Dines and North City Holden
[1997] IRCA 57
•07 February 1997
DECISION NO:57/97
CATCHWORDS
INDUSTRIAL LAW - termination of employment - claim of unlawful termination - valid reason but procedural unfairness - whether compensation should be awarded.
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (C'th) (formerly Industrial Relations Act 1988) Ss 170DC, 170DE(1), 170EA, 170EE
Bartucciotto v Euro Printing Company Pty Limited, 1996 unreported, 72/96,
Von Doussa J
Blythe Chemicals Limited v Bushnell (1933) 49 CLR 66
Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Limited unreported, IRCR 606/96,
13 December 1996, Wilcox CJ von Doussa J and Marshall J,
Elvidge v Burswood Resort Management Limited, unreported, IRCA 631/1996,
16 December 1996, Ritter JR,
Fargie v Freedom Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd, unreported, IRCA 498/96 Parkinson
JR, 14 October 1996
Garbutt v Stothers, unreported, IRCA 416/96 Ritter JR, 27 August 1996
Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 129 ALR 628
Janicek v ICI Dulux, unreported, IRCA 599/1995, 4 September 1995,
Kenefick v Australian Submarine Corporation Pty Limited (1996) 65 IR 366,
Lupoi v Philips Fox, unreported, IRCA 485/96, Ritter JR, 3 October 1996
Nettlefold v Kym Smoker Pty Limited, unreported, Lee J, 4 October 1996,
Nicolson v Heaven and Earth Gallery (1994) 1 IRCR 199
North v Television Corporation Limited (1976) 11 ALR 599.
Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Limited (1996) 62 IR 371
Yew v ACI Glass Packaging Pty Limited, unreported, 596/1996, 11 December 1996, Wilcox CJ
ANTHONY JOHN DINES and NORTH CITY HOLDEN
WI196/1465
Before : RITTER JR
Place : PERTH
Date of Judgment : 7 FEBRUARY 1997
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT )
OF AUSTRALIA )
W.A. DISTRICT REGISTRY )
WI96/1465
B E T W E E N:
ANTHONY JOHN DINES
Applicant
A N D:
NORTH CITY HOLDEN
Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDERS
7 FEBRUARY 1997 PERTH RITTER JR
THE COURT DECLARES AND ORDERS THAT:
The respondent terminated the employment of the applicant in contravention of section 170DC of the Act.
Insofar as the applicant alleges that the respondent contravened section 170DE(1) of the Act, the application is dismissed.
There be no order as to compensation.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT )
OF AUSTRALIA )
VICTORIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY )
No. WI 1465 of 1996
B E T W E E N:
ANTHONY JOHN DINES
Applicant
A N D:
NORTH CITY HOLDEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
7 FEBRUARY 1997 RITTER JR
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
(Revised from the Transcript)
INTRODUCTION
This is an application pursuant to section 170EA of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (formerly called Industrial Relations Act) (the "Act") by the applicant for a remedy in respect of the termination of his employment.
The applicant was employed as a sales person by the respondent from 14 March 1996 until 25 July 1996. The remedy the applicant seeks is that of compensation. The respondent does not challenge that if there is an unlawful termination of employment, compensation is the appropriate remedy to consider. The applicant alleges there were two contraventions of the Act, the first being a contravention of section 170DC of the Act, the second being a contravention of section 170DE(1) of the Act.
The applicant appeared in person and the respondent was represented by Mr Jones from the CCI. By agreement between the parties, the respondent presented its case first. The respondent called as witnesses, Mr Dennis Loader, a Director of the respondent, Mr Stephen Whipp, the then Sales Manager of the respondent and Ms Alison Fahey, an After Market Sales Officer of the respondent. The applicant gave evidence himself but did not call any witnesses.
Essentially the respondent's case was that it denied a contravention of either section 170DC or section 170DE(1) of the Act, but said that if it had contravened section 170DE of the Act, then there ought to be no compensation paid to the applicant.
