Dimopoulos v Dimopoulos & Delaine No. DCCIV-95-817 Judgment No. D150

[1999] SADC 150

DIMOPOULOS
[1999] SADC DIMOPOULOS & DELAINE

Judge Allan
Civil

1 The plaintiff claims damages for injuries and loss sustained in a road accident.
2 The accident occurred on 13 July 1992 at the junction of North East Road, Smith Street and Cassie Street, Walkerville when a motor vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger and which was being driven by her husband, the first defendant, collided with a motor vehicle being driven by the second defendant. The defendants have admitted liability and the matter comes on for an assessment of damages.
3 The plaintiff is now aged 40. She was born in Greece. Both her parents died when she was 10. Thereafter, she was looked after by her grandmother and her uncle. She married when she was 17 and came to Australia. She met her husband when he visited Greece from Australia. There are two children of that marriage, a son born in 1978 and a daughter born in 1982. After six or seven years, she separated from her husband. The children lived with her. She was divorced. She married the first defendant in 1987. Her son now lives and works in Melbourne and her daughter lives with her and her husband.
4 The plaintiff had been involved in a motor vehicle accident in 1977. She sustained a fractured pelvis. She had no injury to her left arm.
5 The first defendant is now aged 65. He was born in Greece and came to Australia when he was 21. He had previously been married. His first wife died. There are four children of that marriage and they all live in Melbourne.
6 After the plaintiff and the first defendant married, they lived in Melbourne. Mr Dimopoulos was a builder. About a year after the marriage, they went on a holiday to the Riverland. They met a friend of Mr Dimopoulos who had a farm at Cooltong, near Renmark. They liked the idea of farm life. Mr Dimopoulos' friend was interested in selling and, so, they entered into an agreement whereby they purchased the farm and paid for it with two houses Mr Dimopoulos had built in Melbourne. They moved onto the farm in late 1988.
7 The farm is described as being section 206 and comprises about 30 acres. It contained a house and an out-building. About 75 per cent of the block was planted with olive trees. There were about 1500 of them, of different varieties. The rest of the block was planted with citrus trees; about 7 acres of lemons and about 3 acres of oranges.
8 The plaintiff and Mr Dimopoulos operated the farm in partnership. The plaintiff had no experience in working a farm like this, but her husband did and she learnt from him. They both worked on the farm and they worked hard. They wanted to make a success of the farm and expand it. The work they performed included fertilising, pruning and packing. They employed other people to do the picking. During the picking season, the plaintiff worked mainly in the packing shed. The olives which were picked were brought to the shed in 1/2 ton bins and they were graded and packed into 10 kg boxes for the market. People were employed to work in the packing shed and the plaintiff supervised them as well as engaging in the work herself.
9 I think it is fair to describe the work performed by the plaintiff on the farm as arduous. She worked most days. It involved her in being on her feet for long periods, climbing ladders, lifting and carrying weights which varied, but were often 10 kgs or more, and the driving of tractors. In addition to the work performed about the farm, the plaintiff attended to the normal household duties. The plaintiff and the defendant fitted in a social life with their work commitments, usually visiting friends.
10 Not long after they moved onto the farm, the plaintiff and Mr. Dimopoulos purchased some vacant land adjoining their property. This land is described as being section 407 and contains about 42 acres. It was bought at auction. The land did not have a water licence attached to it.
11 Soon after the purchase of section 407, in February 1990, the plaintiff and her husband purchased some more land, section 466, which is also adjacent to their farm. It consists of 42 acres and came with a water license. Water was taken from the river. About 28 acres of this land was under irrigation in the form of overhead sprinklers. At the time this land was purchased, about 75 per cent of it was planted with grapes; shiraz and chardonnay. The vines were about 20 years old and were planted in such a way that they could not be harvested mechanically. Subsequently, the plaintiff and her husband cleared this land of the vines and extended the irrigation.
12 The plaintiff and her husband further extended their land holding by purchasing the land contained in section 205 in February 1992. This land is also adjacent to the land originally purchased by them. It consists of 72 acres and the purchase of it enabled the plaintiffs to control the water supply to the two properties. Previously, the water supply to sections 205 and 206 had been shared and this had led to difficulty. As I understand it, the property was purchased from the mortgagee in possession. At the time of purchase, the land was planted with about 55 acres of olive trees, about 1500, and about 10 acres of citrus fruit. The balance of the land was empty space.
13 I mention something about the accident the subject matter of these proceedings because, although there is no issue of liability to be determined by me, some understanding of the forces at work in the accident have some relevance, even if only by way of background, to the injuries the plaintiff alleges she suffered in it.
14 The vehicle driven by Mr. Dimopoulos was a Toyota 4 Wheel Drive. He was driving in a south-westerly direction along North East Road approaching the junction. The second defendant, Sharon Delaine, was driving an old model Ford Sedan in a north-westerly direction along Smith Street approaching the junction. The junction was controlled by traffic lights.
