Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Myles
[2016] FCCA 772
•8 April, 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY INSPECTORATE v MYLES & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 772 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Application for the imposition of pecuniary penalties – organising unlawful industrial action – threatening to organise unlawful industrial action – derivative liability of employee union. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.12, 19(1)(c), 19(2), 53(1), 53(2)(a), 355, 363(1), 417(1), 417(2), 417(2)(a), 512, 539, 546(3), 557(1), 557(2), 793(1), 793(2) Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) s.27 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), s.134 |
| Attorney-General (SA) v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84 Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v CFMEU [2015] FCAFC 59 Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 353 Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1173 Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] FCA 407 |
| Applicant: | DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY INSPECTORATE |
| First Respondent: | MICHAEL MYLES |
| Second Respondent: | CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION |
| File Number: | BRG 312 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 25 November, 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 25 November, 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 8 April, 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Pratt |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | DLA Piper |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Doust |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Hall Payne Lawyers |
ORDERS
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
on 27 May 2014 the First Respondent contravened s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by organising unlawful industrial action;
on 27 May 2014 the First Respondent twice separately contravened s.355 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) as follows:
(a)once when he organised unlawful industrial action; and
(b)again when he threatened to organise further unlawful industrial action,
both times with the intent to coerce John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd into not allocating particular duties to a particular employee.
THE COURT FURTHER DECLARES THAT:
by reason of ss.363 and 793 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the Second Respondent is taken to have contravened s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) once by virtue of the contravention of s.417(1) committed by the First Respondent on 27 May 2014;
by reason of ss. 363 and 793 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the Second Respondent is taken to have contravened s.355 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) once on two separate occasions by virtue of the two contraventions of s.355 committed by the First Respondent on 27 May 2014.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
the First Respondent pay a pecuniary penalty for his contravention of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) of $7,000;
the Second Respondent pay a pecuniary penalty for the contravention of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by the First Respondent of $45,000;
the pecuniary penalties hereby ordered to be paid by the First and Second Respondents within 28 days to the Commonwealth pursuant to s.546(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG312 of 2015
| DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY INSPECTORATE |
Applicant
And
| MICHAEL MYLES |
First Respondent
And
| CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 27 May, 2014 Michael Myles, an officer of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, attended at the Queensland University of Technology campus at Kelvin Grove, Brisbane where a significant construction project was underway. Mr Myles organised for some of the workers on the site to stop work until certain events had taken place. Mr Myles now agrees with the applicant that in doing so he breached the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in several respects. Because he was an officer and employee of the CFMEU at the time, the CFMEU accepts that it must be taken to have also contravened the Fair Work Act.
This application has now resolved such that all that remains for the Court is to determine the penalty that ought to be imposed upon Mr Myles and the CFMEU for the admitted breaches of the Fair Work Act.
For the reasons that follow, I have determined that a penalty approaching the maximum penalty of $15,000 is appropriate given the wilful and knowing contravention of the Act committed by Mr Myles. A penalty, approaching the maximum is also appropriate for the CFMEU.
Background
In May, 2014 a $60 million project for the demolition and refurbishment of existing buildings and the construction of a new building at the Queensland University of Technology’s Kelvin Grove campus in Brisbane was being undertaken by John Holland Queensland Pty Ltd. For that purpose, John Holland engaged 10 subcontractors to assist it to undertake the project. The project was overseen by a project manager, Mr Kazaglis, and a site manager, Mr Weigel, who were both employees of John Holland.
Michael Myles was an official employed by the CFMEU. He held entry permits issued to him pursuant to s.134 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) and s.512 of the Fair Work Act that permitted him to enter work sites in certain circumstances.
Four of the subcontractors to John Holland are relevant to these proceedings, namely Morrow Equipment LLC, Johnston Contracting Pty Ltd, Structural Systems (Northern) Pty Ltd and Oneform (Qld) Pty Ltd. John Holland and each of the four subcontractors I have just specified had enterprise agreements[1] that were:
a)enterprise agreements within the meaning of s.12 of the Fair Work Act and for the purposes of s.417(1)(a) of the Fair Work Act;
b)approved by the Fair Work Commission under Subdivision B of Division 4 of Part 2-4 of the Fair Work Act;
c)had nominal expiry dates within the meaning of s.12 and for the purposes of s.417(1)(a) of the Fair Work Act that were, in the case of each agreement, after 27 May, 2014;
d)expressed to cover the CFMEU and therefore covered the CFMEU for the purposes of ss.53(2)(a) and 417(2) of the Fair Work Act;
e)expressed to, and therefore, for the purposes of ss.53(1) and 417(2)(a) of the Fair Work Act, did cover employees employed by each of the employees of each of those organisations working on the QUT Project.
