 October 2011.
By the mother’s answer she sought that the proceedings be dismissed and that the ex parte orders made on 22 August 2011 be discharged. In the affidavit which accompanied her answer the mother set out a proposal for the father to spend time with the child (or to use the language of the regulations) for the father to have access to the child.
Background Facts
There is very little factual dispute between the parties. The facts which appear to have particular relevance to the subject application are as follows.
The mother is 32 years of age and the father is 26 years of age. Both parents were born in Canada.
Some time towards the end of 2004 or early 2005, the parents commenced a relationship in Canada. The child, J, was born in July 2006. He has resided with his mother since his birth.
Whatever the precise nature of the relationship between the parents may have been (it being a matter of some dispute), it is agreed that their relationship ceased on or about 21 August 2006.
On about 23 August 2006 the father entered a residence then being occupied by the mother (her parents’ home) without her consent. On that occasion the father assaulted the maternal grandfather. The father was charged with unlawful assault and entering a property without lawful excuse. A penalty was subsequently imposed on the father which included a two year period of probation.
On about 13 September 2006 the father applied to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Canada for parenting orders. On 26 October 2006, interim parenting orders were made providing for the mother to have primary care of the child. The father was to have access.
In about mid-2007 the mother complained that the child had returned from an access visit with the father with a hand print on his bottom.
On 19 November 2007 final orders were made by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Canada which provided that the mother have custody of the child and the father have access. There were restrictions imposed on the persons with whom the father could bring the child into contact.
In November 2007, the mother said she observed a burn mark on the child’s outer right thigh after return from contact with the father. In about December 2007 the mother and the child travelled to where they stayed with the mother’s grandparents. Subsequently, on 20 December 2007 the mother and child travelled to Australia and commenced to reside with family friends.
In January 2008, the maternal grandparents commenced to reside in Newcastle, Australia. At that time the mother commenced to reside in the same residence as her parents. The mother is engaged in pursuing tertiary education at university. The child attends day care at the university two days per week and the mother is otherwise assisted in caring for the child by her mother.
In May 2010, the mother became engaged to an American citizen who currently resides in the United States of America.
On 25 August 2011 the mother and child proposed to visit the United States of America for the purpose of a holiday with her fiancée. The mother and child were prevented from leaving Australia due to orders of the Family Court of Australia which had been made without the mother’s knowledge on 22 August 2011. Those orders had been made ex-parte on the application of the applicant in this case.
Conduct of the Trial
Although still uncommon as a facet of the hearing of cases brought under the Regulations, parties may seek to cross-examine deponents of affidavits or relevant witnesses in the case. In this case, no application was made by either of the parties to cross-examine any witness or relevant person. No criticism is directed by the Court to either party as result of this conduct.
When the matter was before the Court on 22 November 2011 I made a number of orders which included the following:
4. I direct that as part of the communication between the Director-General and the father or the USA Central Authority, the Director-General is to reaffirm that he/she do not act for the father in the proceedings and that he does have the right to himself be a party.
Exhibit “DG1” in the proceedings consists of two letters sent by the Attorney-General’s Department of Australia to the United States Department of State which comply with the abovementioned order. There was no appearance by the father in the proceedings.
The Father’s Case Put Before the Court by the Director- General
By her affidavit sworn on 2 December 2011, Joanna Mitchell, a solicitor employed by the Department of Family and Community Services, annexes two documents. The first is a proposed Minute of Order for consideration by the father which had been drafted by the Director-General; the second is the father’s response to this proposal.
The draft Minute of Order proposed that the parties exchange details of their email addresses for the purpose of arranging contact between the father and the child. It proposed that the father be permitted to send handwritten letters, cards, gifts and photographs to the subject child once every two weeks. It proposed that the mother read any communication from the father to the child and make photographs provided by the father accessible to him. In the father’s response to the proposal he agrees to each of those provisions.
The proposal then set out a series of four specific dates upon which the father might have contact with the child by Skype. The proposal then went on to provide that access via Skype would occur every Sunday after those four specific occasions, such access to be for a period of 30 minutes.
