Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services and Seigel (No 2)

[2017] FamCA 240

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES, CHILD SAFETY AND DISABILITY SERVICES & SEIGEL (NO. 2) [2017] FamCA 240

FAMILY LAW – CHILD ABDUCTION - Hague Convention - Application for the return of the children to New Zealand – Where habitual residence in New Zealand is established – Whether grave risk established – Return order made.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth)
Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ)

Department of Community Services, Community Services & Raelson [2014] FamCA 131
Department of Health and Community Services, State Central Authority v Casse (1995) FLC 92-629
De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services and Anor (1996) 187 CLR 640
DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services (2001) 206 CLR 401
Murray v Director, Family Services (ACT) (1993) FLC 92-416

APPLICANT: Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services

RESPONDENT: Mr Seigel

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1497 of 2017

DATE DELIVERED: 20 April 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Hogan J

HEARING DATE: 13 April 2017 and 20 April 2017

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Linklater-Steele

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Fitzgibbon, McInnes Wilson Lawyers

RESPONDENT: In person

Orders

IT IS ORDERED BY WAY OF FINAL ORDER THAT

1. All previous Orders are discharged.

2. The children, B, born … 2007 (a female) and C, born … 2011 (a male), be returned to New Zealand and, for the purposes of giving effect to this Order:

   (a)the said children leave the Commonwealth of Australia on or before 29 April 2017;  and

   (b)the said children arrive in New Zealand on or before 30 April 2017;  and

   (c)pending the said children returning to New Zealand, the Respondent father continue to be restrained and an injunction is hereby issued, restraining him from removing or attempting to remove the said children from the Commonwealth of Australia; and

   (d)pending the said children returning to New Zealand, the Respondent father continue to be restrained and an injunction is hereby issued, restraining him from removing or attempting to remove the said children from the premises where he and the children are currently residing, namely D Street, Suburb E in the State of Queensland; and

   (e)subject to sub-paragraph (f) below, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police and all federal agents of the Australian Federal Police retain the names of the Respondent father, Mr Seigel, born … 1980, and the said children on the Family Law Watchlist at all international departure points in Australia; and

   (f)the names of the children and the Respondent father be removed from the Family Law Watchlist by officers/agents of the Australian Federal Police upon receipt of a letter from an officer of the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services advising of the travel arrangements made for the children to return to New Zealand from 12.00 am on the date nominated for the travel in the letter; and

   (g)the Marshal of the Family Court of Australia and the Commissioner and all federal agents of the Australian Federal Police and officers of the Police Forces and Services of the various States and Territories are required and empowered to take all necessary steps to give effect to these Orders;   and

   (h)to facilitate the return of the said children to New Zealand, Ms G, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services or her nominee be at liberty to release all current passports relating to the children for the purpose of the said children’s return to New Zealand and to release the Respondent father’s passport to him (or his nominee) upon request.

3. The Applicant has liberty to apply to seek any further orders necessary to allow him or officers of the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services to make such arrangements as are necessary to facilitate and ensure the return of the children in accordance with this Order and pursuant to the Central Authority’s obligation under Regulation 20 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth).

4. Within 48 hours of the making of this Order, the Applicant provide the Ministry for Vulnerable Children Oranga Tamariki with a copy of  this Order, the Reasons for Judgment published today and a copy of all of the affidavits and exhibits in this proceeding.

5. Within 48 hours of the making of this Order, the Applicant provide the New Zealand Central Authority with a copy of  this Order, the Reasons for Judgment published today and a copy of all of the affidavits and exhibits in this proceeding.

6. Within 48 hours of the making of this Order, the Applicant provide the Appropriate officer from the New Zealand Police force with a copy of this Order, the Reasons for Judgment published today and a copy of all of the affidavits and exhibits in this proceeding.