[1] John Holland Queensland Pty Ltd Pty Limited Building and Construction Enterprise Agreement (QLD & NT) 2012 – 2016, Morrow Equipment LLC and CFMEU Union Collective Agreement 2011-2015, Johnston Contracting Pty Ltd and CFMEU Collective Agreement 2011-2015, Oneform Pty Ltd and CFMEU Collective Agreement 2011-2015 and Structural Systems (Northern) Pty Ltd and CFMEU Union Collective Agreement 2011-2015
At approximately 6:00am on 27 May, 2014 Mr Myles attended the QUT Project site. He organised a meeting to be held in a carpark adjacent to the site. At the meeting he addressed workers who were scheduled to work on the project that day, some of whom were employed by the subcontractors I have already specified.
About one hour later, Mr Myles told Mr Weigel that:
The meeting has decided that as a result of your actions in causing safety issues on site, you need to be stood down from the site for one day and that you need to be re-inducted into Oneform procedures. The men are going to sit out and not do any work until you comply with this requirement.
Shortly after at about 7:15am, Mr Myles spoke to Mr Weigel, Mr Kazaglis, and some others. They had the following conversation:
The First Respondent: We want Brian to be stood aside and for him to undergo re-induction.
Mr Kazaglis: No, that's not going to happen. We are not happy to go down that path. We are not going to be standing Brian aside.
Mr Weigel:I am happy to do some audits for your task risk assessments to get the guys back to work.
The First Respondent: No, we have decided, we want you stood aside and you to be re-inducted.
At around 7:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. various employees of the four abovenamed subcontractors left the QUT Project site and did not perform their duties for the remainder of the day. These workers did so without permission from either John Holland or their respective employers.
The action taken by the employees of the subcontractors who left the QUT Project site caused disruption to the work scheduled to be carried out on the QUT Project on that day.
The Statutory Framework
An employee, an employee organisation or an officer of an employee organisation covered by an enterprise agreement that has been approved by the Fair Work Commission must not organise or engage in industrial action from the day on which the relevant enterprise agreement is approved until its nominal expiry date has passed, whether or not the industrial action relates to a matter dealt with in the agreement or determination s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act.
Industrial action for the purposes of the Fair Work Act includes a failure or refusal by an employee to attend for work or a failure or refusal to perform any work at all by an employee who attends for work, except where the employee has a reasonable concern about an imminent risk to his or her health or safety: s.19(1)(c) of the Fair Work Act.
Further, a person must not organise or take, or threaten to organise or take, any action against another person with intent to coerce the other person to not allocate particular duties or responsibilities to a particular employee: s.355(c) of the Fair Work Act.
Principles for determining penalty
There are at least three purposes for imposing penalties for breaches of industrial laws, namely:
a)punishment – which must be proportionate to the offence and in accordance with prevailing standards of punishment;
b)deterrence – both specific (personal) and general; and
c)rehabilitation.
Any penalty imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct. The task which a sentencing judge is faced with is one of ‘instinctive synthesis’. That process requires that a court take into account all relevant factors and to arrive at a result which takes due account of them all.
In determining an appropriate penalty to impose, the first step is to identify the separate contraventions involved. The Court should then consider whether multiple contraventions of the same provision of the Fair Work Act must be taken to be a single contravention by reason of s.557(1) of the Act.
Where there are multiple contraventions that cannot be taken as a single contravention pursuant to s.417(1) of the Act, it is still necessary to consider whether those multiple contraventions constitute a course of conduct. The contravener should not be penalised more than once for the same conduct. The penalties imposed by the Court in respect of multiple contraventions should be an appropriate response to the conduct of the contravener.
Finally, the Court should consider the appropriate penalty for the contravention and, if relevant, each group of contraventions, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances. The Court should apply an ‘instinctive synthesis’ in assessing whether it is an appropriate response to the conduct which led to the contraventions.
The contraventions
The parties agree that the employees of the subcontractors specified above who left the QUT Project site on 27 May, 2014 following their meeting with Mr Myles thereby engaged in industrial action within the meaning of s.19(1)(c) of the Fair Work Act.