15 According to Ms. Delaine, she stopped at the traffic lights. It was her intention to turn right. There were two lanes of traffic for that purpose. She said the lights applicable to her changed to green and she moved into the junction and commenced to make her turn. She said she had travelled about 3 to 4 metres into the junction when her car was struck by Mr. Dimopoulos' vehicle. She said Mr. Dimopoulos' vehicle entered the junction when the lights applicable to it were showing red. She said the vehicle driven by Mr. Dimopoulos struck the driver's side door and the front, right mudguard of her car. She described the impact as medium. She said neither she nor her passenger were injured in the accident. She said she did not see anything to indicate that the front windscreen of the Dimopoulos' vehicle was broken in the accident.
16 According to Mr. Dimopoulos, the car driven by Ms. Delaine did not stop at the junction and was travelling at between 60 to 70 kms per hour at the time of impact. He said, in effect, that the other car entered the junction when the lights applicable to it were showing red. He said his speed was 55 to 60 kms per hour just before impact.
17 According to the plaintiff, she was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle driven by her husband. She said she was wearing a seat belt. She said they were travelling "slow". She said he husband's vehicle entered the junction when the lights applicable to it were on green. She said that, in the impact, she struck her knee on the glove box and that her head hit the windscreen, breaking it.
18 I prefer the evidence of Ms. Delaine to that of the plaintiff and Mr. Dimopoulos wherever there is a conflict between them. I have viewed the evidence on this topic against the background of the other evidence in the case as a whole and I find her evidence to be much more reliable than that of the plaintiff and Mr. Dimopoulos.
19 The defendants alleged that the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident, but abandoned this allegation during the trial.
20 At the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff and her husband were on their way home. They continued their journey. The plaintiff had a headache and was nauseous. They stopped at the Riverland Regional Hospital at Berri on the way home. The plaintiff was examined and allowed to leave.
21 The plaintiff says that, the following day, her headache was worse, that she had pain in the right side of her head, the left side of her face in the area of the jaw, the right side of her head and both sides of the collar bone and that she could not rotate her head. She saw Dr. Ross, her local general medical practitioner that day. She says that, over the next few days, she had constant pain in her neck and head and left upper arm and numbness in all the fingers of her left hand, but more so in the middle, ring and little fingers.
22 The plaintiff says that in the first few weeks after the accident, there was no improvement in her condition. She says she was unable to sleep, she had "pressure" in her head and, emotionally, she was not well.
23 The plaintiff says that, about one week after the accident, she began to experience dizzy spells; that she would feel as though she was going to fall and would put her hand on something to steady herself. She says that these spells varied in frequency and lasted for varying periods. She says she has fallen at least once as a result of her dizzy spells.
24 The plaintiff says that, following the accident, she had pain in her left knee which gradually abated with the passage of time, although, she says, she still has some discomfort in the knee when wearing high-heeled shoes. She says that, since the accident, she "cannot hear very well" in her left ear.
25 The plaintiff says that, since the accident, her symptoms have remained the same. She says she feels worried, very scared, that she is unable to sleep, lacks energy and has a loss of libido. She says she has not returned to her pre-accident work. She says that she helps out on the farm as much as she can. She says that, if she engages in physical work about the farm, her neck gets sore and her left arm gets very tired. She says she can only work for about 10 minutes before she has to take a break and sit down. She says that she would supervise the workers in the packing shed. In this way, she says, she would work for about one hour per day, but not every day. She says she can no longer lift the boxes in the packing shed because her left arm and neck start to hurt. She says she can bend and lift, but gets pain at the back of her neck. She says she has limitation in the rotation of her head and demonstrated a range of about 30 degrees to the left and 45 degrees to the right. She later demonstrated rotation to the left of about 45 degrees, saying she can turn it more, but that it hurts. She says inclining her head forward for any length of time causes her pain and dizziness. She says she is unable to lift the hoses involved in watering because of pain in her left arm and neck. She says she is unable to prune or fertilise because of the symptoms of pain she experiences. She says she does some housework, a little at a time and mainly in the kitchen. She says she cannot iron and that hanging out the washing makes her tired. She says she has help about the house from her husband and her daughter. She says her daughter cleans the bathroom and does the ironing, vacuuming, dish-washing and sweeping. In this way, she says, her daughter spends about 2 hours per week doing work which she, the plaintiff, used to do. She says that, since the accident, her husband spends about 2 hours per week doing housework which she did before the accident.
26 The plaintiff says that her mood is "not that good". She says she was happier before the accident. She says that, now, she is not happy. She says she has no social life and rarely visits friends. She says she has difficulty in sleeping. She says she goes to bed at about 2.00 to 3.00 a.m., wakes at about 7.00 a.m. and that she feels tired all the time. She says that she is unable to drive a vehicle for long distances because she gets scared. She says there was a time after the accident when she was not able to drive at all because she felt scared. She says she does not drive a tractor now, but that she sometimes rides on the tractor with her husband.