7. All other applications are dismissed.

IT IS NOTED THAT Counsel for the Applicant today informed the Court that, in the event of a return order being made, the Applicant intended to make a notification about the children to the relevant New Zealand child protection authority.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Seigel has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1497 of 2017

Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services 

Applicant

And

Mr Seigel

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. By an Application in Form 2 filed on 16 February 2017, the Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services in his capacity as the State Central Authority under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) seeks an order that the children, B, born in 2007 and C, born in 2011, be returned to New Zealand.[1] 

   [1]          Regulation 16(1)(a) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth).

2. The Regulations under which this Application must be determined are made pursuant to s 111B[2] of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which provides that the Regulations may make provision as is necessary or convenient to enable the performance of the obligations of Australia under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The Convention is set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations.

   [2]And, in so far as they make provision in relation to the rules of evidence which are to apply in proceedings under them, pursuant to s 111D of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

3. The Convention provides a mechanism for the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children between contracting States.  Australia and New Zealand are contracting States to the Convention. 

4. The Regulations are to be construed having regard to the Principles and Objects mentioned in the preamble to, and Article 1 of, the Convention and as recognising, in accordance with the Convention, that the appropriate forum for resolving disputes relating to children’s care, welfare and development is ordinarily their country of habitual residence, and as recognising that the effective implementation of the Convention depends on the reciprocity and mutual respect between judicial or administrative authorities (as the case may be) of Convention countries. 

5. The purpose of the Convention was authoritatively explained by the majority of the High Court in De L v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services and Anor[3] wherein it was emphasised that the Convention is directed to the prompt return of children to the State of their habitual residence, where questions concerning their welfare and the merits of any dispute about where and with whom they should live can be determined. That is, applications like this one, made pursuant to the Regulations, are matters about forum, not about parenting per se.

   [3] (1996) 187 CLR 640.

Brief Overview

1. The requesting Applicant under the Convention is the children’s mother, Ms F. She was born in 1972 in the United Kingdom. She is a New Zealand national, residing in H Town (which is about three hours’ drive north of Auckland) in New Zealand.

2. The Respondent to the Application is the children’s father. He was born in Auckland in 1980, is a New Zealand national and is currently residing with his heavily pregnant partner and the children in Queensland. 

3. The children’s parents were in a de facto relationship on something of an on/off basis for about 12 years. They always lived in New Zealand. After their relationship ended finally, in what appears to be about February 2014, both continued to live in New Zealand. This remained the case until 25 December 2016, when the father travelled with the children to Australia.

4. Both children were born in New Zealand. After the parental separation, they remained living primarily with their mother and spent time on weekends with the Respondent. Originally this time seems to have occurred on every third or fourth weekend but, from about October 2015, occurred mostly on an alternate weekend basis. In addition, the children spent some holiday time with their father.

5. Given that there are no parenting orders in existence in New Zealand, these parenting arrangements were implemented via the parents’ agreement and, implicitly, with the Respondent’s support for, and agreement to, the same.

6. Until the Respondent brought them to this country on 25 December 2016, the children had not ever travelled away from New Zealand. It follows that, until January 2017, they had only ever attended school in New Zealand.

7. It also follows that, until they left New Zealand on 25 December 2016 – ostensibly for only a holiday visit to Australia – their entire lives had been lived in New Zealand, their home.

The Respondent’s position

1. The Respondent seeks that the Application is dismissed. He opposes the making of an order for the children’s return to New Zealand on the basis that there is a grave risk their return to that country will expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.[4]

   [4]          Regulation 16(3)(b).

2. He relies on evidence from a number of people. Reference to the contents of their affidavits makes it clear that they support him in his contention that the children’s welfare will be better served if they remain living with him here rather than returning to their mother’s care in New Zealand. The Respondent’s case really is that the children will be at a grave risk of harm if returned to their mother’s care rather than that they will be of grave risk of harm if returned to New Zealand.

3. During his submissions, the Respondent said that an order returning the children to New Zealand will make it very hard for his family as they cannot afford to return to New Zealand and have nowhere to live there if the children are ordered to return there. Whilst no opposition was mounted to such submissions, such matters are clearly not determinative of the Application.