The respondent's case was that it had a valid reason to terminate the employment of the applicant because in the course of selling a motor vehicle, being a Holden Apollo, to a Mr Gray on behalf of his mother, Mrs Gray, the applicant made a gross misrepresentation about the motor vehicle. It was alleged the applicant indicated the motor vehicle concerned had been the vehicle of and solely driven by the Service Manager of the respondent when this was not the case. The vehicle in question was one of a fleet of courtesy vehicles which the respondent used to loan to customers of the respondent at times when those customers left their car to be serviced by the respondent.
The respondent emphasised as part of its case the importance of the honesty of its sales people in dealing with customers and members of the public. Indeed the respondent referred to the requirement in the contract of employment between the applicant and the respondent, and in particular in the job specification of the contract of employment at clause 8, that all staff were required to have outstanding business ethics.
I have mentioned earlier the witnesses the respondent called. It did not call Mr or Mrs Gray as witnesses, the relevance of which I will discuss a little later.
THE FACTS
The respondent's case as to the series of events is as follows. It is clear and there is no doubt that Mr Gray did indeed purchase the Apollo motor vehicle from the respondent.
It is also clear that the applicant was the sales person who sold the motor vehicle. The motor vehicle concerned was a courtesy vehicle that had been used by the respondent in the manner that I earlier described. Ms Alison Fahey gave evidence of a conversation that she had involving Mr Gray and the applicant. She said that she was called by the applicant to the sales area of the respondent's premises after the applicant had completed the sale of the motor vehicle to Mr Gray. One of her functions was to ask customers whether they required an extended warranty plan offered by the respondent.
She said that she sat in the office of the applicant and the customer, Mr Gray, was on the other side of the desk. She said that ordinarily the salesmen then leave the office, but in this instance the applicant remained just outside or on the edge of the office. Ms Fahey said that when she asked Mr Gray whether he wanted the extended warranty plan, he said that he would not need this because the car had only been driven by the Service Manager. She said at that time Mr Dines was at the door of the office. Ms Fahey said that she said "Oh", in exclamation at the remark made by Mr Gray and then looked at the applicant.
She said that the applicant then said that the car had been driven by Mr Frank Parlevliet who was the Service Manager. Ms Fahey said she did not herself know the origin of this particular vehicle; all that she knew was that it was an Apollo. She said that Mr Parlevliet, like other employees of the respondent, had the use of a company car as part of their employment package, but she knew that Mr Parlevliet had not driven this car. Ms Fahey did not say anything about this to Mr Gray.
It seems clear that Mr Gray returned to the premises of the respondent on the next day or the next day or so after the sale. The sale seems to have taken place on about 20 July 1996.
After an attendance at the service area of the respondent's premises, Mr Gray was unhappy with the sale that had been transacted with him, and made complaints both to Mr Loader and to Mr Whipp. Mr Loader, in his evidence, described the complaint that was made to him. Essentially the complaint that was made to him by Mr Gray was that it had been represented to him that the car that he had been sold to his mother was that of the Service Manager, when indeed that was not the case. Mr. Loader investigated the situation to the extent that I will mention in a moment.
With respect to Mr Gray, it seems that the fact of his dissatisfaction was a matter then well known through the respondent's premises, and Mr Gray was reasonably angry in his dealings with a number of staff of the respondent. Mr Gray was ultimately placated to some extent by the respondent agreeing to receive back from Mr Gray the motor vehicle in question as a trade-in on a new car, and with the respondent giving the motor vehicle traded in the value that Mr Gray had purchased the vehicle for. Mr. Loader on finding out the nature of the complaint being made by Mr Gray spoke to Ms Fahey about the matter. She said to Mr Loader that she understood that what Mr Gray was complaining about was correct because of the conversation which she had with Mr Dines and Mr Gray which I described earlier.
Mr Loader then went to see Mr Stephen Whipp, who as I have said was then the Sales Manager. Mr Loader instructed Mr Whipp to terminate the employment of Mr Dines. Mr Loader said that he did this because he regarded Mr Dines as having grossly misrepresented the history of the car to the customer, and he regarded this as a very serious matter, particularly given the terms of the contract of employment. One can readily understand Mr. Loader taking that attitude to the alleged misrepresentation. It is of course a matter for concern of principals of organisations that sell used cars that their sales people are honest in their dealings with customers.
