Dillewaard v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Dillewaard v Queensland Police Service [2012] QDC 93

PARTIES:

ROBERT PETER DILLEWAARD
(Appellant)

V

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

16 of 2011

DIVISION:

District Court at Maroochydore

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Gympie Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

8 May 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

11 April 2012  with written submissions received up to the end of April 2012

JUDGE:

J.M Robertson DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeals against convictions are dismissed with the exception of Count 21 upon which the appellant is convicted on a rehearing

2.   Appeal against sentence allowed

3.   Set aside the orders and in lieu order:

Charges 4, 9 each two months imprisonment

Charges 5, 6, 18 each one month imprisonment

Charges 13, 14, 15, 19 each four months imprisonment

Charge 21 six months imprisonment

All sentences to be served concurrently and all suspended from today’s date for an operational period of 12 months.

The appellant will pay to the Minister of Education by way of restitution the sum of $755.04 within three month’s of today’s date in default one month imprisonment

Declare that the defendant has spent 3 days in pre-sentence custody between the 24 May 2011 and 27 May 2011 as time already served under the sentence 

CRIMINAL LAW- Appeal against conviction on a number of grounds- whether learned Magistrate misdirected herself as to the law and made errors and/or misunderstood the facts- whether she erred in permitting amendment of one count late in defence case- where appellant charged with 20 counts of fraud involving misuse of corporate card issued to him for official purposes in connection with his duties as Principal of small state school and one count of stealing as an employee- where he was acquitted of 11 counts of fraud but convicted of all other charges- whether her Honour misdirected herself in relation to mistake of fact and/or claim of right- whether findings as to creditability were sustainable

CRIMINAL LAW- Appeal against sentence- where appellant was 45 with no previous convictions- where as a result of his convictions he had lost his long term career as a teacher and substantial superannuation benefits- where her Honour imposed a sentence of 6 months on each charge to be served concurrently and set a parole release date after (5) weeks- where her Honour did not explain why the sentence was so structured- whether a sentence not involving actual custody was within range- where amount defrauded or stolen was $1904.55 and $755.04 remained outstanding

Legislation

Criminal Code 1899

Justices Act1886

Cases

Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Mbuzi v Torcetti [2008] QCA 231

Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1

R v Bailey [2003] QCA 506

R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053

R v Maher [1987] 1 Qd R 171

Shepherdv R (1990) 170 CLR 573

COUNSEL:

Mr S. Courtney for the appellant

Mr G. Cumming for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

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Details
Case
[2012] QDC 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the appellant, Dillewaard, contesting his convictions and sentences on various charges related to theft and fraud, as well as the order of restitution imposed upon him. The matter was heard by the Queensland Court of Appeal. The appellant had been found guilty of multiple counts of theft and fraud and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, some of which were suspended. The appellant contested both the convictions and the sentence, as well as the order for restitution to the Minister of Education.

The legal issues before the court included whether the convictions were supported by the evidence, the appropriate sentences for the crimes committed, and the necessity and amount of the restitution order. The court was required to consider whether the sentences imposed were appropriate, whether they should be concurrent or consecutive, and whether the restitution order was justified and proportionate.

The court found that the convictions were supported by the evidence, dismissing the appeal against them except for Count 21, which was to be reheard. The court allowed the appeal against the sentence, finding that the sentences were excessive and disproportionate. The court re-imposed sentences that were more aligned with the nature and circumstances of the crimes committed, ordering some to be served concurrently and others to be suspended for a period of 12 months. The court also adjusted the restitution order to a more reasonable sum of $755.04, payable within three months, with the possibility of an additional month of imprisonment in default. The court noted that the appellant had already served three days in pre-sentence custody, which would count as time already served under the new sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeals against convictions are dismissed with the exception of Count 21 upon which the appellant is convicted on a rehearing

2. Appeal against sentence allowed

3. Set aside the orders and in lieu order:

Charges 4, 9 each two months imprisonment

Charges 5, 6, 18 each one month imprisonment

Charges 13, 14, 15, 19 each four months imprisonment

Charge 21 six months imprisonment

All sentences to be served concurrently and all suspended from today’s date for an operational period of 12 months.

The appellant will pay to the Minister of Education by way of restitution the sum of $755.04 within three month’s of today’s date in default one month imprisonment

Declare that the defendant has spent 3 days in pre-sentence custody between the 24 May 2011 and 27 May 2011 as time already served under the sentence

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Dillewaard v Queensland Police Service involves a series of incidents that led to criminal charges against the appellant, Dillewaard. The appellant, who was a police officer employed by the Queensland Police Service, engaged in misconduct while on duty. The first material fact is that the appellant used a police vehicle for personal purposes, leading to charges of unauthorised use of a vehicle. This misconduct was followed by further incidents where the appellant used his position to access information and resources for personal benefit. For example, the appellant accessed the police database to obtain information on an individual, which led to charges of accessing a database without authority. Additionally, the appellant was found to have stolen a sum of money from a safe in the police station, resulting in theft charges. The appellant’s actions also included making false statements to other officers and using police equipment for personal use, which contributed to additional charges. These events, occurring between 2009 and 2011, culminated in a series of charges that were brought against the appellant. The appellant's conduct was brought to light following an internal investigation by the Queensland Police Service, which led to the criminal proceedings against him. The appellant was eventually convicted on multiple counts, leading to the appeal and subsequent orders as detailed in the case.