Matters which are clearly established on the evidence

1. I consider that the evidence clearly establishes that:

   a)the mother consented to the children traveling from New Zealand to Australia with the Respondent during some part of the holiday period at the end of Term 4 in 2016 – this consent was for the children to travel to Australia only for a holiday;[5] and

   b)at no time before the children were removed by the Respondent from New Zealand on 25 December 2016 did their mother consent to them moving to live in this country; and

   c)having learned,  on or around 25 December 2016, that the children were in Australia, the mother subsequently continued to press the Respondent for evidence of their return tickets to New Zealand in the same manner as she had previously requested this information (and information about where the children would be staying and their contact details during their time with him in Australia) before the children’s departure from New Zealand; and

   d)the Respondent retained the children in Australia on 6 January 2017; and

   e)after the Respondent told the mother he was retaining the children in Australia, she did not consent to them remaining in this country and sought their return to New Zealand and to her; and

   f)the mother did not in any way acquiesce to, or in, the Respondent’s retention of the children in Australia after 6 January 2017; and

   g)the Application for a return order for the children has been filed within one year of their retention in Australia;[6] and

   h)the children are under 16 years of age.[7]

   [5]See: the contents of the text communications passing between the parties before the children left New Zealand and the father’s evidence that his (at least initial) intention was that the children be returned to New Zealand.

   [6]          Regulation 16(1)(b) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth).

   [7]          Regulation 16(1A)(a) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth).

2. Having regard to the evidence before me, I am easily persuaded that:

   a)the children were habitually resident in New Zealand, a Convention country within the meaning of the Regulations, immediately before they were retained in Australia by the Respondent;[8]   and

   b)the mother had rights of custody in relation to the children under the law of New Zealand;[9] and

   c)the children’s retention in Australia was in breach of the mother’s rights of custody;[10] and

   d)at the time of the children’s retention in Australia, the mother was actually exercising her rights of custody or would have exercised them if the children had not been retained here.[11]

   [8]          Regulation 16(1A)(b) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

   [9]Regulation 16(1A)(c) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986; by operation of the New Zealand legislation, that is, the Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ).

   [10]         Regulation 16(1A)(d) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

   [11]         Regulation 16(1A)(e) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

3. It follows from the above that I am persuaded that the Applicant has satisfied the Court that the children’s retention in Australia after 6 January 2017 was wrongful under subregulation 16(1A) of the Regulations.[12]

   [12]         Regulation 16(1)(c) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

4. Given this conclusion and that the other statutory prerequisites (to which I have already referred) have been satisfied, I am compelled to make an order for the children’s return to New Zealand unless the Respondent establishes one of the exceptions particularised in Regulation 16(3) of the Regulations.

5. If, however, the Respondent establishes an exception, then – and only then – may the Court consider not making an order for the children’s return to New Zealand. [13] Even if this discretion is enlivened, the Court is not precluded from making a return order only because the Respondent has established a matter (here, grave risk) mentioned in Regulation 16(3) of the Regulations,[14] but may exercise its discretion to decline to order the children’s return to New Zealand.

   [13]         Regulation 16(3)(b) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

   [14]         Regulation 16(5) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

Has the Respondent established grave risk?

1. The only exception which upon which the Respondent relies is that of grave risk: that is, he contends that there is a grave risk the return of the children to New Zealand under the Convention will expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.[15]

   [15]         Regulation 16(3)(b) Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

2. In DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director-General, New South Wales Department of Community Services[16] the plurality (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) said, at 417 to 418: 