27 The plaintiff has not had any form of treatment for some time. She says she takes panadol about 4 times per day, but that it does not provide her with any relief from her symptoms, being, she says, of psychological benefit only. She says she also uses a machine to massage her neck which provides her with some temporary relief from her symptoms; a machine which, she says, was purchased for that purpose.
28 The plaintiff has seen a number of medical practitioners since the accident, although she seems to have had little in the way of treatment. The treatment she has had, as best I can tell, has been a small amount of physiotherapy, some medication which she has taken spasmodically and some counselling. After the accident, her general medical practitioner seems to have supervised her treatment for a time. She has seen a number of medical specialists, surgeons and psychiatrists, often for diagnostic purposes only, and she has undertaken various radiological procedures, also for diagnostic purposes. Some of the medical practitioners she has seen were Greek-speaking and she saw them for that reason. She says she can only understand and speak English in a limited way. Her husband acted as interpreter for her when she saw non-Greek-speaking medical practitioners. She gave her evidence through an interpreter. Some of the medical practitioners she saw gave evidence and I will make reference to their evidence in a moment; but, first, I propose to mentioned something about her medical condition, and any treatment therefor, prior to the accident, so far as it is relevant.
29 Prior to the accident, Dr Ross was the plaintiff's general medical practitioner. He was, and remains, a member of a clinic at Renmark which the plaintiff and her husband consulted after they moved into the area. The plaintiff did not see only Dr. Ross, consulting other members of the clinic from time to time.
30 Dr. Ross saw the plaintiff for the first time on 8 September 1989. She was complaining of dizziness; vertigo. Dr. Ross said, and I accept, that, in his opinion, the vertigo was psychosomatic in nature, produced by anxiety. Dr. Ross arranged for a CT scan of the plaintiff's brain to be performed. The scan showed a small area of calcification which might or might not have been abnormal. There was nothing to suggest that it was an active problem at the time. Dr. Ross did not treat the plaintiff for her vertigo: the plaintiff told him that she proposed to see a medical practitioner in Melbourne about that matter and asked Dr. Ross to forward a copy of the report of the CT scan to that practitioner.
31 Dr. Ross saw the plaintiff again on 1 February 1991. She consulted him about her emotional state. On that occasion, Dr. Ross thought that the plaintiff might have been showing some early signs of schizophrenia: there were, to him, some signs of auditory hallucinations. Dr. Ross prescribed some medication, Thioridizine, and asked the plaintiff to return in two weeks time for review. The plaintiff did not keep that appointment and Dr. Ross did not see her again until after the accident. He formed the impression she had not taken the medication he had prescribed.
32 Dr. Ross described the plaintiff's presentation on these occasions as being "very quiet" and "not reactive"; "flattened"; and that is the way she has always presented to him.
33 Dr. Ross saw the plaintiff at the Renmark and Paringa District Hospital on the night of the accident. She complained to him of pain in the occipital region of her head extending down to the posterior aspect of her neck. He observed some minor bruising on the anterior aspect of her left knee. She seemed to him to be quite distressed and he gave her an intra-muscular injection of diazepam to relief her anxiety. He saw her again the following day, as I have already mentioned, and  diagnosed her as suffering from a whiplash injury of the neck. She also complained to him of tinnitus and nausea which he related to the after affects of her head injury; an injury which he considered to be a significant one. He prescribed anti-inflammatory, analgesic medication. I mention that the plaintiff made no complaint of tinnitus in her evidence.
34 Dr. Ross saw the plaintiff again on 4 August 1992. He observed her neck was more rigid and he referred her to a physiotherapist. She still complained of tinnitus. He observed that she had become very anxious.
35 Dr. Ross saw the plaintiff again on 4 September 1992. She complained to him that her neck had not improved and that it was inhibiting her sleep. She also complained to him of pins and needles in her left arm and numbness affecting the whole of her left arm. He referred the plaintiff to Mr. Pope, an orthopaedic surgeon, because he thought her symptoms were worsening in a way he did not expect from his original assessment of her. He has not seen her since, apart from 19 January 1994, when she complained of vague, dizzy symptoms.
36 Mr. Pope saw the plaintiff in November 1992. She complained to him of neck pain and stiffness since the accident and of numbness in her left hand. She was wearing a cervical collar. On examination, he found no marked muscle wasting, some reduced sensation in the C6/C7 area and normal reflexes. He arranged for an MRI scan of her cervical spine and saw her again a few days later. In his view, the MRI scan was normal apart from a very small C6/C7 disc bulge which did not involve nerve roots. He concluded that she had suffered a musculo-ligamentous injury with no evidence of any major disc or bony injury in the accident and that her symptoms would settle.
37 Mr. Pope saw the plaintiff again in about June 1993. On that occasion, she complained of symptoms of pain in her neck radiating into her left hand and numbness in her left hand. He found it difficult to determine which fingers had reduced sensation. On examination, he found no sign of muscle wasting. The plaintiff demonstrated neck flexion and extension to 30 degrees and a reduced biceps jerk on the left compared to that on the right. He considered that she had a C7 degenerative lesion secondary to the C6/C7 disc. She also complained to him at that time of hearing loss and vertigo.
38 Mr. Pope saw the plaintiff again in December 1993. Her complaints of symptoms in her neck and arm remained unchanged with numbness in a C7 distribution. On examination, he found that her reflexes were intact in her upper limbs, that she demonstrated a generalised weakness in her left upper arm, neck stiffness with a range of flexion and extension to 15 degrees and lateral flexion to 20 degrees bilaterally and he observed some mild biceps wasting.
39 Mr. Pope saw the plaintiff again in June 1994 and referred her to Mr. Orso Osti, an orthopaedic and spinal surgeon.
40 Mr. Osti saw the plaintiff on 5 September 1994. On examination, the plaintiff demonstrated moderate tenderness over the C5-6 spinous processes, cervical movement ranging from 40 degrees flexion to 20 degrees extension with moderate discomfort and decreased sensation to light touch in the left C8 and T1 nerve root distribution, which, to him, was not entirely anatomical. In his view, the MRI scan of 30 November 1992 showed mild posterior bulging of the C6-7 annulus without cord or nerve root sheath compression. He found no objective signs of any neurological deficit. He considered the plaintiff's symptoms stemmed from moderate cervical spondylosis at the C6-7 level which was asymptomatic before the accident, but made symptomatic by the accident. He considered that there was evidence of "psychogenic overlay" which, in his view, could have contributed, at least in part, to her ongoing symptoms. He considered that she should be able to cope with light to moderate physical duties, avoiding repetitive bending, repetitive lifting of weights over 10 kgs, prolonged overhead work and prolonged driving or being a passenger in a motor vehicle for prolonged periods.

41 Mr Osti saw the plaintiff again on 22 April 1996, 30 July 1997 and 7 April 1999. He arranged for her to undergo an MRI scan of her cervical spine and a bone scan on 7 October 1997. In his view, the MRI scan showed degenerative changes at the C6-7 level with a posterior degenerative bulge of the intervertebral disc at the same level, possibly involving the left C7 nerve root to a mild degree. The bone scan showed minor degenerative changes in both hands which were not suggestive of reflex sympathetic dystrophy. I mention this because there had been a suggestion by Dr. Sevdalis, a general medical practitioner in Melbourne who was consulted by the plaintiff in circumstances I will mention in more detail shortly, that the plaintiff suffered from reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the left upper limb. I will say more about that also, but, for the moment, it is sufficient to say that Mr. Osti could find no evidence of such a condition and I unhesitatingly accept his evidence on that topic.
42 Mr. Osti's opinion has not changed: the plaintiff's symptoms stem from a degenerative condition of the cervical spine at the C6-7 level made symptomatic by the accident. In his view, her condition is compounded by a "functional overlay" for which she should have some "ongoing psychological/psychiatric counselling". His view has not changed about the sort of physical activities she should avoid.
43 Dr. Sevdalis speaks Greek. He says he knew the plaintiff before the accident; that he had met her in 1990 and had mixed with her socially. Curiously enough, in her evidence, the plaintiff said she did not know him before she first consulted him on 2 December 1994. She said she went to see him because she had trouble communicating with her previous medical practitioner; her husband usually being present and acting as an interpreter. As best I can tell, between 2 December 1994 and July 1997, the plaintiff saw Dr. Sevdalis or other members of his clinic in Melbourne on almost 20 occasions, travelling by motor vehicle each time for that purpose. She last saw him on 18 September 1999.
44 Dr. Sevdalis arranged for the plaintiff to undergo various tests and referred her to medical specialists, including Dr Mouratides, a Greek-speaking psychiatrist.
45 Dr. Sevdalis said that, prior to the accident, the plaintiff presented as outgoing, confident and sociable. He said that, when he saw her on 2 December 1994, she presented as morbidly withdrawn, depressed, self-centred and focussing on her symptoms.
46 Dr. Sevdalis says that, in his opinion, as a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered a "severe post concussive head trauma syndrome  with anxiety/depression/headaches/dizziness/collapsing", reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the left upper limb, which, he said, explained some diffuse non-organic symptoms of which the plaintiff complained in that arm, "C6-7 cervical disc prolapse and C7 nerve root impingement" with radiation of pain into the neck, left shoulder girdle, left upper limb and into the head, left rotator cuff tendonitis, a severe anxiety/depressive reaction, and a massive personality change, all of which restricted her personal life and ability to work. He regarded her as "severely incapacitated".
47 I was not impressed by Dr. Sevdalis as a witness. It seemed to me that, for whatever reason, he was interested in promoting the plaintiff's claim; even to the point of using a document which he must have known had been altered in order to support a diagnosis by him of reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the left arm. It came about in a way I shall now describe.