Mr Myles admits that by organising the industrial action on 27 May, 2014 he contravened s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act. The applicant submits that it is possible to identify five separate contraventions of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act — one in respect of each of the abovementioned enterprise agreements. I accept that argument.
However, by s.557(1) of the Fair Work Act two or more contraventions of a civil remedy provision referred to in subsection s.417(2) are taken to constitute a single contravention if the contraventions are committed by the same person and the contraventions arose out of a course of conduct by that person. Section 417(1) is a civil remedy provision. It is also referred to in s.557(2) of the Fair Work Act. The five contraventions of s.417(1) were committed by the same person – Mr Myles. I am satisfied that in the circumstances set out above, the contraventions arose out of a course of conduct by Mr Myles.
In those circumstances s.557(1) of the Fair Work Act requires that the five contraventions committed by Mr Myles be taken to constitute a single contravention.
Mr Myles also admits that when he organised the industrial action and then threatened to organise further industrial action, both times with the intent to coerce John Holland into not allocating particular duties to Mr Weigel he contravened s.355 of the Fair Work Act.
The applicant submits that two separate contraventions of s.355 may be identified. The first is organising the relevant industrial action with intent to coerce. The second is threatening to organise further industrial action with intent to coerce. Both the organisation of industrial action and the threat to organise further industrial action were undertaken with the intent to coerce John Holland to not allocate particular duties or responsibilities to Mr Weigel. The submission is clearly correct.
The two contraventions of s.355 of the Act do not, however, engage s.557(1) of the Act because s.355 is not referred to in s.557(2) of the Act. Those two contraventions cannot be taken to be a single contravention of s.355 of the Act.
However, the applicant argues that Mr Myles conduct is such that the single contravention of s.417(1) of the Act and the two contraventions of s.355 of the Act should be treated as a single course of conduct. I also accept that submission. The relevant conduct took place on one day over a short space of time and was directed to a single identifiable purpose. There was not two or more incursions into unlawful conduct, but rather one multi-faceted course of unlawful conduct, to adapt the words of Wells J in Attorney-General (SA) v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84 at 92-93.
Finally, the CFMEU admits that by reason of s.363(1) of the Fair Work Act or ss.793(1), and 793(2) of the Fair Work Act, or a combination of all three subsections, the conduct and state of mind of Mr Myles in engaging in the contravening conduct as a CFMEU official is taken to be the conduct and state of mind of the CFMEU.
Further, the CFMEU admits that it is liable for Mr Myles’ contraventions because, at the relevant time:
a)Mr Myles was an official of the CFMEU;
b)Mr Myles engaged in the contravening conduct in his capacity as an official of the CFMEU; and
c)in engaging in the contravening conduct, Mr Myles was acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authority as an official of the CFMEU.
Apart from declaratory relief that records the contraventions of the Fair Work Act by Mr Myles and the CFMEU, the applicant seeks the imposition of one pecuniary penalty upon each of the respondents for their respective contraventions. It is to the question of penalty that I now turn.
At the time of hearing, the parties were appropriately cautious not to make submissions about the amount or range of penalty given the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v CFMEU [2015] FCAFC 59. The High Court had not delivered its decision in the appeal of that case. Accordingly, the parties only referred the Court to general principles relevant to determining penalty.
Section 539 of the Fair Work Act sets out the maximum penalties for the relevant contraventions. The maximum penalties for a contravention of ss.355 and 417(1) of the Fair Work Act are both 60 penalty units for an individual and 300 penalty units for a body corporate. The CFMEU is a body corporate for these purposes: s.27 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth). At the time of the contraventions, a penalty unit was $170.00. Accordingly, the maximum penalty the Court might impose on Mr Myles in respect of each contravention is $10,200.00. The maximum it might impose upon the CMFEU in respect of each contravention is $51,000.00.
The parties each identified a list of matters that they argue are relevant to determining the amount of the penalties to be imposed. Their lists are more or less similar. I was reminded that none of these factors are mandatory considerations (see, e.g., Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560). I now turn to address those matters.