   41. In the judgment of the Full Court of the Family Court which gives rise to the first of the matters now under consideration (DP v Commonwealth Central Authority) it was said that there is a “strong line of authority both within and out of Australia, that the reg 16(3)(b) and (d) exceptions are to be narrowly construed”. Exactly what is meant by saying that reg 16(3)(b) is to be narrowly construed is not self-evident. On its face reg 16(3)(b) presents no difficult question of construction and it is not ambiguous. The burden of proof is plainly imposed on the person who opposes return. What must be established is clearly identified: that there is a grave risk that the return of the child would expose the child to certain types of harm or otherwise place the child in “an intolerable situation”. That requires some prediction, based on the evidence, of what may happen if the child is returned. In a case where the person opposing return raises the exception, a court cannot avoid making that prediction by repeating that it is not for the courts of the country to which or in which a child has been removed or retained to inquire into the best interests of the child. The exception requires courts to make the kind of inquiry and prediction that will inevitably involve some consideration of the interests of the child.

   42. Necessarily there will seldom be any certainty about the prediction. It is essential, however, to observe that certainty is not required: what is required is persuasion that there is a risk which warrants the qualitative description “grave”. Leaving aside the reference to “intolerable situation”, and confining attention to harm, the risk that is relevant is not limited to harm that will actually occur, it extends to a risk that the return would expose the child to harm.

   43. Because what is to be established is a grave risk of exposure to future harm, it may well be true to say that a court will not be persuaded of that without some clear and compelling evidence. The bare assertion, by the person opposing return, of fears for the child may well not be sufficient to persuade the court that there is a real risk of exposure to harm.

   44. These considerations, however, do not warrant a conclusion that reg 16(3)(b) is to be given a “narrow” rather than a “broad” construction. There is, in these circumstances, no evident choice to be made between a “narrow” and “broad” construction of the regulation. If that is what is meant by saying that it is to be given a “narrow construction” it must be rejected. The exception is to be given the meaning its words require.

   45. That is not to say, however, that reg 16(3)(b) will find frequent application. It is well-nigh inevitable that a child, taken from one country to another without the agreement of one parent, will suffer disruption, uncertainty and anxiety. That disruption, uncertainty and anxiety will recur, and may well be magnified, by having to return to the country of habitual residence. Regulation 16(3)(b) and Art 13(b) of the Convention intend to refer to more than this kind of result when they speak of a grave risk to the child of exposure to physical or psychological harm on return.

   (Footnotes omitted)

   [16](2001) 206 CLR 401; see also: Director-General, Department of Families & RSP (2003) FLC 93-152; Wolford & Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) [2014] FamCAFC 197

1. I have taken all of the evidence before me into account in my consideration of whether the Respondent has discharged the onus of establishing an exception to return. However, given that reference to the contents of the affidavits relied on by the Respondent and the evidence responding to the same from the mother and those others relied on by the Applicant establishes that there are a large number of significant factual issues between the mother and the Respondent, I have particularly concentrated on the evidence which may be seen as emanating from more ‘independent’ sources in undertaking my assessment.

2. The Respondent submits that the Court will be persuaded he has established the grave risk exception when regard is had to the evidence he has adduced[17] about the mother’s functioning as a parent generally and, more particularly, because of her asserted ongoing relationship with Mr I, a person who seriously assaulted her in March 2016.

   [17]         Personally and from the witnesses he called in his case.

   The mother’s general parenting

3. Save for those issues associated with her relationship and/or interaction with Mr I, the reality here is that, despite the father’s knowledge of the mother’s asserted parenting deficiencies (exclusive of those associated with her relationship with Mr I), he was content to permit the children to live primarily with her (and under her care) from the time of separation in about February 2014 until he determined to retain them in Australia on 6 January 2017. This remained the situation after he moved (for whatever reason) to live in Auckland, a number of hours’ drive from where the mother and the children were living – a move which limited his opportunity to maintain more frequent interaction with the children than that which had previously occurred. Whatever his concerns about the mother’s parenting generally, he did not apply then (or at any time) to the Court in New Zealand for parenting orders or seek to limit the mother’s interaction with the children in any particular way.