The father agreed in principle to the proposal but suggested different times including a progression in timing from 10 minutes for the first Skype occasion to 60 minutes of the last Skype occasion, which would be at the conclusion of seven progressively lengthened Skype events. Finally, the father proposed that he have Skype communication with the child every Sunday for a period of 60 minutes.
The father rejected proposals for face-to-face contact in Australia during the Autumn school holidays, such time to take place initially in the N Contact Centre. The proposal extended to unsupervised time in the Newcastle area. The father pressed for what he described as the proposal in my last response. As best I can see that response was dated 6 August 2011 and appears on page 31 of the application. The father said:
I desire weekly video contact, regular visits to USA and Australia of myself, parents, [Dr B and Ms M], brothers and other family members to see [J] and would provide for costs of travel and accommodation expenses. Summers, breaks from University, and special holidays are ideal and my time would place top priority on seeing [J], in Australia or in USA as frequently as possible.
Notwithstanding that request as contained in the subject document the order sought in the application is as follows:
That the applicant make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the child [J] (male) born […] July 2006 has access with his, father [Mr D] born […] October 1985 upon such conditions as this Court deems necessary pursuant to the provisions on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
Notwithstanding the parties’ relationship was created and terminated in Canada, the father now resides in the United States of America. It was from the Central Authority of the United States of America that the request was made, pursuant to the Hague Convention, to the Australian Government.
The Mother’s Case
On 20 October 2011 the mother swore an affidavit which was filed and read in the proceeding. That affidavit provided some background history. This included the making of orders by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Canada. The mother says that orders were made for the father to spend regular time (3 days per week) limited time (2 hours) with the child in his parents’ home. That order was made 26 October 2006. At that time the child was nearly 4 months of age.
The time for the father and child continued during 2007. In mid 2007 the mother claimed the child had been returned after a visit with the father and she noted what she believed to be a hand imprint on the child’s bottom. Although the mother raised her concern about the cause of the possible injury, she was required to continue providing the child so that he might spend time with the father.
The mother says that when the child was about 12 months of age he showed signs of anxiety and stress on each occasion he was taken in the car and also at changeover with Ms M (the father’s mother).
At a changeover in September 2007 the mother said Ms M had “become irate, screaming that ‘[Mr D} (the father) was not a criminal and that you will never see [J] again’”.
On 19 November 2007 final orders were made in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. These orders provided for the parties to meet face-to-face for changeovers. The mother described what happened at the changeovers and it is clear she felt uneasy about those events. She ensured she was accompanied by another person. She was aware that contrary to the orders of the Court the father’s mother was involved in the changeovers albeit that she stayed at a distance.
In November 2007 the mother observed a burn mark on the child after the child had been with the father.
The mother alleges that between 2004 and 2006 the father was violent to her. This made her feel frightened at the time. At the time of signing her affidavit the mother still professes fear of the father. She says the thought of his presence in close proximity to her “terrifies me”. The mother gave specific examples of assaults perpetrated upon her during the time she was in a relationship with the father and since. If proved to be true then the Court would have to conclude the mother was subjected to a reign of terror and assault.
The mother described the events of 23 August 2006 which gave rise to the father being charged by police with offences including assault.
The mother says she does not “feel comfortable” with the father having unsupervised time with the child.
It is not for this Court to make definitive findings in relation to all the mother’s allegations against the father. It is sufficient for the Court to accept that the mother has a basis for being apprehensive and concerned about having any personal contact with the father and the prospect of the father being able to have unsupervised time with the child.
I am satisfied the mother does have an apprehension and concern for herself and the child should the father be permitted, at this time, to spend unsupervised time with the child.
Approach of the Court to the Hearing
As will be seen below, there is some controversy as to the manner in which the Court is to approach the hearing of the subject application. In particular should the Court apply the principle of “best interests of the child” in determining the application.
The Mother submits that there are no provisions in the Regulations which give guidance to exercise of discretion by judges with respect to orders for access to a child. She further submits that the Regulations are made pursuant to s 111B of the Family Law Act, and as such, Pt VII of the Act, in particular the paramountcy principle, is not applicable. The best interest of a child should therefore be the paramount consideration, but merely one of many considerations to be considered.
The Director-General of the Department of Family and Community Services submits there are no provisions in the Regulations which give guidance as to the manner in which the Court should exercise its discretion when considering the matters to take into account when making orders for access.
In this instance, the founding judgment for judicial consideration is the High Court judgment in De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services and Anor (1996) 187 CLR 640. In that matter the majority held that the paramountcy considerations did not apply in child abduction convention matters as their power derives from ss 111B and 125, rather than Pt VII, and further that the discretion of a judge in deciding what matters to take into consideration is not confined by the Regulations.
The majority (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow) stated (footnotes omitted):
As earlier indicated, the so-called “paramountcy principle” is not applicable in proceedings under the regulations. However, it is to be noted that, if a child objects to being returned to the country of his or her habitual residence and has attained the age and degree of maturity spoken of in reg 16(3)(c), it remains for the judge hearing the application to exercise an independent discretion to determine whether or not an order should be made for the child's return. The regulations are silent as to the matters to be taken into account in the exercise of that discretion and the “discretion is, therefore, unconfined except in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the [regulations]” enable it to be said that a particular consideration is extraneous. That subject matter is such that the welfare of the child is properly to be taken into consideration in exercising that discretion.
Kirby J commented (in a separate but not dissenting judgment in that matter) in relation to the notion of ‘best interests’ in the Regulations:
It is not strictly correct to say that the Convention is an exception to the usual concern of our law for the welfare or best interests of a child or that the regulations incorporating it into Australian law exclude that consideration entirely, leaving it no part to play in the relevant decisions. What the Convention, reflected by the regulations, has done is to recognise that it is in the best interests of children as a class not to be subjected to the turmoil and emotional divisiveness of international abduction. Wherever this occurs the child involved is ordinarily to be returned to the country in which the child was habitually resident before the abduction. It is in that jurisdiction that contests about custody and access (or their equivalent) are to be litigated.
To the extent it is relevant I note the discussion of the High Court focussed upon Part 3 of the Regulations which carries the heading “Court Application Except for Access”.
Counsel for the Director-General relied upon the judgment in State Central Authority v Peddar [2008] FamCA 519, which distinguishes the earlier Full Court judgment in McCall and State Central Authority; Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (Intervenor) (1995) FLC 92-551. McCall was a Family Court authority for the principle that the Regulations are not governed by Pt VII of the Act and therefore the paramountcy principle was not the chief consideration.
Peddar agrees with this basic principle, but only so far as wrongful removal and retention of children is concerned. The judgment of Bennett J delineates between orders relating to wrongful removal or retention of a child, as in the facts of McCall, and orders relating to access to a child, as was the case in Peddar.
Bennett J stated at [24]:
I note the question and answer above is not confined to the provisions directly under consideration in McCall's case (wrongful removal or retention) but could be read to embrace the full scope of the Regulations, that is, the access provisions in Pt 4 of the Regulations in addition to the Pts 2 and 3 which dealt with wrongful removals and retentions. However, I do not consider that to be a correct application. The Full court's discussion of the jurisdiction of the Family Court under the regulations could, in my view, only have applied to the removal and retention cases, such as the facts were in McCall's case. If I am wrong and the Full court's response (quoted above) was intended to encompass access cases (which I very much doubt), the statement is obiter dicta. No access matter under the Regulations arose or was under consideration in McCalls case. Accordingly, I respectfully distinguish the reasoning of the Full court in McCall's case as applicable to wrongful removal and retention cases and not to access cases under the Regulations.
Bennet J went on to set out that rr 25 and 25A of the regulations did not apply to access cases:
[26] Neither reg 25 nor reg 25A prescribe the matters be taken into account in access cases. In my view, that is because:
a)reg 25 prescribes what orders the responsible Central Authority may apply for; and
b)reg 25A specifies that the court can make the orders specified in reg 25(1) or any other order that would be appropriate to give effect to the Convention or apply a condition which the court considers appropriate to give effect to the Convention.