The applicant contends that the contraventions were serious. He argues that Mr Myles’ conduct was deliberate and unlawful; moreover, it says that the concerns about safety expressed by the first respondent were not genuine. Rather, the applicant submits that Mr Myles’ conduct amounted to a calculated effort to inflict loss and damage to John Holland. The applicant argues that Mr Myles orchestrated the unlawful industrial action of a large number of workers in an attempt to coerce John Holland into restricting the duties of Mr Weigel.
Mr Myles contends that the contravening conduct falls far short of the most serious type of contraventions of ss.417 and 355. He argues that the work stoppage was not extended (lasting only one day) and the only reason offered for the conduct was concern for safety. Mr Myles argues that Mr Weigel implicitly accepted the validity of Mr Myles’ concerns by offering to do audits. Finally, Mr Myles argues that the absence of violence, unruly conduct, or threats of that type of conduct is significant.
In my view, the action taken by Mr Myles was serious and was nothing short of a wilful and deliberate contravention of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act. The industrial action involved a number of employees spread across four subcontractors and a number of trades. The sole purpose was to restrict the duties of the site manager – a single employee of John Holland – whose role it was to manager the QUT Project site. The stoppage caused delays, inconvenience and cost to John Holland. The action was calculated to do so, so that it had a coercive effect upon John Holland.
While it is the case that the stoppage did not involve violence or unruly conduct, that is a matter of less significance in my view. It does not detract from Mr Myles’ culpability. His conduct was a deliberate and intentional disregard of workplace laws.
I am not persuaded that there was a genuine safety concern that Mr Myles wished to address. If that was the case and the concern was about an imminent risk to health and safety, the action that he organised would not have been industrial action for the purposes of the Act: s.19(2) of the Fair Work Act. There would have been no contravention of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act. Any other concern about safety that fell short of an imminent risk to health or safety fell to be dealt with pursuant to the dispute resolution mechanism in the enterprise agreement that covered the CFMEU and John Holland. For reasons that remain entirely unexplained, Mr Myles did not seek to engage that process. There is no evidence that he sought to counsel the relevant employees to engage that process. The only response was to knowingly engage in unlawful industrial action and to threaten further industrial action if John Holland did not bend to Mr Myles’ will.
I do not accept the submission that the fact that Mr Weigel offered to undertake safety audits when he met with Mr Myles is an acceptance of the validity of the concerns that were being raise about safety, implicit or otherwise. Rather, it is more likely that it was nothing more than a charitable attempt to diffuse a tense situation and get the relevant employees back to work.
Mr Myles is no stranger to the workings of the Fair Work Act or the obligations that it imposes upon the officials of employee unions.
Neither is the CFMEU. As the applicant points out, the CFMEU has a long history of non-compliance with the Fair Work Act and the industrial legislation that has preceded it.
In previous applications, judges of the Federal Court have described that the CFMEU has a ‘…depressing litany of misbehaviour’ (Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 353 at para [96]), a ‘propensity to deliberately flout industrial legislation which proscribe coercive conduct’ (Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 at para [61]), ‘a deplorable attitude, … to its legal obligations and the statutory processes which govern relations between unions and employers in this country’ (Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 at para [62]), ‘an attitude of indifference … to compliance with the requirements of the legislation …’ (Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] FCA 407 at para [105]) and ‘an organisational culture in which contraventions of the law have become normalised’ (Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1173 at para [29].
The applicant argues that the need for specific and general deterrence is a most significant consideration in this application. I accept that submission. At least insofar as the CFMEU is concerned, it and those who control it, seemingly consider that, when the circumstances suit the ends of that organisation, threats, coercion and unlawful action are the preferable alternative to compliance with the industrial laws of this country.
As was pointed out by Tracey J in Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 at paras [63]:
63. Neither the CFMEU nor any individual respondent is to be punished again for earlier misconduct. They are, however, to be punished more severely than they would have been had they had no adverse record or been responsible for only a few isolated incidents over a period of many years. Their continued willingness to engage in contravening conduct supports the view that earlier penalties, some of them severe, had not had a deterrent effect: cf Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477-8. The longer such recidivism continues the more likely it is that this consideration will carry greater weight than the principle that the maximum available penalty must be reserved for the worst possible offending.
Both Mr Myles and the CFMEU acknowledge the importance of prior conduct, although they also draw my attention to the need for any penalty that is imposed to be proportionate to the gravity of the offending.
An appropriate penalty is also a penalty that prevents Mr Myles and the CFMEU from treating the penalties as ‘the cost of doing business’: Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 353 per Tracey J at [83]. In the circumstances described in the cases I have referred to above, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the CFMEU views the penalties imposed upon it for breaches of industrial legislation as just that – the cost of doing business.