48 Dr. Sevdalis arranged for the plaintiff to undergo a sympathetic activity test at the Alfred Hospital Vascular Unit in Melbourne. The report of that unit was forwarded to Dr. Sevdalis. In it's unaltered form, the conclusion stated in that report is as follows:
"No significant evidence of reflex sympathetic dystrophy in
the LEFT arm".

49 Dr. Sevdalis sent a copy of that report to the plaintiff's solicitor with his report of 13 June, 1995. That copy had been altered so that the conclusion read as follows:
"significant evidence of reflex sympathetic dystrophy in
LEFT arm".

50 However the document came to be altered, I think that Dr. Sevdalis knew that it had been altered and that he used the report knowing it to have been altered. I infer that he did so in order to support his diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy. In all the circumstances, I am not prepared to accept his evidence on any topic unless it relates to a matter about which there is no dispute or it is consistent with other evidence which I accept.
51 Dr. Mouratides first saw the plaintiff on 8 March 1995. The plaintiff complained to her of a number of symptoms: cervical pain, left upper limb pain and numbness, headaches, car phobia, loss of interest, loss of concentration, anxiety, irritability, sleep disturbance, impatience, dizziness, blurred vision, tightness in the chest, shortness of breath, vague aches and pains, lethargy, social withdrawal, loss of libido and feelings of hopelessness and helplessness.
52 Dr. Mouratides considered that the plaintiff, as a result of the accident, suffered from a post traumatic stress disorder and a depressive illness; a major affective disorder.
53 Dr. Mouratides saw the plaintiff again on 12 September 1995, 23 January 1996, 14 May 1999 and 29 July 1999, the last two consultations being in preparation for the trial.
54 As I understand the evidence of Dr. Mouratides, she would have preferred to see the plaintiff for a longer period because she considered the plaintiff required ongoing counselling and medication. She concluded that the plaintiff had ceased visiting her because, at least in part, she found the car travel tiring and that she, the plaintiff, thought she was not getting much benefit from the consultations. She thought the plaintiff had probably not persisted with the medication she prescribed for her.
55 Dr. Mouratides thought that, although she did not consider the plaintiff's prognosis to be good, a period of counselling and medication would probably lead to an abatement of her condition and symptoms.
56 I sense that Dr. Mouratides would have been happier about expressing her opinions if she had become more familiar with the plaintiff through further sessions with her. I think she would have been somewhat surprised to learn that the plaintiff had continued to travel to Melbourne to see Dr. Sevdalis. The plaintiff saw Dr. Sevdalis or other members of his clinic on a number of occasions in 1996 and 1997. Dr. Mouratides expressed surprise that the plaintiff had been able to sit through the trial. I mention that Dr. Mouratides gave evidence on the 5th day of the trial and that the plaintiff was present in court while she gave her evidence.
57 Mr. Eriksen, a surgeon, examined the plaintiff on 3 May 1993 on behalf of the defendants. The plaintiff told him that, as a result of the accident, she had suffered a brief loss of consciousness, that she had an immediate headache and neck pain and that she was dizzy; saying that she had impaired vision and that there was a grey area in front of her eyes so that she could not distinguish colours very clearly.
58 The plaintiff complained to Mr. Eriksen that she experienced pain radiating from the base of her skull into the nape of her neck and into the inner shoulder area on the left side, pain and pins and needles involving the whole of the left arm and all the fingers of the left hand, which were initially of a minor nature, but which became more marked as time passed after the accident, that the fingers of her left hand were numb, that there was a reduction of grip strength of the left hand, that she had constant pain of the neck and shoulder, usually mild in nature, but increased by physical activity and which interfered with her sleep at night, that she had restriction of movement of her neck to the right and left and forward and backwards, that there was an aching of the left upper arm on lifting it above shoulder level and that she was feeling "dizzy"; telling Mr. Eriksen that she had not experienced such a problem before and that she had not had any previous symptoms of vertigo.
59 On examination of the plaintiff, Mr. Eriksen found a range of voluntary movement, in flexion, extension, angulation and rotation of her head and neck of only about one third, although he noted a much greater pain free range of movement in what he called the "non-test situation". She complained of pain at the C6-7 spinous process on forward flexion and extension of the lumbo-sacral spine with her head in the neutral position and angulation to the right of her lumbo-sacral spine. She did not complain of pain on angulation to the left. She indicated upper scapular discomfort on elevation of the right and left shoulders above 120 degrees. There was a claim of a loss of pinprick sensation which involved the left hand and the forearm of a non-organic distribution. There was no evidence of muscle wasting of the left hand and there was non-organic loss of grip strength of her left hand compared to her right. Her reflexes were intact.
60 Mr. Eriksen concluded that the plaintiff probably sustained a spraining injury of the cervical spine and a contusion of the left knee and head in the accident. He considered that the physical symptoms of which the plaintiff complained to him and the signs he observed were non-organic. He was not able "to define a persistent physical injury" at that time. He considered that the symptoms the plaintiff complained of in the left arm could only be explained by an entirely non-organic presentation. He did not detect any sign of a left sided capsulitis. He did not consider she had any persistent physical injury which would affect her activities, work or otherwise. Acting on the report of Mr. Osti as to the MRI scan conducted in October 1997, he considered the disc bulge apparent to be a normal variation. He did not think, as a result of his examination of the plaintiff, that there were any C7 nerve root problems. He had seen the report of the MRI scan performed in 1992.
61 Mr. McCulloch, a neurosurgeon, saw the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants on 3 April 1995. She complained to him of pain in the posterior cervical region and when turning her head to the right, pain in the left shoulder extending to the elbow, numbness in the left hand involving all her fingers, occasional pain in the left leg and some swelling of the left foot, dizziness, blurred vision and hearing loss in the left ear. She told him that her symptoms were worse when flexing her head, and extending driving for an extended period of time and with use of her left hand.
62 On examination of the plaintiff, Mr. McCulloch observed that she was able to rotate her neck to 60 degrees to the right and to the left, slowly and with apparent pain; however, during the interview, he noticed that she made "quite rapid" rotational movement of her neck without any apparent pain reaction. He found that the lateral flexion movements were "fairly normal". Flexion and extension movements of the head and neck were limited to about half the normal range. He observed what he regarded as non-organic weakness in the left hand. He found that her tendon reflexes were normal and that measurement of the upper limbs revealed them to be of equal circumference. A sensory examination performed by him revealed a non-organic sensory impairment involving the entire left arm. His examination of the left shoulder revealed that abduction was possible to 180 degrees, but that the plaintiff complained of pain and resisted movements quite markedly. He found there was apparent pain for about 30 degrees of abduction. He found that the internal and external rotational movements of the arm were normal.
63 Mr. McCulloch concluded that the plaintiff might have suffered a cervical ligamentous injury in the accident, but, because of the widespread nature of her symptoms and his non-organic findings, he thought there was no longer any ongoing abnormality. He thought her condition was stable, that she had a very slight residual disability of no more than 5 per cent loss of function of the cervical spine as a whole, that, in organic terms, the effects of the injury had not interfered with her ability to perform her normal, daily activities and that her prognosis was determined purely by recovery from what he regarded as functional or non-organic aspects of her condition. He concluded that her symptoms were basically non-organic in origin. He saw a CT scan of the plaintiff's cervical spine performed on 16 January 1995, which he considered showed some slight degenerative change, but no significant disc protrusion; a matter which, for him, confirmed the conclusion that he had reached about the plaintiff's condition.
64 Mr. Jose, an orthopaedic surgeon, saw the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants on 26 October 1998. I note that Mr. Jose says that the plaintiff told him that, following the accident and at the scene, she did not get out of the car. This conflicts with the evidence of Miss Delaine who said that the plaintiff got out of the car in which she had been travelling and asked after her, Miss Delaine's, well being.
65 Mr. Jose considered that the MRI of the plaintiff's cervical spine performed on 7 October 1997 did not suggest any focal disc herniation and he thought the results were fairly normal for somebody of the plaintiff's age. He regarded the bulge at C6-7 level as minor. He thought it indicated a little, natural, degenerative change, but nothing of any major degree.
66 The plaintiff complained to Mr. Jose of pain on the top of her head and bouts of dizziness, pain all over her neck, but mainly on the left side, extending down her thoracic spine, reduced neck movement, pain in the lower neck and down the left arm if she lifts anything heavy or lifts for an extended period, restriction of movement and coldness in her left arm and coldness and numbness in the fingers of her left hand. She said to him that her symptoms were worse when she became tired.
67 Mr. Jose observed that, during the interview, the plaintiff moved her neck freely and did not seem to be in pain when doing so. He observed that she did not move her left arm "much at all". He said that this alone would make the left arm and hand cold, but would not expect it to produce numbness.
68 On examination, Mr. Jose found that the plaintiff's cervical spine movements were reduced, but of reasonable range, that rotation to the right was possible to at least 60 degrees and marginally better to the left, both being slightly less than he observed at other times, that palpation of the cervical spinous process produced complaints of severe pain with tenderness extending out to the suprascapular area and down her thoracic spine. He found that flexion and extension movements of her neck were of average range and that her upper limb reflexes were present.  Examination of the right shoulder revealed no abnormality "although everything appeared to be an effort". Examination of the left shoulder produced an overall restriction of shoulder movement and complaints of pain on attempts to exceed that movement. He found that the grip in her left hand was "inordinately weak". He did not observe any wasting of her upper left arm and, although there was a 1cm difference between her right and left forearms at the maximum level, he considered this not to be significant and possibly explained by her right arm dominance. He found there was a lack of sensation over most of the area below the left elbow and that most of her hand appeared to be numb, but that her muscles were not wasted. He noticed that her left hand and forearm felt colder than her right hand and forearm which he thought was probably because she was not using it. He found that movement of the thoracic spine produced complaints of tenderness and was perhaps slightly reduced. She complained of a numbness down her spine with a "shooting pain at times". The plaintiff complained of left sided neck pain when she gripped with her left hand.
69 Mr. Jose considered that, in the accident, the plaintiff sustained a soft tissue neck strain. He thought there was a possibility that she had a mild capsulitis in her left shoulder, although the absence of wasting of the deltoid and supraspinatus muscles on his examination suggested that, if the condition existed, it was of recent origin; less than two to three years. He doubted whether the shoulder symptoms "directly relate to the accident". As I have already mentioned, Mr. Eriksen considered there was no sign of capsulitis when he examined the plaintiff. Mr. Osti thought that the shoulder tendon thickening observed in an ultrasound test performed in Melbourne on 16 January, 1995 might be due to a lack of use of the arm. Mr. Jose considered that there were a number of non-organic features relating to the left arm and neck symptoms of which the plaintiff complained. He saw no reason why, "with some treatment", she would not be able to do her pre-accident work. He thought there were no objective findings to the contrary.
70 It seems the plaintiff saw Dr. Tomich, an ear, nose and throat specialist, about her complaints of dizziness. Dr. Tomich did not give evidence. There is a reference by Dr. Pope in his report of 8 December, 1993 to the effect that the plaintiff told him that she had seen Dr. Tomich about her hearing loss and vertigo, that pathology was found, but that the plaintiff was reluctant to proceed with any surgery. Dr. Jose makes a similar comment and there are references in the notes of The Riverland Medical Clinic to the plaintiff seeing Dr. Tomich and the possibility of ear surgery. It will be remembered that, prior to the accident, the plaintiff had consulted Dr. Ross complaining about dizziness. It is time for me to say something about the impression made on me by the plaintiff.
71 As I have said, the plaintiff gave evidence through an interpreter. However, I gained the impression that she had a more than passing understanding of English and often understood the questions put to her before they were translated. Her appearance was flat, but she became more animated, and defensive, when she perceived herself to be under challenge. She held her head and neck rather rigidly and, from time to time, she appeared to be in some discomfort. After she had given evidence, she remained in the courtroom and was present when Dr. Mouratides gave evidence; during the course of which, as I have said, Dr. Mouratides said that she was surprised that the plaintiff had been able to sit through the trial up to that time: it was then in it's 5th day. After Dr. Mouratides gave evidence, the plaintiff, from time to time, left the courtroom. She had not done that previously. I drew counsel's attention to it at the time. The plaintiff struck me as intelligent and strong-willed with a clear idea of the issues in the case; and I thought she tailored her evidence accordingly. On the topic of the circumstances surrounding the accident, I think her evidence was plainly false; and I infer that the reason for that was to protect her husband from criticism about it and also to exaggerate the force of the impact between the two vehicles. During her cross-examination, she was shown film which had been taken of her on 22 September 1995, 29 February 1996 and 6 April 1996. The film showed her shopping, riding on the back of a tractor and doing some sweeping or raking. I did not detect any limitation of neck or head movement in her actions as portrayed in the film. I think what happened is that, following the accident, she did have some pain and stiffness of movement in her neck for a period and that, for whatever reason or reasons, and they might not necessarily be financial, she has consciously maintained those symptoms. I mention that Mr. Osti thought this was possible. It might even be, in a somewhat paradoxical way, that, by consciously maintaining the symptoms, she has produced some signs, such as coldness in her left arm and hand; but, whatever, at the end of the day, and viewing her evidence against the background of all the other evidence in the case, I am not prepared to treat her evidence as a reliable basis for findings of fact; accepting it only on matters about which there is no real dispute. The view I have formed of the plaintiff affects the opinions of the medical practitioners who, at least in part, relied on her description of her symptoms to them in reaching those opinions.

72 It is true that there is some pathology in the plaintiff's cervical spine at the C6-7 level, but my impression of the evidence on this topic is that it is of a mild, degenerative sort; and I so find. I think Mr. Osti was looking for a cause of symptoms of which the plaintiff complained to him, or some of them, and, in doing so, and accepting the complaints she made to him, or some of them, he was prepared to ascribe their cause to the pathology in the plaintiff's cervical spine; but his opinion relies to a large extent on the symptoms from which the plaintiff told him she suffered; and, if those complaints are not correct, then, inevitably, the basis of the opinion crumbles and, with it, the opinion itself. None of this is a criticism of Mr. Osti. If he had any doubts about the plaintiff's symptoms as described to him, he was, understandably, giving the benefit of them to the plaintiff; although it is worth remembering that he thought there was a non-organic element of the plaintiff's complaints of symptoms and that it was possible she had consciously maintained early symptoms. I think that what happened, although it does not matter, is that the presence of the pathology in the plaintiff's cervical spine was, for the plaintiff, somewhat fortuitous and became a peg on which could be hung the hat of her complaints of symptoms.
73 I find that, in the accident, the plaintiff sustained a soft tissue injury to her neck. This is the opinion variously expressed by Mr. Eriksen, Mr. McCulloch and Mr. Jose; and I accept it. It is an opinion which accords with my view of the evidence. I also find that she suffered some minor bruising of her left knee. I am not satisfied that she suffered any other physical injuries. I turn to the evidence of Dr. Mouratides.
74 As with the other medical practitioners who examined her, Dr. Mouratides was substantially dependant on what the plaintiff told her about her symptoms and feelings for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment; and, for that reason, I am not prepared to accept the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder: the plaintiff's evidence is not reliable on those matters. It might be that the plaintiff does suffer from some form of depressive illness; but, whatever the position so far as that is concerned, and assuming that she does have a depressive illness, I am not satisfied that it is related to the accident in any relevant, causal way.
75 I accept the evidence of the plaintiff and that of her husband that, since the accident, their relationship has undergone a change. It is clear that there has been a deterioration in their relationship; that there is an undercurrent of irritation and a general mood of discontent and unhappiness. I also accept that the plaintiff has withdrawn from much of her pre-accident activities about the farm; but, whatever the reason for that might be, I am not satisfied that it has any relevant, causal connection to the accident. It is possible, I suppose, that, for whatever reason, the accident provided an opportunity for the plaintiff to change the way she lived her life with all the consequences which flow from such a change; but that, by itself, would not sheet home to the defendants responsibility therefor in any relevant sense.
76 I accept, and find, that, for some period after the accident which, because of the state of the evidence and the view I have taken of it, I am not able to specify, the plaintiff, as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident, was unable to perform her pre-accident work on the farm; but I do not think it was a lengthy period; and I think she would have gradually returned to a stage where she could have returned to that work; a stage which would have been reached in a time measured in weeks and months rather than years. I am not satisfied that, as a result of the injuries sustained by her in the accident, she has been disabled from performing her pre-accident work thereafter.
77 I accept, and find, that, as a result of her incapacity for work following the accident in consequence of her injuries sustained in it, the partnership would have incurred a loss which, in turn, would be reflected in a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. It is impossible to make any arithmetical calculation about that, the evidentiary material before me not permitting me to do so; but, as I have said earlier, the plaintiff worked hard about the farm before the accident and I think the partnership must have suffered a loss when, as a result of her injuries, she could not do her pre-accident work. In assessing damages in respect of that loss, I will do the best I can; but, in all the circumstances, it will be a notional sum. The partnership records do not disclose any drop in profit in, say, the two years following the accident.
78 So far as the claim for loss of future earning capacity is concerned, I am not satisfied that there is any. I think it possible that the plaintiff, for whatever reason, will never return to her pre-accident work; but I am not satisfied that any such reason is causally related to the accident.
79 It is the plaintiff's case that, because of the injuries sustained by her and the resultant disability to perform her pre-accident work, she and her husband did not proceed with the planting of grape vines on section 466 as planned and that, as a result, there has been, and will continue to be, a loss to the partnership measured in terms of the profit which the partnership would have made had the planting of the vines proceeded.
80 The plaintiff's husband said in evidence that, had it not been for the failure of his wife to return to her pre-accident work, the planting of the vines would have gone ahead. He said the plan was that he and the plaintiff would do the planting together because they could not otherwise afford it and that, when she could not do the work, the project was cancelled. I need not dwell on this matter because, as I have said, I am not satisfied any relevant, causal connection exists between the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the accident and the non-performance of her pre-accident work apart from the period I have mentioned; but, because of the time devoted to this topic during the course of the trial, I think I should say I would have had difficulty in relying on Mr. Dimopoulos' evidence for the purpose of finding that the project would have proceeded but for the plaintiff's condition after the accident. I was not impressed by Mr. Dimopoulos as a witness: notwithstanding he was a defendant, he was clearly about promoting the plaintiff's claim. He was a garrulous witness prone to exaggeration; and, in the case of the circumstances relating to the accident, his evidence was plainly false. His evidence was not a reliable basis for findings of fact; and this leaves aside evidence which indicates reasons might have existed for the non-planting of the grape vines not connected with the plaintiff's ability to perform work. I mention that section 466 has now been sold.
81 I am satisfied that, for a period after the accident which I am not able to specify, the plaintiff required the assistance of her husband in the normal, household duties which she had previously performed and I will allow something under this head.
82 So far as the claim for damages for non-economic loss is concerned, I am satisfied there would have been a period after the accident when the plaintiff would have suffered pain and discomfort in her neck and some limitation of movement. I am unable to specify for what period she would have suffered such disability. I am satisfied she also had some soreness in her left knee for a time. Doing the best I can, so far as damages for non-economic loss are concerned, I ascribe the number 5. This produces a figure of $6,850.
83 So far as damages for past economic loss is concerned, I award the sum of $5,000.
84 There will be no award for damages for future economic loss.
85 I award the sum of $500 for gratuitous services.
86 The parties were trying to agree special damages. To this date, I have not been informed that they have done so.
87 There will be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants in the sum of $12,350 plus special damages as agreed between the parties or determined by the court.
88 I will hear counsel as to costs.

12