As Mr Loader explained, a large part of their business is dependent upon the good reputation of the business and receiving referrals from customers or follow-up business from customers in subsequent years. Mr Loader himself did not speak to the applicant about the matter. He said that he was convinced of the truth of the complaint being made about the applicant because of the complaint that was made by Mr Gray and its verification to him by what Ms Fahey had told him.
I mention here that one can also accept that if what Mr Gray said did occur, one can understand his dissatisfaction with the matter. If it was represented that the car had previously been the personal vehicle of the Service Manager of the respondent, it gives the car a particular characteristic or quality which one could well understand a customer would find attractive. This is because the Service Manager would well be expected to look after his own personal motor vehicle, and as a service manager would have the skills and resources to make sure that the vehicle was well looked after. If, on the other hand, the vehicle was simply a courtesy vehicle which was used by not only the staff of the respondent but also by members of the public when using it from time to time, the vehicle has a somewhat different quality and characteristic in my opinion.
As I have mentioned, Mr Loader instructed Mr Whipp to effect the termination of the applicant's employment. Mr Whipp carried out this task on 25 July 1996 in an office at the respondent's premises. Mr Whipp said he had a conversation with the applicant in which he explained that the applicant's employment was being terminated. He explained that it was due to the applicant having made a gross misrepresentation. He said that although he did not specifically mention that it was to do with the Gray vehicle, he thought this was obvious, given the "carryings on" of the last couple of days and all of the circumstances. Mr Whipp essentially said that the applicant left the office without saying very much, but took his termination payment with him. Mr Whipp then said the applicant left the premises of his own volition about 10 minutes later. That is a summary of the evidence presented on behalf of the respondent.
In his evidence, the applicant denied having made the misrepresentation that was alleged to Mr Gray. He also denied the conversation that Ms Fahey said that she had with the applicant and Mr Gray. In relation to the former, the applicant said in his evidence that he was not certain as to the vehicle's history. He knew that it was a vehicle that was used by the Service Department under the direction of the Service Manager, and that was what he would have informed the customer, Mr Gray. He also said that he was aware this Apollo was one of four Apollo vehicles used by the Service Department of the respondent. He said that as he understood it, the Apollo that he sold was used by someone he described as a "54-year old lady employee" of the respondent to drive customers to and from their places of work and home after they left their motor vehicles with the respondent for service purposes.
However he was unable to answer in any satisfactory way a question that I asked of him as to, if this was the use of the Apollo motor vehicle, why the respondent would have owned four such motor vehicles, it being obvious that if the purpose of this motor vehicle was simply so an employee could ferry people to and from work and home then only one motor vehicle would have been required.
In relation to the evidence given by Ms Fahey, as I have said, Mr Dines, in his evidence, denied that the conversation took place. He said that the salesmen were instructed to make sure that they left the office when Ms Fahey was talking to clients, and that is what he did on this occasion. He denied being sufficiently close to the office to either make eye contact with or speak to Ms Fahey. Indeed, he denied making such eye contact or speaking to her, either in the manner she alleged or at all.
In relation to the conflict of evidence between the applicant and Ms Fahey, I prefer the evidence of Ms Fahey. In my opinion, she gave her evidence clearly and in a straightforward and unexaggerated fashion. I have no reason to suspect that she would be giving inaccurate or embellished evidence. On the contrary, the applicant, apart from having an interest in putting the particular version of events that he did in relation to the evidence given by Ms Fahey, gave unconvincing evidence in other respects. I mention, for example, the question in relation to the four vehicles that I put to him, and I also think he was being somewhat evasive when answering the questions of Mr Jones in cross-examination.
Having said that I prefer the evidence of Ms Fahey in relation to that conversation, there is a secondary question as to the implication of that, which I will come to later.
SECTION 170DC
Dealing first with the alleged contravention of section 170DC, which subsection provides that:
"An employer must not terminate an employee's employment for reasons related to the employee's conduct or performance unless:
(a)the employee has been given the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made; or
(b),the employer could not reasonably be expected to give the employee that opportunity."