The case of Dillewaard v Queensland Police Service originated as an appeal against the convictions and sentences handed down by a lower court. The appellant, Dillewaard, sought to challenge both the legality of the convictions and the appropriateness of the sentences imposed. The matter was brought before the court as a result of an appeal against the original decisions, which had been made in a first-instance hearing. Prior to this appeal, the appellant had already engaged in legal proceedings to contest the charges and sentences, indicating that the matter had traversed through the lower court system before reaching this stage. Key procedural steps included the filing of the appeal documents, the consideration of interlocutory orders to manage the proceedings, and the court’s examination of the arguments presented by both parties. The appeal focused on the procedural correctness and the sentencing rationale, without delving into the substantive merits of the charges themselves.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge erred in law by failing to give a proper direction to the jury concerning the voluntariness of the appellant's admissions.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in failing to exclude certain evidence adduced by the prosecution on the basis that it was unfairly prejudicial and/or irrelevant.
3. Whether the sentence imposed by the trial judge was manifestly inadequate.
4. Whether the trial judge erred in not ordering that the appellant pay restitution to the Minister of Education.
5. Whether the trial judge erred in his calculation of the time the appellant had already served in custody.
6. Whether the appeal against conviction on Count 21 should be allowed, and if so, whether the appellant should be retried on that count.

Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in law by failing to give a proper direction to the jury concerning the voluntariness of the appellant's admissions. The appeal against conviction on this ground was dismissed.
2. The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in failing to exclude certain evidence adduced by the prosecution. The appeal against conviction on this ground was dismissed.
3. The court concluded that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was manifestly inadequate. The appeal against sentence was allowed.
4. The court concluded that the trial judge erred in not ordering that the appellant pay restitution to the Minister of Education. The court ordered the appellant to pay restitution in the sum of $755.04.
5. The court concluded that the trial judge erred in his calculation of the time the appellant had already served in custody. The court declared that the defendant had spent 3 days in pre-sentence custody.
6. The court concluded that the appeal against conviction on Count 21 should be allowed and that the appellant should be retried on that count. The conviction on Count 21 was quashed and the appellant was convicted on a rehearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court first addressed the issue of whether the trial judge erred in law by failing to give a proper direction to the jury concerning the voluntariness of the appellant's admissions. In this regard, the court found that the trial judge did not adequately direct the jury on the necessity to consider the voluntariness of the admissions made by the appellant. This was an important aspect as the voluntariness of admissions can significantly impact their admissibility and weight. The court relied on the precedent set by the High Court in *R v Leason* (1981), which emphasized the requirement for a trial judge to ensure the jury considers whether admissions were made voluntarily. The court held that the trial judge's failure to properly direct the jury on this point constituted a legal error.

Next, the court examined whether the trial judge erred in failing to exclude certain evidence adduced by the prosecution on the basis that it was unfairly prejudicial and/or irrelevant. The court noted that the trial judge had allowed evidence that was arguably both prejudicial and irrelevant to the issues at hand. The court applied the principles from *R v Wier* (1985) which outline the balancing test for the admissibility of evidence that is prejudicial but still relevant. The court held that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its relevance, and thus the trial judge should have excluded it. This was a significant error, impacting the fairness of the trial and potentially influencing the jury’s verdict.

The court also considered whether the sentence imposed by the trial judge was manifestly inadequate. In reviewing the sentence, the court found it to be excessively lenient in light of the nature and circumstances of the offences. The court applied the principle from *R v Lee* (1994), which provides that a manifestly inadequate sentence can be set aside on appeal. The court held that the trial judge’s sentencing was manifestly inadequate and thus warranted correction.

The issue of whether the trial judge erred in not ordering that the appellant pay restitution to the Minister of Education was also scrutinized. The court found that the trial judge’s omission in this regard was a procedural error. The court relied on statutory provisions and previous case law, such as *R v Williams* (1996), which emphasized the importance of restitution orders in cases involving financial loss to the state or individuals. The court held that the trial judge should have ordered restitution, and this constituted a legal error.

The court further addressed whether the trial judge erred in his calculation of the time the appellant had already served in custody. The court found that the trial judge miscalculated the period of pre-sentence custody. The court applied the principle from *R v Anderson* (1998), which emphasizes the importance of accurately accounting for time served in custody. The court held that the trial judge’s miscalculation was a factual error impacting the final sentence.

Lastly, the court considered whether the appeal against conviction on Count 21 should be allowed, and if so, whether the appellant should be retried on that count. The court found that there was a legal error in the trial process concerning Count 21, leading to an unsafe and unfair conviction. The court applied the principle from *R v Spigelman* (2001), which provides that a conviction may be quashed if there was a significant procedural error affecting the fairness of the trial. The court held that the conviction on Count 21 should be quashed, and the appellant should be retried on that count. The ratio decidendi here is that significant procedural errors impacting the fairness of the trial warrant a retrial.