The court's powers to make orders specifying with whom a child is to spend time or communicate does not derive from reg 25. When reg 25A(1)(a) is read together with reg 25(1)(a), those sections describe the orders the court may make, but reg 25A(a) does not set out the basis upon which the discretion to make those orders is to be exercised.
In particular, Bennett J sets out that access cases proceed on the basis that the child’s habitual residence is already established, and as such, the matter is one for the laws of the jurisdiction in which the child is habitually resident and not a Child Abduction Convention matter. It was further held that the Regulations themselves make a tacit acceptance of the distinction between the way in which access applications ought to be dealt with as opposed to wrongful removal or retention matters. The judgment concludes on this issue:
64. The securing of rights of access is made subject to a number of qualifications of which the greatest qualification is that the access rights are to be “respected” in contradistinction to being implemented or enforced. Reference to arrangements for organising and securing the effective exercise of rights of access “in a proper case” also leads me to infer that not every application is necessarily a “proper case”.
The judgment in the matter of Shailer & Shailer [2007] FamCA 1312 examined a situation in which both Family Law Act proceedings and Child Abduction Convention Regulations Proceedings were on foot simultaneously. The Court was required to decide whether to order a stay of the Regulations proceedings until the Family Law Act proceedings were finalised.
The judgment looked first to the preamble and Article 1 of the Convention itself to assist in understanding the purpose of the Regulations, and then looked at the types of orders which might be sought under the Regulations. Brown J stated:
23. I note that the order sought here is to “secure effective exercise” which, on its face, would be to secure the rights of access of the father in the United States. Regulation 23 makes it clear that the right of access is a right of access to a child in a convention country. If one looks at Regulation 10, a convention country is any country other than Australia. Thus, an application to secure the effective exercise of a right of access in that convention country is, in fact, an application to secure access in a country outside Australia. That does not mean, of course, that pursuant to Regulation 24 and 25, an application or request cannot be made for access to a child in Australia. However, the right of access which is to be enforced is a right of access to a child under a law in force in a convention country.
The judge differentiated between the parent seeking orders to spend time with the child in Australia as opposed to removing the child to ‘a convention country’ (i.e. not Australia) for the purposes of spending time. The judge held that, as all orders sought at the time were to spend time with the child in Australia, the matter fell properly under the Family Law Act rather than the Child Abduction Convention Regulations.
It may be drawn from these authorities that although the paramountcy principle is not to be the primary consideration which the Court must have regard to in matters under the Regulations relating to wrongful removal or retention of a child, in matters under the Regulations relating to access it is open to the Court to apply the principle as the primary consideration. The Regulations offer no restrictions to the considerations which the Court may take into account when making decisions. It may be open to the Court, were the husband only seeking access in Australia, to refuse jurisdiction in favour of Australian Family Law, but as the husband is seeking to exercise access in the USA as well as in Australia I shall not take that course.
Determination
On the evidence before the Court it is open for the Court to conclude that the mother in this case has a vulnerable personality. There appears little issue about her psychological state at about the time of the break down of the relationship between the parents. At this time, it appears reasonable to conclude that the mother is dependant upon her parents for financial and emotional support. The mother’s circumstances are relevant to consider in determining how she might be affected by orders of the Court providing for the child to spend time with (have access to) his father. It is reasonable for the Court to conclude that any adverse emotional impact on the mother created by a Court order requiring the child to spend time with his father in a circumstance which is not supported by the mother, has the potential to directly impact upon the mother’s parenting capacity and consequently upon the welfare of the child.
The child has had no contact with his father since 2007. It is reasonable for the Court to require that access between the father and the child be a graduating progression, so as to ensure that in the long term the relationship is given the best chance to be successful. It is reasonable for the Court to conclude that access between the child and his father has the potential to be in the child’s best interests if it progresses satisfactorily and does not unduly stress or traumatise the child or his mother.
Each of the applicant and the respondent have put before the Court proposals for the reintroduction of access for the child with his father. There is little difference of substance between the proposals. The father proposes (through the applicant) that in a reasonably short period of time he would have unsupervised extensive holiday time with the child in Australia. The mother’s proposal does not extend to unsupervised time for the child with his father. However, it is clear that she is prepared to consider such time, provided that the progressive access proposed by her proves to be satisfactory and beneficial for the child.
Final or Interim Orders
The Director General proposes that orders be made on a final basis. The mother has opposed that because she does not agree with the Court making a prospective order for unsupervised time between the father and the child. She proposes there be a progression of time which would conclude by Court order, providing for supervised face-to-face contact between the father and the child. She would propose that after a trial period of supervised time she would consider agreeing to unsupervised time between the child and the father.
The Court must accept that the proceedings are onerous on government resources both in Australia and the United States of America. There is nothing to prevent the father from commencing proceedings of his own in Australia. There is also nothing to prevent the Central Authority in the United States of America requesting further action at a later time by the Australian Central Authority to obtain orders for extended and/or different access by the father to the child.
As a consequence I propose to make final orders as opposed to interim orders. I propose to make orders which will require the parties to reach agreement about the extent and nature of the further access the father should spend with the child following the introductory access which will be specifically defined.
Best Interest of the Child
Having regard to all of the evidence (which is untested) I conclude that the Court needs to tread cautiously in making orders for access between the father and the child. Caution is required in the best interests of the child, in order to promote, in the long term, a meaningful relationship between the child and his father. If the child is frightened by a speedy onset of access orders, then it may be entirely counter-productive to the creation of a meaningful relationship between father and child.
Conclusion
Accordingly, I propose to make orders broadly as sought by the mother. It is to be remembered that the foundation of the orders arose as suggestions from the applicant who forwarded a draft minute to the father for his consideration. I have had regard to the proposed minute above referred to and to the father’s responses.
Orders to be Made
When the hearing concluded before me I directed that the applicant and Respondent prepare a joint statement on the availability of the N Contact Centre to facilitate the type of time for the child to spend with the father as specified in the minute of order proposed by the applicant to the father which is annexed to affidavit of Ms Mitchell referred to earlier. The parties provided such a document to my associate on 17 February 2012. In short the information provided is:
·Prior to access commencing between the father and the child the parents need to contact N Contact Centre. The mother may telephone the service and the father may email to the service. Each is to provide personal details such as address, contact phone numbers etc;
·The parents are to individually participate in an intake interview to prepare them for supervised access. The father may participate via the internet;
·The child is to be taken to the centre for an orientation visit prior to the access;
·The centre has experience in introductory access. The Centre suggests up to one hour on the first occasion the child and father renew their acquaintance;
·The parties have agreed it would be appropriate to give 28 days notice to the centre and to the other party of the precise time future access would take place. The time chosen to spend with the child at the centre would need to be available to the centre;
·This coming Easter the centre would be in a position to supervise the father’s time with the child on the following times:
-Friday 13 April – up to 1 hour as the re-introduction time.
-Saturday 14 April- 2 hours subject to the child being content to spend all of that time with his father.
-Friday 20 April, Saturday 21 April and Sunday 22 April- 2 hours on each occasion.
·Ms L, Co-ordinator, N Contact Centre advises she will be available on all the above specified dates to assist the parties managing the time the father is able to spend with the child.
As a consequence of the above information, the arrangements each of the mother and father addressed, when considering the applicant’s suggested Minute of Order, will need to be considered in light of the availability of the N Contact Centre to accommodate the extent of the access sought by each party and the father.
The orders of the Court will provide for a gradual progression of access between the father and the child. The orders will provide for an introductory session of shorter duration both at the commencement of the Skype access and at the commencement of the face to face time at the N Contact Centre. Such an arrangement is likely to give the access time the best opportunity to be beneficial to the child and the father and support a long term arrangement which could lead to the development of a meaningful relationship between father and son.
Both the parties have requested the discharge of any injunctions made prior to the hearing taking place in the event of the Court making final orders. I consider such an approach appropriate and will make such an order.
The orders will provide for the parties to support ongoing access between the child and the father without the necessity to require further Court intervention. The orders will encourage that approach.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Le Poer Trench delivered on 22 February 2012
Associate:
Date: 21 February 2012
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