The Chief Justice in Nicolson v Heaven and Earth Gallery (1994) 1 IRCR 199 at page 209 said of this section that:
"Section 170DC(a) does not require any particular formality, but this does not mean that it is unimportant or capable of perfunctory satisfaction. Section 170DC carries into Australian labour law a fundamental component of the concept known to lawyers as natural justice, or more recently procedural fairness. The relevant principle is that a person should not exercise legal power over another to that person's disadvantage and for a reason personal to him or her, without first affording the affected person an opportunity to present a case."
In the later case of Janicek v ICI Dulux, unreported, IRCA 599/1995, 4 September 1995, the Chief Justice said:
"I emphasise that section 170DC does not require any particular formality; that has been said time and time again. What is important is that the substance of the relevant allegation be put to the employee under circumstances where he or she has the opportunity of putting a defence. It is not material to determine whether the employee would have made a defence. The employer's obligation is to put the allegation, so as to give the employee the opportunity of doing so. In the present case, I think the critical allegation was not put. That is enough to support a finding of unlawful termination."
In the case of Kenefick v Australian Submarine Corporation Pty Limited (1996) 65 IR 366, the Full Court said, although in a different context, that section 170DC satisfies a need for the employee to have an opportunity to respond, because a convincing defence to allegations may persuade an employer not to terminate the employment of the employee.
In my opinion, in this case, subsection 170DC(a) has not been satisfied. This is because the decision to terminate the applicant's employment was made by Mr Loader prior to giving the applicant an opportunity to answer to the allegation. The fact that the applicant may have been able to say something in his defence at the time of his termination by Mr Whipp does not, in my opinion, satisfy the requirements of section 170DC. As the cases indicate, the section requires that the employee has a right to put his defence, prior to a decision being made to terminate his employment, not after the decision has been and as he is being given his termination pay cheque.
In my opinion, Mr Dines was not given the "fair go" that subsection 170DC(a) requires. I also consider that subsection 170DC(b) does not apply. In my opinion, it is not a situation where the employer could not reasonably be expected to give the employee the opportunity to be heard. This is because there was nothing which would have practically or reasonably prevented the employer from giving the employee such an opportunity.
Mr Loader, or Mr Whipp on his behalf, could easily have interviewed the applicant in relation to the matter prior to a decision being made to terminate his employment. There was no need to terminate his employment prior to giving him that opportunity. Therefore, there has been, in my opinion, contravention of section 170DC. However, what remedy, if any, ought to be granted in relation to that contravention is a separate matter, and I will return to that later.
SECTION 170DE(1)
I will now deal with the alleged contravention of section 170DE(1) of the Act. That section reads as follows:
"An employer must not terminate an employee's employment unless there is a valid reason, or valid reasons, connected with the employee's capacity or conduct or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service."
Pursuant to section 170ED/A of the Act, the respondent has the onus of providing that there was a valid reason of the kind specified in section 170DE(1).
In this case, as I have said earlier, the respondent alleged the valid reason was the gross misrepresentation allegedly made by the applicant to Mr Gray in conducting the sale of the Apollo motor vehicle.
In the case of Nettlefold v Kym Smoker Pty Limited, unreported, Lee J, 4 October 1996, his Honour at pages 5 and 6 referred to the well-known remarks of Northrop J in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Limited (1996) 62 IR 371 at 373, on the meaning of the expression "valid reason". Northrop J said that:
"In its context in section 170DE(1), the adjective "valid" should be given the meaning of sound, defensible or well founded. A reason which is capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced could never be a valid reason for the purposes of section 170DE(1). At the same time the reason must be valid in the context of the employee's capacity or conduct or based on the operational requirements of the employer's business.
Further, in considering whether a reason is valid, it must be remembered that the requirement applies in a practical sphere of the employment relationship between an employer and an employee, where each has rights and privileges and duties and obligations conferred and imposed on them. The provisions must be applied in a practical commonplace way, to ensure that (a) the employer and employee are each treated fairly."
In relation to a case where the respondent alleges that the valid reason was based on misconduct, there are essentially two things which need to be proved: first, the respondent needs to prove that the misconduct did occur and secondly, the respondent needs to prove that the misconduct involved was sufficiently serious to warrant the sanction of dismissal. In relation to the first matter, I cite the authority of Elvidge v Burswood Resort Management Limited, unreported, IRCA 631/1996, 16 December 1996, Ritter JR, and also the decision of Yew v ACI Glass Packaging Pty Limited, unreported, 596/1996, 11 December 1996, Wilcox CJ.
In the Yew case, at page 12, the Chief Justice said that:
"The effect of section 170 DE(1) is to make unlawful a termination of employment effected without a valid reason. If the termination comes before the Court it is the duty of the Court to determine for itself whether, upon the balance of probabilities, there was a valid reason for the termination. It must do this by reference to the evidence. The Court is not concerned with the question whether, upon the information available to the employer, the conclusion reached by the employer was, or was not, a reasonable one.
I agree that the Court does not sit as an appeal from the employer's decision, but only because the reference to an appeal implies that the Court is concerned to examine the employer's decision making process. It is not. It is concerned to ascertain whether there was a valid reason for the conclusion that the employee's employment should be terminated. The Court does this for itself but on the basis of the evidence of the primary facts placed before it."
In relation to the second proposition I mentioned, that the misconduct has to be sufficiently serious to warrant the termination of employment, I make reference to the decisions of Fargie v Freedom Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd, unreported, IRCA 498/96 Parkinson JR, 14 October 1996 and also to Lupoi v Philips Fox, unreported, IRCA 485/96, Ritter JR, 3 October 1996. In that case, at pages 25 and 26, I referred to my earlier decision of Garbutt v Stothers, unreported, IRCA 416/96 Ritter JR, 27 August 1996. At page 5 of the Garbutt decision, I said that:
"Where there is a termination based on misconduct, for there to be a valid reason for termination, the misconduct must have a quality sufficiently serious to warrant the termination of employment. For example, it would be difficult to say that a secretary of a large office, who stole one paper clip could be characterised by her employer as dishonest and a thief, and therefore, there was a valid reason for termination of employment. In my opinion, there must be a qualitative aspect of the misconduct, sufficient to warrant the sanction of termination."
During the course of his submissions, Mr Jones referred to the decision of Blythe Chemicals Limited v Bushnell (1933) 49 CLR 66, and in particular to page 81, from the joint judgment of Dixon and McTiernan JJ. Mr Jones also referred me to page 240 of the text Labour Law Text and Materials by Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, second edition, and in particular the quotation from Heppell and O'Higgins Employment Law 4th Edition, where principals of termination for misconduct are discussed.
In my opinion, the Blythe Chemicals decision and the principles set out by Heppell and O'Higgins, are consistent with the principles I have earlier referred to, and also consistent with other authorities that I mentioned in Lupoi at pages 27 and 28, and in particular Bartucciotto v Euro Printing Company Pty Limited, 1996 unreported, 72/96, Von Doussa J, Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation, (1995) 129 ALR 628 at 636 and 637, and North v Television Corporation Limited, (1976) 11 ALR 599.
The first question to consider, therefore, is whether the alleged misconduct did occur on the evidence; that is, whether Mr Dines did grossly misrepresent the position in relation to the motor vehicle sold to Mr Gray. In this respect, as I noted earlier, Mr Gray or Ms Gray did not give evidence. That is potentially a deficiency in the respondent's case. There was no evidence given as to why these witnesses could not have been called; however, the respondent's position, at least implicitly, was that the evidence from Ms Fahey overcame any need to call Mr or Ms Gray.
This was because Ms Fahey could give evidence as to what Mr Dines said to her, in the presence of Mr Gray, which was consistent with the alleged misrepresentation that was made. In my opinion, the respondent's position in this respect is correct. I have said earlier I accept Ms Fahey's evidence as to what was said to her and to Mr Gray by Mr Dines. In my opinion, what Mr Dines there said, as I have found, supports the inference that he had given gross misinformation to the client about the motor vehicle the client was purchasing to the effect that the motor vehicle was the personal vehicle used by the Service Manager and not simply one of a fleet of courtesy vehicles used by members of the public.
Therefore, I am satisfied on the evidence that the misconduct alleged did occur.