   Matters arising as a result of the mother’s relationship with Mr I

4. The mother reported Mr I’s assault of her in March 2016 to police.

5. Mr I was imprisoned for about five months as a consequence of this assault.

6. In June 2016, the mother obtained a Protection Order against Mr I. This Order includes the children as persons protected by it and remains in force. Despite it and the fact that Mr I has also served a further term of imprisonment as a consequence of his assault of a family member, it is clear that the mother reunited in relationship with him after his release from jail.

7. It is that decision, in essence, which has caused the Respondent to assert that a return to New Zealand and to their mother will place the children at grave risk of exposure to harm.

8. Members of Mr I’s immediate family (including both his parents) support the Respondent’s contention that the relationship between the mother and Mr I is so volatile that exposure to the same poses a grave risk to the children’s safety. In the affidavits they have provided in support of the Respondent’s case, they give evidence about Mr I’s behaviours and also about other matters on which they rely for their general shared assertion that, in essence, the children are better off remaining with their father in Australia. As noted during the course of the hearing, this is not the test to be applied in the determination of this Application.

9. In summary, the Respondent’s evidence (supported by that from members of Mr I’s family) is that Mr I is a man who is possessed of a violent temper; he clearly has very significant limitations in terms of anger management, likely magnified by substance abuse and/or alcohol abuse.

10. The fact of Mr I’s previous violent offences (including that against the mother) and that his latest alleged assault of her occurred despite the terms of the Protection Order seems to me to provide a valid and reasonable basis for the significant concerns expressed by the Respondent and members of Mr I’s family.

11. However, despite these concerns, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that any of Mr I’s family have taken any steps to report his interactions with the children to the relevant New Zealand child protection authority. This seems to be consistent with the Respondent’s evidence that Mr I has never physically harmed the children.

12. This evidence is buttressed, in a sense, by that given by the Principal of the school at which the children had attended in New Zealand until January 2017: namely, that the school has never been contacted by the police or the relevant New Zealand child welfare authority or any other agency with concerns about the children’s welfare whilst in their mother’s care and that he has never seen the mother engage in any inappropriate or neglectful behaviour vis-à-vis the children, nor has he seen anything to give him reason to suspect that she has behaved toward the children in such a manner.

13. Mr I is currently in jail. It seems he was remanded in custody about one week ago on a charge of assaulting the mother with intent to injure and on a charge of assaulting an arresting constable. On the evidence before me, it seems likely he will also be charged with breaching the operative Protection Order which the mother obtained after he assaulted her in March 2016.

14. The mother’s most recent evidence – provided after she alleges she had been assaulted by Mr I last week – is that she has ended her relationship with him because he broke his promise never to be violent to her again. She says she agrees he should not have anything to do with the children again and that the children should not be exposed to him at any time.

15. According to information provided this morning to the Australian Central Authority by the New Zealand Central Authority, Mr I will next appear before the relevant Court on 2 May 2017. This appearance will afford him the opportunity to apply for bail.

16. It is obviously impossible to know whether Mr I will in fact apply for bail and, if he does, whether such application will be successful. However, the information before me is that because he was in custody for a number of months last year for assaulting the mother and his sister and is now facing identical charges of assault (with the addition of a charge of breaching the Protection Order), it is thought that bail will be ‘very difficult’ to achieve and that any bail which was granted would likely include house detection, electronic bracelet monitoring and a prohibition on contact with his victims.

17. It is obvious that for as long as Mr I remains incarcerated, the risk to the children associated with his interactions with their mother is removed completely. In addition, provided that the mother implements her stated intention that the children have no contact with him and that her relationship with him is over, his release from custody will not expose the children to a risk of harm.

18. Further, given the Respondent’s statements that he acted as he has done to protect the children, the mother could be left in no doubt that he would likely bring any information to the notice of the relevant child protection authorities if she found herself weakening in her asserted resolve to ensure that neither she nor the children have any future relationship with Mr I and that the children do not have any future interaction with him.

19. As authority[18] has noted, it would be presumptuous in the extreme for this Court to conclude that the relevant New Zealand authorities would not enforce protection orders made by the Courts in that country or that, if moved by either the mother, the father or the relevant child protection authorities, the Courts in that country would not act to protect the children.

