Director-General, Department of Child Safety & Milson

Link copied
Case Copied 90 min read

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
CHILD SAFETY & MILSON
[2008] FamCA 872
FAMILY LAW - CHILDREN - HAGUE CONVENTION - Application for return of children to New Zealand - Alleged wrongful removal by mother in breach of father’s rights of custody under New Zealand law – Mother’s removal of children from New Zealand to Australia in breach of father’s right of custody to determine children’s place of residence – Consent – Mother failed to discharge onus that father consented to the removal or acquiesced in relation to it – Children’s objection to return – Mother established the children’s objection and that in relation to each child the objection showed a strength of feeling beyond the mere expression of a preference or ordinary wishes and that each had attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account his or her views – Discretion to refuse to make a return order enlivened – Discretion exercised to refuse to make a return order
Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) Regs 16(1A), 16(3)(a)(ii), 16(3)(c)

AF v M B-F [2008] EWHC 272 (Fam)
Agee v Agee (2000) FLC 93-055
A v Central Authority for New Zealand [1996] NZLR 517
B v Director-General, Department of Community Services [2001] FamCA 50
Clarke v Carson [1996] 1 NZLR 349
De L v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640
De L v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (1997) FLC 92-739
Director General, Department of Community Services v T (Family Court of Australia, O’Ryan J, 30 April 1997)
Director General, Department of Families Youth and Community Care v Thorpe (1997) FLC 92-785
Director General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v A [1999] FamCA 182
Director General, Department of Youth and Community Care Queensland v A [2000] FamCA 738
Director General, NSW Department of Community Services v S [1999] FamCA 611
Director-General, Department of Child Safety and Stratford (2005) FLC 93-249
Director-General, Department of Community Services v Crowe (1996) FLC 92-717
Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v Hobbs (2000) FLC 93-007
DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director General, NSW Department of Community Services (2001) 206 CLR 401
InRe F (Hague Convention: Child’s Objections) (2006) FLC 93-277
In reP (A Child) (Abduction: Custody Rights) (2004) EWCA Civ 971; 2004 All ER (D) 520; 2005 Fam 293
MW and Director-General of the Department of Community Services [2008] HCA 12 28 March 2008
Panayotides and Panayotides (1997) FLC 92-733
Re M (Abduction: Child’s Objections) [2007] EWCA Civ 260
Re M & Anor [2007] UKHL 55
Re T (Abduction: Child’s Objections to Return) [2000] 2 FLR 192
S v S (Child Abduction) (Child’s Views) [1993] Fam 242
Vigreux v Michel [2006] EWCA Civ 630

Zaffino v Zaffino (Abduction: Children’s Views) [2005] EWCA Civ 1012; [2006] 1 FLR 410

APPLICANT: Director-General, Department of Child Safety
RESPONDENT: Ms Milson
FILE NUMBER: BRC 3266 of 2008
DATE DELIVERED: 22 October 2008
PLACE DELIVERED:
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Director-General, Department of Child Safety & Milson and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] FamCA 872
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by the Director-General, Department of Child Safety, and the father of two children, seeking the return of the children to New Zealand under the Hague Convention. The father alleged that the children had been removed from New Zealand without his knowledge or consent. The mother, however, contended that the father had consented to the children's relocation. The court was required to determine whether the father had provided his consent to the children's removal from New Zealand.

The central legal issue before the court was how to resolve disputed affidavit evidence concerning the father's consent to the children's relocation, in circumstances where no oral evidence was presented. The court had to consider the principles established in English case law, specifically *In re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction)* and *In re P (A Child) (Abduction: Custody Rights)*, which govern the approach to disputed facts in Convention matters. These principles dictate that if a judge is faced with irreconcilable affidavit evidence and no oral evidence is available, the judge must look for compelling independent extraneous evidence to reject sworn testimony. Alternatively, the affidavit evidence itself may be inherently improbable. If neither of these conditions is met, the party bearing the onus of proof will fail to establish their case.

Applying these principles, the court examined the father's sworn testimony, which stated he was unaware of the children's departure from New Zealand and had not consented to their relocation. The father's affidavit asserted he was "stunned" to be informed the children were living in Australia and had "absolutely no idea where the children are." He expressed distress at the children being taken without his knowledge or consent, which made ongoing contact impossible. The court noted that the mother's assertion of consent was not supported by any independent extraneous evidence, nor was her affidavit inherently improbable. Consequently, the father had not established his case that the children were removed without his consent.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In In reP (A Child) (Abduction: Custody Rights) (2004) EWCA Civ 971; 2004 All ER (D) 520; 2005 Fam 293, the English Court of Appeal said, as to the proper approach in resolving disputed matters of fact in Convention matters:20 The law is well settled. In In reF (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548, 553-554 Butler-Sloss LJ said:If a judge is faced with irreconcilable affidavit evidence and no oral evidence is available or, as in this case, there was no application to call it, how does the judge resolve the disputed evidence? It may turn out not to be crucial to the decision, thus not requiring a determination. If the issue has to be faced on disputed non-oral evidence, the judge has to look to see if there is independent extraneous evidence in support of one side. That evidence has, in my judgment, to be compelling before the judge is entitled to reject the sworn testimony of a deponent. Alternatively, the evidence contained within the affidavit may in itself be inherently improbable and therefore so unreliable that the judge is entitled to reject it. If, however, there are no grounds for rejecting the written evidence on either side, the applicant will have failed to establish his case. (emphasis added) In In reF (A Minor) (Child Abduction): (Custody Rights Abroad) [1995] Fam 224, 232 she added:Admission of oral evidence in Convention cases should be allowed sparingly. If the issues between the parties cannot be resolved on affidavit the article 13(b) criteria will not have been established. The child is returned pursuant to article 12 and it will be for the court of habitual residence to determine the disputed issues with the opportunity to hear oral evidence and the parties cross-examined. (emphasis added) In Stratford (above) I said, after referring to these passages in In re P:49Thus, where there is disputed non-oral evidence, any “extraneous independent evidence” must be more than persuasive, and indeed, be compelling, to reject a deponent’s sworn testimony, such that, where there are “no grounds for rejecting the written evidence on either side”, the party carrying the onus will have failed to establish his or her case. Re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 458 at 553-4 per Butler-Sloss LJ, cited in In re P, at par 20, set out above. It is within the framework of these principles that I must now consider the mother’s and the father’s sworn testimony on the consent issue. The father said in his affidavit filed on 11 April 2008 (filed with the Central Authority’s application), pars 19-22:19. In December 2007 I received a telephone call from a representative of the Inland Revenue Department in Australia. He informed me that payment of child support was now being administered by the Child Support Agency in Australia. This was, he said, because the children were now living in Australia, and, he said, I was now liable to make payments via the IRD in Australia. At the time, IRD in New Zealand was continuing to deduct child support payments from my wages.20. I was stunned to be informed that the children were now living in Australia, because I had not known, to that point, that they had even left New Zealand.…22. I have absolutely no idea where the children are. I have received no communication at all from [the mother]. I am very upset the children have been taken away from New Zealand without my knowledge and consent; and effectively making it impossible for me to have ongoing regular contact with them. (emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established