The second question is whether the misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant the sanction of termination of employment. In my opinion it was. The importance of sales people giving honest information to customers has been referred to earlier by me. It was seen by the respondent as very important and is specifically included as part of the contract of employment in the sense of honest business ethics being referred to in that document. It is clear in my opinion that for a used-car yard (for want of a better expression) to represent themselves as ethical businesses, it is vitally important that their sales people give honest, clear and complete information to members of the public.
In this respect, in my opinion, Mr Dines fell short of that. Therefore, I am satisfied that there was a valid reason for the termination of Mr Dines employment and that the respondent has discharged its onus of proof under section 170DE(1).
REMEDY
I return now to the question of the remedy for the contravention of section 170DC. I earlier made mention to the judgment of the Chief Justice in Nicolson v Heaven and Earth Gallery (1994) 1RCR 199. At page 212 of that decision, the Chief Justice said:
"In assessing compensation for a breach of section 170DC, it is appropriate to consider what would have been likely to occur if the breach had not occurred. It should not be assumed that the employee would have been dismissed anyway. Such an assumption ignores the rationale of procedural fairness and every day experience that decision makers often change their minds when presented with another side of the case It devalues section 170DC to the point of redundancy."
I carefully bear in mind those words of the Chief Justice. However, in this case there are factors other than those mentioned by the Chief Justice which ought to be taken into account. The first is that having heard all of the evidence in relation to the matter, including the explanation that Mr Dines could have given to Mr Loader if he had bothered to interview him, I have been satisfied that there was a valid reason for the termination of Mr Dine's employment. Secondly, it seems clear that there was no economic loss suffered by Mr Dines as a result of the termination of his employment by the respondent. Upon his termination, Mr Dines was paid one week's termination pay plus an amount for holiday pay then outstanding to him. At the relevant time, Mr Dines was paid at the rate of $889 per week by the respondent. Only four days after the termination of his employment he was employed in an identical position, that is as a car sales person, by Lynford. He remained in that employment for two weeks when he left of his own accord. Immediately after that he obtained employment with Houghton Motors in Victoria Park. The income that he has received from Houghton Motors has averaged $1789 per week over a period of five months. It is, by quite a large amount, in excess of that which he had earned when he was in the employ of the respondent.
Therefore, the applicant has not suffered any economic loss by virtue of the termination of his employment from the respondent. Dealing with the question of compensation, section 170EE(2) of the Act says that:
"If the Court thinks in respect of a contravention of a provision of this division constituted by the termination of employment of an employee, that the reinstatement of the employee is impracticable, the Court may, if the Court considers it appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, make an order requiring the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount as the Court thinks appropriate."
It is clear from the terms of section 170EE(2) that the Court, although having the power and jurisdiction to award compensation, such power and jurisdiction is discretionary. This comes about by the use of the word "may" and the use of the words "if the Court considers it appropriate in all the circumstances of the case". Section 170EE(3) provides that the Court is to have regard in working out the amount of any compensation, the remuneration that the employee would have received or would have been likely to have received if the employer had not terminated the employment. As a result of that, the Court is focussed, at least to some extent, upon the economic loss that an applicant has suffered by reason of the contravention of the Act by a respondent. However, in this case, as I have said, there is no economic loss. I am not satisfied in all the circumstances of the case that it would be appropriate to award compensation and I will decline to do so.
I have taken into account the observations of the Full Court in the recent decision of Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Limited unreported, IRCR 606/96, 13 December 1996, Wilcox CJ von Doussa J and Marshall J, that one may award compensation in this jurisdiction for matters such as distress. However, there was no clear, comprehensive or substantive evidence of any stress or distress that Mr Dines suffered as a result of the contravention of the Act. Therefore, I decline to make any order for compensation on that basis. The orders that I will make are these:
A declaration that the respondent terminated the employment of the applicant in contravention of section 170DC of the Act.
Insofar as the applicant alleges that the respondent contravened section 170DE(1) of the Act, the application is dismissed.
There be no order as to compensation.
I certify that this and the preceding fourteen (14) pages
are a true copy of the reasons for decision of
Judicial Registrar Ritter.
Associate:
Date:
APPEARANCES
Applicant (in person): Mr Dines
Representative for the Respondent: Mr Jones of the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (WA)
Date of hearing: 7 February 1997
Date of judgment: 7 February 1997
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