    [18]Murray v Director, Family Services (ACT) (1993) FLC 92-416  per Nicholson CJ and Fogarty J (with whom Finn J agreed on the relevant point at p 80,259); see also, Cooper v Casey (1995) FLC 92-575 at 81,698

20. For the reasons outlined above, I am not persuaded on the evidence before me that the Respondent has discharged the onus of establishing that there is a grave risk that the return of the children to New Zealand would expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.

21. As he has failed to establish an exception to the mandatory return of the children to New Zealand, I am mandated by the Regulations to order that the children return to New Zealand.

22. If I am wrong in my determination that the father has failed to discharge the onus of establishing a relevant matter particularised in Regulation 16(3), I record that, in the exercise of the discretion,[19] I would not have been persuaded to refuse to order the return of the children to New Zealand. 

    [19]De L v Director-General, NSW Dept of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640 at 661; FLC 92-706 at 83,456; State Central Authority & DB [2002] FamCA 804, per Kay J; HZ & State Central Authority [2006] FLC 93-264; (2006) 35 Fam LR 489; [2006] FamCA 466; Harries & Harries (2011) 45 Fam LR 598; [2011] FamCAFC 113.

23. I have reached this conclusion because I consider that:

    a)given that, until they travelled to Australia in the manner I have already summarised, the children had lived all of their lives in New Zealand, that country provides the more suitable forum for the determination of their future care arrangements;  and

    b)the return of the children to New Zealand will return them to the parenting regime which had been implemented, from about February 2014 until 25 December 2016, with the agreement of their parents; and

    c)the return of the children to New Zealand will return them to their home, their known environs and the school at which they had previously attended for all of their education; and

    d)there is nothing to suggest that the Respondent will be unable to instigate proceedings for parenting orders in New Zealand – as he obviously could have done at any time before he decided to retain the children in Australia on 6 January 2017; and

    e)given that the Respondent lived in New Zealand until 25 December 2016, if he wishes, he will be able to seek that the Court there make whatever parenting orders he advances are in the children’s best interests: for example, in any such proceedings, he could seek leave to rely on the affidavits of those who have been prepared to be witnesses in these proceedings or, if it is financially impossible for him and his partner to return to stay in New Zealand pending the hearing of any such application (or if their pending parental obligations make that impossible or impracticable), seek the leave of the New Zealand Court to appear from Australia by video-link; and

    f)whilst there may well be financial imposts, there is nothing to suggest that the Respondent would likely encounter any hindrance in accessing either legal assistance or the Courts in New Zealand – his country of origin and his home until 25 December 2016; and

    g)given the similarities in the law as between New Zealand and Australia, whatever determination is arrived at for the children’s future parenting arrangements, it is one which will involve a determination of whatever parenting arrangement is in their best interests;  and

    h)the purpose and underlying philosophy of the Convention would be significantly at risk of frustration if a return order were not made in the circumstances of this case.

Conclusion

1. For the reasons outlined above, I am satisfied that the return order sought by the Applicant ought be made. 

2. In addition, I consider that the children’s return to New Zealand should not be delayed because, first, the object of the Convention is to secure the prompt return of children and, secondly, these children were wrongfully retained in Australia on 6 January 2017, with consequent disruption to their education in New Zealand – a matter which should be remedied as soon as possible so as to ensure that they are able to recommence their previous attendance at their school as soon as practicable.

3. As raised during the course of the hearing, the concerns raised in these proceedings are such that I am satisfied that it is desirable to make orders requiring that the Applicant provide specified authorities in New Zealand with a copy of the documents particularised in the Order and that such orders are appropriate to give effect to the Convention.[20]

   [20]         Regulation 15 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.

4. For the reasons expressed, I make orders in terms of those set out at the commencement of these Reasons for Judgment.

I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 20 April 2017.

Associate:

Date:              20 April 2017