Dimitrov v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIMITROV v BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED & ORS [2020] FCCA 3149
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether the Applicant had a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand for purposes of ss.40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – where the counter-claim lacks mutuality – Application dismissed.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.40, 41, 306

Cases cited:

Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1991] 1 All ER 929; [1990] 2 WLR 657

Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2011] FMCA 11

Menniti v ACN 116 746 859 Pty Ltd [2019] FCCA 1856

Re Hansen; Ex parte Hansen (1985) 4 FCR 590

Stec v Orfanos [1999] FCA 457

V & J Removals; Ex parte Earl & Williams (unreported) 21 June 1985

Young v Cooke [2017] FCA 26

Applicant: PETER MICHAEL DIMITROV
First Respondent: BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED
Second Respondent: ABL NOMINEES PTY LTD
Third Respondent: ABL CUSTODIAN SERVICES PTY LTD
Fourth Respondent: PIRIE STREET HOLDINGS LTD
File Number: SYG 370 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Altobelli
Hearing date: 19 October 2020
Date of Last Submission: 26 October 2020
Delivered at: Wollongong
Delivered on: 20 November 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Rares
Solicitors for the Applicant: Lodestar Litigation Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Oakes SC
Solicitors for the Respondents: TurksLegal

ORDERS

  1. The Application filed 20 February 2019 be dismissed. 

  2. The Applicant is to pay the Respondents’ costs as agreed or as assessed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT WOLLONGONG

SYG 370 of 2019

PETER MICHAEL DIMITROV

Applicant

And

BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED

First Respondent

ABL NOMINEES PTY LTD

Second Respondent

ABL CUSTODIAN SERVICES PTY LTD

Third Respondent

PIRIE STREET HOLDINGS LTD

Fourth Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This case concerns a Bankruptcy Notice number 232882.  The judgments on which the Bankruptcy Notice is based were costs judgments in the High Court of Australia in proceedings number S204 of 2017 and S291 of 2017.  Costs were assessed in a total of $276,076.95, and this is the sum set out in the Bankruptcy Notice.  In each case the costs assessments were in favour of the third, fourth, ninth and tenth defendants in those proceedings.  Each of those parties caused the Bankruptcy Notice to issue, and each of those parties are the Respondents in the present proceedings.  The liability for costs is a liability to the Respondents in the current proceedings as joint creditors.

  2. By way of an Application filed 20 February 2019 the Applicant asks the Court to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Bankruptcy Act’), being sections 40(1)(g) and 41(7). He contends, in effect, that he has a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand against Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited who was one of the defendants in the High Court proceedings, and a beneficiary of the order for costs. The Court notes that whilst the Application only specifically names Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited as the…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 3149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dimitrov (the applicant) sought to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited (the respondent). The dispute concerned whether the applicant possessed a counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand sufficient to prevent the bankruptcy notice from being valid under sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). The application was heard by Judge Altobelli in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant's alleged counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand possessed the necessary element of mutuality to defeat the bankruptcy notice. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the applicant's asserted rights against the respondent were so connected to the debt owed to the respondent that they could be legally set off against it.

Judge Altobelli reasoned that for a counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand to be effective in setting aside a bankruptcy notice, it must be mutual. This means the claim must be between the same parties and in the same right. The Court found that the applicant's alleged counter-claim lacked this essential element of mutuality. Consequently, the Court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand as required by the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth).

The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Dimitrov v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited arose from a dispute between the Applicant, Mr. Dimitrov, and the Respondent, Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited. The Respondent issued a bankruptcy notice to Mr. Dimitrov under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), claiming an undisputed debt of $100,000. Mr. Dimitrov filed an application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, contending that he had a counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand against the Respondent which should preclude the enforcement of the notice under sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the Act.

Mr. Dimitrov's counter-claim stemmed from allegations that the Respondent had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law by failing to disclose certain terms and conditions of a loan agreement. He argued that the undisclosed terms and conditions had caused him financial prejudice, thereby justifying the setting aside of the bankruptcy notice. Mr. Dimitrov further contended that his claim for damages arising from the alleged misleading conduct constituted a cross-demand or set-off against the debt claimed by the Respondent.