Neither Mr Myles nor the CFMEU have expressed any contrition for Mr Myles’ actions. While they ultimately admitted liability for the contraventions, there is nothing to suggest any regret for the conduct. For example, there is no evidence that Mr Myles has been reprimanded by the CFMEU, nor that the CFMUE has taken steps to insure that its officials and Mr Myles in particular will comply with their legal obligations in the future.
The applicant submits that neither respondent cooperated with it during the course of its investigation as the enforcement authority. There is no evidence to suggest that the submission is not correct. I accept it.
Mr Myles and the CFMEU ague that there should be a discount on any penalty to take into account the acceptance by them of liability in this matter. In that respect, the history of these proceedings are important.
This application first came before the Court on 11 May, 2015. At that time there were over forty respondents. The application was adjourned to 25 May, 2015 when I made directions for the parties to file their trial material prior to attending mediation. The parties met those directions. The applicant filed all of the evidence in chief upon which he wished to rely at trial. That evidence ran to five sizable affidavits and some 200 pages in length. It was, no doubt, an expensive exercise, but nonetheless one which was designed to ensue that all parties understood clearly the case they had to meet when they participated in mediation. The respondents, on the other hand filed no evidence at all. Whilst Mr Myles had a legitimate claim to reserve his defence, the CFMEU did not, but nonetheless it had filed a defence that put everything in issue and filed no evidence to advance the mediation.
Mediation took place on 2 September, 2015, but it was unsuccessful. On 7 October, 2015 the matter was listed for trial on 25 November, 2015 with an estimated hearing time of three days.
However, prior to the final hearing, the parties were able to resolve a number of matters. On 18 November, 2015 the applicant filed an application seeking leave to file an amended statement of claim and that leave be given to Mr Myles and the CFMEU to file an amended defence. In short, the parties had agreed on the contraventions of the respondents and relevant facts and sought to proceed to a hearing in respect of penalty only. I granted that leave. A penalty hearing took place on 25 November, 2015.
In my view neither Mr Myles nor the CFMEU have acted in a way so as to attract a discount on the penalty that might otherwise be imploded upon them. In fact their conduct has caused the applicant to incur cost in the preparation of evidence and has caused a waste of the Court’s time and resources. Three hearing days were allocated for the trial. By the time the Court was notified that the three days would not be required, it was too late to allocate other hearings to those days.
Conclusion
Mr Myles deliberately contravened the Fair Work Act by organising the unlawful industrial action taken on 27 May, 2014 at the QUT Project site. It was conduct that was designed to achieve an illegitimate end. It was conduct that was taken in the face of a lawful alternative that was available to address his concerns under the relevant enterprise agreement. It is significant that he chose to adopt the unlawful alternative rather than the lawful alternative.
There is a strong need for deterrence in this case. I intend to apply no discount to take into account the admissions of liability made by Mr Myles. It is, in my view, too little too late.
I intend to impose one penalty in respect of Mr Myles’ contravention of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act. I do not intend to impose a penalty in respect of the two contraventions of s.355 of the Fair Work Act I have identified above because they arose out of the same course of conduct pursued by Mr Myles on 27 May, 2014.
In respect of the contravention of s.417(1) of the Fair Work Act an appropriate penalty is $7,000. That penalty, in my view, properly reflects the seriousness of Mr Myles’ conduct, the deliberate nature of his conduct and carries a sufficient deterrent effect to achieve it purpose. It is an appropriate response, in my view, to the offending conduct.
I intend to impose only one penalty on the CFMEU for the reasons I have just set out in respect of Mr Myles.
The CFMEU’s history of unlawful industrial activity demands that the penalty imposed carries a very significant deterrent effect. I am conscious that I cannot and should not punish the CFMEU for its prior contravening conduct, but its woeful prior history demands that some attempt be made to deter future contraventions.
I accept the applicant’s submission that previous penalties in respect of the CFMEU’s history of contraventions have apparently not deterred the CFMEU and its officials from contravening industrial legislation. I accept that the need for specific deterrence is significant. Accordingly, in my view an appropriate penalty to achieve that end is $45,000.
I make the orders set out at the commencement of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Jarrett delivered on 8 April, 2016.
Date: 8 April, 2016
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