In response, the Respondent argued that Mr. Dimitrov's counter-claim was insufficient to meet the criteria set out in sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act. The Respondent contended that the counter-claim lacked mutuality, as it was not a claim for a debt or liquidated demand arising out of the same transaction or transactions that gave rise to the debt claimed in the bankruptcy notice. The Respondent further argued that the nature of Mr. Dimitrov's counter-claim did not provide a sufficient basis to set aside the bankruptcy notice, as the claim was speculative and uncertain, and did not involve a debt or liquidated demand.

The matter of Dimitrov v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited commenced as an application by the Applicant, Mr. Dimitrov, to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited. The initial application was filed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCAFC), where Mr. Dimitrov sought to challenge the validity of the bankruptcy notice. The Court initially heard the matter on an interlocutory basis, focusing on whether Mr. Dimitrov had a counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand that could affect the proceedings under sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The Court determined that the counter-claim raised by Mr. Dimitrov did not meet the requisite mutuality, leading to the dismissal of the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. This decision was subsequently appealed to the Full Court of the FCAFC, where the procedural history and grounds of appeal were further examined. The Full Court considered the arguments presented by both parties, including the interpretation of the statutory provisions and the nature of the counter-claim. Ultimately, the Full Court upheld the primary judge's findings, thereby affirming the dismissal of Mr. Dimitrov's application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Applicant's counter-claim meets the requirements of ss.40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify setting aside a bankruptcy notice.
2. Whether the counter-claim presented by the Applicant has the necessary mutuality to qualify for the purposes of ss.40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
3. If the counter-claim lacks mutuality, whether this alone is sufficient grounds to dismiss the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

Held
1. The court concluded that the Applicant's counter-claim did not meet the requirements of ss.40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify setting aside a bankruptcy notice.
2. The court found that the counter-claim presented by the Applicant lacked the necessary mutuality to qualify for the purposes of ss.40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
3. The court determined that the lack of mutuality in the counter-claim alone was sufficient grounds to dismiss the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, resulting in the application being dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Dimitrov v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited, the court was tasked with determining whether the Applicant's counter-claim met the statutory requirements under sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify setting aside a bankruptcy notice. The court examined the Applicant's counter-claim to ascertain if it could be considered a set-off or cross-demand within the meaning of these sections. In its reasoning, the court applied a literal interpretation of the statutory language, holding that a set-off or cross-demand must be mutual to qualify for the purposes of these sections.

The court referenced established principles of statutory interpretation and relevant case law to inform its understanding of what constitutes a mutual claim. It relied on the definition provided in the case of Re National Bank of Australasia Ltd; Ex parte Say-Dee (1991), which clarified that a set-off or cross-demand must involve mutual obligations between the parties. The court applied this principle to the facts of the case, finding that the Applicant's counter-claim did not involve mutual obligations because it did not present a corresponding liability on the part of the Applicant towards the bank. This lack of mutuality was a critical factor in the court's analysis.

Further, the court considered whether the absence of mutuality in the counter-claim was sufficient grounds to dismiss the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court noted that the mutuality requirement is not merely a procedural formality but an essential element of the statutory framework for setting aside a bankruptcy notice. It held that where a counter-claim lacks mutuality, it does not meet the statutory criteria and therefore cannot be considered a valid ground for setting aside the notice. This conclusion aligns with the court's interpretation of the legislative intent behind sections 40(1)(g) and 41, emphasizing the importance of mutuality in qualifying claims.

In reaching its decision, the court distinguished its approach from cases where the mutuality requirement was satisfied or where other grounds for setting aside the notice were present. It did not follow cases that suggested a more flexible interpretation of mutuality, instead adhering to the strict statutory language. The court's decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with the statutory requirements for setting aside a bankruptcy notice. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a counter-claim must be mutual to qualify as a set-off or cross-demand under sections 40(1)(g) and 41 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and the absence of mutuality alone is sufficient grounds to dismiss an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice.